The SANDF after 30 years

Walking the tightrope between external and internal operations on a shoestring budget

Abstract

Since 1994 the South African government’s commitment to peace and security in Africa inexorably drew the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) into extensive involvement in multinational peacekeeping operations. These external operations clearly
aligned the South African government with its articulated objectives concerning the pursuit of peace on the African continent and its (moral) intention and responsibility to act in a leading role on the continent. However, a dwindling defence budget and the burden of a high-tech force design increasingly impacted negatively on the SANDF to maintain and develop a sustainable capability geared for regional external operations. Yet, in the domestic context the government also increasingly expected the SANDF to render support to the SAPS as murder and death rates are comparable and, in some instances, even higher than death rates in high-intensity war zones in the international community. This simply means that the SANDF has the almost impossible task of balancing its demanding regional deployments with ongoing appeals by politicians and elements of the public for the SANDF to be of assistance in hotspots of high levels of criminality where the SAPS is unable to protect South Africans in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution. In the final analysis, the article concludes that there is a mismatch between what has been expected of the SANDF in the past three decades from its political masters on the one side, and its budget and related capabilities on the other.