Strategic Review for Southern Africa

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Aims and Scope

The Strategic Review for Southern Africa is an accredited on-access journal listed in the IBSS index. It has since 1978 been a platform for strategic and political analyses of themes and socio-political developments that impact on or provide lessons for Southern Africa. As a multi-disciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary journal, the Strategic Review facilitates vigorous and enlightened debate among scholars, policy makers, practitioners, students and activists in order to contribute to the wider global discourse on changing strategic and political dynamics within and beyond nation states.

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Contents

Essays

Review article

Book Review

Editorial

Resilience, Solidarity and Agency

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The Covid period has made issues of solidarity and isolation particularly important in society today. Adversity tends to cause society to drift towards despair, the survival of the fittest and development that leave many behind. We have seen enough of this with many crises that African societies have confronted including violence, crime, governance crises, terrorism and health calamities. Yet, these crises have already generated interest in ways of building resilience through solidarity and cooperation.

The papers in this collection in different ways stimulate ways of thinking about human solidarity and cooperation both in responses to threats to living well as well as to opportunity for fashioning better futures. Bidandi describes how these solidarity networks come from familial systems around which society is organised, pointing out some of the threats to this age-old social fabric. Molapo analyses how African religious thinking in families and communities has affected how people understand and respond to the Covid-19 crisis today, suggesting this is turn to relationality in face of the alienation crises induce. Just how the police culture may be changing in ways that enable comprehensive crime responses are the subject of Maweni's paper. The paper by Sadiki and Steyn analyses the plight of the homeless people in Tshwane in the face of growing criminality and how the victims might understand their conditions in society. Sooliman reflects critically on the idea of the transformation of the university, focusing on how they could be transformed into spaces of co-existence and continuity of life rather than violence and death.

Rapanyane's paper focuses on the problem of terrorism in Nigeria and how funds are mobilised in support of terror. It discusses this to offer suggestions on how to minimise terror mobilisation. Makone suggests the concept of a hybrid

regime as useful to guide our understanding of the long-standing governance crisis in Zimbabwe. Phaahla describes the significance of the Communist Party of China as a crucial political institution behind the rise of China and distils lessons for political parties. Ndzendze uses trade data to argue that the relationship between South Africa under Thabo Mbeki and Vladimir Putin's Russia was much more significant in relation to economic cooperation than it is realised. Pillay grapples with whether China has exported to South Africa the propaganda model of manufacturing consent in society and whether this explains limited criticism of China's conduct in the South African media.

All these discussions point to the significance of developments that become apparent at the confluence of resilience, solidarity and agency. They demonstrate individually which of these three are significant. They may lead to a greater understanding of how resilience is affected by violence, terror, governance crisis, crime patterns, the institutional cultures in law-enforcement agencies, economic cooperation, and failures in education. These also affect agency and solidarity patterns in Africa.

RESEARCH ARTICLES

The Responsibility of Government and Society Towards Social Cohesion: A Family Perspective

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Abstract

Social cohesion, the foundation that keeps society together, is influenced by various inter-related factors such as education social, cultural, religious, and business, among others. Current debates indicates that unless social cohesion in its various dimensions is addressed, be it through reconciliation, tackling inequality, crafting a national identity, or bridging rural-urban divides, the implementation of any Southern African Development Plan will be challenging. In this paper, social cohesion is viewed as an intervention for coexistence; as an invitation to find common ground and allowing the sharing of social spaces; and to forge a common identity whilst recognising societal diversity. This paper postulates that although social cohesion is intended to contribute towards nation-building and national unity, government policies are fundamental to the advancement thereof. The paper defines, unpacks, and identifies the challenges

of social cohesion using South Africa as a case study. The paper argues that the family is instrumental in building social cohesion. Government through its policies processes has an important role to play in strengthen the family. The lessons learnt could contribute to the role of family towards social cohesion on the African continent.

Keywords: Family; responsibility of government; public policy; social cohesion; responsibility of society; South Africa

1. Introduction

The African continent has a well-known history of colonialism, oppression, human rights abuse, poverty, unemployment and socio-economic inequality. South Africa likewise displayed similar characteristics. In 1994 the country held its first democratic election. The election did not change the dysfunctional and segregated societal fault lines of inequality, racism poverty and unemployment. To the contrary it seems that inequality and racial segregation increased post 1994 first democratically elected government. Social cohesion was identified as a national key priority to address the social inequalities and advance national building. A number of policy and strategic documents were promulgated to advance social cohesion. The Presidency's Macro Social Report (The Presidency 2012), *A Nation in the Making: Macro Social Trends in South Africa* (2012), which made a significant contribution to introducing the concept of social cohesion into policy discourse. This was followed by the Presidency's *Fifteen Year Review* (Rustomjee and Hanival 2008), the National Planning Commission's (NPC) *Diagnostic Overview* (2011b), the *National Development Plan – Vision for 2030* (2011a), and the Presidency's *Twenty Year Review* (2014). Furthermore, the most comprehensive and focused strategy on social cohesion emerged from the South African Department of Arts and Culture (SADAC) national summit on Building a Caring Nation which was held on 4-5 July 2012 at Walter Sisulu Square, Kliptown, Soweto (SADAC 2012). This strategy entitled, 'A National Strategy for Developing an Inclusive and a Cohesive South African Society' has become the authoritative government document that provides broad national guidelines on how to pursue social cohesion in South Africa.

Quite explicit, the National Strategy bequeath all spheres of government with

the responsibility to drive social cohesion (SADAC 2012). Equally, it envisages that civil society organisations, which include "trade unions, communities and citizens [participate] to build a just, prosperous, inclusive and cohesive society" (SADAC 2012:15). However, there is a lack of clarity regarding the nature of the responsibilities of both the government and society towards building social cohesion. In addition, the available literature on the subject does not adequately highlight the required nature of the relationship between government and society in order to harness their efforts in building social cohesion. To achieve this aim, this paper evaluates the family as an important unit and the building block of a well-functioning community and nation. Evidence indicates that many families across the continent and in particular South Africa are dysfunctional (Koonce 2011; Burns, Hull, Lefko-Everret and Njozele 2018). In the main it is attributed to the adverse socio-economic conditions and related societal ills such as substance abuse, unemployment, inequality and poverty. Importantly, family is a key building block of community and by extension social cohesion. Family is part of a network of families which forms communities and societies. A dysfunctional family therefore has a negative influence on the family network. It is therefore important that a renewed focus be placed on the role of the family and its contribution to social cohesion.

This paper used secondary data from sources such as books, the Internet, peer-reviewed journals, and newspapers to carry out the research (Koziol and Arthur 2011). Secondary data according to Johnston (2017) contributes to knowledge development considering important questions without some of the limitations of the original investigations. Furthermore, it is also an empirical exercise and a systematic method with procedural and evaluative steps, just as in collecting and evaluating primary data. According to Vartanian (2010), secondary data generates new hypotheses in which a researcher finds answers to questions that are different from the original work.

The rationale of using secondary data in this study was to delineate factors associated with the responsibility of government and society towards social cohesion in relation to family in South Africa, as well as to generate specific testable assumptions for future research. Using secondary data provided a broader understanding of the concept of 'social cohesion' in relation to family, and the responsibility of government and society in South Africa.

2. The Concept of Social Cohesion

Globally, social cohesion had been debated by academics and policy-makers since the late 19th century. Over the years, interest on the topic has been on major socio-economic and political change in the 1940s and 1970s (Jenson 2010 Snower 1997). The most recent wave of interest by policy-makers can be traced to the mid-1990s in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries such as Canada, Germany, Australia, and New Zealand. To place this term in context, the social cohesion concept has been used in policy to indicate certain public policy actions and to explain the social, political, and sometimes, economic changes a country may be experiencing (Hulse and Stone 2007; Jenson 1998; OECD 2001; Burns et al. 2018). The difference between these practices is often unclear. While the tendency of policy-makers is to employ the term as a policy concept, Hulse and Stone (2007) argue that they sometimes draw on academic literature which in itself is not explicit.

Social cohesion is a broad concept that encompasses a variety of factors ranging from community development, nation-building, diversity, globalisation, technology, economic performance, societal well-being, and legitimacy of democratic institutions. Furthermore, it is about belonging, employment opportunities, poverty reduction, building inclusive societies, peaceful co-existence, equality in urban or rural communities, socio-economic rights, freedoms, and citizenship, among others.

It has been argued that although social cohesion may not be clearly understood, it has the ability to cushion people from economic uncertainties and failures that may impede the provision of education, health, employment, and social grants that play a significant role in promoting prosperity (Snower 1997). However, according to Friedman (2019), social cohesion appears to be an avenue through which the elite dominate citizens by coercing them to suppress their differences while at the same time blaming them for community failures. This narrative points to contestations which seem to be based on the premise that some scholars have provided, for example, the rejection of the concept based on the understanding that the principles according to which social life and community are organised are problematic, especially the prevalence of marginalisation, poverty, and inequality (Beauvais and Jenson 2002; Stanley 2003; Williams 2006).

Scholars, such as Beauvais and Jenson (2002), Friedkin (2004), and Kazepov (2005), view the concept as a multidimensional phenomenon, or as a latent construct with multiple indicators, which does not address the problems of the nation in the way it has been defined. In this light, its effectiveness is questioned by those who believe that the concept does not in practice address the well-being of many, particularly regarding issues around racial inequality, social inequality, poverty, unemployment, housing conditions, false promises by governments, limited family support, skewed employment practices, limited participation in economic development, and negative mass perceptions, all of which have policy implications (Rhodes 1997; Echeverría, Diez-Roux, Shea, Borrell, and Jackson 2008; Heyneman 2011).

Nonetheless, in situations where a country struggles to provide employment opportunities to generate income, social cohesion alone may not hold the country for long (Beauvais and Jonson 2002; Stanley 2003; Burns et al. 2018). Despite these challenges, social cohesion seems to contribute to a wide variety of social outcomes, such as economic prosperity, job opportunities, creation of economic and social ties that have the potential to build enticements to work across boundaries and resolve societal challenges, be it health, education, poverty, or unemployment, for example. However, this can only be achieved with the aid of good policy practices. Fundamentally, even if the concept would seem to refer to social interactions and the ways in which societies manage collective decision-making with others in order to provide access to voices that can realise a sense of belonging, there is the need to consider the family as the key to achieve positive policy outcomes for the country as a whole.

3. Unpacking Social Cohesion Policy and the Role of the Family

The draft policy on *Social Cohesion and Nation Building* drafted by the SADAC to a large extent reflects the uniqueness of the South African concept of social cohesion (Palmary 2015). In this context, social cohesion is seen as a project of nation-building, whereas globally the concept is more localised. South Africa's project of social cohesion as a strategy towards nation-building, as argued by Palmary (2015: 64), "Is seen as precisely a response to, and remedy for, the effects of a racist and otherwise exclusionary past". In its pursuit to transcend the ills of racial, ethnic, and other social constructs that have an adverse effect on the socio-

political and economic landscape, the government has promoted social cohesion through a unified South African identity amidst diversity. There is an important element to social cohesion which is seldom highlighted in the draft policy of the DAC and the rhetoric of drivers for social cohesion in South Africa – the family.

According to Moissiard, Cokus, Cary, Feng, Billi, Stroud and Hale (2012:18), "Social scientists generally use the term family to refer to a group of closely related kin, not necessarily living together". These authors use the term 'household' to refer to a group of people, not necessarily kin, who live together (Moissiard et al. 2012). The family is the bedrock of society and the foundation of every nation/state. On this premise, the stability and well-being of families dictate the socio-political and economic standings of a community and the state at large (Moissiard et al. 2012). Families forms a network that influence and shape society norms and values. With emphasis on the socially created nature of society, it is obvious that government policies can have potentially pivotal roles in changing behaviour in families, and thus drive social change (Moissiard et al. 2012). In this case, the South African Government has, to a large extent, brought positive changes in the well-being of families by providing social safety networks such as social grants, free education and health services.

Families have a role to play towards moral regeneration and social cohesion. Families are significant to society and government as it is believed to be the micro ecology in which social and material needs are met for the majority of people (Callan 2010; Hewitt 2012). To succinctly state, family is essential for social cohesion and socialisation for individual well-being. Additionally, the family is the base from which individuals work and contribute to society (Callan 2010; DSD 2011). To Callan (2010), a strong family may help build robust and successful society. Evidence justifies that families are seen as both the problem and solution to a range of social ills (DSD 2011; Burns et al. 2018). For example, children being raised in a dysfunctional family environment are at high risk of engaging in immoral activities during adolescence and later in life, while a supportive family acts as a protective factor against such outcomes. According to the Green Paper on Families (DSD 2011), government attempts to shape family life through education and other social benefits, but unfortunately weak family structures remain problematic. A correlation seems to exist between family and social cohesion. In this regard Mokomane, Roberts, Struwig and Gordon (2019) are of view that weakness in family cohesion contributes to socio-economic

problems in a society and country at large. This seems to suggest that lack of cohesion is associated with the social-economic problems experienced in society and family.

While the government has the responsibility to provide social grants to the needy, it fails, for example, to recognise the role of families as a significant factor for social cohesion, particularly regarding issues such as education, poverty, and unemployment, among others. There is an old proverb that goes: 'Do not give me fish but teach me or show me how to fish' (Hewitt, 2012: 2). However, on the other hand, there is the tendency of many not wanting to learn or know how to fish because the few that have done so do not have or are denied access to fishing waters. Mokomane et al. (2019) aver that family has the responsibility to ensure their children attain education for themselves and family well-being. In other words, education opens employment opportunities which by itself contributes to the social economic development of the nation. This alludes to the importance of a holistic approach to education in regards to the family. Looking at the matrix of threats and challenges to social cohesion and nation-building as reported in *A National Strategy for Developing an Inclusive and Cohesive South African Society*, there is low primary performance and secondary education completion as a result of inequalities in learning conditions and teaching skills (Hewitt 2012). Social cohesion policy has not actually engaged to address the issue of education through the family unit. It is obvious that when a family acquires and adopts certain cultures, values, and aspirations, almost every member of that family aligns themselves with that vision which is eventually perpetuated among younger generations.

As McKie and Cunningham-Burley (2005: 12) explain, "[I]n contemporary terms, our engagement with other individuals, groups and organisations is often framed by the exchange of information on living and family arrangements". Academic education (formal and informal) has been seen as the key to the upliftment of individuals and society, but on the basis of social cohesion, it is tempting to ask if it actually meets the objectives of social cohesion policy. The policy does very little to place the family as the core or first port of call for a bottom-top approach towards social cohesion. If the concept of social cohesion is to yield results, then the family as a unit has to understand and appreciate its tenets. According to Burns et al. (2018), the provision of social welfare should not detract individuals from meeting their commitments to family and society

(Roman and Miller 2014). This speaks to the idea that although it is essential for the government to provide social services to sustain families and societies, it should not lose track of the fact that it is the responsibility of individuals to provide for their families and society, complemented by the government.

For this to be achievable, the state through its policy processes must invest in programmes that foster good moral, ethical, and socio-cultural practices. In South Africa, there is an intolerance to diversity and the prevalence of social ills such as drug abuse, rape, femicide, and xenophobia which negate the building of strong families, and ultimately, social cohesion (Mokomane et al. 2019). There is visibility of broken families as people constantly struggle for daily survival. This inevitably leads to a neglect of caring and nurturing the young and vulnerable. A major threat to social cohesion is racial profiling. Where people live, and where they come from, has led to the stigmatisation of certain groups of people. Even when people have attained economic and educational success, they still find rejection from certain communities (Mokomane et al. 2019). There is a need for ethical and moral values to be instilled in people, and this can be done mostly at the level of the family. An engagement of the challenges and dynamics of social cohesion is key to achieving this goal.

4. Challenges and Dynamics of Social Cohesion

The concept of social cohesion is habitually used by governments (policy-makers) in both South Africa and elsewhere on the continent when referring to socio-economic and political uncertainties in society, but fails to account for the role of the family as key to addressing the former. However, literature suggests that the concept is used to describe a process more than a condition (Snower 1997; Jenson 2010; Beall, Crankshaw and Parnell 2014). For example, after 1994, the African National Congress (ANC) promised a better life for all, but 26years later, the triple challenges of poverty, inequality, and unemployment still have dire consequence for families. In fact, the World Bank in 2015 pronounced South Africa as one of the most unequal societies in the world (Statistics South Africa 2019).

While the social cohesion concept is perceived as a sense of commitment and a desire to live together in harmony, social-economic benefits that flow in society and glue society together appear to be exclusive and benefit only a few (Beall et

al. 2014). Furthermore, the Government of South Africa has become less able to protect society and families, in particular, from economic uncertainties and its impact on unemployment and poverty. Against this background, two parallel worlds seem to exist in South Africa:

[One] being white, relatively wealthy regardless of gender has access to education and other benefits" while the other society being black lives under conditions of underdevelopment with limited opportunities to education and high levels of poverty and unemployment (Bojabotseha 2011: 3).

This seems to point to government's inability to address the needs of society in an equitable manner (Herr and Kazandziska 2011; Roman and Miller 2014). As a result, the majority of the people, especially black people, are still living in abject poverty with high unemployment, with many families struggling to afford even a basic meal (Armstrong, Lekezwa and Siebrits, 2008; Van der Berg 2011). To bridge the gap, an alternative trajectory should focus on empowering the family to become financially self-sustainable and able to participate in the economy.

The concept of social cohesion has been misunderstood as a *means* rather than as a *process* to the improvement of life. The early social cohesion policy pursued by Nelson Mandela's notion of a 'rainbow nation' meant that constitutionally South Africa belongs to all who live in it, meaning that nothing unites South Africans more than the Constitution (Bound and Johnson 1995; Republic of South Africa (RSA) 1996; Johnson 1997; Borjas 2002). However, the policy seems to impress that all groups have the freedom to access education, health, employment, and other social-economic rights. At this juncture, many in society feel that the government failed its constitutional mandate, as many South Africans remain in the poverty and unemployment trap. According to Findley and Ogbu (2011), the unemployment rate among black people is nearly 29 percent. These negative socio-economic conditions that many black South African families find themselves in is a hindrance to social cohesion.

Current narratives conflate social cohesion and Ubuntu(universal bond of sharing that connects society). Perhaps the nationalist philosophy of Ubuntu could deliver freedom and opportunities that address the values and employment among other issues from a multiracial and multicultural setting (Marx 2002). Hewitt (2012) indicates that the Ubuntu concept provides characteristics that reinforce democracy in South Africa and presents strategies for nation-building. Moreover, this was achieved through policy initiatives, such as the

Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP), and Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), which in themselves intimate inclusiveness. With its emphasis on societal values, it promotes an attitude of conformity. However, the controversies around Ubuntu is that it is more of a rhetoric than a practical reality: "I am because we are". Yet, policy has neglected that social cohesion is about society, and more so families (Swanson 2007; Letseka 2012).

Nonetheless, the majority of South Africans who live in abject poverty continue to struggle, yet the government seems to have limited capacity to influence the much needed social-economic inclusion of this group. For example, the Black Economic Empowerment (BEE); the Growth, Employment, and Redistribution (GEAR); Affirmative Action(AA); and Employment Equity(EE) were envisaged to achieve social-economic development to ensure social equity and to uplift the majority, but instead, it only benefits a few (Letseka 2012). This basically means that the government has failed to transform society simply because the policies benefited a minority, especially those in leadership, leaving the majority to experience inequality and social exclusion (Mbeki 2006; Chibba and Luiz 2011). Moreover, the distribution of wealth remains problematic and appears to erode the very essence of social cohesion. Additionally, the consecration of economic resources puts power in the narrow sector of the economy, and the concentration of wealth is tied to the concentration of power.

Social cohesion, being a base that holds society together, seems to present a paradigm shift in economic and social policy towards neoliberalism, which, in essence, provokes serious strains on rising poverty, crime, declining rural/urban economic development, and a loss of confidence in public institutions (Jenson 2010). Studies show that the microeconomic policies the South Africa Government adopted after 1994 exacerbated inequality. Thus, many proffer that different approaches must be designed since the current policy regime is not working for the majority of South Africans (Alexander 2007; Ponte, Roberts and Van Sittert 2007; Chibba and Luiz 2011). Other scholars contend that a need exists for economic approaches that accompany a certain microeconomic policy that fights poverty is required. For example, family-oriented anti-poverty policies in terms of income are required to satisfy those societal needs.

The lack of trust in public institutions affects the use or attainment of social cohesion. Satisfying the needs of society would require trust in public institutions. Friedman (2019) postulates that the loss of trust in public institutions has been

attributed to the rising levels of corruption. For example, the gap to reduce poverty in South Africa through social grants has been marred by serious corruption allegations (Gray 2006; Reddy and Sokomani 2008; Butler 2017).

In view of the above, other studies indicate that though South Africa has engaged in reassessing the responsibilities of institutional complexes as well as the public, private, and other sectors of the state as the country seems to be undergoing an economic contraction which, by and large, is seen as one of the contributing factors to unemployment which currently stands at 27% (Peck 2001; Stanley 2003; Geddes 2005; Makaringe and Khobai 2018). Whereas the post-1994 South African Government preaches the commitment to engage with all sectors of society through basic service delivery, on the contrary, the neoliberal policies of the Washington Consensus point to privatisation, the commodification of services, and minimal reduction on state involvement have increasingly given credence to the private sector. Interestingly, the private supplier of services is more into profit than the citizen's needs. This understanding provokes an extensive discussion among those who fear the social and economic costs of ignoring social cohesion (Ataguba and Alaba 2012).

While social cohesion policy envisages bridging the gap in terms of national development, diversity, societal well-being, belonging, trust, employment opportunities, poverty reduction, building inclusive societies, and social-economic rights, among others, for example, point to social-economic inequality in South Africa. Friedman (2019) postulates that the concept has no popularity, and it is about trusting government, even if it could do wrong. Further, he argues, for example, that social cohesion is not an answer to the high crime rate or substance abuse in the country, but rather, it is about dominance, which, in essence, fails to create opportunities and address the challenges of inequality.

In light of the above, studies seem to indicate that skewed employment opportunities are still experienced, and therefore, the country remains unequal with limited opportunities for many South Africans (Findley and Ogbu 2011; Letseka 2012; Beall, et al. 2014; Crankshaw and Parnell 2014). In more tangible terms, the country at large would benefit most from social cohesion if it were to realise the purpose of family in terms of facilitating equitable distribution of services and inclusive policy agendas.

5. Responsibility of Government and Society

Governments ought to provide for the well-being of their people and, as such, provide leadership, maintain order, and provide public services, national security, economic security, social security, and economic assistance. The concept of 'government as a provider' is largely about the provision of goods and services to those who cannot provide for themselves in society (Dexter 2003; Njozela, Shaw and Burns 2017; Makaringe and Khobai 2018). The government, in this understanding, is assumed to be a solution to collective action problems and the means through which society creates public goods that benefit everyone, but they are also subject to recourse problems without collective obligation. In other words, government is built on the idea of protecting and providing. For example, the protection of society from violence and the provision of public goods (knowledge, health care) at a level necessary to ensure a competitive economy and a well-functioning society (Koonce 2011; Kosmatopoulos 2011; Ataguba and Alaba 2012; Beall et al. 2014). Nonetheless, government has the responsibility to invest in citizens, especially the family capabilities, to enable them to provide for themselves in the increasingly shifting socio-economic conditions.

To achieve the shifting socio-conditions, government has the responsibility to shape the circumstance in which society is structured (Koonce 2011). This can promote social cohesion through public services, especially when they are provided fairly without any form of discrimination or other social barrier. Such outcomes may potentially be achieved through the empowerment of society and family.

Whereas social cohesion is shaped by government, it is also important to ensure that society and the family in particular become responsible for empowering themselves through education and other avenues. Easterly, Ritzen and Woolcock (2006) recognise three ways in which education contributes to social cohesion, namely: (1) it may help to provide public knowledge about the very idea of social relations among individuals and between individuals and the state; (2) it may provide the context within which society learns the appropriate behaviour for upholding national and societal values of how to deal with problems and opportunities society might encounter; (3) it may help society to understand and appreciate the very idea of a social cohesion. Friedman (2019: 3) on the other hand that: social cohesion is used to dominate the poor in this and

other ways. Its popularity gives a green light to more attempts to bully people in townships and shack settlements into behaving as others want. Social cohesion insists that we must all be the same when we have a right to be different. It assumes that we should obey the elite when we should hold them to account. It insists that society is to blame for what is done to them. And so, it is a licence for a minority to dominate the majority, not a recipe for a better world and as such going against the notion of shared values.

This understanding indicates a lack of clarity regarding values, especially in relation to family and society at large. Friedman (2019) elucidates that values are created by people who wield power, and for this reason, it is important to note that social cohesion policy does not provide clear objectives on families, especially about the shared values. Friedman (2019: 1) poses the question, who decides when values should be shared? This seems to indicate that there is a confused accountability and limited understanding of social cohesion. The case in point is the NDP 2030, which appears to have been driven by government, as there is no clear indication whether or how people took part in the *2012 Strategic Plan*, *Macro Social Report*, *NDP 2011*, and *A National Strategic Plan* by the SADAC initiatives. In contrast, Friedman (2019) views social cohesion as a buzz slogan cheered by those who consider themselves responsible and yet fail to recognise society, especially family, in policy decisions. Easterly et al. (2006) states that society has to trust the government if we are to realise the long-term gains of social cohesion. Though these authors point to trust, they fail to account for the family as the foundation on which society and the state itself are constituted. We, therefore, argue that all the spheres of government in the work with society, especially family, are to determine or practically test social cohesion.

The literature shows that the material conditions, such as employment, income, equality, health, education, and housing have not received significant attention in post-1994 period, despite these being fundamental to social cohesion in the new South Africa (Mubangizi 2008). Moreover, relations within communities/families suffer when people lack jobs and endure hardship, debt, anxiety, low self-esteem, ill health, poor skills, and harsh living conditions, to mention a few (Ravanera 2000; Andereotti, Mingione and Polizzi 2012; Beall et al. 2014). In fact, these are elementary provisions of life, and important indicators of family cohesion and shared values in society.

Moreover, Smith (2018) indicates, for example, that the State of the Nation

Address (SONA) is supposed to not only reflect on the progress of government's delivery of programmes and services, but should also include social cohesion, particularly the notion of the family, since it is of critical importance for the well-being of the country. Smith (2018) underscores that the invisible state of the nation is about the social cohesion of our society and can be explained as a state of developing a country through a common sense of identity and belonging.

Based on the above analysis to scrutinise social cohesion policies since 2004, there is a need to review the existing policies to establish common problems related to societal values so that the state can induce political will that encourages civic participation, particularly the involvement of families in state activities. Perhaps more importantly, social cohesion needs advocacy in families, and by extension, our communities, to ensure that vulnerable people within these spaces have access to information about government services and opportunities. Local government is ideally placed to advance social cohesion because it is the third sphere closest to the people.

6. Policy Implications

The study hold policy implication for the continent generally. In the case of post-1994, South Africa emerged from a challenging and long history in which race, ethnicity, and culture were used as the basis to impose divisions, inequality, and classification of society that excluded the majority of the population from citizenship, and social-economic benefits (Dragolov, Ignacz, Lorenz, Delhey, Boehnke and Unzicker 2016; Njozela et al. 2017). Although the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has attempted to improve the situation through various institutional and legislative frameworks (NDP's vision 2030), the inherited socio-economic order has had far-reaching policy implications to this day (Njozela et al. 2017).

The legacy of apartheid still lingers and negatively impacts on the political, social, economic, and cultural life of many South Africans 26years on. This seems to permeate the social fabric constructed on a racially exclusive society in which only a minority enjoy the national cake. However, in this light, serious policy implications for social cohesion could be experienced since different policy trials to strike a balance seem not to have yielded positive results, possibly due to the fundamental political mandate of the long struggle for democracy which

still faces the realities of inequality, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, and landlessness, and others which remain complex for policy (DAC 2012; Statistics South Africa 2019).

Other areas with serious policy implications include uneven and inadequate local government service delivery in historically marginalised groups. Its continued manifestation has an enormous strain on the social fabric and the economy. Currently, crime is spiralling upward in marginalised communities. If left unaddressed, the escalation of these disorders presents a direct threat to social cohesion and the prospects of economic development.

The policy acknowledges that slow pace of economic growth and transformation impacts directly on the capacity of the state to expand economic participation and inclusion for all South Africans. This in itself is an indication of continued economic exclusion, unemployment, poverty, and inequality for those historically excluded from productive and gainful livelihoods (Williams 2006; Chipkin and Ngaqulunga 2008; DSD 2012).

Last, but certainly not the least, the country's wealth has not been essentially associated with adequate employment opportunities, more formal jobs, or better gender outcomes (Eizaguirre, Pradel, Terrones, Martinez-Celorrio and Garcia 2012; DSD 2012; Hunting 2015). The economic growth appears to have increased both the pace of urban migration, which in essence exacerbates the challenges that social cohesion faces in integrating people who migrate circularly, interprovincial, and even, internationally. This contributes to the demand for housing, land, and job opportunities, among many others, which compromises social cohesion.

7. Recommendations

The family is an important contributor to social cohesion and hold the key in building society.   The following recommendations are therefore made:

Government through its policy process must address the underlying structural issues such as unemployment, inequality, and poverty in order to advance social cohesion

Government policy formulation process generally must take into consideration the family perspective to understand its contribution to social cohesion.

Government should create civic education platforms with a view of addressing

social inclusion or integration of families into the mainstream institutions of civil society. This should also include people's sense of belonging to various spaces, be it urban or rural, to strengthen shared experiences, identities, and values between those from different backgrounds.

Citizenship advocacy is needed to address structural issues, such as poverty, unemployment, and inequality, among others.

The above recommendations are built on the premise that social cohesion needs a family focus in order to meet the specific needs of the community in South Africa. Fundamentally, families in South Africa should be tasked to evaluate their social cohesion efforts to ensure resources are allocated efficiently and effectively. By achieving this undertaking, there is a need for government to work with the community, especially families, to identify how to measure the appropriateness, identify opportunities, effectiveness, and efficiency of actions.

8. Conclusion

This paper analysed and unpacked the challenges and dynamics of the concept of 'social cohesion', and postulated the important role of the family unit in advancing social cohesion. Some studies view the concept from social justice, lack of equitable outcomes, or systemic discrimination, but literature also stress that the conversation about the concept has been debated by academics and policy since the late 1900s to draw attention to the major social-economic and political change in the 1940s and 1970s. The OECD countries, for example, use the concept in policy to indicate certain public policy actions and to explain social, political, and sometimes, economic changes these countries have experienced over time. Whereas policy-makers may use social cohesion as a policy concept, they sometimes draw on academic literature which in itself is problematic.

Social cohesion in South Africa started as early as 1994 after the collapse of apartheid. However, during this period, different policies were tested to ensure greater inclusiveness, more civic participation, and the creation of opportunities for all, but this dream became almost impossible to attain due to multiple global trends such privatisation, neoliberal economics, among others, all of which had a negative effect on social cohesion policy in South Africa. For example, GEAR and BEE did not seem to work in the interest of the many, especially the marginalised. The realisation of social cohesion as one of the key national

priorities in a number of policy and strategic documents since 2004 was driven on the principle of earlier policies but with more focus on creating opportunities in the economy to address high unemployment, education, race, inequality, and other social-economic and political issues.

We have observed that the history of inequality, unemployment, poverty, crime, racial segregation, classification of society, economic exclusion, to mention a few, still linger negatively on the political, social, economic, and cultural life of many South Africans 26 years since 1994. This understanding seems to erode the social fabric constructed on a non-sexist and non-racialist society. One would, however, suggest that serious policy implications for social cohesion could be experienced if the policy does not address reality. We would, in addition, suggest that social cohesion policy should be tested or driven from the family's perspective since the family is said to constitute a nation. Ways to bridge the gap between policy and actions require further research to develop a conceptual framework to identify factors that are fundamental to understanding families in order to contribute to the development of social cohesion. The study although using South Africa as a case study contributes to the discourse on the African continent of role of the family and government to advance social cohesion and nation building.

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Solidarity, Isolation, and Cynicism:
An Attitudinal Analysis of the Police Culture in the South African Police Service

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Abstract

Numerous scholars have contributed to the police culture body of knowledge (Cockcroft 2013; O'Neill, Marks & Singh 2007; Sklansky 2005). They submit that the traditional understanding of police culture is no longer relevant due to the new developments that have transpired in policing, which have consequently changed the police culture. More specifically, they suggest that the South African Police Service (SAPS) too has witnessed changes in the traits of its police culture that accentuate the cynicism of and isolation from the public. This article is an attempt to challenge this narrative by comparing the police culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism attitudes of two different cohorts of new South African Police Service (SAPS) recruits separated by ten years. By making use of the 30-item police culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism questionnaire, designed by Steyn (2005), the article establishes that a representative sample (138 out of a population of 140) of new SAPS recruits from the SAPS Chatsworth Basic Training Institute (August 2015), have remarkably similar attitudes in support of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism, compared to a representative sample of all new SAPS recruits that started their basic training in January 2005 (Steyn, 2005). Although small in representation, the study refutes the claims that traditional understandings of police culture are no longer relevant and that the traits of the police culture in the South African

Police Service (SAPS) has so changed that it accentuates the cynicism of and isolation from the public.

1. Introduction

The motivation of police agencies worldwide - both in the developed and developing world - to change coincides with disillusionment with the military and paramilitary model of traditional policing (O'Neil, Marks and Singh 2007; Chan 1997; Manning 1997; Bayley and Shearing 1994). Where traditional policing emphasizes arrests, speedy vehicles and haphazard perambulation, the new vision of policing is one of being accountable to the community and establishing a nexus of partnerships with the community in policing (Cockcroft 2013; O'Neil, Marks and Singh 2007). It recognizes the ineffectiveness of traditional policing methods as well as the resourcefulness of the community in matters of crime deterrence and social control (Chan 1997, 49). The 'blueprint for the future' in policing is not one of piecemeal tinkering with police practices or the police image, but a dramatic departure from traditional policing: "Police, in order to be competitive and to attract the resources necessary to fulfil their role of the future, must become outward-looking, increasingly sensitive to developments and trends in their environment, responsive and resilient to change, innovative and creative in their approach to problem solving and idea generation, and more open and accountable to the community and Government" (Bayley and Shearing 1994, 143). To this endeavour, the former South African Minister of Safety and Security, Dr. Sidney Mufamadi, stated at the time of transforming South Africa into democracy as follows: "The philosophy of community policing must inform and pervade the entire organisation. Changing the police culture is perhaps the most significant challenge facing the new government" (Department of Safety and Security 1994).

For such change to be actual and durable, the creed of democratic policing must essentially be adopted as part of the new police organisational culture by altering the fundamental suppositions of each police official pertaining to the establishment and its setting. In advancing this makeover, the SAPS applied a national policy of guaranteeing gender and race compatibility in the composition of the service to the conclusion of befitting representation of the greater South African populace. Alpert, Dunham and Stroshine (2006) contend that an upsurge in variety in police establishments might succeed to splinter, and even perhaps extinguish, the notion of a homogeneous police culture. Particularly, service of women in the police could weaken certain characteristics

of the hyper-masculine makings of police culture and as an alternative, spawn an empathetic and gentler manner of policing (Miller 2003). Contemporary ethnographers (Cockcroft 2013; O'Neill, Marks and Singh 2007; Sklansky 2005) contend that these new developments in policing have changed the police, and that traditional understanding of police culture, as a consequence, are no longer relevant. More specifically that the SAPS has changed many of the traits of police culture that accentuate the cynicism of and isolation from the public. This paper is an attempt to challenge this narrative by comparing the police culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism attitudes of two different cohorts of new SAPS recruits separated over a ten period (2005-2015).

The primary objective of the current study that this article arises from is to establish whether changes in the SAPS have made traditional understandings of police culture obsolete; whether the new developments in the SAPS counteract the traits of police culture that accentuate the cynicism of and isolation from the public. The study sought to address this by assessing whether a representative sample of new SAPS recruits that started their basic training in July 2015 at the SAPS Chatsworth Basic Training Institute have similar or different attitudes to police culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism, compared to a study conducted by Steyn (2006) ten years ago (2005) on a representative sample of all new recruits in the SAPS that commenced their basic training in January 2005.

The paper hypothesises that a representative sample of all SAPS recruits that commenced their basic police training at the SAPS Chatsworth Basic Training Institute in July 2015 have indicators demonstrating police culture theme solidarity, isolation, cynicism. Secondly, it hypothesised that a representative sample of all SAPS recruits that commenced their basic police training at the SAPS Chatsworth Basic Training Institute in July 2015 have weaker attitudes in support of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism, compared to a study conducted by Steyn (2006) study referred above.

2. The origins of police culture

Police culture was derived from conspicuous qualities of two interdependent but paradoxical surroundings within which police officials perform their duties. These are the police occupational setting and the police organisational setting (Paoline III 2003). The occupational setting relates to the police officials

connection to the community of people living in a particular country or region. The most referenced components of this setting is physical harm/risk, and the distinctive forcible authorization police officials have over the public (Paoline III 2003). Police officials tend to be fixated with believing that their work setting is loaded with hazards (real or perceived), and expect such most of the time (Steyn and De Vries 2007). The component of physical harm/risk is so central to the police official's world view that being confronted could potentially prompt affective impediments to performing police work (Paoline III 2003). Physical harm/risk creates formidable solidarity amongst police officials whilst at the same time it produces isolation from the general public whom they may see as the primary source of physical harm/risk (Crank 2004). The police occupation is distinct in that police officials have the legislative right to use force if chosen to do so. This very license and the accompanying need to demonstrate control underscores the acuity of physical harm/risk. Irrespective of the circumstances; police officials are compelled to initiate, demonstrate and uphold – control (Paoline III 2003).

The second setting that police officials work in is the organisation, which consists of one's connection with the establishment (i.e. overseers) (Paoline III 2003). The two most salient components of this setting are the erratic and disciplinary overseeing, and the abstruseness of the police role (Paoline III 2003). The connection between police officials and their managers has been depicted as ambiguous. It is expected of the police to impose laws, yet they are obliged to keep to the correct bureaucratic rubrics and conventions (Paoline III 2003). Technical infringements from the inappropriate use of the law can end in punitive proceedings. Novice police officials soon realise that when they become noticed it is usually for mistakes, instead of being commended for behaving admirably (Steyn and De Vries 2007). Enthusiastic behaviour amongst police officials is not encouraged as it increases the likelihood of blunders and its accompanying detection and reprimand. As such, police officials are constricted, employed by an establishment that commands that all challenges on the 'front line' be controlled with competent inevitability (Paoline III 2003). This institutional ambiguity is the corresponding element to the apparent corporal risks within the police work setting. Supplementary to the erratic and disciplinary overseeing, police officials also work within an institutional setting that supports vague task affinity. Empirical enquiries have ascertained no less than three foremost

roles that police officials are anticipated to perform: preservation of the peace, execution of the law and the provision of public assistance, yet police institutions have traditionally more often than not formally recognised execution of the law. This is reinforced through police institutional tuition, formation of expert sections, emphasis on crime numbers and notably, assessment of performance and advancement (Meyer, Steyn and Gopal 2013).

3. Police culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism

A number of themes have been identified and discussed extensively within the police culture literature however, three loose-coupling themes appear most prominent in relation to the traits of police culture that accentuate the cynicism of and isolation from the public. These themes are solidarity, isolation, and police cynicism. Contemporary research on police culture has been focusing on themes that are termed as 'coping mechanism themes' (Steyn 2015). What is meant by coping mechanism themes is that these police cultural themes emerge when line police officials think that particular groups interfere with their ability to do their day-to-day work (Steyn 2008). Such themes (solidarity, isolation and cynicism) represent general attitudinal positions line-police-officials take to protect themselves from external oversight. Each police cultural theme is discussed below.

Solidarity refers to the powerful bond between police officials that can be described as the glue that holds the police culture together (Crank 2004; Chan 2003; Skolnick and Fyfe 1993; Christopher 1991; Manning 1978). The primary use of solidarity is to sustain police group identity, mark group boundaries and protect police officials from external oversight (Crank 2004; Chan 2003). Police solidarity emerges from a variety of contexts police officials are exposed to such as conflicts and animosities with diverse out-groups that perceivably challenge police authority on how they do their day-to-day work such as the public, courts, the media, politicians and police commanders themselves (Crank 2004 and Coser 1956). Moreover, the sheer danger of police work encourages strong loyalties in an 'all for one and one for all' sense of camaraderie, and a military sense of combat-readiness and general spiritedness. Powerful loyalties emerge in the commonly shared and perilous effort to control dangerous crimes. Central to the police cultural theme of solidarity is the sense of high-minded morality amongst its members. High-minded morality requires the elementary

logic that the enemy (out-groups in conflict with the police such as the public, courts, criminals, politicians, administrative brass) is totally evil and the police members are totally good. The intense focus on officer safety that characterises police-college training today reinforces the 'we-them' attitude where the 'them' is the public. Police officials are expected to watch out for their colleagues before all others (Reuss-Ianni 1983). The entire outside world is dangerous, and only officers can identify the dangers out there (Crank 2004, 247).

Isolation refers to the segregations of police officials from previous friends, the community, the legal system, and even spouses and families (Drummond 1976; Skolnick 1966). Police impose social isolation upon themselves as a means of protection against real and perceived dangers, loss of personal and professional autonomy, and social rejection (Skolnick 1966, 18). Skolnick (1966) submits that in an attempt to be attentive to any possible violence, the officer becomes generally suspicious of everyone. Likewise, many officers begin to distance themselves from previous friends as they do not seem to understand and appreciate the rigors of being a cop.

Various other factors that tend to impact on the isolation of police officers may be attributed to the nature of their occupation such as unique shift work, days-off during the week and court. Police also become isolated due to their authority. They are required to enforce many laws representing puritanical morality, such as those prohibiting drunkenness. Many police officials get drunk themselves and become sensitive to the charge of hypocrisy. In order to protect themselves they tend to socialise with other police or spend time alone, again leading to social isolation (Kingshott and Prinsloo 2004).

Niederhoffer (1967, 98) describes police cynicism as diffuse feelings of hate, envy, impotent hostility and a sour-grapes pattern, which are reflected as a state of mind in the individual police official. Niederhoffer states further that police cynicism is directed towards life, the world, people in general, and the police system itself. Cynicism emerges early on from language and attitude modelling in college training, partly because of a desire among newcomers to emulate experienced police officials in an effort to shed their status as novices (Wilt and Bannon 1976, 40), and partly because new recruits have the motivational desire to quickly learn how to cover their 'butts', like more experienced police officials do (Crank 2004, 325).

4. Research methodology

The researchers selected a quantitative research approach. The research problem required a measuring instrument that would translate the research hypotheses into numerical variables that would represent data that could be collected in a standardised way and that could then be analysed via statistical procedures. Such a measuring instrument is the Thirty-Item Police Culture Questionnaire, developed by Steyn (2006) whose permission was sought and received. Response choices on the individual items were structured and close-ended with a five-point Likert-type option, ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The level of measurement on scales of the 30-item self-report questionnaire was of an ordinal nature, meaning that the scales (categories) were mutually exclusive, mutually exhaustive and rank-ordered. Each scale was assigned a numerical value to identify differences (magnitude) in participants' responses. Only items 22, 25 and 28 were assigned differently due to the direction of the statements. Although the item scales were of an ordinal nature the numerical data were analysed on an interval scale for the purpose of determining the category order of participants' responses.

The Thirty-Item Police Culture Questionnaire was piloted in December 2004 amongst 100 SAPS functional police officials stationed within the city of Durban, Republic of South Africa, and the factor analysis (VARIMAX technique) identified nine factors of which four met the latent root criterion (also known as the eighenvalue-one criterion or the Kaiser criterion) of eighenvalue greater than 1.0 (as indicated in Table 2), the rationale being that each observed variable contributes one unit of variance in the data set. Any factor that displays an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 accounts for a greater amount of variance than was contributed by one variable. Williams, Hollan, and Stevens (1983) noted that the latent root criterion has shown to produce the correct number of factors when the number of variables included in the analysis is small (10 to 15) or moderate (20 to 30). The reliability coefficient (Cronbach alpha) of 0.77 for the Thirty-Item Police Culture Questionnaire is also within the 0.7 acceptable indicator level.

Table 1

Study measuring instrument Factor Loadings

Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
3.4625324	2.1932821	1.7459078	1.5539314

The factor analysis discovered statistically significant loadings (with >0.70 communality) for items (measures/questions) 30, 24, 21, 29, 27 and 30, on Factor 1. More specifically, items 21, 23, and 24 can be grouped into respondents' viewpoints apropos truthfulness and fidelity in the populace, whilst items 27, 29, and 30, gauges participants' beliefs about the corollaries of these traits for police community interactions. The relational direction between the Factor 1 loadings signify that partakers who deemed the public as commonly deceitful and untrustworthy, correspondingly did not imagine that the police and the public can work well together, and vice-versa.

Questions that loaded with statistical significance on Factor 2, were items 29 and 30 (which was the case on Factor 1), as well as 25. The latter is a determinant of respondents' creeds pertaining veneration for the police by the civic, and the former (29 and 30) measure contributors' attitudes vis-à-vis the upshots of these features for police public dealings. Participants' that thought that people do not respect the police were also of the opinion that the police and the public do not trust each other, and vice-versa.

Factor 3 is constituted by high loadings (with >0.70 communality) from measures 12, 11, 2, 5, and 6. These items largely elucidate why respondents believe that police officials have to look out for each other. Participants' who consider a collective purpose (rid the country of it's bad elements) and view outsiders as hasty criticizers of the police, likewise believe that police officials have to look after each other, and as a result prefer to mingle more with police peers and less with folks distanced of the police, and vice-versa.

Measures 23, 16, 28, 24, and 14, loaded statistically significantly on Factor 4. These items appear to measure the extent to which respondents socialise with others outside of the police and justifications thereof. Respondents' that indicated that they were socialising less with those outside of the police since becoming trainee police officials were also of the opinion that this was due to uncooperative and non-supportive courts, shift work and special duties, and

the belief that even though members of the public are open to the opinions and suggestions of police officials – they are not to be trusted and are generally dishonest, and vice-versa.

In general (factor analysis), several of the study measuring instrument questions did not load on any of the four factors (with eighenvalues >1.0), and some of the items loaded (statistically significant) on more than one factor; thus indicating a composite of a more generalised multi-dimensional and categorical (behavioural and attitudinal) measure.

A challenge for operationalising the constructs of police culture solidarity, police culture isolation and police culture cynicism, is the amorphous nature as the constructs are multi-dimensional. As a consequence it was originally decided (pre-test, first post-test and second post-test) to create a composite measure of each scale (scale of solidarity [items 1-10]; scale of isolation [items 11-20]; scale of cynicism [items 21-30]) as the literature does not clearly indicate how each item relates. The longitudinal makes the argument that each individual item measures perceived solidarity, isolation and cynicism. The same procedure is followed for the third post-test (September 2013 – June 2014). The critical question regarding the measurement of the constructs is whether each item, based on the literature, is valid on its face as a measure of a dimension of the constructs of solidarity, isolation and cynicism.

5. Findings

5.2 Frequency comparison of participants' responses

Overall, Table 2 below indicates that both samples (2005 and 2015) tended towards answering *Agree* or *Strongly Agree*, notable with 24 out of the 30 items (80%). However, the 2015 sample inclined to answer *Agree* or *Strongly Agree* more (by 13.34%) when compared to the 2005 sample.

In general, on the solidarity items (1-10), both sets of participants (2005 and 2015) either strongly agreed or agreed with all of the items. In other words, there were no differences of kind but rather of degree. More specifically, the difference of degree can be noted on item 7, where the 2005 sample mostly answered *Agree* followed by *Strongly Agree*, whereas the 2015 sample answered primarily *Strongly Agree* followed by *Agree*. The 2005 sample tended to agree with the statement

that difficult challenges only makes one stronger (item 7), whilst the 2015 sample strongly agreed. In terms of the isolation items (11-20), broadly, both samples tended to agree or strongly agree with most of the items (2005 [7 items], 2015 sample [9 items]), however the 2015 sample more so. Differences of kind can be discerned on items 14, 16, and 20, differences of degree on item 13.

With regards to the former, the 2005 sample either disagreed or strongly disagreed about the uncooperative and unsupportive statement about courts, whilst the 2015 participants mostly (50%) indicated that they had no opinion on the matter (item 14). Most of the 2005 new SAPS recruits strongly disagreed or disagreed that shift work and special duties influence their socialising with friends external to SAPS (item 16), whilst 2015 cadets held the opposite opinion. The 2015 cohort agreed or strongly agreed that generals do not really know what is happening at grass roots level; whereas the 2005 group felt that they did (item 20).

Commonly, one can spot differences of kind between the two sets of samples, in relation to the cynicism items (21-30). The 2005 group had middle ground between agreeing and disagreeing (5/5), whilst the 2015 group mostly agreed (7 items). More specifically, the differences in kind can be noted for items 25 and 28. The 2005 new SAPS recruits were of the opinion that most people respect the authority of police officials, whilst the 2015 new SAPS recruits disagreed or strongly disagreed that most people respect the authority of police officials. The 2005 cadets also had a more optimistic perception about the openness of the community with regards to police opinions and suggestions, compared to the 2015 student constables. The 2015 sample disagreed or strongly disagreed that members of the community are open to the opinions and suggestions of police officials.

Table 2

Frequency comparison of participants' responses between the 2005 sample (SAPS Basic Training Institute participants conducted by Steyn [2005]) and the 2015 sample (SAPS Chatsworth Basic Training Institute participants conducted by Maweni [2015]) to the 30-item classical police culture themes questionnaire

See overleaf

Item	Sample Category	Strongly Agree	Agree	No Opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Did Not Complete
Police culture theme of solidarity							
1 I think that aPolice officialshould be one ofthe highest paid careers	2005 sample N	871	479	21	71	13	0
	2005 sample %	59.86%	32.92%	01.44%	04.88%	00.89%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	100	32	2	2	0	0
	2015 sample %	73.52%	23.53%	01.47%	01.47%	00.00%	00.00%
2 I feel it is my duty to rid the country of its bad elements.	2005 sample N	839	554	14	33	9	0
	2005 sample %	57.90%	38.23%	00.97%	02.28%	00.62%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	80	52	1	3	0	2
	2015 sample %	58.82%	38.25%	00.74%	2.20%	00.00%	1.44%
3 Police officials arecareful of how they behave in public.	2005 sample N	502	734	11	186	27	0
	2005 sample %	34.38%	50.27%	00.75%	12.74%	1.85%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	37	65	15	17	1	3
	2015 sample %	26.81%	47.10%	10.86%	12.31%	00.72%	02.17
4 You don't understand what it is to be a police official until you are a police official.	2005 sample N	658	527	7	209	59	0
	2005 sample %	45.07%	36.10%	00.48%	14.32%	04.04%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	90	37	2	7	1	1
	2015 sample %	65.21%	26.81%	01.44%	05.07%	00.72%	00.72%
5 Police officials have to look out for each other.	2005 sample N	1040	382	4	21	10	0
	2005 sample %	71.38%	26.22%	00.27%	01.44%	00.69%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	103	30	3	0	0	2
	2015 sample %	74.63%	21.73%	02.17%	00.00%	00.00%	01.45%
6 Members of the public, media and politicians are quick to criticise the police but seldom recognise the good that SAPS members do	2005 sample N	805	593	20	34	2	0
	2005 sample %	55.36%	40.78%	01.38%	02.34%	00.14%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	68	58	8	3	1	0
	2015 sample %	49.27%	42.03%	05.79%	02.17%	00.72%	00.00%
7 What does not kill a police official makes him or her stronger.	2005 sample N	390	627	243	130	29	0
	2005 sample %	27.48%	44.19%	17.12%	09.16%	02.04%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	59	56	12	7	3	1
	2015 sample %	42.75%	40.58%	08.69%	12.31%	02.17%	00.72
8 Most members of the public don't really know what is going on 'out there'.	2005 sample N	559	723	15	132	28	0
	2005 sample %	38.37%	49.62%	01.03%	09.06%	01.92%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	48	65	8	16	1	0
	2015 sample %	34.78%	47.10%	05.79%	11.59%	00.72%	00.00%
9 A good police official takes nothing at face value.	2005 sample N	535	672	76	142	19	0
	2005 sample %	37.05%	46.54%	05.26%	09.83%	01.32%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	49	62	20	3	1	3
	2015 sample %	35.51%	44.93%	14.49%	02.17%	00.72%	02.17%
10 To be a police official is not just another job it is a'higher calling'.	2005 sample N	942	453	15	35	13	0
	2005 sample %	64.61%	31.07%	01.03%	02.40%	00.89%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	75	49	6	7	1	0
	2015 sample %	54.35%	35.51%	04.34%	05.07%	00.72%	00.00%

Item	Sample Category	Strongly Agree	Agree	No Opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Did Not Complete
Police culture theme of Isolation							
11 I tend to socialise less with my friends outside of the police since I have become a police	2005 sample N	289	607	41	391	131	0
	2005 sample %	19.81%	41.60%	02.81%	26.80%	08.98%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	25	71	6	24	10	2
	2015 sample %	18.12%	51.45%	04.35%	17.39%	07.25%	01.45%
12 I prefer socialising with my colleagues to socialising with non-members.	2005 sample N	252	517	45	536	108	0
	2005 sample %	17.28%	35.46%	03.09%	36.76%	07.41%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	22	53	15	43	4	1
	2015 sample %	15.94%	38.41%	10.87%	31.16%	02.89%	00.72%
13 I don't really talking in-depth to people outside of the SAPS about my work	2005 sample N	666	634	23	100	36	0
	2005 sample %	45.65%	43.45%	01.58%	06.85%	02.47%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	56	69	1	6	5	1
	2015 sample %	40.57%	50.00%	00.72%	04.35%	03.62%	00.72%
4 Being a police official made me realise how uncooperative and non-supportive the courts are	2005 sample N	118	309	298	541	188	0
	2005 sample %	08.12%	21.25%	20.50%	37.21%	12.93%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	7	19	69	35	7	1
	2015 sample %	05.07%	13.97%	50.00%	25.36%	05.07%	00.72%
15 My husband/ wife,boyfriend/ girlfriend tends not to understand what being a police official is all about.	2005 sample N	255	611	71	394	128	0
	2005 sample %	17.48%	41.88%	04.87%	27.00%	08.77%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	19	56	12	37	13	1
	2015 sample %	13.77%	40.58%	08.69%	26.81%	09.42%	00.72%
16 Shift work and special duties influence my socialising with friends outside theSAPS.	2005 sample N	106	366	127	216	641	0
	2005 sample %	07.28%	25.14%	08.72%	14.84%	44.02%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	17	45	20	45	9	2
	2015 sample %	12.31%	32.61%	14.49%	32.61%	06.52%	01.44%
17I feel like I belong with my work colleagues more every day, and less with people that I have to police	2005 sample N	172	623	82	492	87	0
	2005 sample %	11.81%	42.79%	05.63%	33.79%	05.98%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	12	56	15	46	8	1
	2015 sample %	08.69%	40.58%	10.87%	33.33%	05.79%	00.72%
.8 As a police official, I am being watched critically bymembers of thecommunity, even in my social life.	2005 sample N	778	520	42	101	18	0
	2005 sample %	53.32%	35.64%	02.88%	06.92%	01.23%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	65	53	14	4	1	1
	2015 sample %	47.10%	38.40%	10.14%	02.89%	00.72%	00.72%

		Strongly Agree	Agree	No Opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Did Not Complete
19 I can be more open with my work colleagues than with members of the public.	2005 sample N	414	679	47	258	57	0
	2005 sample %	28.45%	46.67%	03.23%	17.73%	03.92%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	36	63	13	22	3	1
	2015 sample %	26.08%	45.65%	09.42%	15.94%	02.17%	00.72%
20 Generals do not really know what is happening at grass roots level.	2005 sample N	275	344	155	498	188	0
	2005 sample %	18.84%	23.56%	10.62%	34.11%	12.88%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	23	35	39	29	10	2
	2015 sample %	16.66%	25.36%	28.26%	21.01%	07.25%	01.45%

Item	Sample Category	Strongly Agree	Agree	No Opinion	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Did Not Complete
Police culture theme of Cynicism							
21 Most people lie when answering questions posed by police officials.	2005 sample N	357	877	73	129	22	0
	2005 sample %	24.49%	60.15%	05.01%	08.85%	01.51%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	21	74	27	14	2	0
	2015 sample %	15.22%	53.62%	19.57%	10.14%	01.45%	00.00%
22 Most people do not hesitate to go out of their way to help someone in trouble.	2005 sample N	152	648	33	538	87	0
	2005 sample %	10.43%	44.44%	02.26%	36.90%	05.97%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	11	57	12	53	4	1
	2015 sample %	07.97%	41.30%	08.69%	38.40%	02.89%	00.72%
23 Most people are untrustworthy and dishonest.	2005 sample N	313	779	29	301	38	0
	2005 sample %	21.44%	53.36%	01.99%	20.62%	02.60%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	15	61	21	39	0	2
24 Most people would steal if they knew they would not get caught.	2015 sample %	10.87%	44.20%	15.21%	28.26%	00,00%	01.44%
	2005 sample N	478	747	26	169	39	0
	2005 sample %	32.76%	51.20%	01.78%	11.58%	02.67%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	32	65	19	20	1	1
	2015 sample %	23.18%	47.10%	01.76%	14.49%	00.72%	00.72%
25 Most people respect the authority of police officials.	2005 sample N	246	798	16	358	38	0
	2005 sample %	16.90%	54.81%	01.10%	24.59%	02.61%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	6	43	6	70	12	1
	2015 sample %	04.35%	31.15%	04.35%	50.72%	08.69%	00.72%
26 Most people lack the proper level of respect for police officials.	2005 sample N	249	784	24	348	51	0
	2005 sample %	17.10%	53.85%	01.85%	23.90%	03.50%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	21	66	12	37	2	0
	2015 sample %	15.21%	47.83%	08.70%	26.81%	01.44%	00.00%
27 Police officials will never trust members of the Community enough to work together effectively.	2005 sample N	148	482	38	636	154	0
	2005 sample %	10.15%	33.06%	02.61%	43.62%	10.56%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	4	48	15	61	10	0
	2015 sample %	02.89%	34.78%	10.87%	44.20%	07.25%	00.00%

28 Most members of the community are open to the opinions and suggestions of police officials.	2005 sample N	175	841	45	363	32	0
	2005 sample %	12.02%	57.76%	03.09%	24.93%	02.20%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	4	39	21	65	9	0
	2015 sample %	02.89%	28.26%	15.22%	47.10%	06.52%	00.00%
29 Members of the community will not trust police officials enough to work together effectively.	2005 sample N	85	586	38	605	143	0
	2005 sample %	05.83%	40.22%	02.61%	41.52%	09.81%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	6	51	14	61	6	0
	2015 sample %	04.35%	36.95%	10.14%	44.20%	04.35%	00.00%
30 The community does not support the police and the police do not trust the public.	2005 sample N	94	419	55	638	248	0
	2005 sample %	06.46%	28.82%	03.78%	43.88%	17.06%	00.00%
	2015 sample N	6	28	26	55	22	1
	2015 sample %	04.35%	20.29%	18.84%	39.86%	15.94%	00.72%
Note. 'N' symbolizes number; '%' denotes percentage							

5.2 Measuring police culture solidarity, isolation and cynicism

The challenge for operationalising the constructs of police culture solidarity, police culture isolation and police culture cynicism, is the amorphous nature, as constructs are multi-dimensional. As a consequence, it was necessary to create a composite measure of each scale (scale of solidarity [items 1-10]; scale of isolation [items 11-20]; scale of cynicism [items 21-30] as the literature does not clearly indicate how each item relates. The study makes the argument that each individual item measures perceive solidarity, isolation and cynicism. The critical question regarding the measurement of the constructs is whether each item, based on the literature, is valid on its face as a measure of dimension of the constructs of solidarity, isolation and cynicism.

A decision needs to be made whether to analyse the data at the micro level or to create composite measures of more generalised multi-dimensional constructs. The analysis begins with the macro-level questions such as whether indicators evince the presence of traditional police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism amongst a representative sample of SAPS lateral entry recruits? To be able to answer this question one must ask, how isolated or cynical, as a general proposition, must the police be in order to assess whether one is willing to conclude that the police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism are sufficiently present. The decision is somewhat unpredictable but the traits must be present in ample extent to substantiate a compelling assertion. An inclusive

mean score of twenty four (24) (60%) or more per individual participant on a particular police culture theme (for example, theme 1: Solidarity [items 1-10], on a scale of ten (10) to a possible forty (40), was selected as criteria, with the higher score demonstrating the greater presence of a particular police culture theme.

Strongly disagree	1	Disagree	2	I do not have an opinion	0	Agree	3	Strongly Agree	4

In other words, a cut-off mean score of no less than twenty- four (24) (60%), on a scale of zero (0) to a possible forty (40), with the higher score demonstrating the greater presence.

Table 3 below contains the mean scores and mean score percentages of participants' responses per police culture theme.

Overall mean score comparisons between the 2005 sample and the 2015 sample

Overall, Table 3 and Chart 1 indicate no statistically significant differences in the responses of participants between the 2005 and 2015 samples. In other words, both sets of new SAPS recruits, even though ten years apart, arrived for SAPS basic police training with predispositions in support of police culture of solidarity and isolation. However, a difference in kind, with regards to police culture cynicism can be observed.

More specifically, if one would strictly use the 60% cut-off indicator, the 2005 sample entered with cynical attitudes, whilst the 2015 cohort did not. Conversely, it would be meaningful to note that 2% shy of 60% is still a strong marker. Collaterally, more than half of the 2015 SAPS cadets had attitudes in support of police culture cynicism.

Table 3

	Mean score and mean score percentage comparison of 2005 SAPS participants and 2015 SAPS participants to the 30-item questionnaire measuring police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism							
S	Solidarity mean score	Solidarity mean score %	Isolation mean score	Isolation mean score %	Cynicism mean Score	Cynicism mean score %	ROW TOTAL	
							M	%
2005	3.30	82.63%	2.53	63.41%	2.53	63.16%	2.80	70.07%
2015	3.17	79.35%	2.42	60.50%	2.31	57.84%	2.64	66.06%
RT	3.23	80.99%	2.47	61.95%	2.42	60.50%	2.72	68.06%

Note: 'M' reflects mean; '%' denotes percentage; 'S' signposts sample; and 'RT' represents row total.


Chart 1

Mean score percentage comparison between the 2005 new SAPS recruits and the 2015 new SAPS recruits, on the 30-item police culture questionnaire, measuring solidarity, isolation, and cynicism

Legend:
- Police culture solidarity indicator
- Police culture isolation indicator
- Police culture cynicism indicator

X-axis: 2005 new SAPS recruits, 2015 new SAPS recruits

5.4 Mean score and mean score percentage comparisons on the 2005 and 2015 biographical variables

The data analysis indicated no statistically significant differences in terms of the 2015 sample's responses on the 30-item self-report police culture questionnaire (measuring police culture solidarity, isolation, and cynicism), with due consideration of the five categorical biographical independent variables of the participants. The article acknowledges that there are a myriad of other items that could have been employed to measure police culture themes of solidarity, isolation and cynicism but this should not be taken, in and of itself, as a limitation. All choices of measures are ultimately approximations of the true construct. The study furthermore does not assume a direct correlation between attitude and overt behaviour nor draw conclusions to all new recruits in the SAPS, nor to speak of the SAPS as a whole.

As indicated earlier, some contemporary ethnographers of police culture (Cockcroft 2013; O'Neill, Marks and Singh, 2007; Sklansky 2005), in support of the search for nuances, fashionably argue against presumably orthodox characterisations. The premise being novelty to the policing context will drastically change the police culture. Based on the data analyses the current study accepts both hypotheses. More specifically, a representative sample (138 out of a population of 140) of all new SAPS recruits that started their basic police training at the SAPS Chatsworth Basic Training Institute in July 2015 had moderate to strong attitudes in support of police culture themes of solidarity and isolation. Even though the study participants did not meet the predetermined cut-off mean score percentage of sixty (60), on the cynicism scale, the indicator shortfall of two percent (2%) is somewhat above the midpoint (50%), and an argument could be made, within relative terms, for attitudes in support of police culture cynicism. Thus, new SAPS cadets, recruited by the SAPS from other state departments, arrived for basic police training at the SAPS Chatsworth Basic Training Institute with traits of police culture that accentuate the cynicism of and isolation from the public. The study further found that the indicators evincing of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism, between new SAPS recruits that started their basic police training.

Chart 2

Sample comparison: indicators evincing police culture themes

Even though not statistically significant, the 2015 sample of new SAPS recruits arrived for basic police training with slightly weaker attitudes in support of police culture themes of solidarity, isolation, and cynicism, compared to the 2005 sample (Steyn 2006) of new SAPS recruits. In summary, the two sets of new SAPS recruits, while ten years apart, believe that their vocation, enacted in a dangerous and uncertain environment, is highly skilled and moral purposed, and can only be performed by unique individuals (appropriate for police work with characteristics such as toughness and suspiciousness, etc.) from broader society. Groups outside of the police (public, media and politicians) have very little regard and understanding of 'coalface' police work as reflected in unsatisfactory monetary compensation, cockeyed criticism and ill-considered prescriptions. These police officials isolate themselves from outsiders (former friends, family members/important others, community, courts, and top ranking officials), and favour mingling with their fellows. They deem that most folks lie when replying to questions tendered by police officials, would thieve if they knew they would not get netted, are untrustworthy and dishonest, not perturbed by the help cries

of others, dearth the decorous quantity of veneration for police officials, and are obtruded to the sentiments and promptings of police officials.

Conclusion and recommendations

Based on the above-mentioned findings of the study, it can be concluded that despite the new developments that have been introduced in an attempt to transform the SAPS, new recruits still possess traditional police culture traits such as isolating themselves from their former friends and family and favour mingling with their colleagues instead. These traits are in contrast to democratic policing, which primarily requires SAPS officials to be community orientated. Furthermore, it can be argued that the SAPS recruit individuals with characteristics in support of the organisations' culture, and therefore maintain the status quo. Lastly, the study findings reflects on the relevance of conventional police culture understandings in contemporary times.

This paper therefore recommends that the SAPS amend their recruitment criteria so that individuals with different characteristics from the organisations' culture can be employed. Furthermore, this study recommends that future research explore on this topic in order to establish the nature of other SAPS new recruits in various police training colleges within the country. As this study was confined to the Chatsworth training college, it would also be meaningful for future studies to reveal whether new recruits across the country share the same traits as the new recruits of this study.

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Destitute and vulnerable: Fear of crime and victimisation among the homeless in urban and rural settings in South Africa

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Abstract

In 2019, the murders of five homeless men in Pretoria drew attention to the vulnerability of people living on the street. Despite more than two decades of democracy, social injustices and inequality continue to characterise post-apartheid South Africa. In addition to rampant poverty burgeoning informal settlements and poor housing, homelessness forms an integral part of the country's urban and rural landscapes. However, homelessness is often accompanied by victimisation, racial and social injustices, and human rights violations. This paper reports on the victimisation of homeless people in South Africa, their patterns of reporting such incidences, and interactions with criminal justice agents. The paper also contextualises a fear of crime among the homeless and evaluates the limitations of the lifestyle exposure, routine activities, and deviance place theories to adequately explain injustices committed against the homeless. Implications for context-specific and global realities regarding homeless people are discussed. Quantitative data was obtained through non-probability sampling strategies from 40 urban and 30 rural homeless people. More than half of respondents felt unsafe while living on the streets (55.8%), feared becoming a victim of crime in the next year (54.5%) and the greater proportion of respondents (57.1%) had fallen victim to crime in the past. Statistically significant differences (p<0.05; r>0.4) featured between urban and rural respondents in terms of theft and harassment and

anticipating victimisation. The findings highlight the social injustices suffered by homeless people, often at the hand of those who are supposed to protect vulnerable groups.

Keywords: Crime, Victimisation, Vulnerability, Homeless, Human rights

1. Introduction

Homelessness is a worldwide phenomenon characterised by extreme poverty, social exclusion, and a lack of access to basic services (Cross, Seager, Erasmus, Ward & O'Donovan 2010, 6). Defining the term homelessness is a greatly contested matter, because home and homelessness take on different meanings and vary across countries. Often homelessness reflects a political orientation rather than the reality of deprivation (Tipple & Speak 2005, 337; Makiwane, Tamasane & Schneider 2010, 39). In its policy on homelessness, the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality defines the homeless as persons who find themselves on the streets with no shelter and very limited social support (Mashau 2017, 419). Pathways in and out of homelessness are neither linear nor uniform. The causes of homelessness are both structural and personal, including unemployment, migration, social exclusion, lack of access to affordable housing, poor mental health, traumatic life events, family conflict, and substance dependency (Manganyi 2017, 451; Roets, Botha, Greef, Human, Strydom, Watson & Chigeza 2016, 622). In South Africa, homelessness is tied to the country's socio-political history of exclusion and marginalisation, as well as uncoordinated planning, ever-growing informal settlement populations, and the increase of child-headed families and associated family disintegration (Olufemi 2000, 224).

Interpretation of "homelessness" developed by local government agencies tends to minimise the homeless population and only focus on individuals who are publicly visible (Amore, Baker and Howden-Chapman 2011, 21). Therefore, homelessness is a politically sensitive subject because how it is understood determines who will be counted as homeless, and who will eventually receive financial or other support. Policies developed to address homelessness can only be effective and workable if they are based on a clear understanding of what homelessness entails (United Nations Centre for Human Settlements 2000, 447; Naidoo 2010, 131; Tosi 201, 221). Such understandings influence the extent of

the phenomenon and it also circumscribes the possible solutions (Echenberg & Jensen 2012, 1). Solutions to homelessness require concerted efforts and collaboration between government entities and policy intervention. However, there are no comprehensive policies on homelessness in the Southern African context. Furthermore, the African Union (AU) has no policy targeted at homeless people. Available AU policies are geared towards assisting displaced persons, returnees, and refugees. In a three-day meeting held for Aspiration 3 of Agenda 2063, the member states pledged to use the spirit of ubuntu and Pan-Africanism as a strategy to end homelessness in Africa. Furthermore, the leaders reiterated the need to translate legal instruments intended to support displaced women and children into practical actions. These include having updated data on the number of displaced persons, practical medium to long-term solutions, and the monitoring of governance at host communities (AU 2020).

In African countries, displacement because of war, civil conflict, and natural disasters is a pathway to homelessness. In 2005, between May and June, operation Murambatsvina was implemented in Zimbabwe, which left thousands of Zimbabweans displaced. The operation was aimed at demolishing illegal squatters from urban areas, leaving thousands of people homeless (Dorman 2016, 84; Benyera & Nyere 2015, 6524). The operation highlighted issues of citizenship and sovereignty in the country. The Zimbabwean government asserted that it was 'within its sovereign rights' to execute the operation (Dorman 2016, 85; Benyera & Nyere 2015, 6524). The operation had an impact on already marginalized communities, afflicting the most vulnerable members whose life chances and quality of life were already compromised by poverty (Benyera & Nyere 2015, 6524). The operation further illustrates the importance of how housing and homelessness are defined. According to the operation, it was argued that no one was rendered homeless as the informal settlers were already homeless (Tipple & Speak 2005, 337).

Homeless persons have a greater risk of falling victim to crime compared to the general population (Kinsella 2012, 126; Garland, Richards & Cooney 2010, 287; Larney Conroy, Mills, Burns & Teeson 2009, 347; Rattelade, Farrell, Aubrey & Klodawsky 2014, 1607). Violence, threats, intimidation, and abuse by the public appear to be an everyday reality for the homeless population. 'Not only are the homeless unprotected, their very identity often makes them the target of ill-treatment by members of the public' (Newburn 2006 and Rock,

148). Understandably, homeless people experience the world as an unsafe place (Kinsella 2012, 126). Homelessness is multidimensional, it does not just refer to a lack of shelter or a lack of a roof over one's head but involves deprivation across several dimensions (Somerville 2013, 384).

Experiences of victimisation among the homeless present unique characteristics in terms of the nature of crimes committed against them, the profile of offenders, and dynamics related to the time and place of offences. In addition, homeless persons tend to underreport victimisation to the police and (Scurfield, Rees and Norman 2004, 8), by not having a fixed or registered address, they are mostly excluded from victims of crime surveys which rely on official databases for sampling purposes. Potentially due to society perceiving homelessness as (an avoidable) nuisance, homeless persons as victims of crime seldom receive media attention, and if they do reports about the crimes committed against them are sensationally framed similarly to the 2019 widespread news report assuming the serial killing of five middle-aged homeless men in Pretoria. The men were either stabbed or suffered blunt force injuries in the evening and near public areas, namely at Mears Park train station, Magnolia Park and Muckleneuk Park (Mitchley 2019).

South African research on homelessness is scarce yet some inroads into the phenomenon have been made. Studies are concentrated in urban settings, particularly in the City of Tshwane, Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Durban (de Beer and Valley 2017, 389; Kriel, Tembe & Mashava 2017, 428; Schenck, Roman, Erasmus, Blaauw and Ryan 2017, 266; Moyo, Patel and Ross 2015,1). The focus on homelessness in urban settings has resulted in the evidence cupboard on rural homelessness being glaringly empty (Skott-Myhre, Raby and Nikolaou 2008, 88; Schiff, Schiff, Turner & Bernard 2015, 85). Additionally, research tends to focus pertinently on homeless policies, demographic profiles and mental health, and pathways to homelessness (Naidoo 2010, 129; Du Toit 2010, 111; Kok, Cross & Roux 2010, 21; Makiwane, Tamasane & Schneider 2010, 39). Limited local knowledge exists regarding homeless persons' feelings of safety and the crimes committed against them hence the present paper sets out to describe the nature and extent of fear of crime and victimisation among homeless persons in urban and rural settings. The paper focuses on their feelings of safety, fear of crime, experiences of victimisation and subsequent reactions to and reporting of incidents of victimisation.

2. Research methods

Survey methods were used to obtain data from 40 homeless persons living in the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (urban sample) and 30 in the Vhembe District Municipality in Limpopo (rural sample). A questionnaire was developed from existing instruments, in particular victims of crime surveys. Data was gathered through face-to-face interviews due to the anticipated low literacy levels of homeless persons (Kumar 2014, 182). For quality purposes, the questionnaire was tested with six homeless persons prior to the survey and resulted in the reformulation of a few questions.

Purposive sampling was used to identify respondents because homeless persons do not have a fixed residential address or any other type of identification from which a random sample can be drawn. Shelters and feeding programmes were used as entry points to find potential respondents. The data was electronically captured and analysed using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (IBM 2019). Since the data did not show a normal distribution and because a non-probability sampling strategy was followed, non-parametric procedures, in particular, the Mann-Whitney U test was used to identify differences between the urban and rural samples (IBM 2019). In cases where a statistically significant difference featured ($p<0.05$), effect sizes were calculated where $r=-0.1$ indicates a weak, $r=-0.3$ notes a medium, and $r=-0.5$ points to a large effect size. The study adhered to the ethical standards associated with social science research and was approved by the Ethics Committee of the Faculty of Humanities, University of Pretoria. Respondents were required to give consent to participate prior to the interviews by signing a consent form which informed them about the purpose of the study, voluntary participation, and that they could withdraw from the interview at any time. Due to the nature of the research, and the fact that the researcher had to interview homeless individuals in public places, potential risks to the researcher were assessed during the planning phase of the study, and measures were taken to minimise such risks. To ensure anonymity, none of the respondents' names or any information that could be traced back to them were recorded. After the completion of each survey, participants were asked whether they needed to see a counsellor because of the sensitive nature of some of the questions asked. However, no one requested such services.

3. Results and discussion

3.1 Background characteristics

Homelessness is considered to be gendered, with men more likely to be homeless than women (Makiwane et al 2010, 41). Nearly all respondents (n=67; 95.7%) in the survey were male. Evidence shows that the majority of the South African homeless population comprises of adults between the ages of 20 and 50 (Kok et al 2010, 31; Makiwane et al. 2010, 41). In the present survey, the average age of respondents was 35 years with an age range of 20 to 60 years. Roughly two-thirds (n=27; 67.5%) of urban respondents were 35 years or younger, while 63.3% (n=19) of rural respondents were 36 years and older (p=0.005; r=-0.33).

Research on homelessness has predominantly focused on the current age of homeless persons without considering the age when they became homeless which is important for determining the causes of homelessness and for implementing policies intended to address homelessness. In the United State of America (USA), research shows a growing number of individuals who are becoming homeless at an older age (Gonyea, Mills-Dick and Bachman 2010, 575-576). Conversely, becoming homeless at a young age could lead to prolonged and chronic homelessness (Culhane, Metraux, Bryne, Stino & Bainbridge 2013, 4; Rothwell, Sussman, Grenier, Mott & Bourgeois-Guerin 2017, 72; Mayock, Corr & O'Sullivan 2013, 442). The average age when respondents became homeless was 32 years with a significant difference (p=0.005; r=-0.33) between urban (average homeless age 28 years) and rural (average homeless age 37 years) respondents (Figure 1). Urban respondents (n=33; 82.5%) were significantly more likely (p=0.019; r=-0.28) to experience chronic homelessness compared to rural respondents (n=7; 17.5%).

Figure 1: Age when respondents became homeless (%)

Homeless persons are mainly single individuals who lack ties with society. The survey found that 71.4% (n=50) of respondents were single. Furthermore, the homeless generally present low levels of education. As a result of being homeless, they forgo educational opportunities, therefore, limiting work experiences (Ferguson, Bender, Thompson, Maccio & Pollio 2012,387; Makiwane et al 2010, 42). Nearly two-thirds (n=45; 64.3%) of respondents achieved Grade 9 or lower, while 27.1% (n=19) completed Grade 12 and 8.6% (n=6) had a post-school qualification. Education levels showed a significant difference across the two research settings with the urban sample presenting higher levels of education compared to the rural sample (p=0.004; r=-0.34).

Less than two in five respondents (n=26; 37.1%) were raised by both parents and one in four (n=19; 27.1%) experienced some form of child abuse. Given the high unemployment rate of 30.1% in South Africa, and 55.2% among young people between the ages of 15 and 24, the situation does not bode well for the urban homeless (Statistics South Africa 2020). Respondents identified unemployment as the leading cause of homelessness (n=38; 51.4%), followed by being an illegal immigrant (n=14; 18.9%), breakdown of family life (n=9; 12.2%), having served a prison sentence (n=7; 9.5%) and substance dependency (n=6; 8.1%). Persons who become homeless at a younger age often cite family disorganisation as a reason for being homeless (Collins 2013, 62). The present survey confirms this observation because one in five urban respondents (n=9; 19.6%) cited family breakdown as contributing factor compared to none of the rural homeless.

3.2 Homelessness and fear of crime

Homeless persons report higher levels of fear of crime than the general population which can be attributed to the public nature of their daily lives. Fear of crime is influenced by demographic and neighbourhood characteristics (Baron 2011, 477; Kinsella 2012, 128). The survey showed a statistically significant difference ($p<0.001$) with a large effect size (r=-0.56) between how safe urban and rural respondents feel while living on the street (Figure 2). The difference can be explained by the deviant place theory which suggests that individuals are more likely to fall victim to crime when they are exposed to dangerous places. The theory considers cities as dangerous places since they present higher levels of crime compared to rural areas (Siegel 2010, 72).

Figure 2: Respondents' feelings of safety while living on the street (%)

Fear of crime is context-specific and, amongst others, influenced by the environment. Respondents identified twelve spaces where they feel most safe, with the most frequently mentioned safe space being public areas (n=19; 27.1%). Urban and rural respondents expressed roughly the same level of concern about falling victim to robbery, although significant differences featured in terms of fear of being physically attacked (p=0.038, r=-0.24), theft of goods ($p<0.001$; r=-0.41), and harassment ($p<0.001$; r=-0.51) (Figure 3).

Figure 3: Respondents' fear of falling victim to types of crime (%)

Urban respondents (n=32; 80.0%) were significantly more likely ($p<0.001$; $r=-0.54$) to anticipate falling victim to crime in the future compared to their rural counterparts (n=8; 26.7%). More than a third of all respondents felt safe in the morning and somewhat less safe in the afternoon (Figure 4). Evenings proved to be the least safe time for both urban and rural respondents. Compared to less than one in ten (n=3; 7.7%) urban respondents, more than a third of rural respondents (n=11; 35.7%) felt safe all day.

**Figure 4: Time of day respondents feel most safe (%)**

Fear of crime amongst the homeless may be a function of where and with whom they spend their time. The survey showed that the majority of respondents (n=57; 81.4%) slept on the street or in public parks (n=10; 14.3%), and very few

made use of the shelters (n=3; 4.3%). Roughly half of the respondents (n=36; 51.4%) spent most of their day time in the company of other homeless persons and 61.4% (n=43) do so at night. The lifestyle exposure theory suggests that the likelihood of victimisation increases when less time is spent with non-family members, especially in the case of younger men who reside in the inner city. While the potential of being victimised by other homeless persons is present, it can conversely be argued that spending time with others, especially at night, might serve as protection against possible threats. In other words, fellow homeless persons could fulfil the role of guardians as the routine activities theory suggests (Tyler, Kort-Butler & Swendener 2014, 1059; Felson & Cohen 1980, 392; Tyler & Beal 2010, 103).

3.3 Experiences of victimisation

The prevalence of victimisation amongst homeless persons is evident since they often witness fellow homeless persons being victimised. More than two-thirds of respondents (n=30; 42.9%) knew a homeless person who fell victim to crime. Respondents from the urban setting reported a higher frequency of knowing of a homeless person who fell victim to crime compared to those from the rural sample ($p<0.001$; r=-0.44) (Figure 5).

**Figure 5: Responses on how often the homeless fall victim to crime (%)**

The homeless are more likely to be victimised than the general population. Due to their vulnerability, homeless persons are exposed to violent situations and potential offenders on - daily basis (Dietz and Wright 2005, 38; Scurfield et al 2004, 7). Evidence on the victimisation of homeless people ranges from 32% to 68% with the most common form of crimes being physical assault and theft. More than half of the respondents from the present survey (n=37; 52.9%) have been victimised since becoming homeless. Three in five urban respondents (n=24; 60.0%) and two in five rural respondents (n=13; 43.3%) reported having fallen victim to crime.

Although the survey covered an array of victimisation typologies, only theft and physical assault will be reported here since the n-values of, for example, verbal abuse (n=2; 2.9%), were too low to provide meaningful insights. In the year preceding the survey, 26 respondents (37.1%) experienced incidences of theft, which mostly took place on the street. Male offenders perpetrated all cases of theft and they were between 20 and 29 years of age. Fourteen incidences of theft occurred in the evening and twelve during the day. Only six cases of theft were reported to the police. Fifteen respondents (n=15; 21.4%) were physically assaulted, of which ten incidents took place in the street. The assaults were committed by one female and 17 male perpetrators. In eleven cases the perpetrators were between the ages of 20 and 29 years and they were intoxicated at the time of the assault. Only three of the assaults were reported to the police and in 14 cases respondents suffered physical injury – nine of which sustained serious harm – yet none of them sought medical assistance.

More than half of respondents (n=39; 55.7%) have used violence to counteract victimisation (Figure 6), and the vast majority of these (n=35; 89.7%) felt that such behaviour was effective. According to the routine activities theory, predictable activities heightens the possibility of victimisation and it is, therefore, not surprising that nearly one in five urban respondents (n=7; 18.4%) alter their daily routines (Felson & Cohen 1980, 392).

Figure 6: Methods respondents used to prevent victimisation (%)

3.4 The homeless and the police

Homeless individuals tend to have a negative relationship with the police (McNamara, Crawford & Burns 2013, 359). When a homeless person commits a serious offence, they must be held accountable, but arrest and imprisonment should be the last resort for homeless persons who commit minor transgressions, especially behaviour that is guided by municipal bylaws (Police Executive Research Forum 2018). It is of concern that the South African metropolitan police, specifically that of Tshwane, Johannesburg, Cape Town, and Ethekwini, barely feature in official policies that affect the homeless. Moreover, an online search for the policies of these four metropolitan police services regarding homelessness yielded no results. In this regard, a survey in the United States showed that 60% of municipal police and 90% of sheriff's departments did not have a policy on homelessness (McNamara et al 2013, 364-365). It is worthwhile to briefly reflect on the homeless person policies of two police departments in the United States, namely that of Ford Lauderdale (2019) and San Luis Obispo (2019). The two policies broadly state that,

- The homeless have specific needs, including safety and protection, to which police officers must be sensitive.
- Homelessness is not a crime and it cannot be used as justification for detention or unwarranted law enforcement action.
- Procedures are required to guide police officers when engaging with the

homeless, albeit for casual contact or law enforcement purposes.

- A staff member must be designated as a homeless liaison officer to link with social services and to train fellow officers in legal and social matters related to homelessness.
- The homeless must be offered the same level and quality of service as any other member of society.
- In the case of a homeless person having committed a misdemeanour, referral to support services should be offered in lieu of physical arrest.
- Officers should respect the personal property of homeless persons and should not remove, destroy or discard their property without specific reasons to do so.

In light of their negative relationship with the police, homeless persons are generally unwilling to report incidents of victimisation to the police. As such, it is not surprising that most incidences of theft (n=20; 76.9%) and assault (n=12; 80.0%) were not reported to the police. Homeless persons' strained relationship with the police extends to their own adverse experiences and interactions with police officers. More than half of respondents (n=42; 60.0%) stated that they have been harassed by the police, with urban respondents (n=30; 71.4%) having been significantly more likely than rural (n=12; 40.0%) counterparts to have experienced such harassment (p=0.003; r=-0.35). Rural respondents mostly reported being stopped and searched by police officers, while urban respondents reported a wider variety of forms of police harassment (p=0.028; r=-0.33) (Figure 7).

Figure 7: Respondents' encounters with the police (%)

3.5 Leaving the streets

The lack of recognition of the street homeless arises as a separate issue in development planning and housing policies. Furthermore, the majority of homeless people are trapped in the cycle of homelessness due to the lack of employment as well as identity documents (South African Institute of International Affairs 2018). The greater proportion (n=67; 95.7%) of survey respondents stated that they would like to leave the streets. Similar to reasons why respondents were homeless in the first place, the bulk of respondents (n=26; 86.5%) from the rural setting cited unemployment as an explanation of why they were still homeless (Figure 8). Rates of homelessness frequently correlate with economic conditions and costs of housing and rentals. Pathways out of homelessness often depend on the availability of affordable housing (Hanratty, 2017,640). Internationally, various kinds of housing provision have been the most advocated solutions to street homelessness, but it has been almost impossible for the South African government to implement a similar approach given the many uncertainties about the nature and size of the homeless population (Cross et al 2010,144). At least 20.5% of the urban respondents reported a lack of housing as a reason for still being homeless.

Figure 8: Reason still homeless (urban/rural) (%)

4. Conclusion

Living on the street is without a doubt unsafe. The current study sheds light on the vulnerability of the homeless to fall victim to crime, and how troubled personal histories and structural influences shape pathways to homelessness. Homeless people experience the world as an unsafe place. Theirs is a world of exposure to frequent, often never-ending abuse and ridicule, and one in which they are denied respect. The high levels of victimisation and the failure of formal agencies to provide protection are clear indications of the denial of homeless people as victims of crime, and equally so of the denial of the rights generally associated with full citizenship.

With the South African unemployment rate at 30.8% in the third quarter of 2020 (Statistics South Africa 2020), the background characteristics of homeless persons in South Africa paint a bleak picture for employment prospects, which is exacerbated by low education levels and the age of becoming homeless, particularly amongst the urban homeless who risk becoming chronically homeless. The findings suggest that the rural homeless feel more safe, present lower levels of fear of victimisation, and are less likely to anticipate falling victim to crime in the near future. Similar to the general population, the homeless feel safer in the morning and afternoon which is not surprising since the theft and physical assault appear more likely to take place in the evenings. The profile of perpetrators is similar across settings, i.e. young, intoxicated men who are unknown to the homeless, and it is therefore understandable that homeless victims often retaliate with physical force and weapons to prevent personal harm. The findings further highlight the complex relationships which the homeless have with the police. The homeless needs to be able to seek help when victimised, thus ease of access to criminal justice and health care is essential.

Homeless people's experiences of victimisation need to be recognised on a national and local policy level, therefore, requiring the systematic counting of the homeless population to determine what responses are necessary to assist the homeless. To ensure that the homeless receive the necessary protection from criminal justice system agents, it is important to acknowledge that the homeless can be victims of crime too. Additionally, law enforcement agents should receive training on how to effectively interact with the homeless. Furthermore, alternative strategies- beyond the criminal justice system- should be explored

as a means of tackling violence and victimisation amongst the homeless. The reliance on criminal justice frameworks yields limited results. Social intervention programmes geared for the homeless should focus on developing and harnessing social support.

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South Africa-Russia Trade Relations in the Mbeki-Putin Years, 1999-2008: Ideological Minimalism and Growing Commercial Flows

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Abstract

With both leaders focused on integration (or re-integration) of their states with their respective regions, for South Africa and Russia, under the coinciding presidencies of Thabo Mbeki and Vladimir Putin (1999 to 2008), distal ties would appear to have been a peripheral consideration, albeit one pursued with relative consistency. These years were un-ideological, having followed the collapse of the USSR but preceding the emergence of the intermittently ideological BRICS project. I use trade data from multiple sources to assess the two countries' economic relationship under these leaders. Upon noting the continued but slow growth in political interaction under the two leaders, the article documents the effects of political interaction on trade, which was encouraged by both leaders as they sought deeper south-south cooperation (SSC) and lessened dependency on the West (with which both countries were nevertheless growingly intertwined). Trade responded favourably on both sides after the 2006 mutual visits by the two presidents (as seen by 2007 trade volumes). Overall, under the Mbeki-Putin years, we observe Russian products forming a higher share of South African imports than the other way around, whilst growth in access to each other's markets saw mostly new access for South Africa (giving it a favourable surplus of over US$25-million, which grew to over US$2-billion under the Zuma years), thereby complicating our understanding of the relationship and the nature of the asymmetry which defines it.

Keywords: Russia in Africa; South Africa-Russia relations; South-south cooperation; Trade; Thabo Mbeki; Vladimir Putin

1.Introduction

The 1994 transition to democracy in South Africa signified a victory not only for the liberation movements which had fought against Apartheid, but also for their international allies. Thus, South Africa's (re-)entry into global affairs ought to have coincided not only with a re-kindling of relations with the international community broadly but also the formation of relations with states with whom relations had never existed with Pretoria. These include the majority of the states on the African continent (who had stood in solidarity with the oppressed and marginalised black population in the country), India (who had led the charge in calling for a boycott of the minority regime in South Africa by the United Nations in the 1940s), and China (who had given support to the Pan-African Congress) and Russia, formerly the citadel of the Soviet Union. The last of these in particular is particularly interesting; by the admission of the South African ruling party's own leaders, it offered the most support to the African National Congress (ANC) whilst it was in exile. But by 1994, the Soviet Union had ceased to exist, having collapsed in 1991, and had been replaced by the political entity of the Russian Federation (which also succeeded it to its seat at the UN Security Council [UNSC]) following its dissolution. The ANC's own communist inclinations had dampened under the weight of the post-Cold War order. What character would relations between the two countries take? This was one of the questions that loomed largest as the new administration settled in. South African saw the first official visit by a head of state – five years after coming into power – when President Nelson Mandela visited Moscow in April 1999. He was on his way out, having opted to have one term in office. It would be another seven years until the next visit when a sitting president of South Africa, already in his second term in office, paid a visit to Russia, in July 2006, which was reciprocated two months later, marking the first time a Russian president had ever visited South Africa.

By many Cold War logics, which indeed informed policy in the West and thereby led to a soft stance on the Apartheid government (seen as a bulwark against communist influence in southern Africa), Russia ought to have been the principal partner of an ANC-run South Africa. Yet by the admission of former president Thabo Mbeki, the relationship with Moscow failed to live up to many of its stated goals, and was rather characterised by minimal political

contact. This was a typical post-Cold War nexus; with ideology absent as a common denominator and cooperative agreements confined to scientific and economic cooperation. Ultimately, the relationship saw the unfulfilled creation of a geostrategic platform that had been meant to be an "OPEC for platinum" led by the two countries, joined by Zimbabwe. Though trade flows continued to grow, both sides nonetheless continued to be substantially more integrated with the West than with each other, with immediate regional priorities preoccupying both leaders' foreign policies.

By comparison, President Jacob Zuma's tenure in office (2009-2018) was characterised by much closer cooperation and courted controversy for doing so. Some notable milestones in this regard include South Africa's entry into the BRICS association (both an economic and ideological fount for the administration whose rhetoric was laden with a turn away from the West), as well as the ultimately failed nuclear deal. Nevertheless, what may appear from afar to be a minimalist relationship may closer examination prove to be an active interaction. The present study, the first full-length peer-reviewed article to do so, sought to examine the relationship with those aims through the prism of the two presidents who led the countries in their immediate post-transitional phases (Mbeki after Mandela and Putin following Boris Yeltsin). Moreover, it does so with a view to test the contours of South Africa-Russian asymmetry, and problematises assumptions of South African juniority/dependency on Russia upon the former's liberation and governance under the ANC, owing to its struggle-era reliance on the latter.

This article reviews the pattern taken by the trade between South Africa and Russia in the 1999-2008 period under presidents Thabo Mbeki and Vladimir Putin. The research is based on economic data and several interviews with South African and Russian policymakers who had involvement or have expert-level familiarity with the relations under these two presidents. The article relies on these as its primary sources. Upon noting the continued but slow growth in political relations under the two leaders, the article documents trade findings, with a view to demonstrate the co-evolution in political and economic relations. These show growth in trade, which was encouraged by both leaders as they sought deeper 'South-South cooperation' and less dependency on the West (with which their countries were nevertheless both intertwined).

Interestingly, in light of the differences in economic and population size,

the trade appears to have mostly been in favour of South Africa and growth in each other's access to mutual markets saw mostly new access for South Africa in Russia (with its trade surplus moving up from US$25.5-million to US$2.153-billion). This should go a long way in complicating our understanding of the relationship in its global South mould; the data generated shows that, under Mbeki, Russia accounted for a higher share of South African imports than South African products did for Russian imports. Thus, in this regard, South Africa was (quantitatively) *more* dependent on Russia. However, South Africa exported more to Russia in dollar terms (thus garnering the US$25.5-million surplus). Notably, the years under Zuma saw South Africa not only growing its balance of trade surplus vis-à-vis Russia, but also accounting for a higher share of Russia's import market than Russia did for South Africa's. The product profile was not substantially transformed, however. The study also notes growths in trade in 2007, the year after the mutual visits, with Russian imports to South Africa more than doubling, and with them the share of Russia's South African imports. This spike declined in the following year. One of the potential obstacles to heightened trade under Mbeki and Putin may have been barriers to entry, which were only diminished by Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2012. Overall, however, the countries still constitute less than 1% of each other's import markets. The years under Mbeki and Putin did not substantially revise commercial reliance on third party trade partners, who are mostly in the West, albeit with an already growing Chinese share in both their markets. This thus necessitates a renewed understanding of dependency on commercial activity among countries of the global South among themselves, and particularly these two. This is delved into in the Conclusion of this article.

Section 2 of this article reviews the South Africa-Russia relationship. Section 3 gives a literature review. Section 4 briefly comments on the potential conceptual and theoretical relevance of the findings to be made. Section 5 provides a breakdown of the methodology. Section 6 presents the findings made. Section 7 concludes the article, reflecting on the significance of the findings and avenues for further research.

2. South Africa and Russia: The Foreign Policies and Bilateral Relations of Two Societies in Transition

South African president Jacob Zuma (2009-2018) paid more visits to Russia than to any other country. Furthermore, the two countries' cooperation found expression in the BRICS association of emerging countries. South Africa's chronic electricity shortages were apparently looking to be satiated through Russian cooperation, with the South African government seemingly granting a contract to Russian company Rosatom to bolster its nuclear power. This so-called 'Russia nuclear deal' worth US$10-billion later gained controversy, however. As Russian officials see it, this was due to untoward Western influence, including over local media which painted the deal as corrupt. Local opponents of the deal, meanwhile, touted the expensiveness of the procedure, as well as a lack of transparency on how the Russian company had been selected.

The substantially deepened relations between Zuma-led South Africa and Medvedev- and later Putin(II)-led Russia were the product of foundations cemented in the period when the South Africa and Russia were under the leaderships of Thabo Mbeki and Vladimir Putin (first as Prime Minister and then President) from 1999 to 2008. Significantly, this relatively under-examined period offers some a priori analogies which make for insightful comparisons. Both presidents were leading their countries in period which could be described as 'post-transitional societies' (Hughes and John 2001: 673; Frenkel and MacKenzie 2010: 1). South Africa was five years into its emergence from the throes of Apartheid, which had been substantially assisted by the Soviet Union/Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), which had itself collapsed in the early 1990s.

Both were therefore only the second leaders of their countries, with elderly predecessors (Nelson Mandela and Boris Yeltsin), though Mbeki arguably had had a greater role in foreign policy-making as early as 1994, when he became Deputy President of the country (Van Heerden 2017: 3). Putin on the other hand, had been involved in Moscow's intelligence apparatus, and had later served as Secretary of the Security Council prior to becoming Prime Minister in August of 1999, and president less than a year later in December of 1999 in an acting capacity and then formally from May of 2000. Both leaders also sought to position themselves as regionally-mindedness in their foreign policies, with Mbeki propounding the policy he termed the African Renaissance, buttressed by the reformation of the

Organisation of African Unity into the African Union in the Durban Summit in 2002, along with institutions such as the New Economic Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD, later renamed the AU Development Agency in 2019). On the other hand, Putin-led Russia prioritised what is termed the 'near abroad' (Spechler 2010: 36) of the former Soviet sphere, which were increasingly pursued by (and in turn pursuing) the European Union for membership. These were buttressed by the formation and consolidation, respectively, of the Commonwealth of Independent States (consisting of Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Armenia, Moldova, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, with Georgia initially joining and exiting in 2008; Ukraine and Turkmenistan were parties of the founding process but never became official members) and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) military alliance (signed in 1992 and formalised in 2002), which is widely seen as a successor to the Warsaw Pact (Sussex 2012: 203). On the other hand, the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) looked westward, and joined the EU and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004.

The two leaders were also in complicated relationships with the West, operating as they were in a period of US triumphalism at the behest of the post-Cold War period, followed by US militarism in the post-9/11 years, with Russia having pursued its own anti-terror strategy in Chechnya but which was reluctant to grant the US permission to invade Iraq through the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) in 2003. On the other hand, many African leaders, including South African President Thabo Mbeki were quite opposed to the manner in which the war on terror took shape. Indeed, his predecessor Nelson Mandela had even planned a trip to Iraq, along with British mogul Richard Branson, to try and convince Saddam Hussein to step down. The bombing began before he could make the trip, however. Nevertheless, both countries were, and indeed remain, commercially linked to the EU, which is the principal trade partner for both countries, whilst the US was the leading source of FDI to Russia in 2019 at US\$39.2-billion (Bershidsky 2019), and the EU to South Africa, at 75% of all foreign direct investments in 2018 (Tralac 2018). These two leaders therefore had a rare near-perfect coincidence of holding high office in their countries and directing their foreign policies. How much did the two leaders cooperate?

President Mbeki only made a single state visit to Russia, in July of 2006, however this was not only to meet with his Russian counterpart but for a

multilateral summit; President Mbeki, accompanied by First Lady Zanele Mbeki, had led a South African delegation including then Minister of Foreign Affairs Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, Minister of Trade and Industry Mandisi Mpahlwa and his special advisor Adv. Mojanku Gumbi, went to St. Petersburg mainly to the G8 Summit. The South African President was part of a delegation of the Strategic Outreach Partners made up of the leaders of other countries, including India, Brazil, China and Mexico. The purpose of hid participation in the summit was "for strategic discussions with G8 leaders to discuss among others energy, security, education, infectious diseases, international trade and a presentation on Africa" (DIRCO 2006). The president also used the summit to make numerous bilateral discussions, including with the leaders of Brazil, China, France, President Hu Jintao and President Jacques Chirac, and the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

On the other hand, President Putin made a bilateral visit to South Africa, which he made later that year. The meeting was mainly economic in nature, accompanied by discussions on developments in the southern African region, as well as then ongoing conflicts in Sudan and Cote d'Ivoire, indicating already at this point a Russian focus on conflict and security on the continent, which has shaped its policy in recent years towards the Central African Republic, the Horn and Libya (*Fin24*, 4 September 2006).

At the time, the two concluded several agreements, including on medical cooperation, peaceful use of outer space, intellectual property protection, and aviation and water resources and forestry (*Fin24* 2006). At the time, the majority of South African exports are made up of vehicle engines (18.8% of exports); machines and mechanical appliances (14%); fresh grapes (13.8%); flat-rolled products or iron (10%); pears (6.8%) peaches (3.4%), amounting to almost 70% of all exports to Russia, whilst South Africa mainly imported nickel group minerals from Russia (*Fin24* 2006). Putin's visit was also arranged to ensure a meeting with South African diamond mining mogul and Chairman of the De Beers Group Nicky Oppenheimer, who was thanked by the Russian president for establishing the South Africa-Russia Business Council (Kremlin 2006) – "two months later De Beers and Russia's state-owned Alrosa diamond mining firm signed a joint prospecting deal" (*Forbes* 5 March 2008).

"We want to see the visit not as a once-off event but as a very significant building block in our relations," noted Dlamini-Zuma, though this would be the

last visit until Putin's visit in 2018 for the BRICS summit. In that period, Russia took the opportunity to hold bilateral discussions with other countries, most notably Turkey, leading to wide speculation that Ankara would soon join the association (Ndzendze 2018). In his bilateral meeting with new South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, during which he reportedly inquired on whether the nuclear deal could be resuscitated (Winning 2018), as he did once again in the 2019 October Sochi Russia-Africa Summit. In turn, Ramaphosa summarised his response thus, claiming that "we are not about to embark on a nuclear power project we cannot afford" (Fabricius 2019). In a 2016 interview with the Russian *Kazan Journal of International Law and International Relations*, Mbeki admitted that some failures, including a planned OPEC-like cartel for platinum with Russia and Zimbabwe: however, "these discussions did not go anywhere" (Mbeki and Mezyaev 2016: 13).

In some regards, however, the two leaders set in motion the lead up to formation of the BRICS as it is in the present, though South African entry is substantially due to Chinese invitation. Many scholars have observed that the organisation is trying to engineer redress in global order (Mthembu 2017). Composed of the developing states of Brazil, Russia, India, China and (belatedly added) South Africa, the BRICS association was formed in 2009 upon being benchmarked in 2001 by the Goldman Sachs economist Jim O'Neal to be set, caeteris paribus, to match the level of industrialisation and economic standing of the developed nations. It was therefore, at the very least, an attempt to bring about some level of multilateralism and a shift away from the historically globally dominant US and the EU countries and 'their' international financial institutions, primarily Bretton Woods, as well as ratings agencies such as Moody's, Fitch and Standard and Poor's. In the successive summits since 2009 that take place in the BRICS countries on a rotating basis, the BRICS countries have discussed and enacted various mutual positions and common policies and have sought to build institutions indicating a shift away from the West-dominated order, including a development bank and a 'BRICS ratings agency' to offset the perceived disproportional influence of the western ratings agencies, Within that organisation, as is the case in general global political economy which the organisation itself is trying to transform, some asymmetry persists. For example, between 2008 and 2018, China was the largest recipient of FDI, whereas Brazil overtook Russia in 2010 by receiving US$82.39-billion to Russia's US$43.168-billion; India overtook Russia in 2014, when it saw

a US$34.577-billion worth of new FDI to Russia's US$22.031-billion. As at the end of the dataset, the ranking of FDI influx ranged from China (US$203.429-billion), Brazil (US$88.324-billion), India (US$42.117-billion), Russia (US$8.785-billion), and South Africa (US$5.46-billion).

It is worth examining therefore the degree to which the asymmetry plays out in the bilateral setting between South Africa and Russia. The two following sections below respectively (1) give a literature review on the study of South African and Russian foreign policies, and appraisals of the relationship, and the emergent themes in the scholarship and (2) provide the theoretical framework through which to analyse (and therefore potentially understand) the relations between the two countries, specifically under the coinciding presidencies of Mbeki and Putin.

3. Literature Review

Former president Mbeki summarises the history of the ANC and the USSR as follows:

> "Before the 1960s these relationships were mostly between Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the South African Communist Party. But later, from the 1960s the relationships were broadened and included ANC. At the end, globally the Soviet Union became the principal supporter of the ANC in many respects. For instance when the British and American Governments and others claimed that ANC was a terrorist movement, USSR clearly said that ANC was a leading movement of the people of South Africa who were struggling for their liberation. The Soviet Union was our principal supporter in terms of the supply of weapons to conduct the armed struggle" (Mbeki and Mezyaev 2016: 11).

South Africa's foreign policy, much like (and indeed because of) the domestic order of the country took a divergence in 1994, with the coming into power of the country's first black government under the leadership of Nelson Mandela. Thus "South Africa's foreign policy has evolved through various presidents" (Qobo and Dube 2015: 145). Furthermore, and more to the point of this book, scholars of South African foreign policy observe that "since the dawn of democracy

there has also been a gradual shift from a foreign policy that exhibited strong normative expressions, inclined to the West, to a more pragmatic foreign policy that is aligned with the new rising powers" (Qobo and Dube 2015: 145; Van der Westhuizen and Smith 2015: 344). What has remained constant over this near three-decade period is South Africa's self-understanding as a regional leader, and middle power. Within the continent has had ample opportunities to live up to middle power and regional leadership status, as "typical middle power activities include a consistent interest in the resolution of conflicts (more often in their immediate region, but also on occasion beyond), and strengthening international law and the multilateral system (because they do not have preponderant military power)." Nevertheless, the middle power ranking, though often caricatured as the diplomatic equivalent of a 'global boy scout', has not precluded pragmatism given that "the middle power role is also driven by considerable self interest" (Van der Westhuizen and Smith 2015: 344). It is because of this that some foreign policy watchers note that South Africa's foreign policy "began its own drift with the demise of Mbeki in 2008; at the same time, opportunities for expanded international ties had begun to arise in the form of the interest in African resources on the part of emerging economies" (Qobo and Dube 2015: 151).

Under President Zuma, foreign policy was aligned more and more towards China and Russia (Van der Westhuizen and Smith 2015: 344). Indeed it is a commonly held historiography that "In the period beginning around 2002, especially midway through President Thabo Mbeki's first term of office, South Africa placed a strong emphasis on Africa's renewal or renaissance," whereas under Mandela there was a "moralising discourse on human rights that was characteristic of President Nelson Mandela's era (1994–1999)" (Qobo and Dube 2015: 151; Van Heerden 2017), whereas the Zuma presidency in turn was characterised by the tilt towards the East. Furthermore, the ruling ANC "has cemented party-to-party relations with both Vladimir Putin's United Russia, despite its right-leaning credentials, and the Communist Party of China" (Qobo and Dube 2015: 151). Such associations have been received differently, and accusations of corruption have flared up (Head 2019). Nonetheless, the decisive tilt in South Africa's policy is noted by all. Nonetheless, this neat compartmentalisation is not without its flaws. Indeed, the eastward tilt had already begun in the 1990s, owing to the historical relationship between the ANC and the USSR, the re-kindling of the staunchly anti-Apartheid India (which also has the a sizeable diaspora in South

Africa, which is the largest anywhere in the world), as well as South Africa's recognition of the PRC, owing to the pending return of Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997.

Nevertheless, the collapse of the USSR eliminated the ideological outlook of Moscow, who was also preoccupied with rebuilding Russia's economy and placed increasingly less emphasis on foreign relations on Africa (Neethling 2020: 15). As seen, the 2006 visit by Putin was the first of any Russian head of state. Succeeding Yeltsin, in his first term as president Putin is widely understood to have grown "increasingly wary" of the EU and the US's policies of expanding into Russia's "backyard" (Spechler 2010: 35). The relations between Russia and Africa appear to be less ideologically-inclined therefore, despite (or perhaps signified by) the party-to-party relations between the ANC and Russia United. Thus the Russia of 1999 was substantially removed from the Soviet Union Mbeki had went to study in in 1969 (Mbeki and Mezyaev 2016). The former president acknowledged that:

> "There were very close relations between Soviet Union and the ANC. But we have not seen this replicated in the relations between the Russian Federation and democratic South Africa. This was the same story with Sweden which had helped the ANC and our struggle very much. When it came to state-to-state relations during the post-apartheid period these did not become as strong as they should have been. So I think that this reflects some weaknesses in the formation and implementation of our foreign policy" (Mbeki and Mezyaev 2016: 13).

Russia's re-emergence on the continent has been linked to an ostensible Putin plan to outmanoeuvre Europe: "Putin has a renewed interest in Africa because it can play an important role in his political ambition to build strategic control over energy networks and resources. He can use the deals he made with Algeria, Libya and Nigeria to put the EU under pressure with regard to its future energy provision" (Hoste and Koch 2015: 3). Thus reportedly, "Russia is further reducing the EU's supply options by coupling its effort in the east with its efforts in Africa, especially in the countries that could eventually serve as alternative suppliers (to Russian energy resources) when it comes to European energy needs" (Hoste and Koch 2015: 3). The recent spurt of studies on Russia's re-emergence on the continent has brought to the fore some insights. Nonetheless, in their future-

oriented goals, they do not shed light on the history of specific bilateral relations. Thus, this is a first study of the relations between South Africa and Russia during the Mbeki-Putin period, with a comparative quantitative outlook on trade relations that also analyses the direction and magnitude of the mutual imports and balance of trade within the period as well as under the Zuma-Medvedev and Zuma-Putin (II) years (2009-2017).

4. Conceptual Framework

Though the article is not set out to vindicate, generate or test any particular theory, we can nonetheless make some theoretically relevant insights. There are numerous theoretical frameworks which could be employed to frame our analysis of the South Africa-Russia relationship under Mbeki and Putin. However, as our interest is in the asymmetry between the two major partners, the article will therefore make findings implicative for relations among middle powers and recovering major powers. In this regard, the most readily apparent framework is dependency theory, given its core-periphery lens. "The relationship is one in which a metropolis or center exerts pressure upon its satellite or periphery," and particularly "the South (Africa) has become an external sector of the North (Europe) - a source of materials, cheap labour and educated people (through brain drain)" (Matunhu 2011: 68).

Conceptually, the history of the relationship between the liberation movement governing South Africa and its historical proximity and dependency on Soviet assistance, this is given greater relevance. In research terms, given the historical client-like relationship that the ANC had observed with regards to the USSR ("the Soviet Union was our principal supporter" as Mbeki put had it [Mbeki and Mezyaev 2016: 11]), we would expect the trade balance to be tilted towards Russia, and it would have the trade surplus; moreover, the product set may be expected to look a certain way, with South Africa importing manufactured products and exporting mainly raw materials. This may especially be more so given Russia's economic size by virtue of its GDP, which stood at US$3.4-trillion in 2019 to South Africa's US$368-billion (a ratio of 1: 9), as well as its comparatively advanced stage of industrial development. Additionally, the lack of ideological convergence (as detailed in the literature review and as indicated in interviews with policymakers) as well as the lack of extensive public interaction

between the political principals, the economically concentrated analysis is given further rationale.

5. Methods and Analysis

This article quantitatively assesses the direction and magnitude of mutual imports between South Africa and Russia over the 1999-2008 period. In so doing, we are interested in the following research questions. Firstly, did Russian imports of South African products experience growth or decline in the period? Moreover, were these matched or exceeded by South African imports of Russian products? Secondly, we are interested in finding whether the overall balance of trade was in South Africa's favour (surplus) or not (deficit). Thirdly, the growth of South African exports to Russia were higher or lower than growth of exports under the successive Zuma presidency (i.e., 2008 to 2017). Thus, the first two questions investigate the direction, and the third question investigates the magnitude of trade relations under Mbeki and Putin.

This section analyses the direction and magnitude of mutual imports between South Africa and Russia in the 1999-2008 period. In Figure 1 below, we summarise the total imports by either country of products sourced from the other in the years under study.

Figure 1: Total Mutual Imports (in Millions of USD)

Figure 1 demonstrates that in 1999, and then between 2001 and 2005 and once again in 2008, Russian imports out-measured South African imports from Russia. Thus, South Africa had trade surpluses for 6 of the 10 years. Whilst Figure 1 captures the year-to-year trade totals (as well as the respective balances of trade), it nonetheless does not give insight on the significance of either country's imports into the other's market. Figure 2 shows the different market shares over the same period as derived from Figure 1, with the below figures indicating the share of each county's exports to their counterpart on their total imports.

Figure 2 demonstrates that South Africa has accounted for a higher share of Russian imports in 2 out of the 10 years, in 2003 and 2004, whilst Russia has accounted for a higher share of South African imports in 1999-2002 and 2005-2008. Noticeably, the two countries' mutual imports were still quite insignificant; with neither country accounting for more than 0.74% of each other's imports – the 0.74% high watermark (obtained in 2007) was Russia's (see Figure 2).

Figure 2: Mutual Shares in Total Imports (in %)

On the other hand, Figure 3 demonstrates that Russia imported slightly more from South Africa than did from Russia in the ten-year timeframe. As an aggregation of total annual imports by each country from the other, it demonstrates that South Africa made total imports from Russia that come up to a total of US$1.466-billion, whereas Russia made total imports from South Africa that total US$1.492-billion.

Figure 3: Aggregate South African-Russian Mutual Imports, 1999-2008 (in Millions of USD)

1492

■ Total South African Imports from Russia
■ Total Russian Imports from South Africa

Taken altogether, the data complicate the would-be asymmetrical relationship implied by dependency theorists. Whereas Figure 2 shows Russia having a higher share of South Africa's import market for more years (8) than South Africa did in Russia's (2) under the Mbeki-Putin years, Figures 1 and 3 on the other hand show that in aggregate terms, South Africa made more exports to Russia in dollar terms. Additionally, there can be two readings of Figure 2. It could be an indicator of Russia's multiplicity of trade partners than the purely asymmetrical nature of commercial relations. Alternatively, the Figure could be underlined by unequal import capacities and in this strict interpretation South Africa could be seen as being *more* dependent on Russia. A third reading could nonetheless note that these years were only a maintenance of the trade levels, with Russia accounting for 0.36% of South African imports in 1999 and 0.36% by the last year of Mbeki in office, whilst South Africa had initially accounted for 0.35% of the Russian import market in 1999 and had declined to 0.17% by the year he left office. A fourth reading, stemming from the third, could therefore understand the pattern in a global dependency pattern; these countries constituted less than 1% of each other's markets, with the substantial portion of either being dominated by the countries of the global north.

Using figures 4 to 6 the article tests the degree to which the pattern under the Mbeki-Putin years was reversed or sustained in the Zuma-Medvedev and Zuma-Putin (III) period. Figure 4 shows that Russia accounted for a higher share of

South African imports than South Africa constituted of Russian imports only in 2 years (2010 and 2016), with the trend mainly showing South Africa having a higher share of Russian imports for the majority of the years (in 2009, and then from 2011-2015). Thus, in this regard, Russia was *more* dependent on South Africa, in reversal to the trend in the 1999-2008 period (compared with Figure 2).

Figure 4: Total Mutual Imports, 2009-2016 (in Millions of USD)

Figure 5: Total Mutual Imports (in Millions of USD)

Furthermore, Russian imports from South Africa substantially out-measured South African imports from Russia (see Figure 5), with trade surpluses for the 2010-2016 period (compare with Figure 1). Noticeably, trade between South Africa and Russia still increased after 2014, the year of the sanctions posed on Russia by the West that also coincided with its expulsion from the G8.

Figure 6: Aggregate South Africa-Russia Mutual Imports, 2009-2016 (in Millions of USD)

2290,4

4444

■Total South African Imports from Russia ■Total Russian Imports from South Africa

Furthermore, Figure 6 shows that despite the shorter period of 8 years, the Zuma years also saw substantially higher exports to Russia at US$4.444-billion (compared to US$1.492-billion between 1999 and 2008; see Figure 3). Compared to the US$2.290-billion worth of South African imports from Russia, this demonstrates a trade surplus of US$2.1536-billion. One of the potential obstacles to heightened trade under Mbeki and Putin may have been barriers to entry, which were diminished by Russia's entry into the World Trade Organization in 2013. This remains untested, however, and is an area for further analysis.

In terms of the product sets, the South African Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) observes that "the export of mineral products [includes oil and gas] (67.4%) and metals and precious products (12.9%) are Russia's major exports" (Van Rensburg and Nqaba 2013: 24). However, South Africa mainly imports wheat (30%), processed copper (16%) and fertilisers (14%) from Russia, and Russia mainly imports agriculture, from South Africa. This indicates that the product exchange between the two countries was not changed between Mbeki and Zuma's presidencies. Noticeably, South Africa's oil imports do not stem from Russia. Rather the following countries make up the entirety of its oil sources: Saudi Arabia (42.29%), Nigeria (33.81%), Angola (13.02%), United Arab Emirates (5.59%), Ghana (3.05%), Togo (1.71%), and Norway (0.53%) (MIT Observatory of Economic Complexity 2020). For the entirety of the Zuma presidency, this remained unchanged with Saudi Arabia (38.73%), Nigeria

(28.71%), Angola (15.97%), Iran (7.14%), the UAE (3.72%), Ghana (1.82%), Qatar (1.38%), Equatorial Guinea (0.93%), Iraq (0.87%) and Oman (0.65%) being the main sources of oil to South Africa, indicating Russia's focus on its EU market (Barden 2017; November; Bremmer 2020).

6. Conclusion

The relationship between South Africa and Russia is a complex one, as substantially proved by the article. This quantitative analysis has demonstrated an upward trajectory, both in direction and magnitude. The conceptual implications drawn here are that asymmetry can take more than a single form in a bilateral relationship, but that this can change over time when political alignment co-evolves with the economic deepening (as seen under the Zuma years). In essence, this article showcases two routes by which to understand dependency in a dyadic relationship; one premised on share of a trade partner's total imports, another on trade balance surplus alone. The task at hand, however, remains integrating this into the nature of the political interaction, wherein Russia is the larger of the two in terms of GDP, population and global influence, but South Africa has a larger trade surplus.

The verdict remains to be seen for the Ramaphosa-Putin period, which has started off to mixed signals; resistance to the nuclear deal on the one hand, and security cooperation on the other; as signified by the perfectly timed landing of the Tupolev Tu-160 'Blackjack' bombers at Air Force Base Waterkloof at the onset of the Sochi summit in October of 2019 (Martin 2019).

There thus persist some areas of further research, including on the role of the Russian diaspora, the effect of third parties on the bilateral interaction (including the West as well as fellow BRICS members China and India, who are also playing and seeking to play greater roles on the continent, and who both boast large diasporas in South Africa), as well as FDI, which could further the quantitatively informed framework for analysing the asymmetry between South Africa and Russia as it could integrate notions of investor confidence on both sides. Some early research into investment flows demonstrate greater interest in Russia by South African financiers than Russian interest in South Africa.

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DEBATE ARTICLES

A Decolonial Perspective on Boko Haram's Campaign of Terror, Sources of Funding, Mobilisation Strategies and Major Attacks since 2009

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Abstract

In the West African region, one conflict that has ravaged the nations since 2009 is the Boko Haram Insurgency which is located in Nigeria. This Islamist group is indisputably the most dangerous group confronting Nigeria today with their violent activities ranging from political and socio-economic to security and governance aspects. Boko Haram has managed to wipe out thousands of Nigerians since its inception in 2009, with an attempt to take power from the legitimate government of Nigeria. Boko Haram's ethnic, religious, and regional fault-lines do not only impact Nigeria but people beyond the borders of Nigeria. A quick review of the current ongoing scholarly debate on the activities of Boko Haram reveals that scholars have not paid much attention to the group's funding, recruitment, and major attacks in combination for better apprehension when reading. In cases where such has been analysed, it has been individually analysed and most of these studies are five-ten years old. Hence, such information needs an update to remain relevant in cases where they are still poised to be relevant. Therefore, this article's central objective is to analyse the three identified themes using a decolonial perspective. It argues that Boko Haram's ongoing campaign of terror is inextricably linked to the funding it continues to receive and strong recruitment tactics.

1.Introduction

Before any further reading of this article, the authors have hastened to highlight that the relevancy of the geographical scope of Boko Haram stems from the belief that African conflicts elsewhere in the regions have an immense effect on all other regions inclusive of the Southern Africa. Therefore, through many multifaceted studies on the subject concerned, the authors have been able to identify some of the themes which deserve more scholarly debate and update. The same scholarly themes which pillared this research article have been gauged out from the literature analysis provided below to show exactly what drove the undertaking of this research article.

Firstly, the study of Falode (2016) is extensively acknowledged as it provides a number of strategic responses employed by the government of Nigeria in its attempt to counter-fight Boko Haram. But then left out a deep critical reflection of who funds Boko Haram. The same method of analysis was applied secondly by Obaji (2013) whose study revealed to us that videos, blogs and Youtube are used by Boko Haram which continues to encourage extreme vilification of the enemy-other motivating for the holy war through martyrdom.

Thirdly, is the study of Obah-Akpowoghagha (2016) which reveals that Boko Haram continues to feed on the social and economic un-wellness of Nigerians. Human security analysis seems to be dominant as he adds that average citizens do not get enough socio-economic security in Nigeria due to their ongoing battle with cultural deformity, poverty, unemployment, and social discontent amongst the populace. But they did not really pay too much attention to a deep critical reflection of historical major attacks carried out by Boko Haram. The same is also noted from the study of Barna (2014) who has focused on the rise of Boko Haram which continues to contribute to the growing insecurity in Nigeria. He argued that the growth of Boko Haram is mostly attributed to its main appeal to the unemployed youth that is not satisfied with the actions of the government by employing preaching sessions that promote sedition against the Nigerian government, Christians, and other moderate Muslims. There is also the study of Shuaibu and Saleh (2015) which traces the historical genesis of the Yan Tatsine riots, often interpreted as the predecessor of Boko Haram. They both show that the former leader was Muhammed Marwa (nicknamed Maitatsine), a former controversial leader and Nigerian preacher who used to castigate the Nigerian State.

As much as it was important to revisit the studies highlighted above, it remains critical to indicate that Marwa was worried about purifying Islam against westernization and modernization and the establishment of a modern state. His brand of Islamic extremism depicts the worst form of anti-Kano and government emirate texts which led ultimately to the formation of religious riots which killed thousands of people in Nigeria in the 1980s. Against this backdrop, the problems of ethnoreligious unrests in Nigeria have of recent times (Boko Haram period) become a subject of considerable attention. This is because of their escalation which continues to move from the West African region to the South, East and North Africa to beyond the continental borders. It is also important to highlight that Nigeria remains a multi-religious country which has been a victim of recurrent deadly religious riots since independence up to today. This happens most in the Northern region of Nigeria such as in the Adamawa, Borno, Yobe, Kaduna, Sokoto, Kano, and Plateau. Hence the undertaking of this article sought to explore Boko's Haram historical roots, its sources of funding, how it mobilizes youth and major attacks it carried since its inception in 2009.

The aim of this article is to analyse Boko Haram's ongoing campaign of terror, sources of funding, recruitment strategies and major attacks since 2009. The objectives of this article are as follows: to explain the historical development of Boko Haram; analyse Boko Haram's source of funding and mobilization strategies; and to analyse Boko's ongoing campaign of terror in the form of historical major attacks since the inception.

This article employed a qualitative research approach by utilizing secondary sources of data. Secondary sources were adopted because most of the available literature drawn and incorporated in this subject could never be different from those of the primary sources, which to some extent could have required months for issues involving ethical complications, technical analytic aspects and issues of movement. The secondary sources used were research reports, journal articles, online articles, official documents, books which have been written about this subject. The authors adopted the use of Thematic Content Analysis (TCA) which is explained broadly (step by step) by Anderson (2017) to analyse the entire collected data. The TCA analysed data had ensured the ingredients (credibility, dependability, and confirmability) of all qualitative research methods by employing data triangulation.

2. A Decolonial Perspective

After a critical reflection on the literature review on the subject of Boko Haram, the authors have noted that there are a number of themes which needs scholarly attention. It is within the context of the Islamophobic violence against ordinary citizens of Nigeria that the ongoing scholarly debate on the state of Boko Haram should be critically reviewed. The authors of this article debunked the commanding Western conceptualisations and theories in analysing this group (Rapanyane 2018). By doing this, a decolonial theory was chosen to ground-root this article in order to unmask the problematic Euro-American epistemic basis of the current commanding analysis of Boko Haram. Far from denying that it remains a big African problem which needs Africa's attention, the authors have highlighted the hypocrisies and inconsistencies (In introduction) of Western theories in analysing this organization as an organization which is a by-product of greedy and selfish Africans who do not value themselves (Rapanyane 2019). By highlighting this point, it was deemed significant also to indicate that an emerging decolonial scholars like ourselves needed a strong theoretical and literature premise on the already existing information and/ data (either of Africans, Europeans or Americans). This is far from being a strange act as some scholars of Afrocentricity do draw from existing mainstream theories to sharpen and strengthen their scholarly debates. It is important to note that as much as this research article was a desktop one, drawing information from secondary sources indeed assisted the article's decolonial authors to achieve the central objectives which have been identified and deemed significant to address.

Indisputably, the advocates and/ prominent decolonial scholars such as Ndlovu (2013) and Ndlovu-Gatsheni (2013), Zondi (2016) and Lushaba (2015) do agree that decolonial scholars find common ground in viewing the issues of Africa as having received negative analysis in the past and negative light in the global march forward. They are supported by Mignolo (2005, 6) who argues that "Coloniality is a name for the 'darker side' of modernity that needs to be unmasked because it exists as 'an embedded logic that enforces control, domination, and exploitation disguised in the language of salvation, progress, modernization, and is good for everyone." It was Mignolo (2005, 159) who differentiated decoloniality from other prevailing critical social theories and said

that it is "its locus of enunciations and its genealogy- which is outside Europe." He further indicated that "decoloniality can be best understood as a pluriversal epistemology of the future – a redemptive and liberators epistemology that seeks to delink from the tyranny of abstract universals". We therefore, borrowed the Afro-Decolonial analytic categories of grounding, orientation and perspective from Asante (1990, 2003) and Shai (2016) to sharpen our decolonial epistemic standpoint in this article. This was done with the purpose of justifying the much-required scholarly epistemic intervention from non-Euro-American scholars in order to interject the Global Southerners' perspective and space in re-conceptualising Boko Haram as a by-product of the ongoing funds which are poured into its activities (Copeland 2013).

One important point to note in most theoretical underpinnings is that theories are chosen for a particular reason. In this article, the authors have adopted a decolonial perspective because most of the studies which have been conducted on this subject have subscribed to Non-African, Western theories which have not really been aligned well to the ground-conditions of Africa. These theories often produced western informed experiences on what is transpiring in Nigeria, particularly as it relates to Boko Haram (Rapanyane, 2019). Drawing from this unfairness in the analysis of the subject of this nature, the authors have opted to use a decolonial perspective in order to decolonize this subject so that readers (in the present and the future) can finally hear the genuine voices of an Africans on this subject. Often times, theories of this kind are adopted to bring about an epistemic justice in subjects that lack African decolonial voices. It is within the parameters of the capable African scholars who have an immense interest in ensuring that their voices are heard in African Scholarship to ensure that they analyse these African issues fairly, without taking sides, as they are also informed by African principles of knowing. This stands a good chance in intensifying the struggle for decolonization in Africa.

As much as scholars can disagree to agree that Boko Haram might/might not be a problem of the entire African continent. What remains critical is that Boko Haram developed out of Africa and continues to affect African countries even beyond the borders of Africa. Countries like Chad, Cameroon, Mozambique, and Niger are not sparred in the continued violence that erupts in the presence of Boko Haram. Thus, even if it is still very much predominant in North-Eastern Part of Africa, it continues to be a thriving international terrorist group which

is beyond control. This means that African scholars should not move away from placing more attention on this group in order to assist in the complete defeat and removal of this group from the African soil. In doing so, this helps Africa in its developmental objectives that are at times, tempered due to the ongoing political instabilities caused by the likes of Boko Haram.

In order to realise the central objectives of this article, the authors present the disentanglement of Boko Haram as a difficult issue in the conceptualisation of the Euro-American complexity involved in trying to analyse the organization as well as their theoretical failures insufficiently explaining Boko Haram, its history, funding and how it mobilizes the youth which continues to join the organisation, and major attacks as shown by these scholars: Falode (2016), Obaji (2013), Shuaibu and Saleh (2015) Barna (2014) and Obah-Akpowoghagha (2016). This move has assisted the authors in epistemologically and theoretically achieving the central purpose of this decolonial article. The first section of this article explores a synopsis of the historical developments of Boko Haram. The next section then deals with sources of funds, mobilization strategies and major attacks of this group.

3. Boko Haram's historical development in Africa's Western Region

Boko Haram as it is now first begun as Shabaab Muslim Youth Organisation in the year 1995, with operations in Maiduguri (Borno State Capital), and was led by Abubakar Mallam Lawal. Later on, Lawal decided to make an educational trip to Saudi Arabia and left Mohammed Yusuf in power. Their aim "People committed to the propagation of the prophet's teaching and Jihad" has remained a local Salafist Islamic sect for way too long in Nigeria (Courtin 2015). The word Boko Haram means Western education is forbidden. The Boko Haram group has for long been misguided as it was taught that interaction with the societies of the west was a sin in their Islamic teachings. At the same time, they are opposed to the orthodox Islamic Scholarship (Bartolotta 2011). The Leadership of Yusuf delivered political influence and national popularity to the group (*BBC News* 2016). After his expulsion from the Muslim clerics of Maiduguri, Yusuf then began his misinterpreted Islamic teachings of falsifying the radical views of Islam through the establishment of a complex Islamic religious group in the Markaz. The same Markaz complex included an Islamic school and a mosque which was

attended by Nigerian Muslims and neighbours who had an interest in it from Cameroon, Chad and Niger (Thurston 2018). Yusuf in his school and mosque taught a conservative theology that misinterpreted the Saudi-Style Salafism and instructed his followers to disregard the Nigerian secular government (Copeland 2013).

Salaf in simple terms means the devoted people from the past generation of the Islamic community devotees who are the fellows of Mohammed the Prophet and their followers. This composes of the first three Muslim generations and those who managed to follow their ways and belief system (Shuaibu and Saleh 2015). The concept Salafi da'wah signifies a 'call'. Practically, it means calling to the preaching, truths and propagation of pure Islam which is unconfined from alterations, additions, and deletions. In simple terms, it means a strong endearment to the Prophet's path and the true-hearted and strong believers of the previous generations of the community of Islam and a combination of all those who followed them, their beliefs, morals, and actions (Al-Salafi 2015). BBC News (2016) believes that beyond the frontage of Islamic education, Yusuf planned to formulate an Islamic counter-legitimate state through the imposition of the Sharia Law. This is because Yusuf's centre had transformed over time to be the domain of the radicalisation of young women and men. Maybe if the government deployed a sufficient intelligence gathering by its security operatives, Yusuf would not have established his religious Centre. Copeland (2013) has indicated that despite forming a farm and mosque, Yusuf's group imposed a violent form of the Sharia Law which was enforced by its own established police force, anathema to the federalism system of governance employed by Nigeria.

Yusuf's early warning sign of militant or Jihadist tendencies became prevalent when he was suspected to might have killed his former Mentor Sheikh Ja'afar Moh'moud Adam who he accused of disagreeing with on the doctrinal issues (Hassan and Ibrahim 2007). Adam (who preached in the Maiduguri as a moderate preacher) disagreed with Yusuf on radical and extreme interpretations of Islam. After Adam's assassination, then begun the prolonged kidnappings, bombings, destructions of mosques and churches including the violent attacks on different Nigerian communities, are traced back to the clash amongst the members of the government security officials and the sect in Borno State in the year 2009. This was because of the new legislation by the government of Borno State which forced motorbike riders to wear helmets when riding their bikes on

the road (Meral 2018). Not, only did members of the Boko Haram condemn this during a funeral procession, but they also carried out attacks against the police force members of the Nigerian government which transmuted into numerous group injuries and deaths (Friedman 2014).

After the direct police clash with members of the Boko Haram sect in 2009 which saw a number of deaths, Murtada (2013) alleges that Yusuf then saw this as a threat and embarked on a Jihadist approach against the State of Nigeria. In response, he wrote an open letter "An Open letter to the Federal Government" in which he described what would transpire in (Jihadi) operation of which he indicated categorically that only Allah would have the power to stop it (Thurston 2018). It was only when the open letter was avoided by the central government of Nigeria that Yusuf took a decision to unleash violent group attacks on the establishments of the government including on security operatives. Murtada (2013) further deliberates that on the 28th of July 2009, the Army of Nigeria attacked the mosque and compound of Yusuf in Maiduguri. Whilst this was taking place, it resulted in the deaths of about 1000 people from the clash of the security forces, army, and the Boko Haram groups, all in Maiduguri (Courtin 2015). In a matter of days, the Maiduguri incident escalated through killings and riots to the members of the sect in Yobe, Kano and Jigawa State of the Northern region. However, Yusuf did not get away as he got caught by the army in Maiduguri to be placed in police custody and died in what is explained as the extra-judicial killing (Courtin 2015).

Copeland (2013, 03) has indicated clearly that proceedings over the next several days after the arrest of Yusuf culminated into the gun battles, explosions which were led by the police to besiege Boko Haram sites. This did not go well as police officers were also killed and about 50 buildings destroyed of which many of them included churches and schools. The Nigerian government did set an example with the number of those it captured and executed in what was termed extrajudicial killing and illegal by the Human Rights Watch (HRW) as they were believed to be militants. Murtada (2013) gives us a clear picture of the re-grouping of Boko Haram under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau who replaced Yusuf. Shekau was also mistaken to have been assassinated by the Nigerian army in the years 2010, 2011 and 2012, but kept repeatedly reappearing in the mentioned years on YouTube declaring himself an alive, competent and strong leader of Boko Haram (Obaji 2013). In his first reappearance, Shekau

declared his baiting sympathy by indicating that Boko Haram's attention was now placed on the security personnel whom he was now declaring a fight on. He also indicated that Boko Haram was now going to fight Christians and the government security personnel (Obaji, 2013, 24).

> He further addressed Christians and alluded that:
>> You Christians should know that Jesus is a servant and prophet of God. He is not the son of God. This religion of Christianity you are practicing is not a religion of God-it is paganism. God frowns at it. What you are practicing is not religion. Aside from that, you Christians cheated and killed us to the extent of eating our flesh like cannibals!
>
> And also added that:
>> We follow the tenets of the Quran and anybody that thinks he can fight God shouldn't think his prayer or pray in the mosque can save him! Any Muslim that cheats and hides under the cloak of religion, if we know such person, we won't hesitate to eliminate him. Yes, I am saying so because it doesn't take 5 minutes to kill just as we're being killed. We follow the teachings of the Quran. This is what God has told me to explain. Alhamdulillah! (Obaji 2013, 24-25).

Shekau's regrouping of Boko Haram really resulted in the killing of over 20 000 citizens of Nigeria, Chad, and Cameroon wherein which the group has cells. The affected number of people range from 2-6 million people with more than 300000 refugees due to internally displacement (Murtada 2013). Shekau was only replaced in the year 2016 by Abu Musab al-Barnawi who is believed to be the son of Yusuf (founder of Boko Haram) (Busari 2016). In the next section, the authors have decided to redirect attention towards the revelation of the sources of funds which Boko Haram continues to acquire.

4. Sources of Boko Haram Funding and how it mobilizes the Youth

Copeland (2013) reveals that most of the initial activities of Boko Haram are funded by the wealthy Salafi Donors whom which Yusuf met whilst on Hajj (Annual Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, the holiest city of Muslims in Saudi Arabia). The report of terrorist funding in West Africa by the Financial Action Task Force

(2013) has revealed that Boko Haram is funded through the myriad and private sources. Through this, they are able to exploit the emerging advanced technology to transfer and collect funds. Levitt and Jacobson (2008) also attribute:

The evolution in financing sources to rapid globalization and sustained technological advances, which have enabled terrorist groups to raise, store, transfer, and distribute funds for their operations with ease. In particular, the advent of new technology has spurred changes in how money is transferred, with mobile and online money transfers becoming more commonplace.

After this, Boko Haram is then able to welcome funds from its initial international funders through money transference modes. Financial Action Task Force (2013) report has added that the Boko Haram group receives money through criminal citizen kidnappings and drug trafficking. It is also further alleged in the report that Boko Haram taxes communities under its control through ransom payments for the release of some of the captured foreign or local victims.

Copeland has presented this significant data as the Horn of Africa Desk officer representing the Civil-Military Fusion Centre (CFC) which is the knowledge and information organisation that focuses on the improvement of civil military interaction, information facilitation, enhancement and sharing situational awareness via the civic web portal combined with their monthly and weekly publications. All data is premised upon primary source information from several research centres, organisations, and media sources (Copeland 2013). Whilst on the other side, the Financial Action Task Force remains an independent inter-governmental organisation that develops and promotes regulations and/ policies for the protection of the global financial system against terrorist financing, money laundering, and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)'s proliferation. The organisation's recommendations are recognised globally on counter-terrorism financing and anti-money laundering standard.

The group survives on captivating unemployed, young, and underprivileged people who are not satisfied with the governance state in Nigeria. It also engages in utilizing the Islamic preachers who advance sedition against the people and government of other moderate Muslims and faiths in for recruitment. Based on both Shuaibu and Saleh (2015), Boko Haram recruits through the

use of kidnapping underage children ranging from 15-30 who then join the radicalisation preaching and employ suicide bombings as servicemen and women and at some point, executioners through the Jihadist or Islamic groups including the likes of Al-Qaeda, Taliban and Al-Shabab. It is argued that the high rate of unemployment, illiteracy and mis-preaching of Islam are all utilized by Boko Haram to tempt people into joining the sect. Onuoha (2014, 5-7) says that the US Institute of Peace in Tandem in collaboration with Nigerian CLEEN Foundation in 2013 conducted a study on why do youth join Boko Haram and discovered that:

> Ignorance of religious teaching opposed to violence makes youth more vulnerable and susceptible to recruitment; Unemployment and poverty make youth vulnerable to radicalization; Children with difficult upbringings are more vulnerable to extremist views; High levels of illiteracy linked to youth radicalization and extremism; Widespread corruption conducive to recruitment and radicalization

Were strong contributory causes of youth willingly joining Boko Haram to radicalise themselves through extremist groups like Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda. Indisputably, with these recruitment strategies, there are some Islamic preachers and Imams who lecturers or conveys messages through prayers and gatherings of Muslims. These messages negate propaganda on extensive religious Islamic teaching and bad narrative on the corrupt and weakness of the government (Onuoha 2014). Every time, these preachers engaged in the promotion of hate speeches against government buildings, Christians, and government officials inclusive of other moderate Muslims who are opposed to their religious doctrines. However, the current scholarly discourse on this subject to some extends lend a hand in the exploration of how children of underage are willingly becoming suicide bombers of the group. Most of which are untaught of the destruction and death they are obligated to unleash to the general citizens (Onuoha 2014). The reality of the matter is that Jihadi or the Boko Haram conflict has cost many lives in Nigeria, including billions of dollars when it comes to the purchasing of ammunitions and damaging infrastructures and killing thousands of security operatives in continued sect-security operative clashes.

During the group's earlier stage of development, especially in the years 2009 and 2010 respectively, Boko Haram utilized hit and run, guerilla tactics, shooting targets on moving motorcycles (McMaster 2018). They have also utilized knives swords, machetes and clubs, locally manufactured mandate weapons and guns. Falode (2016) interjects that through their violent activities, they have managed to attract the international attention of the global Islamic Jihadi groups like Al-Qaeda to formulate links with. By doing this, Boko Haram sought to enhance its weaponry and expertise system in order to execute well synchronised and bloody thirsty attacks on Nigerian citizens. After this, it then started using improved explosives (IEDs), bombs, the surface to air missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, deadly ammunition, and vehicle monitored machine guns with anti-aircraft visor it currently possesses. Falode (2017) has added that international support from these groups has increased its countrywide sophistication to carry out more coordinated attacks. Also, since it pledged loyalty to the Islamic State (I.S), the qualities of their audio and video productions published on social media has tremendously improved.

5. Major Attacks by Boko Haram

This section discusses all major attacks of Boko Haram since 2009. There are a lot of violent attacks that Boko Haram carried out. But the outlined, were deemed major by the authors. They therefore deserve to be explored as they have caused a lot of pain for the affected people. This is so because they took many lives.

5.1. *Bauchi Prison Attack In 2010*

On September 8 2010, there was a manhunt in Nigeria after an eye-catching jailbreak of more than 700 prisoners inclusive of the fancied members of the Taliban (Nossiter 2010). The Nigerian Police reported that four prison guards were shot dead after the Boko Haram Members of the Islamist sect attacked the Bauchi Jail in the North of Nigeria, setting parts on fire and smashing locks. To add, Smith (2010) helps us understand through a Bauchi resident who illustrated how "About 50 men with machine guns came to the prison site, forced the prison open and released all the prisoners."

5.2. The 2011 Attacks on the Police Headquarters and the United Nation's headquarters in Abuja

In June 2011, Boko Haram bombed the Nigerian police headquarters in Abuja (Capital City). They did this through a car laden that drove into the Louis Edet house compound carrying explosives. It was reported that the driver intended on placing the car near the stairway entrance to target the senior offices but was, unfortunately, redirected towards the back of the building by the security guards where in which the bomb was detonated in the car park (Walker 2012). Again, in August 2011, a Boko Haram man drove a car into the compound of the United Nations (UN) in Abuja and set the detonation of the massive bomb which took about 23 lives and wounded thousands more (Murray and Nossiter 2011). This attack has led Boko Haram to be onto the global news to establish it as a militant group that possess doctrinal, technical and capacity to produce suicide bombs. At a later stage, Boko Haram produced a martyrdom video which was filmed by the car driver (Walker 2012).

5.3. 2012 Bombing in Kano and 2014 Chibok Secondary School 300 Girls Kidnapping

On April 30 2012, Boko Haram again carried out attacks at the University of Nigeria's Northern City of Kano which caused a stampede through the firing of shots and explosives. *BBC News* (2012) understand that: "For over 30 minutes a series of bomb explosions and gunshots took over the old campus, around the academic blocks," which killed more than 180 people and this has since remained its deadliest attack to date. On the night of 14-15 April 2014, Boko Haram again went on a rampage to kidnap 276 girls from the Chibok Village of Northeastern Nigeria. The Boko Haram militants carried out this kidnapping by storming the school out (Melvin 2015). They were accompanied by convoys of buses and trucks to engage in gun battles with security guards of the school. After defeating the guards, they then forced the girls into the trucks and drove into the forest. Many of these girls were never seen again except some in photographs sat on the ground in clad whilst wearing Islamic dresses in semi-circles (Oduah 2014). It is often emphasised that those who did not escape continue to be victims of rape,

brutality, enslavement, and conversion to Islam.

5.4. 2015 Baga shootings, 2000 killed and the 2019 funeral procession Attacks

On the 12th January 2015, Boko Haram carried another violent attack in what is described as also the deadliest massacre on the Baga village where they left thousands of bodies scattered all over the place (Estimation of 2000 dead). It was reported that upon their arrival, they uploaded motorcycles and sprayed bullets all over the residents who then ran into the bush (Abubakar and Karimi 2015). Bukar Musa (Former Chairman of the Local government) in Buga said that "Dead bodies litter the bushes in the area and it is still not safe to go and pick them (up) for burial," and "Some people who hid in their homes were burned alive." (Abubakar and Karimi 2015). On 29th July 2019, at least 65 Nigerians were left dead during an attack by Boko Haram on a funeral gathering in northeast of the country. This took place in the Nganzai District just next to the Borno State. Boko Haram shot dead about 21 people first and others were shot dead when villagers were running after the assailants. Others were injured critically (Busari, Abrak & Sherry, 2019). This incident took place right after the same group forced an estimated 30000 people out of the country in January 2019 (Adebayo and Mazloumsaki 2019).

6. Conclusion and recommendations

In the final analysis, one may ask how this article was decolonial. The only answer to this is that this article has been written by an African decolonial scholar with the intention of bringing a decolonial scholarly awareness of all activities involving Boko Haram. The decolonial part stems from the belief that Boko Haram even in the previous other studies has been studied using other mainstream theories. Thus, the current article is a by-product of the epistemic location which has been adjoined with our intent to contribute to the current decolonial scholarship on African political discourse.

The authors sought to bring a decolonial awareness to the sources of the ongoing violent activities of Boko Haram in Nigeria. To this far, the authors have been able to trace the historical genesis of Boko Haram to the times of the leadership of Yusuf who was replaced by Shekau and now it is commanded by

Yusuf's son al-Barnawi. This article has also shown that the activities of Boko Haram owe historical starting point from the misguided teachings of Islam by Yusuf to some of the people who affiliated to his former Shabaab Muslim Youth Organization. This is the same group which turned more and more extreme, Islamic and violent over time until it officially became Boko Haram which carried out violent and deadly attacks especially in the Northern region of Nigeria. This article has also revealed that Boko Haram's continued operations are funded by wealthy Salafi Donors who were first drawn by Yusuf during Hajj back in 2009. Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaeda are also some of the international funders of Boko Haram and they have managed to bring more attention to Boko Haram after their established strong network. Despite this, Boko Haram has carried a number of violent and deadly attacks on the citizens of Nigeria. Amongst those identified which are major include the 2009 Bauchi Prison attack, 2011, Police Headquarters attack in the Federal Capital Territory, 2011 attack on the United Nation's headquarters in Abuja, 2012, Bombings in Kano, 2014 Kidnappings of 300 from Government Girls Secondary School Chibok, 2015 Baga shootings which results in deaths over 2000 and 2019 Funeral procession attack.

From a decolonial point of view, it is indisputable to state categorically that in just over a decade, this group has advanced from being a local Salafi Islamist organization in Nigeria's North-Eastern parts to now an international violent terrorist organization that carries out kidnappings, killings, bombings and destruction of mosques, churches, government properties and telecommunication equipment in Nigeria and other parts of Western Africa. It remains a growing terrorist intimidating remark due to the ongoing strong feed from its recruitment strategies and sources of funding which remains in bulk. That is why Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and Chad (four Lake Chad nations) have joined forces to establish a joint military force to counter-fight this growing international Jihadist organization. This is a particular new decolonial discovery as most of the previous studies have only analysed individual themes and provided solutions. The inextricable link has been much shortened and often not understood well.

Recommendations: Nigeria and the countries affected by Boko Haram insurgent group should engage those who are financing Islamic Jihadist group and negotiate with them to stop the continued financing of this violent and deadliest extremist organization. Equally important, the Nigerian Army and Police officers should start patrolling around girl schools which are most vulnerable to the

attacks of the members of Boko Haram. This will help in ensuring that those who intend on carrying out violent attacks on these girls or kidnapping them think twice before they engage in such missions. The Nigerian government should also stop corruption and start redirecting the public funds towards the creation of employment opportunities for the youth who are at most, vulnerable to joining this group. The African countries through the African Union (AU) peace and security architecture should find it in themselves to assist with either peace-keeping troops to the region in order to assist those soldiers who are an army on a mission. The ongoing violent attacks on government buildings can only be stopped if Boko Haram fined it within their means to engage their Nigerian government and try to settle their differences peacefully without having to resort to violent measures.

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Space and Approach in "The Virtuous City": A Tale of Two Universities: Re-imagining and reconstruction of the westernised South African university

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Abstract

In order to know how to change one must be able to acknowledge what one does not know. Central to knowledge production of relevance is humility and an understanding of the realities of one's own environment. From a decolonial perspective, knowledge production is affected by the development and creation of the actual physical spaces of the university and its pedagogy. The Covid_19 pandemic has tested the functionality of the physical space of the university as well as the organization of the city space. This paper considers these issues, their impact and effect on the mental well-being of both academics and students by exploring the idea of the university as a virtuous city. We draw on Al-Farabi's treatise of the Virtuous City because physical and conceptual architectures reflect a way in which the world is structured. In South Africa, the violent design of the fragmented spaces has been planned according to the colonial, cartographic imagination which destroys and distorts memory and ruptures tradition. The architecture of the cities and universities, it can be argued, effect a similar process, and serve as an affirmation of the pre-dominance of the white-supremacist power structure in South Africa. Cities are created by people and each city is a creation of the interaction of social, economic, cultural, and political imperatives. The university is a micro-manifestation of the cosmopolitan city that adopts different approaches to knowledge, decolonisation and transformation. In re-imaging and reconstituting the westernised South African university an appropriate approach to reaching the ideals of well-being and harmony would require the shedding of

the ego and the Cartesian "I". The process of decolonising the university should occur by deconstructing and recognising colonial methods, theories and practise in our pedagogy and spaces in order to begin the process of reconstruction.

Keywords: Decoloniality, intellectualism, neo-liberalism, humility, academic activism, pedagogy, politics, mental illness, fear and well-being

> "A multitude of people and yet a solitude."
> – Charles Dickens, A Tale of Two Cities

1.Introduction

Critically engaging the traditions, ethics and architecture of other cultures is an invigorating experience. It is about immersing oneself into the diversity of knowledge and creative expression that exists. The westernized university has been designed to typically reflect the European city. Structures of power, such as the city/university, have been consolidated with knowledge and images that distort the identity of the colonised. Land use has become a rationalised terrain measured by racialisation which perpetuates both alienation and the operation of privilege. Formerly colonised people struggle within these spaces. It is in these spaces that specific experiences are noted. Memories are trapped, dignity is enfringed upon and human rights has little currency. This chapter explores how, in building the world of you- the world of the white western male, and allowing it to dominate institutions of knowledge, the sense of Othering, and/or inferiority that is experienced by the citizens (students) leads to an increase in mental illness. Othering contributes to a sense of inferiority, as the pedagogical approach and content is alienating and oftentimes irrelevant to the context, culture and consciousness of South African students. According to Ramose[1], rather than an African University in South Africa, what we had and continue to have are Universities in Africa. For coherence, the chapter is interwoven with discussions on the university space as developed through a colonial vision and is then contrasted with the virtuous city. This is because the way in which both physical and conceptual architectures come to be, reflect a particular way in which the world is structured. This must be (un)imagined and re-imagined.

1 In Dr. T Lebakeng and Prof MB Ramose, *The Right to be an African University* (unpublished)

Included in this tapestry of creative reimaging is a discussion on the approach to pedagogy by focusing the lens on aspects of knowledge production and the ethics of the academic.

Transformation and decolonisation are not synonymous, they refer to two different aspects of what must happen to the university in a post-colonial age. Additionally, "decolonization is not a metaphor… Decolonization is accountable to Indigenous sovereignty and futurity" (Tuck and Yang 2012:1&35). It opposes the neoliberal conceptualisation of knowledge and knowledge systems that commodify knowledge. To know this is to realise that knowing is not enough. Rather, to know, requires that we *act* from this *knowing*. It is a responsibility to re-imagine from this moment. It is to re-establish the ethical. We say ethical because the effects of a Eurocentric approach have harmful consequences for South Africans as it produces graduates with little knowledge, understanding or sympathy for the reality of their country. It is harmful because it fundamentally undermines the responsibility of the university to contribute to the social good.

The social good is fundamental to a national vision in a society as fractured as South Africa. Here education has always been political. The responsibility and ethical commitment should thus be on developing the individual to respond to these challenges rather than constituting the university as an institution for training students to become ready for the job-market. The job-market as we know it in South Africa is also racialised and supports the perpetuation of racial capitalism. If the university continues to feed into this system without offering alternatives, critique or creative solutions then it is not fulfilling its role as a contributor to the social good. Education is a vital resource to the democratic and civic life of a nation and teaches us that it is not only the individual but the social that can transform this country and its understanding of humanity. Thus, there needs to be a 'buy in' into this vision by all stakeholders. It is here that we acknowledge the activism in the #FeesMustFall (#FMF) and #RhodesMustFall protests. These protests challenged the South African academia to reconsider power, power structures and knowledge production in the academia. The protests ignited a critical reflection and imagining around questions of decolonisation versus transformation. What has become apparent subsequently, is that there is resistance from sectors of the academia, from politicians and some elites to decolonisation. In other words, we are still struggling with the rules of engagement despite knowing that critical pedagogy must be contextualized in its cultural

and political content. These dynamics are linked to the role of educators who need to rethink the inter-connectedness between politics, culture, education and power. Healthy, functional and relevant social, conceptual and lived architectural spaces are necessary for providing young people with the intellectual, material and psychological resources they need to participate in and shape the diverse economic, political, and social conditions influencing their lives. The university space should also be such a holistic space, a city of positivity and nurturing.

2. On the City

2.1 Colonialism, Cities, and the University

The words colonialism and colonisation derive from the Latin word *colere*, which means to design or cultivate. Whilst the historical colonial experience of the colonised reflects the opposite of the 'feel good meanings' in these words, the tenacity of the colonisers to organise and transform non-European areas into what are fundamentally European constructs cannot be underestimated. This propensity to build in the European image has also infiltrated knowledge production so that one cannot view the effect, impact and construction of the city without considering its machinations and systems of operation in order to re-imagine these spaces for the decolonisation process. Consequently the "world of you" (Fanon 1963, 188) that is built, is the one that is dominated by the white western male. The westernised university is no exception to this. From its aesthetic to the way it operates, the university has been designed to typically reflect European city- gardens, housing quarters, names, culture, religious identity and art. These are aesthetically apparent and they permit the continued existence of a racialised hierarchy to exist, through unchanging structural practices and Othering via the spaces. Populated with specific names, statutes and architectural styles they remind not of philanthropy or benevolence but of the destruction and devastation from looted landscapes which have destroyed societies, severed knowledge systems and fragmented identities.

As a result, the essence and material effect of the structure affects the community that is established within the university. It is here that memories and experiences become trapped and for South African students despite

entering with the hope of breaking the shackles of oppression, they continue to experience the effects of coloniality. The colonised mind seeking liberation drifts helplessly in the colonised space where learning should be an intellectual engagement not just job-readiness preparation. Without power and hegemony, its possibilities are limited. During the Covid_19 pandemic these inequalities have been exacerbated as access to online learning and resources for students from different universities have highlighted the fragmentation and racialisation of higher education. Additionally, obstacles to emancipatory pedagogies have surfaced. For the majority black students, it is a violent encounter yet again. They have to function in spaces inherently unconducive to learning and development due to the apartheid cartography.

2.2 The Colonial City, the Virtuous City and the UniverCity

Colonialism and capitalism, which shaped much of the globalised twenty-first century has given birth to (often) violent, unequal, and polluted cities in the world. These diverse cities often swirl with chaos. Part of this chaos can be attributed to the designers, planners, and architects who, perhaps intentionally, never considered the mental well-being of urban citizens, nor have they sought to challenge the aspects of inequality that manifest as a result of these spaces. Such occurrences reflect the attitude or even (un)ethics of the architect. Consider Le Corbusier's letter to Il Duce's French ambassador (Poplack 2018,1), which is a promise that is a 'denial of coevalness' (Fabian 1983, 31). Coevalness can be defined as a sharing of present time. Its denial manifests when colonialists consider Africa to be "backwards." Time cannot be shared presently if one party to the time is lagging. In his letter, Le Corbusier (in Poplack 2018) states that the city models he designed for Addis Abba would be so "severe, that one might think the colony was a space without time, and therefore, without history, and without any particular geographical meaning." By implication, Le Corbusier alluded to the idea that Africa's overcrowded, ungovernable cities must be *remapped* if the continent and its people are to have any future (Poplack 2018, 1). According to our interpretation, this idea of "remapping" African cities and by implication, knowledge production had to be co-opted and manipulated, in order to make the populace subservient; because subservience will afford them a "future." Furthermore, "the city is direct dominion; the city becomes the city of

government," recognising that the architecture of a city establishes an identity, and this in turn sets forth the hierarchies of power. Once (the idea of) power is established, it dominates over all those within its space, and bends them according to its will. As a result, the colonised experience a sense of Othering, and/or inferiority (Fanon 1963, 188). In this world, that is the world of the European white male, they are objects, and can only see themselves through a Eurocentric image (Quijano 2004, 204).

Prior to colonialism, many cities were organised and structured in a different manner and layout to present day cities. For millennia there have been thriving urban societies such as those found in Damascus, which, was established in the third millennium BC and is one of the few cities in the world that has been continuously inhabited (Battuta and Lee 2013, 83). These societies have been cultivated by diverse philosophers and intellectuals who have tried to make the urban space an articulation of the aspirations of each culture and society- including aspects of moral, spiritual, and material well-being. According to urban theorist Louis Mumford's conception, cities were originally vessels for the sacred — places where the gods lived, and so too the communities that worshipped them (Poplack 2018, 1). Thus, when developing a city, one is faced with the seemingly complex task of cultivating and creating spaces that do, and will, nurture both material and mental well-being. Nurturing is possible through ethical conduct infused with humility. This has been evident in the tradition and behaviour of the renowned and recognised Muslim scholar Imam Malik. Imam Malik bin Anas (b. 93 AH, d. 179 AH) was one of the greatest Islamic scholars of all times. His more than 1 300 disciples from all walks of life included rulers, judges, historians, Sufis, poets and students of Islamic texts. The Caliph of the time attended his classes as an ordinary student. Imam Malik showed great respect for knowledge. He considered his own knowledge as a trust and confidently stated that half of knowing is the ability to say 'I don't know'.

This reflects an awareness of the importance and value of knowledge, of the responsibility the carrier of knowledge has and of the humility that knowledge should foster. Not arrogance. Not self-entitlement and not self- glorification. It allows for an approachable repertoire to be built between the 'still learning student' and the esteemed professor who is meant to endear the student to their subject. Sharing knowledge and elaborating on instances of co-operation affirms the inter-connectedness between different people whilst eroding the self-conceit

inherent in western civilisation of superiority in their knowledge canon. Examples such as Napoleon's appreciation of Imam Malik's knowledge and treatises should not be hidden but discussed so that students can learn to appreciate excellence wherever they find it. According to David Moussa Pidcock (taken from Kamali 2019, 272) in his book *Napoleon and Islam* "96 percent of the Napoleonic code came from the rulings of Imam Mālik." The Napoleonic code is the French civil code and is recognised for shifting the focus from feudal laws to laws that are more accessible and clearly written. This sharing of all knowledges is essential for an 'education city' where vast numbers of people gather daily in order to learn, reflect, engage, create and produce beneficial outcomes that contribute to human development. It is a space directed at the social good. Consequently, for cities to represent their citizens, they should hold cultural and spiritual appeal.

Al-Farabi deemed this well-being and care for occupants and is one of the pillars in obtaining a virtuous city (Al-Farabi 1985, 433). This virtuous society formed part of the greater notion of the philosophy of society (*falsafiya madaniyya*). Al-Farabi's philosophy of society relies on society working together to create the virtuous city. Accordingly, "[t]he virtuous city [then] resembles the perfect and healthy body, all of whose limbs cooperate to make the life of the animal perfect and to preserve it in this state." (Al-Farabi, 1985, 231). This requires a leader who possess the necessary wisdom and knowledge to care for the city. It is through this wisdom and knowledge, and the leader's engagement with society that this leader (or Vice Chancellor) then becomes capable of seeing problems that are yet to befall the city. The leader plans ahead to solve particular predicaments which exist at present, unlike those who had detached themselves from society, and through their faulty judgments bring ignorance and wickedness to their cities (Al-Farabi, 1985, 245-253). If one compares this approach to that of the entrepreneurial structure of the neo-liberal university of today, the consequences are self-evident. Where profit is prioritised over people, the social good, sustainability, cosmic harmony and nation building are sacrificed. In the South African context, the violent responses from the universities and securitisation of university spaces during the #MustFall protests are a testament to this issue. For Al-Farabi (1985, 229) the essential elements of the city are multiple. These include to create a place which ensures social security for its inhabitants; a place where the virtuous live; a place that is governed by wise individuals; a place which contributes to spirituality and religion; a place that ensures urban harmony of

all environmental, social, and cultural conditions; a place with an emphasis on public spaces and services; a place where all citizens are recognised as human and thus have, and observe, equal human rights. Al-Farabi is supported by Ibn Khaldun who considers cities being built as a necessary development for people's civilisational growth because it is in these spaces that they come together and exchange knowledge, seek tranquillity, restfulness, and relaxation (Ibn Khaldun 1967, 235-238).

Furthermore, cities are created by people and each city is a creation of the interaction of social, economic, cultural, and political imperatives at each moment of the city's development (Lea & Courtney 1985, 1). In this context, the role of planners and architects is profoundly linked to the historical and cultural context of the cities in which they live. For Al-Farabi (1985, 230) the path to attaining the perfect society can be achieved through education, and the drive by man to obtain perfection. The entire activity of education is about the acquisition of values, knowledge and practical skills by the individual, within a particular period and a particular culture. Education must, at its core, lead the individual to perfection since the human being was created for this purpose. The perfect human being (*al-insan al-kamil*), is one who has obtained theoretical virtue—thus completing their intellectual knowledge, and having acquired practical moral virtues, becoming perfect in their moral behaviour. Crowning these theoretical and moral virtues with effective power, are the individual members of the community who assume the responsibility of political leadership, thus becoming role models for other people. Here Al-Farabi unites moral and aesthetic values: good is beautiful, and beauty is good; the beautiful is that which is valued by the intelligentsia (Al-Farabi 1985, 230). This perfection which he expects from education combines knowledge and virtuous behaviour; it is happiness and goodness at one and the same time. The emphasis is thus, that architecture and space influences life, and when coupled with leadership, they determine the way in which a community develops.

Freire (1972, 71) echoes these sentiments, arguing that the purpose of education is to enable people to become fully human, so that they can act to change their world together with others. Decolonising a space is to ethically examine the types of practises and programmes, be they academic, structural, cultural and/or social that have resulted in South Africans calling for alternate approaches and 'persons' (read: voices/knowledge) to be brought into representative university spaces. It

is asking about why this/they have been excluded in the first place and for what benefit? It requires that we reimagine how and what we teach so that we do not re-inscribe the colonial archive, acting as if the colonial library is the only library. The reconstruction process a free imagination unshackled from the mind that has been disciplined by the colonial project. Additionally, decolonisation of the curriculum "is neither an advocacy to be anti-West, nor is it discouragement to learn from the West and the rest of the world. It is a call to make higher education relevant to the material, historical and social realities of the communities in which universities operate" (Letsekha 2013:14). Considering that there are many ways of being and learning it is plausible to state that the potential exists for a 're-imagining' that can change the way in which we deal with the issue of the human by engaging with other traditions, non-western thoughts and ethics. This is because "mainstream educational discourse not only ignores the ideological nature of teaching and learning, it also erases culture from the political realm by enshrining it either as a purely aesthetic discourse or as a quasi-religious call to celebrate the 'great books' and 'great traditions' of what is termed 'Western Civilization'" (Giroux 2000, 13).

Additionally, custodians of knowledge have an ethical duty to use knowledge constructively and "ethically university-based academic leaders must become public intellectuals who engage the larger public through writing, speaking, or acting'" (Parsons 2013, 2). An academic cannot withdraw into the ivory tower and estrange their work and its relevance from the society in which they exist. The ethical duty is understood from the "Greek ethical ideal of adding 'character' to a society" (Parsons 2013, 4). This consolidates the above argument about the virtuous city, its architectural landscape and the production of knowledge which should combine to eliminate inequality, superiority-inferiority hierarchies and arrogance. It is in this creative re-imagining of the education city that one recognises the threat to well-being posed by the rise of corporate culture's power to eradicate the importance of pedagogy as an ethical and political act. What we have is the packaging of pedagogy as a technical and instrumental practice that promotes higher education primarily as a financial investment. British cultural theorist Richard Johnson points out:

> Teaching and learning are profoundly political practices. They are political at
> every moment of the circuit: in the conditions of production (who produces

knowledge? for whom?), in the knowledges and knowledge forms themselves (knowledge according to what agenda? useful for what?), their publication, circulation, and accessibility, their professional and popular uses, and their impacts on daily life. (Richard Johnson 1997:461)

In the current global context, the ideas developed should confront neoliberal thought and implementation because "the power of neoliberalism lies in its saturation of social practices and consciousness, making it difficult to think otherwise" (Lipman 2011,6). The deregulation inherent in neoliberalism facilitates for private and privileged interests and serves white supremacist goals, especially where those goals and ambitions are entwined with market forces. As a result, there is a reluctance to enable critique and motivation for discussions on the language of social investment, protection, justice, equality and accountability, all of which are exacerbated by short-term contracts, downsizing and "competition between individuals through strategies of individualisation and responsibilisation" (Hofmeyer 2008, 75). Knowledge and learning have become subject to the politics of disposability, what Said (1994,12) refers to as the twin dynamics of "accommodation and privatisation", reflecting the culture of professionalism in the different educational levels. According to Said (1994,13) professionalism is where one thinks of one's "work as an intellectual as something you do for a living, between the hours of nine and five with one eye on the clock, and another cocked at what is considered to be proper, professional behaviour-not rocking the boat, not straying outside the accepted paradigms or limits, making yourself marketable and above all presentable, hence uncontroversial and unpolitical and 'objective'" This gives rise to a group(s) of citizens who exist in the zone of non-being. In the language of neoliberalism, words and concepts that were used to describe the market and market related issues are now applied to the human so that the human factor is reduced to economic descriptors where value is based on material profit, not ethics, not excellence in character and contribution and certainly not in terms of well-being.

2.3 Mental Illness and the UniverCity

However, the university, resembling a city, should be designed and cultivated according the political, social, historical, and cultural regions in which they

are situated. Through its structuring, students then act as citizens within this city, and their interactions are such of those between citizen and state. But, the notion of the university as a public good has been abandoned in this conversion of the university to a micro-state. Instead the university now sees itself as "a quasi-sovereign entity that no longer recognises the fact that it owes the public anything" (Praeg, 2018, 9). From the oral traditions, Imam al- Raghib al-Asfahani a teacher of Islamic philosophy, states that where there is love there is no need for law. If the city loves its citizens, it needs to see to their needs, and it needs to do so with foresight. This is the nature of a virtuous city. When citizens have to demand their rights, it means that the citizens are aware of their rights, and when you are aware of your rights, it is a sign of the absence of law, and a city without virtue. The awareness of one's own rights indicates that the rights are infringed upon. The city in this sense, is wicked and cruel, and this becomes apparent in the way in which it deals with its citizens. Students (citizens) are often marginalised and discriminated against by the law and by power structures should they dare to "rock the boat." While they may have rights, accessing those rights may be difficult (Gordon 2007).

The zone of non-being produces and maintains unbearable conditions of existence that often result in mental, psychological, social and spiritual death (Yousuf 2019, 3). This resonates with Mphahlele's "tyranny of place" which refers to context and its impact on content, to how 'place' assigns identity and of being severed from one's roots (Obee 1994,13). What we have then is about educating for accommodation and not the ideal of linking learning to social change. This leads to students, who are the citizens of the state feeling breathless (Maldonado-Torres 2016, 5). Breathlessness, however is not limited to students, but increasingly black academics find themselves suffocating. Under constant surveillance by the university to stay away from anything "too radical," burdened by journals which require a stricter standard of substantiation if the writing is not centred in the western canon, confined to a space that still reeks with coloniality, and constantly reminded of their place by the symbols of white power and control, academics and students begin to feel as if the constant condition in the city is a state of subordination, alienation, coloniality and disregard, which increases in certain contexts. If academics or students stray too far from what the university has deemed acceptable, the university then exercises a veto power over their livelihood and life (see Yousuf 2019). This goes against Ibn Khaldun's idea that a

city (the university) should promote tranquillity, and relaxation, and should be a place where knowledge is exchanged, as opposed to commodified and traded.

Furthermore, by limiting knowledge and universalising the experience of the white western male, the purpose of knowledge- to obtain the perfection of the human, and to allow one to be fully human- cannot be fully achieved. This is because any experience that does not fall into the experience of the white western male is not a recognised experience. It is not surprising then, that several academics and students increasingly become depressed. In 2018, the University of Pretoria experienced at least 23 suicide attempts (Kgosana 2018). Suicides are an expression of extreme mental distress. The World Health Organisation (2014) released a report on suicide in which it states:

> Risks linked to the community and relationships include war and disaster, stresses of acculturation (such as among indigenous peoples or displaced persons), discrimination, a sense of isolation, abuse, violence and conflictual relationships ... risk factors at the individual level include previous suicide attempts, mental disorders, harmful use of alcohol, financial loss, chronic pain and a family history of suicide.

Interestingly enough, the report specifically refers to stresses of "acculturation, discrimination and a sense of isolation" (World Health Organization 2014). These are particularly poignant forms of domination that exist within the university. In an opinion piece written by Nyulu and published by the Daily Vox (2019) titled 'Students are not committing suicide, universities are killing us' Nyulu argues that: "institutional racism is… not something that can be seen but rather it's something that one feels. Institutional exclusion is hard to tackle because the university isolates you." Additionally, discriminatory practices which cause one to see themselves through a Eurocentric image place great strain on one's own identity, and contribute to a natal alienation (Yousuf 2019, 1). In order to resist this form of oppression, decoloniality presents as an alternative response. Decoloniality challenges the acceptance of inferiority and the conditions of coloniality. It is coupled with dismantling the superiority ideology of the European, and a radical refutation of the lack of the full humanity of the colonised. According to Maldonado-Torres (2016, 5) "[a]s a result of this turn, the colonized subject emerges not only as a questioner but also as an embodied

being who seeks to become an agent". It is however, more than that. It is a holistic movement that involves reaching out to others, communicating, and organizing (Maldonado-Torres 2016, 5)- it is about building a community. It is ultimately about reclaiming spaces and crafting them in a new way. A way that allows for different knowledges and critique to be produced, and for different ways of being, acting, and knowing in the world to come into existence (Maldonado-Torres 2016, 7). What is then built is not the world of you, nor the world of I, but rather it is the world of Us.

Knowledge has limitations and presents conundrums. Astute academics are aware of the pitfalls of knowledge production and dissemination, and especially of their own limitations. That is why they can say: 'I don't know—let's find out together. It is never too late to learn'. Scholars who value knowledge recognise this and manifest it in their work. Recognising the limits of one's own knowledge, or the fact that the knowledge one professes to hold dear could be problematic, requires the humility that was so characteristic of Imam Malik, but is largely absent from the westernised university space where academics are chasing rankings, bonuses and claims of 'expertise', so that they can make themselves indispensable. But expertise in what and for whose benefit, and expert according to whom? In instances where academics had engaged in a thoughtful and disciplined social order, increased fragmentation and individualisation in the commodified, westernised, neoliberal university has eroded the potential to critically engage and to be relevant. Academics seek promotion and tenure, and refrain from activism or public dialogue. Instead, the intellectual response has been silence, claiming 'We are transforming'. Furthermore, to say 'I don't know' would be to admit to not being the expert, which makes one replaceable. Acknowledging the Other's knowledge and embracing it when in fact it was intentionally ignored, is to admit not knowing. Worse still, it could mean that the Other knows what we do not know and is therefore the real expert, which is scary for many. Thus, for many academics, survival is centred on denial of, and resistance to the decolonial/transformational turn. It can then be argued that, as is the case in politics, academic work rarely pursues the 'good life for all', but rather focuses on material benefit for the 'I' as the market has become the mechanism of social control and identity creation.

The ultimate resource that humans have is their creative potential which needs to be invigorated or nurtured, where people can be inspired to challenge

stagnant ideologies and ideas to the extent that spaces of academia become spaces wherein the social order is critiqued. For this reason, epistemic decolonisation requires activism, it requires reconstruction and it cannot occur in a political vacuum.

3. Conclusion

The university is a micro-manifestation of the cosmopolitan city that adopts different approaches to knowledge, decolonisation and transformation. In re-imagining and reconstituting the westernised South African university an appropriate approach to reaching the ideals of well-being and harmony are needed together with a recognition of the fact that the knowledge that is produced and consumed must be beneficial for that society. Al-Farabi's philosophy of society relies on society working together to create the virtuous city and in extrapolating from this idea to that of the university, it is possible to consider the mental well-being of both academics and students by exploring the idea of the university as a virtuous city. If one compares this approach to that of the entrepreneurial structure of the neo-liberal university of today, where profit is prioritised over people, the social good, sustainability, cosmic harmony and nation building are sacrificed, it is evident that in re-imaging the university space one has to move beyond the typical conceptualisation of the European/colonial city. Together with structure, ethos is tantamount. Considering the history of South Africa and the legacy of apartheid it is necessary for academics to re-imagine the role of education, knowledge production and dissemination in the context of decolonisation and transformation. Those in charge of running universities- the city planners, designers, and architects who shape the institution- should give due consideration to the historical and cultural context in which the universities operate, and amend their functioning, institutions, and curricula appropriately so that all the inhabitants are at ease and feel a sense of belonging.

In spaces where the Other feels isolated and alone, the sense of belonging to the city (university) is erased. This has in turn led to an increase in depression and suicide attempts in universities. Safety and ease in spaces of living contribute to greater creativity and output, which requires a shift from the politics of fear and privilege, from the continued embeddedness in a politics of disposability to the re-awakening of political agency and activism in the academia. Decolonisation

includes a way that allows for different knowledge and critique to be produced, and for different ways of being, acting, and knowing in the world to come into existence. What is then built is not the world of you, nor the world of I, but rather it is the world of Us.

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ESSAYS

Of Commandment, Africanity, Religion and Covid-19: Insights from the Seila-Tsatsi Story

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Abstract

This paper explores the significance of the turn to the religion of the family and the clan (i.e., indigenous African religion) taking place under the contemporary conditions of Covid-19 in many African countries. It does this in order to exhibit the Africanity that is hidden by this otherwise pragmatic turn. The paper explores this Africanity by drawing from the classical African story of Seila-Tsatsi, which it argues has its roots in religious education. The key aim of its examination of this Africanity is to interrogate a politics of health it claims the World Health Organisation advances. The paper does not explore this turn by accounting for the meanings individuals attribute to it but is rather abstract and conceptual in its approach. The argument it makes is that the contemporary turn to the religion of the family and the clan exhibits desire for an inclusive form of relationality that ought to inform fair, equitable and just health outcomes. It argues that the WHO's politics of health is blind to this model because it stubbornly upholds binary thought.

Keywords: Commandment, Religion, Relationality, Remembering, Politics, Covid-19, Seila-Tsatsi

1.Introduction

One of the key features of the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic has been a renewed turn to religion. People have turned to religion for a number of reasons, which include, among other things, the search for hope (Roman, Mthembu and Hoosen 2020) and comfort (Bentzen 2020) given the anxiety and loss individuals and families face. This turn to religion has been documented in relation, mainly, to organised religion and specifically to religion as a feature of monotheistic traditions. Little has been done to study this turn in relation to the religion of the family and the clan (i.e.,indigenous African religion) even though scores of Africans are turning to it (Isiko 2020). Consequently, the dynamics and the significance of a turn to religion in its unorganised form under conditions of Covid-19 have been somewhat concealed. It is the turn to the religion of the family and the clan, taking place under conditions of Covid-19, which inspires this paper. The paper asks what this turn may mean for a politics of health dominated by the World Health Organisation. The argument it seeks to advance is that this turn, evident mainly in the touted use of herbal remedies that have historically been central to indigenous African systems of health for centuries but fell to disuse under colonialism, signals a retreat to a life of commandment. The life of commandment exposes the poverty of a dominant politics of health advanced by the WHO, which is devoid of commandment. This politics is without commandment because it is unable to do the work of remembering which commandment demands. Consequently, it is unable to imagine relationality outside of binary thought.

Perhaps, unbeknown to those who under conditions of Covid-19 are retreating to indigenous African religion, this turn is of paramount importance. This is because even though this turn is mainly pragmatic in the sense that it is a return to herbal remedies and plants studied and classified by practitioners of indigenous African religion over centuries, underlying this turn is a significant symbolic gesture. It is a return to the idea that situations or conditions of crisis demand of us to reimagine relationality. They demand of us to investigate the maladies inherent to our contemporary order and to respond to these maladies in a manner that undertakes the work of repair. It is from these maladies after all that these crises often arise. The work of repair directs our attention to addressing the problems inherent in the socio-political and cultural orders of our times.

Reimagining relationality as a result is retrospective work because it is work undertaken in relation to an appreciation of a past out of which contemporary problems issue. Relationality and repair, therefore, belong together with memory seeing that the former is a way of dealing with the past. They are about reimagining life in a way that facilitates the experience of community. This is what the life of commandment implies and it is precisely to the life of commandment that this paper directs its attention. The paper tries to make visible the idea of commandment against a backdrop of rebukes by the WHO directed at the increasing use of herbal remedies to combat Covid-19 in Africa.

It grounds its deliberations around the notion of commandment. It locates commandment at the heart of its reflection because its point of departure is that the turn to the religion of the family and the clan, evident in a renewed urgency concerning the use of indigenous herbal remedies to treat Covid-19, is not purely instrumental but expresses desire to revive the Africanity that remains marginal to the communication of health advanced by the WHO and its allied forces in the African continent. The paper does not concern itself with meanings individuals may attach to this turn but is abstract and speculative in the sense that it seeks to deliberate on the connections it sees between the turn to the religion of the family and the clan under conditions of Covid-19 and the Africanity that this turn presupposes. It is precisely this Africanity that it tries to elucidate. It borrows its notion of commandment from the classical story of Seila-Tsatsi and sees this story as having its origins in indigenous African religious education. The religious origins of this story is apparent in the emphasis the storyteller places on the figure of the healer and on healing that runs throughout the story's plot. The claim of this paper is that the lessons implicit in the contemporary retreat by a significant number of Africans, to herbal remedies whose origins are in indigenous African religion, can be elucidated by the classical story of Seila-Tsatsi.

2. Seila-Tsatsi and the Two Models of Relationality

The central role of commandment as a modality that facilitates the act of remembering is found, among other sources, in the classical African story of Seila-Tsatsi (Jacottet 2015, 97-9). This is the story of a couple who having married for a number of years could not conceive and have children. The couple respond to this problem by arranging to visit a healer for consultation. The story does

not say what transpired during the consultation except that the consultation furnished the healing they sought. Once the couple were pregnant, the healer issued a commandment that once the child was born he/she should never come into direct contact with the sun. Indeed, once the child was born her life was dedicated to the upkeep of the commandment. She never went out of the house during the day. Her life became a life that had to be lived in the absence of direct contact with the sun.

Seila-Tsatsi's dedication to the life of avoidance of direct contact with the sun comes under challenge once she reaches young adulthood and becomes, as a consequence, eligible for marriage. It is during this time that she comes into contact with a young bachelor, namely, Masilo. Prior to knowing about Seila-Tsatsi Masilo (heir to the throne of his kingdom) had a reputation for refusing marriage because he apparently found no woman alive at the time who could qualify to be his partner. Upon hearing of Seila-Tsatsi and her reputation for beauty he made arrangements to pay her a visit. Subsequent to meeting Seila-Tsatsi, Masilo comes back to inform his parents that he is finally willing to marry. Masilo was convinced that in Seila-Tsatsi he had found a perfect and suitable life partner. Masilo's parents first decline his proposal to marry Seila-Tsatsi because she has to live a life of devotion to the avoidance of the sun. Consequently, she could not be expected to assume the normal duties associated with marital life. Masilo insists however on marrying Seila-Tsatsi and promises to honour and respect Seila-Tsatsi's dedication to the life of avoidance of the sun as well as to take good care of her. Upon this undertaking, which he makes before both his parents and later to those of Seila-Tsatsi, the two families bless Seila-Tsatsi and Masilo's plan to marry.

Once the formalities of marriage were complete, Seila-Tsatsi and her entourage embark on a night journey to her in-laws. Upon her arrival at her in-laws, an intriguing incident happens. Her husband Masilo complains of thirst and the storyteller says that one of the women who was in Seila-Tsatsi's entourage went out to fetch water for him. Masilo refuses to the drink the water and pours it out instead. He goes on to reiterate his tormenting thirst. Another woman goes out to fetch him water and he responds to her in the way he did to the first young woman. Then to everybody's shock he becomes explicit and states directly that he would not drink water fetched by anyone other than his wife. Upon saying this, one of the young women runs out and reports Masilo to his parents. Masilo

insists before his parents that only water fetched by his wife would quench his thirst. He declines even the offer of his own mother. Of course, his parents condemn his request and remind him of the oath he took to honour Seila-Tsatsi's life of dedication to the avoidance of the sun as well as to take good care of her.

Masilo, however, cannot persuaded and once his parents take leave, Seila-Tsatsi succumbs to his unrelenting pressure. She takes a basin and readies herself to step outside of the house and into direct contact with the sun for the very first time in her life. As she walks through the door and comes into direct contact with the sun, a sudden but momentary darkness occurs following which Seila-Tsatsi turns into an anthill. Her lament and wailing is heard from that anthill and this wailing anthill leaves Masilo horrified. His temptation to test the word of the healer and the prohibition governing Seila-Tsatsi's life generates crises. Upon learning of the unfortunate circumstances of their daughter, Seila-Tsatsi's parents return to the healer whose consultation yielded their pregnancy. On his arrival (i.e., the healer) at Seila-Tsatsi's in-laws the healer performs a ritual of healing which brings Seila-Tsatsi back to life. Henceforth, however, she is to live a life that no longer avoids the sun. The healer's return lifts the prohibition on Seila-Tsatsi.

One way of reading the story of Seila-Tsatsi is to see it as a story that is primarily concerned with a contrast between two versions of relationality. The first is the primordial form of relationality that, in the case of the story, exists before the alienating experiences brought about by the institutional life of marriage. This is a form of relationality that consists in looking back to the past, to the original moment that exists prior to the institutions that are experienced as alienating (i.e., as disrupting the serenity of the original moment of relationality). This form of relationality consists in trying to secure its legitimacy and freedom by holding alienating forces at bay. The second is a progressive form of the expression of relationality which emerges out of lost origins. These origins may be lost due to interaction with forces that bring about alienation. This alienation may be of a shuttering nature as we see in the story of Seila-Tsatsi. It may generate real crisis and disrupt the security that the primordial form of relationality promises.

The point that the story makes emphatically clear however is that the primordial model of relationality is impossible because it is always already lost because it cannot escape forces of alienation (i.e., it cannot cope with forces of alienation). Relationality, if it is to be real and matter, must be born of and make its home in alienation. It must be a product of interaction with the forces of

alienation that strangers, foreigners and all those othered persons make apparent. Any conception of relationality that tries to bypass alienation in order to secure security and serenity is nothing but a work of fiction. It is a false way of building hope against what is otherwise a creative force necessary for the realisation of relationality, alienation. The history of humanity is littered with some extreme examples of models of relationality that try to bypass alienation in order to realise security. Apartheid and Nazism furnish such examples. They resemble attempts to construct relationality apart from others whose mere existence in the world is considered a threat. In this case, the sheer presence of difference (racial and gender difference) in the world becomes a source of the experience of alienation from which separation is required. That relationality must of necessity be born of alienation is evident in that the storyteller allows Masilo to cause Seila-Tsatsi to stand in violation of avoidance of the sun, a practice that had up to this point secured her integrity. This is of course a dramatic moment and a moment of crisis. However, such drama and crisis furnish the resources for the realisation of a true experience of relationality. The story of Seila-Tsatsi, as a result, appears to dismiss the possibility of the existence of any form of relationality that can stand apart from alienation. Contrary to the vision of Marx (Sayers 2011), it appears to position alienation as a necessary component of the realisation of true relationality.

The two models that the story of Seila-Tsatsi makes apparent are important for this paper's concern with the contemporary turn to indigenous African religion, which takes place under conditions of covid-19. For one thing, this turn appears to express discontent with the primordial model of relationality that has historically come to inform the modern experience of life. The modern experience of life has the primordial model as its foundation because its ground is the fear of alienation. It is informed by the fear of co-existence with the racial and cultural other who is often perceived as a threat to the assumed purity of the primordial model. Consequently, the modern experience of life has subjected countless numbers of people whose presence in the world it deems threating and alienating to subjugation. The modern experience of life, that is, denies co-existence with those deemed threatening by virtue of the difference they present in the world. This denial of co-existence has legitimised exclusion, poverty, racism, sexism and xenophobia among others troubling forms of cruelty. Many of the people who are sidelined and marginalised by this Manichaean world, have

had to become the burden bearers of disease. They have had to inhabit a world that normalises the flourishing of high blood pressure, diabetes, asthma, obesity and other diseases associated chiefly though not exclusively with marginality. The modern experience of life, consequently, has as one of its key features the normalisation of pandemics though its parlance does not refer to these diseases as such. It is only in the context of the outbreak of Covid-19 that it has become apparent that many of the people who are marginal to the modern experience of life have always lived with pandemics. Of course, the WHO and its allies (African governments) never see things that way. The main casualties of the Covid-19 disease show that we have been living with normalised pandemics for quite some time. It is thus ironic to refer to Covid-19 as a pandemic whereas it simply exposes the normalisation of pandemics by the primordial model of relationality that informs the modern experience of life. The primordial model normalises pandemics because it refuses fairness, equity and justice as the building blocks of the experience of life.

The turn to the religion of the family and the clan expresses not only discontent with the primordial model but indicates desire for the return of the healer. The return of the healer is a crucial moment because it signals desire for the realisation of a model of relationality that takes as its foundation, alienation, even if such alienation threatens order with its dissolution. Alienation, however, cannot fully become a resource unless it is accompanied by the act of remembering represented in the story by the return of the healer. It is only if we can remember, after all, that we can reimagine life anew and undertake the work of repair that remembering pressuposes. The intimacy of alienation and the act of remembering is directed at the production of inclusive expressions of relationality. The act of remembering is of paramount importance because it shuns inclinations towards origins or the idea that the good life is one that is lived in the absence of threatening others. Remembering casts relationality as an impossibility in the absence of others since relating can only truly consist in encounter with the strange and the puzzling. This is why the return of the healer in the story of Seila-Tsatsi is of utmost importance. The return of the healer casts remembering as terrain for the repair of relationality. It is the combination, therefore, of remembering and alienation that places relationality firmly on the foundation of equity, fairness and justice. Only visions of relationality, it would appear, born of the intimacy of alienation and remembering have the capacity

to challenge, and possibly undo, the normalisation of injustice characteristic of the primordial model that assumes an 'us' and a 'them'. Consequently, only such visions have the possibility of inaugurating health dispensations based on fairnesss, equity and justice and that can withstand diseases such as Covid-19, which clearly exploit the normalisation of pandemics under the contemporary primordial model of relationality.

3. On Commandment

A careful examination of the story of Seila-Tsatsi seems to suggest that the story concerns itself not only with the two models of relationality discussed above. Important also to this story, is the theme of commandment, which is the over-arching theme around which the story of Seila-Tsatsi revolves. Commandment, it would seem, directs our attention to relationality as consisting ultimately in the violation of the prohibition that safe guards the primordial model. The key question that this part of the paper tries to address relates precisely to what commandment might mean given its centrality to the story. The word of the healer bears testimony to the active presence of commandment throughout the story. The point of departure of this paper is that commandment is almost impossible to fathom outside of others who are lost to death (i.e., the ancestors). It is impossible to think of in the absence of loved ones lost to death. Dead others make commandment possible because they point to the participation of death in what is wholly other, divinity. It is precisely the participation of death in divinity that defines the nature of commandment. Commandment, as such, issues not so much out of opposition between forces because it is a product of the participation of death in divinity as we see in (Molapo 2019). Rather, what defines it is its orientation towards the rhetorical. Commandment is born of persuasion and its truth is persuasive truth. It is born of a world that does not perceive truth in binary oppositions and in adversarial terms as is the case with the modern episteme that (Fanon 1963) so beautifully illustrates. It is the offspring of the central theme of participation that defines the religion of the family and the clan.

The participation in divinity of loved ones lost to death is always a return to what is lost because it is in essence a return to others lost to death. Consequently, it is a return to an experience that was once available but is now lost. It is a return to an experience that though available has become impossible. This impossible

experience nonetheless appears to be constitutive of experience in the here and now or the experience resident in individual biography. It must be distinguished from experiences in individual biographies that lie hidden from conscious view. This is because such experiences do not know death – the thing that constitutes lost others as sacred by virtue of participation in the eternal passage of time. The intriguing thing here is that while the act of remembering – the return to a past – signals and acknowledges the authority of death it simultaneously portrays death as a failure. This is because while it is evident that death can take away life and that every life lives under the final authority of death, the debris that death leaves behind makes the act of remembering possible. The return to a past as a result is a form of vengeance on death (Mbembe 2002).

Because the commandment arises out of participation it belongs to the order of speech. That is, the commandment does not attempt to fix life in the way that writing is a form of the fixing of life and of the world as we see in Pickstock's account of the rise of modernity in Europe (Pickstock 1988). Commandment belongs to the order of speech not because of the lack of writing but precisely because it is opposed to the fixing that is apparent in writing. Speech as a result is terrain for the incarnation of commandment. Yet, even though commandment emerges out of and thrives in ephemerality it always presupposes some form of fixing in the sense that it is always directed to an adherent or adherents. The immediate implication here is that one of the characteristic features of commandment is the creation of an audience or audiences. Commandment generates the creation of an audience or audiences because it is about keeping a word. Those who have to keep the word constitute the audience. This points to the entanglements of commandment with archive because the word that commandment prescribes is restricted and restrictive. It is not a generalised word even if that word were to belong to the order of the ephemeral. It is important to note however that the opposition between what is fixed and what is unfixed is in the main polemical because as we have seen commandment also somewhat fixes by prescribing the word. Consequently, what is fixed and what is unfixed ought to be seen as mere points of convergence.

While commandment is always in an entanglement with death and loss and finds incarnation in speech it must also be understood as a particular kind of mood. It is the imperative mood of the restricted and restrictive word – that word that (underscored by do not) is uttered or given under circumstances that

demand a return to a past. Put another way it is the imperative mood of the word that is uttered or given in the act and moment that legislates remembering as a modality governing the everyday. In general, crises generate this moment that requires a return to the past – to what is lost. It is in response to crises that the imperative mood of the restricted and restrictive word becomes apparent. As the imperative mood of the restricted and restrictive word – that word born of crisis – commandment because of crisis takes us back to the intimacy of memory and loss in order to realise there the repair brought about by experiences that have not been lived but are available (i.e., those experiences that have not been fixed by history in personal biography – experiences that as such repair the myopia brought by history). This is precisely the reason why commandment takes us back to the intimacy of memory and loss. It does so in order to repair historical myopia in the life of individuals or collectives.

Commandment is the imperative mood of the restricted and restrictive word precisely because it arises out of the gift. This however is the gift of loss, which by definition is an impossible gift. It is impossible because it cannot be possessed in the manner that ordinary gifts are possessed. Consequently, it cannot be acquired and given in the manner of ordinary gifts. It does not arise from the terrain of things that can be possessed and given as one would his/her property. Thus, it is prior to the socially derived gifts even if such gifts may have as their ultimate aim the creation of bonds of solidarity. It is prior to the socially derived sense of solidarity. This means that it is outside of the resources that are available or can be found in the social terrain (i.e., it cannot be derived from a given collective because it is outside of community as a construct of the Maussian sense of gift). Further, this means that it is prior to a system of debt and obligation characteristic of community as a construct of socially derived gifts as we see in (Mauss 1954). It is outside of a system of means and ends. As such, it is prior to a structure of reason because it does not submit to the system of means and ends. But precisely because the commandment is the imperative mood of the restricted and restrictive word, it is also the result of a gift – a gift that cannot be possessed because it is always already lost. Commandment as such is outside of the realm of things that can be given in the manner of things that can be possessed. As the imperative mood of the restricted and restrictive word commandment can only be a gift – a gift of loss. That is, it is only because of loss that commandment can be commandment as such.

Commandment, therefore, can be seen as a form of attitude towards truth. It is a form of attitude that validates binary thought (evident in the primordial model) only to surrender it to alienation in the progressive model of relationality. Consequently, commandment is that attitude towards truth that considers binary thought legitimate but elementary form of thought that can only find its maturity in the dissolution brought about by forces of alienation. As an attitude towards truth, commandment sees alienation as the final destination of truth (this is what we see in the story of Seila-Tsatsi). In this final destination, alienation is of course in an intimacy with remembering because it is only that intimacy that enables the ethical work of repair. The turn to the religion of the family and the clan, taking place under conditions of Covid-19, therefore, resembles a deeper yearning for the experience of life that has commandment as its foundation. Only such life can overcome the myopia of a life that has until so far been surrendered to binary thought that has become the final destination in its own right. The consequence of this falsehood is that it has only served to legitimate the normalisation of pandemics that are being exposed by the outbreak of Covid-19.

4. A Politics Without Commandment

A politics of health that informs Covid-19, driven in the main by the WHO, can be seen or characterised as a politics without commandment because it is a politics without remembering. It is a politics premised on opposition between friends and enemies that the primordial model of relationality pressuposes. This orientation is manifest in, among other things, the opposition that the WHO has towards the idea that indigenous African health systems can respond to the Covid-19 pandemic. This opposition exhibits only one thing, the claim that there is only one form of truth about health and that that form of truth is the truth of science. While on the surface this claim may appear to express concern with issues related to public safety due to the potential and possibility of dangerous concoctions entering the market, the truth is that this concern conceals a deeper problematic which is that the truth of science stands opposed and finds alternative forms of truths about health repulsive. This is because the truth of science has its foundation in a modern episteme that because it dispenses with pathos it becomes a system purely grounded in what is rationally plausible. Consequently, the formal and rational become ground informing the articulation of truth as

a construct of scientific knowledge. The extent therefore to which the informal and the non-rational can contribute to knowledge about health disappears from the radar screen of the knowledge claims propagated by institutions such as the WHO. The consequence of this is a ruthless and aggressive relationship that the WHO and its subsidiaries within respective nation states have towards truth claims that temper with the neat division between pathos and its opposite, rational investigation of truth.

Now, because the politics of health informing Covid-19 is opposed to pathos it becomes a politics without remembering. This is to say that it is a politics trapped in a binary system that assumes an enemy to be captured, conquered and inducted in the only truth that matters in issues pertaining to health and the outbreaks of diseases such as Covid-19, outbreaks that of course, furnish yet another opportunity for the hegemonic truth to reassert its monopoly of truth. This politics is without remembering because caught in binary oppositions it is unable to undertake the work of repair that must of necessity follow the shuttering of lives by Covid-19. This shuttering is, of course, broad and must be seen to include lives of loved ones who had to surrender to the brutality of the pandemic as well as economies that have had to bleed livelihoods due to hard and sometimes prolonged lockdowns. The urgent need for repair in the context of a global risk society has recently surfaced in the work of (McLaren 2018) and (Jackson 2014). Yet, while this scholarship advances a critical notion of repair, it does so in the absence of what this paper calls remembering.

Remembering presupposes the ability to transcend binary oppositions in order to arrive at the possibility of re-imagining politics as terrain for a rhetorical understanding of truth. This is the terrain of persuasion and not of the destructive violence that accompanies truth as a product of dialectics evident in the primordial model of relationality, which sustains the modern world. Herein lies the possibility of seeing value in complementarity, multiplicity and difference. Why, after all, would anyone seek persuasion who does not in the first place see value in difference (epistemic difference in this regard). In the absence of life lived through and as persuasion we can only encounter remembering as repetition of the horrors we have by now become familiar with – racism, endemic poverty, unemployment, gender violence, wars of greed, etc. In fact, truth be told this is not remembering but rather a way of looking at the past and seeing others only as threats to one's existence. If remembering does not bring about healing of

systems, lives and the planet - all shuttered by the violence of a politics of health without commandment - then it has ceased to become remembering. Rather, it must be referred to by its appropriate name, commemoration, or the refusal to look into yesteryear and see the enemy as a friend or oneself as the enemy.

It must be pointed out also that the WHO's politics of health is without commandment precisely because it takes for granted the marginalisation of millions of people who inhabit a world framed around the primacy of the primordial model of relationality that has turned these people into outcasts. This politics does not question such a world but tries to put bandages around its festering wounds. Consequently, it is unable to imagine a new world order in which health and its provision issue out of a new conception of relationality that sees in alienation the final destination of the experience of being human. It is unable to imagine this possibility because ontologically, it conceives of reality to consist of contest between adversaries in which case the weak have to submit to the strong. In colonial contexts characterised by the non-recognition of threatening others, this ontological outlook has only unleashed untold suffering and violence as it aided processes aimed at turning people and life into commodities that could be bought and sold in markets.

5. Conclusion

This paper has tried to explore the Africanity that is presupposed by the turn, under conditions of the outbreak of Covid-19, to the religion of the family and the clan (i.e., indigenous African religion). It has argued that this turn, evident in renewed and intensifying use of herbal remedies aimed at treating Covid-19, should not be seen purely in instrumental terms but must be seen also as a symbolic gesture expressing desire for a more equitable expression of relationality. Drawing from the classical African story of Seila-Tsatsi, it deliberated on the conceptual significance of this turn. It made the claim that this turn expresses dissatisfaction with the world as it is. This is because the world as it is assumes the primacy of a primordial model of relationality that conceives of reality in terms of origins and desire for purity. It has argued that this model has historically functioned to normalise pandemics that are currently being exposed by the outbreak of Covid-19. The turn to the religion of the family and the clan expresses a yearning to overcome this model and replace it with a model

of relationality that sees in alienation resource for constituting a fair, equitable and just world. Alienation, it continued, can only become creative resource when subjected to the work of remembering that demands repair. The paper has also claimed that both models of relationality must be seen as key moments in a broader continuum that is commandment. Commandment, of course, is an attitude towards truth – an attitude that sees in the intimacy of alienation and remembering - the final destiny of human experience. The paper has explored the Africanity that the turn to the religion of the family and the clan presupposes in order to offer a critique of a politics of health that it clams the WHO advances.

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Assessing Political Risk Analysis in a Hybrid Regime: The case of Zimbabwe

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Abstract

Political Risk Analysis (PRA) levels are theoretically postulated to increase in a hybrid regime. This paper argues that there is a change to this hypothesis. A single case research design was employed, using Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2018. During the period, Zimbabwe showed five diverse forms of hybridity which are liberal, competitive illiberal, competitive, illiberal, and military hybrid regimes. A conceptual framework is developed to assess political risk in a hybrid regime using hybrid regime indicators and some political risk factors of most concern to developing countries. 28 key informants from six categories of respondents were interviewed. Illegitimacy, corruption, the staleness of leadership, adverse government regulation, election violence, and severed home-host state relations were confirmed to increase the perception of political risk in a hybrid regime. Investors were observed to have developed a tolerance for some "unacceptable" factors that increased political risk. Military tutelage, weak institutions, flawed elections, military generals in power, undemocratic means to retain power, minimum horizontal accountability and weak rule of law were found to not automatically increase political risk as before. The paper concludes that there is no single form of hybridity and as such different forms of hybrid regimes accrue different levels of political risk, some lower levels while others substantially higher levels. Therefore, in a hybrid regime, a differentiated PRA monitoring, assessing and mitigation strategy will be most effective for management to implement.

Future studies can apply the analytical framework of assessing PRA in a hybrid to another hybrid regime to expand the theoretical propositions made by this paper.

1.Introduction

Assessment and mitigation of PRA for foreign investors is crucial for any political regime. The three broad political regimes identified by this paper are democracy, authoritarian regime and hybrid regime (Morlino 2009, 282; Cassani 2012, 4). A political regime is a set of procedures that identifies who has access to power; who can select the government, given specific conditions by which authority is exercised within a specific state (Kailitz 2013, 39). Lower levels of political risk are traditionally attributed to states that are democratic, liberal and capitalist, while non-democracies accrue high levels of political risk (Green 1974, 35; Jarvis and Griffiths 2007, 15). This is because democracies have institutions that constrain the executive arm of government to not advance policies unfavourable to Multi-National Companies (MNC) and leaders in a democracy can be punished at the polls and not voted into office again because they had a poor reputation with financial market and if they retract their commitments made about foreign investments. In addition, democracies offer guarantees for the protection of property rights, stable policies and there is potential for MNCs to participate in drafting policies (Jensen 2003, 592; 2008, 1050–52).

Literature postulates that there are higher levels of political risk for authoritarian regimes. The reasons proffered for this are that centralised political systems possibly headed by military dictators are seen as politically unstable and there is uncertainty over the orderly transfer of power (Robock 1971, 16; Green 1974, 35). Additionally, authoritarian regimes cannot credibly commit to securing property rights and there is the potential of political instability as a result of the government's dissent on the citizens and uncertainty over the orderly transfer of power(Venter 1999, 78; Jensen 2003, 592). However, authoritarian regimes are argued to be stable for foreign (Howell and Chaddick 1994, 76). This stability should only be considered as short-term and not a guarantee for future stability (Sottilotta 2016).

A hybrid regime embodies institutions of democracy and autocracy and the regime has been present for over a decade (Diamond 2002, 23; Morlino 2009, 282). It became pronounced after the third wave of democratisation alluded to by Huntington (1991). Traditionally, a hybrid regime is hypothesised to invariably accrue high levels of political risk (Green 1974, 35; Simon 1984, 127; Jarvis and Griffiths 2007, 15). Authoritarian regimes are claimed to be more stable for

foreign investment than the hybrid regime which is volatile (Sottilotta 2016, 72). This paper will not dispute that when political regimes are compared for political risk levels, the hybrid regime is traditionally ascribed to have a higher risk. This is attributed to the coexisting of democracy and autocracy in one political regime, which are antagonistic and have different sets of priorities.

This paper seeks to critically assess if the traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk for the hybrid regime are still applicable using a single case study of Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2018. It is because an understanding of whether the traditional perceptions of political risk are still applicable will provide more insights on how to monitor, assess and design PRA mitigation strategies for foreign investors in hybrid regimes. First, the paper conceptualises hybrid, PRA and develops an analytical framework that assesses PRA levels in Zimbabwe. Next, the research design and data collection methods are deliberated. Subsequently, Zimbabwe's hybrid development is discussed. Thereafter the findings, discussion and theoretical contribution of this paper are discussed.

2. Hybrid Regime and PRA Conceptualisations and the Analytical Framework

This section discusses the hybrid regime and PRA conceptualisations and develops a framework to analyse PRA in a hybrid regime.

2.1 Hybrid Regime Conceptualisation

The approaches by Wigell (2008) and Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) are selected to conceptualise a hybrid regime because they present a multi-dimensional approach suitable for analysis Wigell (2008) and Gilbert and Mohseni (2011). Wigell (2008) focused on democracy and liberalism which are achieved through the process of elections and constitutionalism. Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) use competition, civil liberties, and tutelary interference to analyse the hybrid regime. Similar indicators given by these aforesaid authors are merged to conceptualise the hybrid regime. The indicator of competition by Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) is similar to elections by Wigell (2008). The indicators of civil liberties and constitutionalism are similar. Wigell (2008) specifies election empowerment and election sovereignty under an additional criterion of elections which have

similar components of what Gilbert and Mohseni (2011) refers to as tutelary interference. Therefore, the conceptualisation to be utilised by this paper will be the following: i) competition/elections renamed as elections, ii) civil liberties/ constitutionalism renamed as civil liberties, and iii) tutelary interference/election empowerment/election sovereignty renamed as tutelary interference.

Elections are multi-party, mostly regular and competitive, however, unfair competition is experienced (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 285). Civil liberties determine the fairness of the competition exhibited in a political regime (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 285). These are state- specific and contextual. Institutions that enable fair competition among political players in a hybrid regime exist, for example, the judiciary. However, unfair competition exists due to discretion applied by the institutions favouring the incumbent. Tutelary interference is when external bodies coerce elected officials to circumvent proper decision-making processes or lead to national legislation being circumvented (Gilbert and Mohseni 2011, 286; Mufti 2018, 115). Tutelage can be applied by a person, group, family or institution which could be the military, religious bodies, a monarchy, MNCs, and terrorist groups (Wigell 2008, 239).

To analyse the hybrid regime, this paper adds the indicator of political elite cohesion. Political elite cohesion analyses the unity among the key decision-makers, it is contextual and case-specific. Political elites are important in a hybrid regime because they are the agents of more sustainable change than the bottom-up approach from the masses (Menocal *et al* 2008, 35). Four elements denote political elite cohesion which are political elite cooperation, factionalism, prevention of threats from external actors and leadership turnover. This conceptualisation of the hybrid regime is applied to the case of Zimbabwe. Additionally, the hybrid indicators discussed will be used as inputs in the analytical framework developed by this paper.

2.2 Political Risk and PRA Conceptualisation

Decision-makers must consider the political risk before an initial project investment and during project implementation in a host country. Traditionally, political risk was perceived as the relationship between a host government and MNCs (Kobrin 1979, 67). This conceptualisation influenced risk factors such as confiscation, expropriation, nationalisation, coups and riots (Robock 1971, 7–12;

Bunn and Mustafaoglu 1978, 1558). Government intervention was increasingly perceived as the major political risk factor that negatively impacted foreign investment which influenced political risk conceptualisation as unwarranted government interference with business operations (Chermak 1992, 168). There was an increase in risk factors such as operational restrictions, loss of transfer freedom, breach of contract and discrimination of taxes. Traditionally, political risk is conceptualised for foreign and not domestic investors (Kobrin 1979, 71; Simon 1982, 66). Nevertheless, domestic firms are not exempted from experiencing risk factors such as riots, nationalisation, war and import restrictions (Lambrechts and Blomquist 2016, 1).

To make the traditional conceptualisation of political risk more comprehensive a few factors must be included. These factors are terrorism, cyber-attacks, extreme weather patterns and health pandemics. Terrorist attacks disrupt business operations, destroy infrastructure and occasionally involve the kidnapping of key personnel, hence, MNCs need to consider the risk of terrorism (Bremmer and Keat 2009, 10). Politically motivated terrorism has increased and it is one of the top ten political risk factors for foreign investors in developing countries (MIGA 2012, 27). Fundamental operations are linked to cyberspace, for example, communication and critical infrastructure. Cybercrime, cyber terrorism, and cyber warfare conducted by governments, organised non-state actors and individuals pose challenges to MNCs of any size. Thus, MNCs should be cognisant of this and take pro-active measures for protection.

Extreme weather patterns and health pandemics are excluded from the traditional political risk conceptualisation because they are not politically motivated. However, when an extreme weather pattern such as a cyclone occurs the costs of interrupted production, distribution, sales and travel are high (Control Risks 2019). Extreme weather patterns were forecasted as the third highest risk for 2019 (Control Risks 2019). Infectious diseases, for example, HIV/AIDS, COVID-19 pose threats to MNCs in the areas with a high disease prevalence rate. A pandemic is a possible political risk factor when the host-government affected by the pandemic has the capacity but fails to curb the spread of the disease resulting in a high prevalence rate. MNCs may be compelled to assist in mitigating the burden of the pandemic in communities where production is located.

PRA involves the assessment, forecasting and management of political risk

(Bremmer and Keat 2009, 192; Howell 2014, 308). PRA enables management to pursue rational decision-making for companies by identifying current and possibly future political threats and opportunities in a host country (Poirier 1997, 676). This allows investors to develop strategies, rank and select the optimal solutions that solve and mitigate the risks. PRA is most effective when conducted throughout the project's implementation (Lambrechts and Blomquist 2016, 14).

This paper proposes that adverse regulatory changes, breach of contract, transfer and convertibility restrictions, expropriation, creeping expropriation, non-honouring government guarantees, and nationalisation are the political risk factors of most common concern to investors in the case of Zimbabwe (MIGA 2012, 21; 27). Terrorism and war were excluded because Zimbabwe has a low Global terrorism index (Trading Economics, 2019b) and the last war was recorded before 1980.

These aforesaid political risk factors and those proposed by this paper will be included in the analytical framework which is discussed in the subsequent section.

2.3 *Analytical Framework for Assessing PRA in a Hybrid Regime*

This section develops the framework to assess PRA in a hybrid regime. The paper hypothesises that a hybrid regime increases PRA. Figure 1 below shows the analytical framework.

Figure 1: Analytical Framework to Assess PRA in a Hybrid Regime

Author's compilation (2020)

Hybrid regime indicators and political risk factors of concern to investors in developing countries are used as inputs of this analytical framework. The framework has three categories: i) political structure and political institutions, ii) political stability, and iii) economic development, as illustrated in Figure 1. Political structure and institutions examine four factors, which are elections, state institutions, rule of law and legitimacy. The second category, political stability, has three factors which were corruption, tutelary interference, and political elite cohesion. Economic development is the last category which focuses on government's participation in the economy, adverse regulations, health pandemics, extreme weather patterns, as well as the host country's economic performance and international perception by other states.

This framework will be applied to the case of Zimbabwe. The framework will not conduct a future forecast of political risk in Zimbabwe, it will analyse whether the conceptual perceptions in a hybrid regime are still applicable from 1990 to 2018. Furthermore, it will show a snapshot of the PRA levels during the period under study. The next section discusses the papers research design.

3. Method

A qualitative research methodology is adopted for a rich and detailed account of political risk in Zimbabwe (Parsons 2011, 407; Yin 2014, 19). A single case research-design is utilised because it allows the researcher to focus on a specific case, thereby deriving detailed and extensive information about it while retaining a holistic and real-world perspective (Yin 2014, 16). The period 1990 to 2018 was selected because the hybrid is evident from 1990, before this Zimbabwe is contextualized as an authoritarian regime. Additionally, the hybrid indicator of political elite cohesion is appropriately analysed when the incumbent party has been in government for a prolonged period. The Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) has been the dominant political party for almost 40 years.

Data was collected using secondary data analysis and primary data. Secondary data informed the paper's literature review, developing the analytical tool and the appropriate research design and data collection methods to use. Primary data was collected between June and October 2018 using key informants because they have specialised knowledge about a concept and would give an in-depth

description of political risk in Zimbabwe (Tremblay 1957, 689; Parsons 2011, 407). Given the sensitivity of the topic other qualitative data collection methods, for example, focus group discussions or direct observations, were not ideal. Political research is regarded with suspicion in Zimbabwe, hence meeting with respondents individually was deemed less intimidating. Also, respondents could respond openly without fear of being victimised or potentially labelled in a group. Synchronising the diaries of experts to conduct a focus group discussion on political risk in Zimbabwe would have been difficult.

A number of key informant interviews were conducted. An Ethical Clearance was obtained from Stellenbosch University before the interviews were conducted. A semi-structured interview guide was used to probe the themes raise by the respondents. Respondents participated after giving their voluntary informed consent. This paper guarantees the anonymity and confidentiality of the respondents. The respondents are referred to as for example, Academia Respondent 1. Only the respondents' contributions are discussed but anything directly identifiable to them is excluded.

A wide range of sectors should be interviewed to capture the varying perspectives and underlying issues of a problem (Tremblay 1957, 688). Six categories of respondents are selected to capture the multidimensions of political risk in Zimbabwe which are the government, the private sector, academia, embassies, civil society, and political risk companies. These categories participate by creating, measuring, reviewing, assessing, studying, or adapting to the changing levels of political risk. Purposive and snowball non-probability sampling techniques were utilised. Purposive sampling selects respondents based on their expertise of the subject matter while snowballing is when interviewed participants are asked to refer other experts the researcher can interview (Babbie 2010, 193). ATLAS.ti was used in managing the fieldwork data, however; the researcher analysed and interpreted the data using thematic analysis (Rambaree 2007, 3)

4. Zimbabwe Hybrid Development[1]

A comprehensive conceptualisation of the hybrid regime is excluded because the main aim of this paper is to assess levels of PRA in a hybrid regime and not hybrid regime development in Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe's hybrid development is briefly discussed based on the conceptualisation of the hybrid regime, discussed in section 2.3. This paper's hybrid regime indicators are elections, civil liberties, tutelary interference, and political elite cohesion. Zimbabwe shows five diverse forms of hybridity which are liberal, competitive illiberal, competitive, illiberal, and military hybrid regimes.

From 1980 to 1990 Zimbabwe exhibited an authoritarian regime. ZANU-PF dominated approximately 70% of the electoral votes which is representative of an authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52). The liberal hybrid from 1990 to February 2000 is the first type. Before 1999, Zimbabwe exhibited a pluralistic media, an independent court system and growth in political parties (Chikwanha-Dzenga, Masunungure, and Madingira 1999, 6). The Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), an opposition political party founded in 1999, drastically changed the political landscape of Zimbabwe (Mangongera 2014, 66–67), however, this change is evident in the succeeding hybrid regime. The liberal regime was thus characterised by non-competitive elections, liberal norms practised, relatively high political elite cohesion and ZANU-PF exerted tutelage.

Second, is the competitive illiberal hybrid from March 2000 to 2008. In this period MDC was highly competitive. There were five rounds of elections between 2000 and 2008[2]. In 2007, elections were synchronised to be conducted collectively with effect from March 2008. MDC's[3] parliamentary margin grew from 47% in

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1 A detailed explanation of the five stages of hybrid development in Zimbabwe is explained in a paper currently under review.

2 Parliamentary elections in 2000, 2005 and 2008, the presidential election in 2002 and 2008, and the local government in 2003 and 2008.

3 In 2005, MDC split into two factions known as Movement for Democratic Change-Tsvangirai (MDC-T) and Movement for Democratic Change-Mutambara (MDC-M) these factions were differentiated by the different leader's surnames. The split occurred during the senatorial elections but was caused by divisions in the executive with regards to structure, tribal issues and accountability (Moore and Raftopoulos 2012, 257).

2000 to have the combined majority vote in parliament in 2008 (Ncube 2013, 100). Civil liberties declined due to limitations on freedom of association, speech, closing of independent media houses and the fast tract land reform programme (Mlambo 2014, 235). Politically motivated violence increased, especially in 2008 due to operation Mavhoterepi *"whom did you vote for"* implemented by Joint Operations Command (JOC) whose aim was to prevent a ZANU-PF presidential runoff loss in the rural areas (Mangongera 2014, 54). The period had competitive elections, was illiberal in practice, had weakening political elite cohesion and the JOC, ZANU-PF and war veterans were the informal reserves of power.

The competitive hybrid regime from 2009 to June 2013 is the third type. The major opposition MDC had the majority in parliament which compelled ZANU-PF to negotiate a coalition government with the opposition. MDC was instrumental in questioning ZANU-PF hegemony; it was a source of new ideas in parliament and there were few cases of politically motivated violence on MDC members and supporters. MDC also assisted in exposing ZANU-PF past inefficiencies, for example, the diamond and salary gate scandals, nevertheless, no ZANU-PF elite or business associates of ZANU-PF were prosecuted (Moyo 2016, 357–59). JOC exerted overt tutelary interference and the political elite cohesion within ZANU-PF was not as strong as in the 1980's period.

The illiberal hybrid from July 2013 to October 2017 is the fourth type of hybrid. ZANU-PF regained the two-thirds majority in parliament in the July 2013 harmonised elections, however, the election results were disputed by civil society, opposition parties, and the international community (Ncube 2013, 100). The judiciary was biased towards ZANU-PF (Magaisa 2019, 154). Factionalism and succession politics within ZANU-PF resulted in fragmenting its political elite cohesion. 'Lacoste' previously known as 'Weevil' led by Emmerson Mnangagwa had a fall out with a faction called 'Gamatox' lead by Joice Mujuru (Mangongera 2014, 64). This resulted in the expulsion of Mujuru as the Vice-President of ZANU-PF and was replaced by Mnangagwa in December 2014. After Mujuru was expelled, factionalism continued within ZANU-PF between Lacoste and an upcoming group called Generation Forty (G-40). Lacoste was more inclined to the military, war veterans and senior ZANU-PF officials while G-40 group was more inclined to educated, young and enterprising ZANU-PF officials (Mandaza and Reeler 2018, 20). The period is marked by non-competitive elections, the denying of freedoms and low ZANU-PF political elite cohesion caused by

divisions over succession politics.

The military hybrid is the last type of hybrid regime exhibited between November 2017 and 2018. The formation of this hybrid type was catalysed by the weak ZANU-PF political elite cohesion between 2013 and 2017. The military became a formal actor in Zimbabwe's political governance. The military forced Mugabe to resign as president and endorse Emmerson Mnangagwa as president in November 2018. ZANU-PFs leadership structures from top to bottom significantly changed with more representation from the army and retired military personnel. In the July 2018 elections, ZANU-PF retained a two-thirds parliamentary majority. The presidential election was highly competitive, Mnangagwa narrowly won over his major opponent Chamisa. Before the elections the environment was liberal and competition was encouraged, but after the election the political environment was repressive towards the opposition. The Zimbabwe Defence Force (ZDF) and aligned ZANU-PF elites were the two tutelage actors. The military hybrid is characterised competitive elections, a mixture of illiberal and liberal behaviour, and low political elite cohesion.

5. Political Risk Levels in Zimbabwe

This section discusses the conceptual perceptions of political risk in Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2018. A brief description of political risk levels in the different hybrid regimes is given, followed by the findings from applying the analytical framework to Zimbabwe. The liberal hybrid had very low political risk levels which was attributed by the regimes liberal nature (Embassy Respondent 4). Political risk levels increased during the competitive illiberal hybrid that followed because the government was intolerant to divergent views and dispensed violence on the opposition political party members (Academia Respondent 1 and 4; Embassy Respondent 4). The competitive hybrid was marked by a decrease in political risk levels due to the sincerity of parties involved in the coalition government (NGO Respondent 3). Political risk levels increased during the illiberal regime because factionalism in ZANU-PF and the government backtracked on commitments made in the preceding period (Embassy Respondent 5). The military hybrid experienced lower levels of political risk than the illiberal hybrid regime because the government was tolerant of divergent views and was motivated to attract foreign investors (MNC Respondent 3; NGO Respondent 4; Embassy

Respondent 4).

The findings are presented according to the three categories of the analytical framework. Each indicator of the analytical framework is analysed, whether it influences changes in political risk. The findings will focus on what the majority of respondents alluded to and the relevant observations raised.

5.1 Political Institutions and Infrastructure

Legitimacy is measured as the wilful acceptance of the government by the citizens, that means the government exercises authority over the citizens through mutual consent and not by way of coercion (Howell and Chaddick 1994, 78). Zimbabwe was characterised as having legitimacy gaps from the year 2000 (Academia Respondent 3; Embassy Respondent 1 and 5; NGO Respondent 1). The government had occasionally used force to enforce public acceptance of it (Academia Respondent 3). The notion of Zimbabwe being an illegitimate government was described to be magnified internationally than within Zimbabwe (Academia Respondent 3; Government Respondent 4 and 5). Majority of the respondents emphasised that illegitimacy increased political risk. To emphasise this one responded said, *"A country led by an illegitimate leader is a ticking time bomb. You never know when things happen; there is no stability."* (Government Respondent 5). The perception of an illegitimate government in Zimbabwe had resulted in low investor confidence and low Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows.

Elections were assessed as free and fair, contested or violence during an election. All respondents expressed that a free and fair election reduced political risk levels. Electoral outcomes were mainly discredited because of how the process was managed. Zimbabwe's electoral outcomes were marred by contestations between 2000 and 2018 which was echoed by majority of the respondents. Some respondents highlighted that contested elections lead to increasing political risk. On the contrary, MNCs highlighted that elections in Zimbabwe had developed a reputation of being contested, however, this did not hamper business operations as these had to continue irrespective of the electoral outcomes (MNC Respondent, 3 and 4). If election contestations led to violence occurring the associated political risk would increase. MNCs mentioned they adequately secured their premises and purchased insurance to protect themselves in the event of political

violence occurring (MNC Respondent 1 and 5). Violence during an election was negatively perceived by a majority of respondents and leads to an increase in political risk. Investors were more concerned about election violence erupting because this could result in loss of property, disruption of operations or harm to their staff members which was highly concerning to them more than who would win the election.

The independence and strength of state institutions was assessed. Public officials are expected to be impartial, non-partisan, and not to prejudice the lawful interests of any political party. Respondents pointed out that the formal institutions in Zimbabwe were characterised as weak. The weak institutions were discussed to be associated with high levels of political risk. Respondents highlighted that the distinction between ZANU-PF and government resources, roles and duties was obscure in practise. However, when the distinction was apparent, the ZANU-PF position took precedence over government positions. MNCs showed an awareness of the ambiguity between ZANU-PF and government roles and an adaption to this behaviour (MNC Respondent 5). Potential foreign investors were also cognisant of the weak institutions, as illustrated by Government Respondent 3 in their comment:

…. if there are investors coming and they have, maybe, the protection of the president, yes, you will see them coming in and surely investing in the country. Two years down the line, their investment is affected, yes, but I think it is two-sided; some may come knowing very well that their investment is going to be protected and some will just come but without the full information.

This comment shows that the practice of '*protection from the president*' was a concept some investors understood and followed to operation in Zimbabwe. It is inferred that the weak institutions in Zimbabwe, coupled with the strong man leadership, resulted in having lower levels of political risk for some foreign investors.

Rule of law is when there is no bias in applying the law supported by an independent judiciary system. An inconsistent application of the law was observed between ZANU-PF elites and ordinary citizens was observed. Regarding the application of the law ZANU-PF elites and those politically connected were treated with bias than ordinary citizen (Academia Respondent 1; NGO

Respondent 3). Rule of law was described as weak and the judiciary system as bribe-able, impacting negatively on political risk. MNCs were conscious of the lack of integrity of the law and the judiciary system. MNC Respondent 1 highlighted this in the following comment:

> Now when you look at the political system, court cases can drag for long up to three or four or five years and you are looking at possibly a loss of United States Dollar (USD) 4 000-00… If it goes to court, some people have better ways to manoeuvre around the judiciary system and will get away with it, while some do not have. But all that comes back to the political environment to say, do they have the political will to say the judicial system needs to have this type of integrity? It's not there and just giving a blind eye. Company B, as big as it is, might have the muscle to say, 'We will see how it goes,' but it can't be a permanent thing to say this year you have a loss of USD three million, the following year you encounter another loss of USD five million…

Investors valued rule of law; however, they had adapted to the inconsistencies of how the law was selectively and preferentially applied. Their options were either to incur the losses accrued from the judiciary system or to use informal institutions as alluded earlier as *"protection from the president"* or a ZANU-PF elite.

5.2 Political Stability

Public corruption was highlighted as high to the extent that some government ministers openly demanded 10% of the value of the project as a pre-condition to approving the project (Moyo 2016; Academia Respondent 1 and 4; Embassy Respondent 1; Embassy Respondent 5; Political Risk Company Respondent 1). The majority of respondents emphasised that a high perception of corruption led to a high perception of political risk in Zimbabwe. Despite the negative consequences of corruption, foreign investors had adjusted and learnt to budget for the *"extra brown envelopes"*, which was referred to as *"lubricating the state machinery"* (Embassy Respondent 5). MNCs interviewed did not disclose if they participated in corrupt activities at any given point. It would have been difficult for them to disclose this as corruption is illegal. There were various mechanisms to fight corruption, for example, the Zimbabwe Anti-Corruption Commission

(ZACC) but, the growth in public corruption showed that the government lacked the political will to aggressively curb corruption in the public sector.

Tutelage was observed to be exercised by ZANU-PF and the military. The impact of ZANU-PF tutelage on political risk was not clearly identified. To illustrate ZANU-PF significance, it was stated that foreign or local investors needed at least a ZANU-PF elite connection to operate in the mining, energy and petroleum sectors (Embassy Respondent 5). Military tutelage by the Zimbabwe Defence Forces (ZDF) was expressed to benefit a privileged few from the security sector. There were two contradictory opinions on the impact of military tutelage on political risk. The leading view was that military tutelage increased political risk (NGO Respondent 1, 3, and 4; Political Risk Company Respondent 1). While in the short run, a military tutelage could be perceived as stable, in the long term it was suggested to cause instability which increased political risk negatively (Political Risk Company Respondent 1).

The less dominant view was the military's involvement in politics did not influence political risk for two specific reasons (Academia Respondent 4, 5 and 6; Embassy, Respondent 5). First, it was indicated that investors operating had intimate knowledge of the military's role in politics and business. It was observed that before foreign investors officially commenced a business, they held meetings with key leaders of the military at their private residences (Embassy Respondent 5). Secondly, there was an overlap of the civil-military relations in Zimbabwe between the military and political leadership, as a result, the military's involvement in politics did not influence political risk (Academia Respondent 4). When the military was ignored politically political risk significantly increased, therefore, involving the military in the country's governance was suggested to keep political risk low (Academia Respondent 4). Most respondents underscored that after the military assisted change of government in November 2017, the perception of the associated political risk of Zimbabwe greatly diminished contrary to the expectation that it had to increase.

Political elite cohesion within ZANU-PF was assessed. Former President Mugabe led ZANU-PF for 37 years. The majority of respondents expressed that unity within ZANU-PF between 2017 and 2018 was weak compared to between 1990 and 2013. It was because ZANU-PF lacked a clear succession plan; hence different factions sought to succeed the late President Mugabe, resulting in the deterioration of political elite cohesion. One respondent mentioned that

the minister of agriculture and the deputy minister of agriculture would take different positions on the same matter when presiding over meetings during the illiberal hybrid regime (MNC Respondent 3). Despite the negative effects of factionalism, one respondent highlighted that their organisation was surveying for possible opportunities that could arise due to the elites political fighting (MNC Respondent 5). A majority of respondents emphasised the effects of ZANU-PF elite political disintegration on the economy, they did not relate it or link to political risk. Only one respondent suggested that when the ruling party elites agreed there would be stability in the party, lowering the associated political risk because there would be predictability (Academia Respondent 5).

5.3 Economic Development

Government's participation in the economy was analysed using how consistent the government adheres to the developmental policies it formulates. Policy formulation and implementation by the Zimbabwean government was observed as inconsistent. Furthermore, it was highlighted by a few respondents to be a factor that affected economic risk than political risk (Academia Respondent 1; Embassy Respondent 1; Government Respondent 2 and 4). Few respondents mentioned that political risk and policy inconsistency had an inverse and indirect relationship. The casual mechanism was explained as a high positive impression caused by policy adherence resulted in positively influencing investors to be interested in investing in Zimbabwe, which in turn resulted in lowering political risk levels (Government Respondent 1, 2 and 3; MNC Respondent 3). Inconsistent policy implementation was highlighted to affect medium to long term planning of MNCs (Government Respondent 2; MNC Respondent 3 and 4).

Regarding adverse regulations, several regulations were suggested. The Indigenisation Economic and Empowerment Act (IEEA) of 2008 was the most adverse regulation followed by the Fast-Track Land Reform Programme (FTLRP). The IEEA of 2008 instructed public and private companies to restructure ownership composition to a ratio of 51% to 49% in favour of indigenous Zimbabweans (Government of Zimbabwe 2008). MNCs had to realign their ownership structure accordingly. The FTLRP expropriated land from white commercial farmers in early 2000 displacing approximately 4 000 commercial

white farmers and 450 000 farm labourers (Raftopoulos 2009, 212; Mlambo 2014, 235).

> The IEEA was aggressively implemented between 2009 to 2016 which negatively deterred foreign investment because of its creeping expropriation effect (Mawanza *et al* 2013, 78; Embassy Respondent 1, 3 and 5; Political Risk Company Respondent 1). Politicians aggressively implemented the IEEA, both as a ZANU-PF campaign strategy and motivated by the potential wealth they personally could gain. This was suggested by MNC Respondent 4 who said,

The IEEA was mainly targeting highly lucrative businesses. I think it was deliberate. People had spent time out on farms, and they saw how difficult it is to farm, so people were not keen on expropriating more farms and what have you; but they were interested in high-net-worth cash-rich businesses which were easy to run mainly, in towns….

Political elites were the ones who were strategically positioned to benefit as recipients of the 51% sale of shares of foreign businesses. Most respondents expressed that the IEEA had increased political risk levels and created uncertainty. One respondent expressed it as follows, "*The general feeling was it was the second round of land reform, looting of properties and assets, people's private assets and companies- this with no compensation.*" The IEEA was revised removing some of the provisions during the military hybrid regime to positively encourage investment. Adverse government regulation is noted to increase political risk in Zimbabwe.

A few economic indicators that could possibly raise warning signs for foreign investors suggested by (Venter 1999, 79) were analysed. In 2016, Zimbabwe had a domestic and external debt of USD four billion and USD13 billion respectively owed (IMF 2017, 5–6). The external government debt, as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), was above 60% between 2009 and 2018 (Trading Economics 2019a). The current account deficit as a percentage of GDP was lowest in 2017 at -17.45% and highest in 2018 at -1.39 between 2009 and 2018 (World Bank 2019). These economic indicators served as warning signs to investors because they showed Zimbabwe's huge debt, low savings, and a possible inability to service the debt. Zimbabwe had a history of expropriating foreign assets without compensation. The IEEA and FTLRP were selectively applied and had

resulted in the expropriation of foreign-owned assets. Expropriation was still observed on a small and targeted basis (Political Risk Company Respondent 1). Foreign investors had to be aware that future expropriations were likely but at a minimal scale since the major expropriations of highly lucrative businesses and land had already occurred. The indicators served as warning signs to investors but could not establish the link with political risk.

The relationships between the MNC parent country and the host state were assessed. Most respondents highlighted that when there are severed home-host relationships MNCs originating from that country were exposed to higher political risk than when there are cordial relations. The MNCs originating from country three operating in Zimbabwe enjoyed favourable operating conditions throughout their existence in Zimbabwe (Embassy Respondent 3), while investors from countries one and four were negatively affected by the land reform and the IEEA (Embassy Respondent 1 and 4). Health pandemics were discussed to marginally increase political risk only in cases where the pandemic weakened the capacity of the state to respond. The location and nature of the outbreak were emphasised to enable tourists and MNCs to devise plans of how to insulate themselves from outbreaks (NGO Respondent 2; Political Risk Company Respondent 1). For Zimbabwe, extreme weather patterns and geographic location were considered insignificant in impacting political risk.

6. PRA and Hybrid Regime: A Discussion

This paper confirms that perceptions regarding illegitimacy, corruption, the staleness of leadership, adverse government regulations and severed home-host state relations between the MNC parent country and the host state still have the impact of increasing the perception of political risk in a hybrid regime (Robock 1971, 7; Fitzpatrick 1983, 249; Howell and Chaddick 1994, 76, 79–82; Venter 1999, 79; MIGA 2011, 21). Election violence was found to increase political risk, while a contested or unfair election had no impact on political risk. Low political elite cohesion was confirmed to increase the perception of political risk. The paper could not establish the impact of economic development, extreme weather patterns with respect to political risk. Health pandemics were found to minimally increase political risk, only when the pandemic severely hampered the

state's ability to respond[4].

The paper notes some contradictions to the theoretical perceptions of hybrid regimes. There was a tolerance level exhibited for military tutelage, weak institutions, relatively flawed elections (absent of violence), military generals in power, undemocratic means to retain power, minimum horizontal accountability, and weak rule of law. These factors have traditionally been perceived to be warning signs that would lead to increasing political risk. The military was assumed to lack governing experience, which would be detrimental in the long term (Howell and Chaddick 1994, 76; Venter 1999, 75) hence governing by military generals was perceived to increase political risk. The findings show that investment was highly revived in Zimbabwe, even when the signs pointed to weak institutions, having military tutelage and a government installed through undemocratic means during the military hybrid regime. Although the military hybrid was short-term, investors were willing to compromise and invest in a host country with a government which was overtly co-governed by the military if certain minimum requirements were adhered to. The associated political risk of Zimbabwe during the military hybrid was lower than the preceding illiberal hybrid regime.

Weak rule of law and a partial judiciary were observed in the case of the competitive hybrid and military hybrid regime. However, these aforesaid hybrid regimes had considerably high foreign investors showing interest and some investing. Foreign investors compensated for the weak institutions and weak rule of law by using informal institutions in the form of the strongman leadership of the late President Mugabe and forming joint ventures with businesses owned or proxies of ZANU-PF elites. These measures lowered political risk and guaranteed investors of some level of protection, especially in the mining, petroleum, and energy sectors. Thus, weak institutions and a partial judiciary did not invariably always increase political risk.

This paper makes two conclusions. Firstly, the traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk in hybrid regimes are still applicable, however, they are less stringently applicable in 2018 than in the 1970s. Secondly, this paper

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4 Ironically, when writing the world was battling with the COVID 19 pandemic. Zimbabwe implemented a national lockdown from the end of March 2020 with restrictions relaxed progressively. Zimbabwe's response to COVID 19 would not impact political risk levels.

concludes that within a single hybrid state, political risk levels differ within the different types of hybrid regimes; some hybrid regimes accrue lower levels of risk, while others accrue substantially higher levels of risk. This finding disregards the theoretical proposition that hybrid regimes accrue high levels of political risk as claimed by risk Green (1974, 35); Simon (1984, 127) and Jarvis and Griffiths (2007, 15). Figure 2 illustrates the perception of political risk levels in the different hybrid regimes in Zimbabwe.

Figure 2: Political Risk Levels illustrated in Zimbabwe's Hybrid Regime

Author's compilation (2020)

The liberal hybrid was perceived to have the least political risk because of an independent and impartial judiciary, strong rule of law, high horizontal accountability, the government perceived as legitimate and strong political elite cohesion. Regardless of the uncompetitive political environment and occasional intimidation on political opponents the overall perception of risk

was low. The competitive hybrid had the second-lowest perception of political risk. The opposition political parties formed the majority in parliament, which was the major distinction from the liberal hybrid. However, the judiciary was partial, inconsistent rule of law and average horizontal accountability made the competitive hybrid to have a higher perception of political risk than the liberal.

The military and illiberal hybrid and are numbered third and fourth respectively of investors' perceptions of perceived political risk. The military hybrid allowed political opposition more freedom, while the illiberal aggressively clamped down on an active opposition. The military hybrid was a new government, so investors probably had more confidence in the new government's ability to engage investors than the government of the late President Mugabe. The military hybrid was a short-term phenomenon; therefore possibly, after a few years, investors would regard it differently. The competitive illiberal hybrid accrued the most political risk. The competitive illiberal hybrid unleashed violence and suppressed political opponents on a larger scale. Furthermore, the IEEA and FTLRP which had an effect of expropriating foreign-owned businesses were passed in this period and changes to private property rights. Thus, investors became more risk aversive during the competitive hybrid regime.

Taking into consideration the research findings of this paper risk management and political risk analysts are better informed that:

1. Hybridity is fluid, it transitions from one form to another hence there should be constant monitoring of this regime. Moreover, the factors that are key to monitor are revealed.
2. Risk management and mitigation must have a differentiated PRA approach in the different hybrid regimes
3. This study recommends the following political risk factors as constituting moderately lower levels of political risk in a hybrid regime: competitive elections, an impartial judiciary, moderate rule of law, strong political elite cohesion of the incumbent, average horizontal accountability, election irregularities (absent of violence), an uneven non-violent political playing field, soft intimidation of political opponents, a partially active civil society and favourable government policies

7. Conclusion

This paper was undertaken to provide more insights on how to monitor, assess and design PRA mitigation strategies for foreign investors in hybrid regimes. The paper sought to critically assess if the traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk for the hybrid regime were still applicable using a single case study of Zimbabwe from 1990 to 2018 (Green 1974, 35; Simon 1984, 127; Jarvis and Griffiths 2007, 15). The case of Zimbabwe shows contrary results. Zimbabwe exhibits five types of hybrid regimes these are: liberal, competitive illiberal, competitive, illiberal and the military hybrid regimes. Findings confirm that perceptions regarding illegitimacy, corruption, the staleness of leadership, adverse government regulation, election violence, and severed home-host state relations between the MNCs parent country and the host state had the impact of increasing the perception of political risk in a hybrid regime. Regarding military tutelage, weak institutions, relatively flawed elections (absent of violence), military generals in power, undemocratic means to retain power, minimum horizontal accountability and weak rule of law did not automatically increase political risk as in times past. The findings confirm that the traditional conceptual perceptions of political risk for hybrid regimes are still applicable. Furthermore, different hybrid regimes accrue different political risk levels, which contradicts the traditional hypothesis. Therefore, investors need to constantly monitor the hybrid regime and to have a differentiated approach of mitigating and managing PRA in the hybrid regime. Future studies can apply the PRA analytical framework to a different hybrid, for example, Zambia/ Rwanda (Africa), Venezuela (South America) and Turkey (Europe) to either confirm or expand on the theoretical propositions that this study made. This paper enlightens on risk monitoring, assessing and mitigation in a hybrid regime.

Declaration
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Reflections on the Proceedings of the 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on Sino-Africa and Sino-BRICS relations

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Abstract

Beijing's economic diplomacy has, since the dawn of the millennium, sought to reconfigure the world by championing a new economic order that is predicated on the principles of multipolarity and fairness. The last policy conference of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) shed some light into how these policy ideals are to be carried out by Beijing and how they will bear on her relationship with countries from the Global South. This paper considers the policy statements of the CCP during its 19th congress held in October 2017 as a sneak peek into the future of China's economic diplomacy and the implications for Africa's own economic future from the context of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). It argues that China's role as the leader of the BRICS fulcrum reflects her goal to have a global influence that will see erstwhile economic backwaters such as Africa turning their focus away from the West to the East in search of sustainable solutions to their economic challenges.

Keywords: China, economic diplomacy, multi-polarity, BRICS, Chinese Communist Party

1.Introduction

The 19th Congress of the Communist Party was held from 18 to 24 October 2017 and it was attended by no less than 2200 delegates from across the party structures of the Communist Party. These quinquennial occasions of the Communist Party are without a doubt the most important events in the wider body politic of the People's Republic of China (henceforth China). They are, by nature, a conclave of high-ranking and powerful power brokers within the party and the apparatus of the Chinese state to decide on the country's future from many fronts – be it economic, social and political or environmental – amongst other policy considerations. Herein the reality of the modern Chinese state is laid bare to see. The communist rule that formed the mainstay of the second quarter of 20th century in Mao Zedong's China may at first glance appear to have been consigned to Cold War history, but its legacy reverberates strongly in the current dispensation, so much so that the modern Chinese state finds it almost impossible to shed off the character of its former self.

Bruce Gilley's work on *Legitimacy and Institutional Change* finds that the political system of present-day China has become something of a quasi-democracy that still holds on to its intolerant political past (Gilley 2008). It is this relatively acrimonious relationship with political liberalisation that has made it difficult for market forces in China to wrest state power entirely from the realm of the economy. Whilst it is yet to dispose completely of its Marxist-Leninist traditions, the fact that China has embraced a newfound capitalist outlook is undeniable. What is for certain is that Deng Xiaoping's vision of a China that opened its borders to the world in 1978 and undertook to fervently participate in the global economy as a necessary tool to grow the country's internal economy was sustained to generate a brand of capitalism that is unique to its own national circumstances and politico-economic history. While the notion of the state being at the centre of the running of the economy remains virtually unchanged in post-communist China, shown in part by a battery of market enhancing policies and state control (Lau 1999), China's economy is underpinned unquestionably by neoliberal principles that form the fabric of the capitalist system currently presiding over the phenomenon known as globalisation.

Against the backdrop of the shifting political and economic undercurrents in China and the international system, what can we learn from the 19th Congress

of the Chinese Communist Party from the economic diplomacy point of view and to what extent does it mirror Beijing's outlook towards the modern day international political and economic order? As a policy making platform, the 19th Congress outlined China's freign policy aspirations, which will implicate directly on how Beijing conducts herself with Africa and the rest of her BRICS partners even though the two were not mentioned explicitly in the Congress' proceedings. Similarly, within the context of Beijing's engagements with the world, particularly Africa and the BRICS fulcrum as a whole, what kind of future will the 19th Central Committee (19th CC) of the Communist Party of China herald for Beijing's economic diplomacy towards Africa within the wider context of the BRICS grouping?

This paper considers the policy statements of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) during its 19th congress held in October 2017 as a sneak peek into the future of China's economic diplomacy and the implications for Africa's own economic future from the context of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS). To this end, the paper commences with the Communist Party's global outlook at the turn of the millennium and the impact it has had on Beijing's quest to carve its own path in the global economy that has placed a premium on growing interdependence between nation-states. It argues that this period serves as the second watershed moment for Beijing (with the first being in 1978 when it first embarked on economic liberalisation) as it sought not only to resuscitate Deng Xiaoping's spirit of 'open door' policy, but also to make an attempt at having a dominant influence that will see China positioning itself as a global player that will offer a framework for global interdependence based on the the principles of equity, fairness and equal cooperation. The paper will then move on to address China's plurilateral and multilateral economic engagements with the African continent within the wider scheme of BRICS and what it is purposed to achieve as a grouping. Ultimately, it will argue that the resolutions of the CCP – although they make no explicit mention of BRICS and Africa – is an important statement of intent for China's economic diplomacy as it taps into economic opportunities provided by new frontiers in its quest to create a global economy that is favourable to Global South interests. Against this backdrop, it also posits that China's role as the leader of the BRICS fulcrum reflects her goal to have a global influence that will see erstwhile economic backwaters such as Africa turning their focus away from the West to the East in search of sustainable

solutions to their economic challenges.

2. The 19th Congress & China's economic diplomacy after the new millennium

Within the wider context of China's relations with other countries, the turn of the century ushered in the period of revival for the country's economic diplomacy. From Africa to Latin America, and from the Asia Pacific to the Middle East, China began flexing the muscles of its foreign economic diplomacy in ways never done by that country before. For instance, thanks to Africa's abundant mineral resources and the ever rising needs of the Chinese economy, the former was prompted to grant development aid to the countries in need in a *quid pro quo* style with the strict condition that they do not give diplomatic support to Taipei. By no means do we submit that China's increasing relationship with Africa is motivated my mineral resources alone as Beijing enjoys bi-lateral relations with non-mineral rich countries on the continent. China also found allure in the Middle East's own abundant oil resources, which resulted in the launch of the 'New Silk Road' initiative to regenerate trade exchanges and investments between the Persian Gulf and Asia (Summers 2016). The relationship between these two regions has grown and blossomed ever since as a result of this initiative.

Similar to the Middle East, Latin America offered China a value proposition that was based mainly on the abundant oil resources the region is endowed with as well as its vast agricultural importance for Beijing's growing food security needs. On regional home turf, China advanced to exert its influence on multilateral economic organisations during the second part of the 1990s in a bid to gain continental dominance. For instance, in 1995 Beijing started to hold annual meetings with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), followed by ASEAN +3, which it initiated in 1997 comprising ASEAN countries plus China, Japan and South Korea. The ASEAN +1 mechanism followed immediately after that initiative, which saw meetings between ASEAN and China being held annually and chaired usually by the Chinese premier. China deepened its participation in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in 2001, which saw that country hosting the ninth leaders' meeting in Shanghai (Cheng-Chwee 2005).

Herein it becomes unquestionable that China still struggles to shed relics

of communist control, despite having embraced openness and some elements of *laissez-faire* market economics as a means to spur domestic growth during chairman Deng Xiaoping's premiership. China seeks not only a participation platform, but a leadership role that would catapult it to global prominence in a bid to counter Washington's hegemonic status, which has seen a gradual decline since the turn of the century. China sought to do this not through military competition (Hodzi 2018), but rather through competing for dominance in the realm of the global economy.

But Beijing's alleged hard power aspirations are not the bone of contention here as its meteoric rise under the current international order is primarily motivated by her own quest to achieve sustainable economic growth. In fact, China's foreign economic policy is underpinned by what Michael Peters of Beijing Normal University calls the policy of "peaceful and open globalisation" based on trade (Peters 2017). Consistent with the proceedings of 17th and 18th congresses specifically, the 19th congress also emphasises the importance of Beijing forging peaceful foreign relations with the rest of the world as a key ingredient to improve the material interests of the Chinese people (*Ibid*). Secondly it has actively used its financial prowess as a soft power tool to forge stronger relations with other countries of goodwill, especially those in the Global South. Charm and persuasion, as opposed to aggression and belligerence, remain the mainstay that gives Beijing's economic diplomacy its unique character, and it has done so in a fashion that echoes the famous Third Plenary Session of the 11th CCP when Deng Xiaoping outlined a new plan to induct China into a comity of economically 'progressive' nations back in 1978 (Shu-yun 1986). Xiaoping, the father of the modern day Chinese economy, envisioned a China whose economic ascendancy would take a peaceful course, with the semblance of humility that would assist further in the stabilisation of the international system during the turbulent period of the Cold War (*Ibid*).

The 19th Congress espoused ideals that reinforced these essential principles that have underpinned China's economic revival since the year of reforms in 1978. It was the first turning point moment, which saw China embracing an economic system entirely foreign to the one Mao Zedong had envisioned. While the latter frowned upon the rules of the international system, Xiaoping embraced them as a means to achieving the kind of social progress that will usher in the next phase of economic prosperity. These principles continue to reverberate

through the social fabric of modern day China as well as through the structure of the economy. The 19th Congress saw the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping, being consecrated into modern-day political configurations of China through the adoption of *Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era*. This next phase of China's economic reforms does not depart much from those policy propositions that were adopted after 1978, which were underpinned by a modernised kind of socialism that had strong echoes of social market economics.

Certainly, this kind of socialism subscribes to the notion that human progress and market fundamentalism are sacrosanct ingredients required to realise a sustained economic future. There is no doubt that China has discharged this ideal with undeniable vigour; hence, since 1978 the rate of poverty in China has declined by 90.3 percent and through its vision, it has made 70 percent contribution to global poverty reduction (World Bank 2017). Similarly, the fact that it is the first developing country to realise the UN's Millennium Development Goal of poverty eradication is telling enough. This fact is echoed strongly in the Xi Jinping Thought, and in many ways, it serves to grant legitimacy to the socialist approach that has become the key pillar of China's economy as it strives to make its mark in a globalised world. In Xi Jinping's Thought, the focus to changing the material conditions of the Chinese people is undeniable, and the need to continue on this course is emphasised even more:

> Today we, more than 1.3 billion Chinese people, live in jubilation and dignity. Our land…radiates with enormous dynamism. Our Chinese civilisation shines with lasting splendour…Our Party shows strong, firm and vibrant leadership. Our socialist system demonstrates great strength and vitality. The Chinese people and the Chinese nation embrace brilliant prospects.(Jinping 2017)

However, it is China's understanding of its position in the world that gives one a true sense of the kind of global ascendancy it is coveting which has been enhanced by the diminishing hegemonic status of the United States (Layne 2009). According to Hodzi and Yu-Wen, "the diminishing leadership role of the U.S. has provided a window of the opportunity for China to advance its own causes. Already, Chinese officials consider Beijing to be playing a prominent and

decisive role in global affairs as the U.S. frontiers of dominance recede" (2018: 6). It is this undeniable sense of purpose, and the entitled attitude to assume one's rightful place in the world that casts China as a fierce competitor hellbent on reshaping the levers of global power and the 'rules of the game'. At the 19th Congress, Xi Jinping expressed desire for China to enter an era of ceaseless rise in the realm of the economy with the kind influence that will herald the dawn of a mutually beneficial world order that will ensure that developing countries are not left behind:

> This is a new historic juncture in China's development. The Chinese nation has stood up, grown rich, and become strong – and it now embraces the brilliant prospects of rejuvenation…It will be an era that sees China moving close to centre stage and making greater contributions to mankind…The path, the theory, the system, and the culture of socialism with Chinese characteristics have kept developing countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence: and it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind. (Jinping 2017)

The Xi Thought embodies the policy direction China will be pursuing for years to come. This, along with the resolutions of the Central Committee of the CCP, offers the backstory to how Chinese economic diplomacy has been shaped and framed over the years and there is no doubt that the national congress is telling of the Party's intent to reinforce and hold on to those ideals. While it tackles a variety of considerations pertaining to modern day China – from national developmental imperatives to the country's global outlook – it offers an invaluable reference point to understanding China's economic diplomacy under the leadership of Xi Jinping towards its partners in foreign shores. Since the second decade of the 2000s, China's economic diplomacy has been punching above its weight in ways that went on to question the legitimacy of balance of forces in the realm of global economy. This is evident through the role the country plays in the BRICS grouping, which it has used to its advantage as an economic diplomacy tool to woo developing nations, including those from Africa, to enter into mutually beneficial economic partnerships. Not only is Beijing prepared to create a new world order that is predicated on principles that depart from

those dominated by Washington and the West as a whole, it also contrives to be the leader of the very new world order it is creating using its economic strength as a useful instrument towards achieving this end. The next section weighs in on the country's economic diplomacy towards the African continent against the backdrop of the BRICS.

3. China-Africa Relations and BRICS

Understanding China's economic diplomacy towards Africa must be taken within the wider context of the early 2000s when the former began making bigger strides to forge stronger relations with the continent. While BRICS became complete in 2010 after the inclusion of South Africa, the turn of the millennium provides an advantageous starting point to assess the growth in maturity in the relationship between Beijing and the African continent. Of course, bilateral relations between China and Africa date back to the 1950's with Egypt becoming the first African country to forge diplomatic relations with China (Wenping 2007). But much of the period after that – and indeed for most part of the Cold War – was characterised by 'diplomatic neglect' which resulted in bilateral relations between Beijing and Africa taking a knock before intensifying after the establishment of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) at the turn of the millennium. Attended by 80 foreign ministers from 45 African countries, China acted swiftly to court Africa by way of filling an economic void previously assumed by the West following their disengagement from the continent after the Cold War (Edoho 2011). By 2004, the value of China-Africa trade had jumped to 39 percent, and by 2006, China had made a series of infrastructural development pledges including the US$500 million it pledged for a number of development projects in Ethiopia (Kwaa Prah 2007: 7). Through FOCAC, the bankrolling of investment and development projects on the continent continued unabated, resulting in the establishment of a US$5 billion China-Africa Development Fund. And by 2015, China had delivered US$60 billion to the continent aimed at energy and transport, which saw countries such Kenya, Ethiopia and Zambia getting the lion's share of the investment (Johnston and Rudyak 2017: 431).

But China's economic interests on the continent can be linked closely to its commitment to the BRICS grouping and the multipolar world it aims to create. Although Beijing's relations with Africa long predate the creation of BRICS,

the emergence of the latter, however, has become even more instrumental in helping deepen the country's longstanding relationship with the continent as well as the possibility of forging new relations with those African countries that Beijing might have otherwise not been able to court with much success in the past. Although the CCP's policy pronouncements at the 19th Congress implied unwavering commitment to the BRICS agenda, to assume that China has relegated BRICS to the side-lines of its priorities would be grossly erroneous. Xi Thought makes all-encompassing policy pronouncements that transcend various facets of policy priorities, requiring that it be read in the context of recent developments in the international system in which China is an active participant. Multipolarity and peaceful multilateralism feature prominently on the policy statements of the Xi Thought, which have echoes of the last BRICS Summit held in Xiamen, in which China placed a lot of emphasis on 'win-win', cooperation, and equality amongst other considerations (BRICS 2017).

Just prior to that, China had proposed the notion of BRICS+, which is a shorthand for an expanded BRICS membership that will add to the existing five member states. It is worth considering at this stage that China's proposition, although failing to obtain the necessary consensus for it to pass, also sought to include a number of African countries whose economies hold the promise of helping to advance the overall mandate of the BRICS. Had this proposition received an unequivocal greenlight from other BRICS countries, it would have fulfilled China's long-held ambition to garner the requisite support that would enhance its global standing as the leader of the Global South and ultimately succeed in the quest to reconfigure the global levers of power. Speaking in Addis Ababa on the occasion of the Second Ministerial Conference of the China-Africa Cooperation in December 2003, the then Prime Minister of China, Wen Jiabao, expressed China's intent to get Africa behind it in the pursuit of this agenda: "China is ready to co-ordinate its positions with African countries in the process of international rules formulation and multilateral trade negotiations" (FMPRC 2003). These words reinforce Hodzi and Yu-Wen's assertions that China is a "revisionist power seeking to challenge the existing international order so as to establish a parallel order, or, at least, materially revise the existing one" (Hodzi and Yu-Wen 2018: 7).

The inclusion of South Africa into the group, which came at the behest of China to make up BRICS, became a powerful economic bloc accounting for 20

percent of global GDP (Tralac, 2014). The fact that China successfully lobbied for the inclusion of South Africa into the alliance is telling of the economic clout it has in the BRICS alliance and it is further telling of the influence it wishes to exert as a *de facto* leader of the Global South. Furthermore, having the latter included in the grouping served the strategic importance of legitimising Beijing as an ally that has the best interest of the continent at heart.

For a while now, South Africa has always been viewed by the rest of the world as the entrepot to the African continent, owing largely to the sophistication of her economy, the size of its gross domestic product (GDP) (as largest on the continent at the time of joining BRICS), good infrastructure, and the promise of success and results-driven cooperation its economy offered. The case Beijing made for South Africa's inclusion most probably followed this logic, which is a success for the country's economic diplomacy given that it managed to galvanise most (if not all) significant economic players from strategic geopolitical regions in the global South to rally behind it. Although China has been engaging with China prior to the South Africa's ascension to BRICS, one can argue that bringing the former into the mix was an attempt at having the already existing relationship with the continent deepened further. Similarly, and as it will be shown in the section to follow, China's economic relationship with the continent began intensifying in the second decade of the millennium either in the form of trade, development assistance (aid) or loans even though it had begun doing the works during the first decade of the 2000s.

4. Beijing's *aid, trade and investment* charm offensive

To Beijing Africa has offered a value proposition that necessitated – from the economic standpoint – the kind of capital injection that will position Beijing as a dependable ally of the continent with genuine interest to help unlock its economic potential. It has in many ways embarked on a drive to delegitimise Africa's traditional economic partners from the West. Indeed in practice Beijing has kept its share of the bargain with its foreign investments on the continent flowing rapidly since the turn of the century. For instance, the meagre $10 billion China invested on the continent in 2000 have since seen a 20-fold increase to $220 billion in 2014 according to the China Africa Research Initiative (CARI) at the School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University (CARI 2017). Along the same lines, Beijing has invested in a number

of railway and port construction projections in East Africa aimed at facilitating the continent's participation in the so-called Maritime Silk Route which forms the basis of Beijing's inclusion of mainly the East Coast of Africa into the One Belt One Road (OBOB). Examples include the planned 759 km route Addis Ababa-Djibouti railways to the cost of US$4.5 billion, the US$11 billion for the construction of a port in Bagamoyo, Tanzania, and the recently completed Nairobi-Mombasa railway, said to have come at the cost of US$3.2 billion (Edinger and Labuschagne 2019: 7).

The same level of commitment is also demonstrated in the value of trade between Beijing and the African continent as reported by the *Financial Times* of London, amongst other publications (Financial Times 2017). Relative to the value of trade exchanged between the continent and the United States since the first decade of the 2000s, the value of trade between China and the continent has risen steadily, only coming second after the United States. As shown in the diagram below, the tables began to turn during second decade of the 2000s, which saw the value of trade between China and the continent, surpassing that with the United States. Although the value of trade between Africa and China dropped severely from the over US$220 billion peak of 2015, to under US$150 billion in 2017, it far surpasses the US$49 billion that makes up overall US-Africa trade.

Chinese and US trade with Africa

Total trade value ($bn)

Source: IMF

Figure 1

Source: Financial Times (2017)

The nature of China-Africa trade is subject to various interpretations, many of which speak to the growing importance of the continent to China's long-term economic interests. The first six years of the millennium saw China importing a slightly higher number of goods from Africa than it exported to the continent (Moyo 2016). Although the year 2007 saw a change in this pattern, with Beijing importing less goods before the 2000s, 2008 saw a slight resurgence of imports in China despite the sharp economic decline that gripped the world economy with imports mainly dominated by oil (CARI 2017). Table 1 shows that this trend in Sino-Africa trade continued well into 2009 with Angola emerging as China's top trade partner in Africa and whose oil production only came second after Nigeria, as shown in Table 2. By 2018, the situation had barely changed save for South Africa replacing Angola as Africa's top trading partner followed closely by oil producers such as Nigeria, Egypt and Algeria respectively, according to China's Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) (ECNS 2018). Nevertheless, the number of exports from Africa to China took a meteoric rise, with the value of Chinese exports to the region reported as having peaked from US$92 billion in 2013 to US$120 billion in 2017 according to CARI.

Table 1: China's top trade partners relative to overall Sino-Africa trade, 2009 & 2018 (Percentage)

	Percentage (%)	
Country	2009	2018
South Africa	17,6	21,3
Angola	18,7	13,7
Congo	2,3	3,5
Congo, DR	1,6	3,6
Equitorial Guinea	1,5	1,1
Nigeria	6,9	7,4
Sudan	7,0	1,2
Zambia	1,5	2,4

Source: Estimates and calculations by author (National Bureau of Statitics, 2009 & 2018)

Table 2: Oil production and reserves in Africa

Country	Production * (bbl/day)	Proven reserves ** (000's barrels)
Nigeria	2,211,000 (15)	37,500,000 (10)
Angola	1,948,009 (17)	13,500,00 (15)
Sudan	486,700 (31)	8,800,000 (20)
Congo, Republic of the	274,400 (39)	1,600,000 (37)
Gabon	241,700 (41)	2,000,000 (35)
South Africa	191,000 (43)	15,000,000 (87)
Chad	115,000 (51)	1,500,000 (39)
Cameroon	77,310 (55)	200,000 (58)
Cote d'Ivoire	58,950 (60)	250,000 (57)
Congo, Democratic Republic of the	16,360 (78)	180,000 (61)

* Production figure is for 2009

** Proven reserves as of 29 April 2011

Figures in parentheses are world rankings

Source: CIA World Factbook (in Edoho, 2011: 114)

However, these trends still leave an important question hanging in the air; how does China-Africa trade compare to China-BRICS trade as a whole? Further, how significant is the trade volume between China and the respective regions represented by each one of the BRICS member states? Compared to Asia, which trades the most with China of all regions represented by a BRICS member state, Africa seems to be trading the least with China, with Sino-South Africa trade accounting for only 27,18 percent of the overall China-Africa trade in 2014, a figure that marginally declined to 25,7 percent in 2015. Table 3 also shows that when compared with the rest of the BRICS countries, China trades with Africa the least, with overall China-Africa trade in 2014 accounting for 6,2 percent of China-BRICS trade, a figure that declined to 5,5 percent the following year. These estimates are a far cry from figures showing China-Asia trade, which account for 64,3 percent of overall China-BRICS trade for 2015, a marginal decline from 65,3 percent of 2014. Also, the volume of bilateral trade between China and Africa contracted significantly from US$28 billion in 2005 (Alden 2005) to a little over US$20 billion in 2018 as shown in Table 5, which represented a drop of 28.5 percent.

Table 3: Value of Chinese trade with BRICS countries relative to their respective regions, 2014 – 2015 (US$ 10 000)

	2014			2015		
	Total (US$)	Exports (US$)	Imports (US$)	Total (US$)	Exports (US$)	Imports (US$)
Asia	227,347,807	118,838,071	108,509,736	209,440,911	114,009,975	95,430,936
India	7,057,611	5,421,742	1,635,869	7,159,658	5,822,803	1,336,855
%	3,10	4,5	1,5	3,4	5,1	1,4
Africa	22,166,613	10,603,475	11,563,138	17,879,878	10,854 050	7,025,827
South Africa	6,026,728	1,569,915	4,456,813	4,600,933	1,585,792	3,015,141
%	27,1	14,8	38,5	25,7	14,6	42.9
Europe	77,495,555	43,882,482	33,613,073	69,630,569	40,324,061	29,306,508
Russia	9,527,045	5,367,694	4,159,351	6,801,554	3,475,688	3,325,866
%	12,2	12,2	12,3	9,7	8,6	11,3
Latin America	26,327,753	13,622,356	12,705,397	23,589,325	13,209,660	10,379,664
Brazil	8,654,336	3,489,013	5,165,322	7,150,158	2,741,223	4,408,936
%	32,8	25,6	40,6	30,3	20,7	42,4

Calculations and estimates by author (Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China, 2014 & 2015)

Table 4: Value of Chinese trade with BRICS countries relative to their respective regions, 2016 – 2017 (US$ 10 000)

	2016			2017		
	Total (US$)	Exports (US$)	Imports (US$)	Total (US$)	Exports (US$)	Imports (US$)
Asia	194,691,029	104,111,685	90,579,344	212,652,448	109,634,007	103,018,441
India	7,017,947	5,841,534	1,176,413	7,159,658	5,822,803	1,634,537
%	3,6	5.6	1,3	3,41	5,1	1,5
Africa	14,896,190	9,227,200	5,668,990	17,064,477	9,471,762	7,592,715
South Africa	3,508,242	1,285,352	2,222,889	3,919,736	1,480,877	2,438,860
%	23,5	13,9	39,2	22,9	15,6	32,1
Europe	67,776,336	38,991,655	28,784,681	75,610,675	42,897,540	32,713,136
Russia	6,961,592	3,735,527	3,226,015	8,422,089	4,283,060	4,139,029
%	10,2	9,5	11,2	11,1	9,9	12,6
Latin America	21,700,736	11,393,614	10,307,123	25,859,012	13,081,617	12,277,394
Brazil	6,783,432	2,197,927	4,585,505	8,780,769	2,895,054	5,885,716
%	31,2	19,2	44,4	33,9	22,1	48,1

Calculations and estimates by author (Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2016 & 2017)

Table 5: Value of Chinese trade with BRICS countries relative to their respective regions, 2016 – 2018 (US$ 10 000)

	2018		
	Total (US$)	Exports (US$)	Imports (US$)
Asia	238,058,298	118,759,869	119,298,429
India	9,550,900	7,667,566	1,883,335
%	4	6,4	1,5
Africa	20,415,879	10,489,386	9,926,493
South Africa	4,353,589	1,624,838	2,728,749
%	21,3	15,4	27,4
Europe	85,403,048	47,559,772	37,943,276
Russia	10,710,745	4,796,527	5,914,218
%	12,5	10	15,5
Latin America	30,717,170	14,877,758	15,839,412
Brazil	11,123,439	3,366,487	7,756,952
%	36,2	22,7	48,9

Calculations and estimates by author (Source: National Bureau of Statistics, 2018)

Looking at Table 1, 2 and 3 combined, it would not be far-fetched to surmise that oil remains at the centre of China-Africa trade, a reality corroborated by the fact that China's top trading partner in the region is Angola, Africa's second largest oil producer. Although China-Africa trade shows that South Africa also accounts for quite a sizable percentage of the value of trade between Beijing and Africa, the trends show that things have not changed much from trade estimates shown in Table 1 with the exception of Angola, which was leapfrogged by South Africa as China's top trading partner in SSA. Bilateral trade between China and Sudan has dropped significantly, but that is ascribed to the protracted political conflict in Sudan as opposed to reduced appetite for oil by Beijing.

The relatively low levels of trade between the two member countries of BRICS, i.e. South Africa and China, are without a doubt symptomatic of the unevenness and unequal nature of China-Africa trade as a whole, which has given primacy to oil to the benefit of China's economy in the long run as shown in Table 2. Compared to China-BRICS trade, China-South Africa trade fell sharply from a buoyant 27 percent as a proportion of China-Africa trade to a worryingly low level of 21.3 percent between 2016 and 2018, as shown in Table 5. Meanwhile, South Africa has on average contributed 36 percent of China's total imports from

Africa since 2014, with imports from the former contracting to 32 per cent in 2017 as a proportion of China-Africa trade and falling yet further to 27.4 percent in 2018.

Table 6: Africa-BRICS Trade Categorised by Product, 2016

Product Code	Gross Exports	Gross Imports
Food & live animals	$2,505,760	$11,299,454
Beverages & tobacco	$971,208	$649,459
Crude materials, inedible, except fuels	$3,350,176	$1,722,330
Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials	$13,444,084	$5,241,207
Animal & vegetable oils, fats and waxes	$39,776	$593,275
Chemicals and related products n.e.s	$2,289,344	$9,398,479
Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material	$2,463,633	$19,553,536
Machinery and transport	$564,243	$29,817,547
Miscellaneous manufactured articles	$343,618	$7,400,247
Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC	$4,900,232	$246,212
Total	$30,872,073	$85,921,746

Source: Dodd (2019:78)

If it is true that China's top trading partners in Africa comprise mainly oil and mineral-rich countries as Table 1 suggests, then these estimates imply that the value of Africa as China's trading partner is disproportionately reliant on its vast mineral and oil endowment with very little prospects for the latter to forge strong trade relations with non-oil and minerals exporters in sight. And if the foregoing observation is anything to go by, it begs a number of questions concerning the nature and quality of Sino-Africa trade and its bearing on BRICS-Africa relations in years to come. Others concern whether China's stranglehold on the continent leaves room for Africa-BRICS trade relationship that is less dependent on mineral fuels and related materials as Table 6 suggests. Additionally, one is tempted to ponder the extent to which BRICS might be used as a legitimacy building instrument to expand Beiing's presence on the continent.

5. Conclusion

Beijing's quest for the creation of a multipolar world order has inadvertently cast it as the champion of pro-Global South interests. This new-found sense of responsibility has seen it forge strong relations with developing countries,

including working cheek-by-jowl with many countries from Africa to change their economic circumstances through various schemes and initiatives aimed at boosting their economies. Owing to an increase in economic activity between China and Africa since the advent of the millennium (either in the form of trade, loans and development assistance), there is no doubt that China is intent on positioning itself as an active participant within the realm of the global economy and assuming the global leadership that it feels it deserves. However, China does not want to do this alone, and in fact, it does not see reasonable prospects of it materialising without her unofficial enthronement as a *bona fide* champion of the Global South. For China, BRICS offers the opportunity to get the process of rallying countries from the Global South behind her as a well-oiled vehicle to pursue that ambition with vigiour.

While the proceedings of the 19th congress make no explicit mention of Sino-Africa relations, or China's relationship with the rest of the BRICS countries, the policy outcomes of the congress will have far reaching implications for both. BRICS will remain central to China's economic diplomacy, which relies heavily on maintaining goodly relations with other Global South countries, and there is no doubt that *that* equation has set sights on Africa as an important consideration. The many strides China has made on the continent – be it in the form trade or investments, amongst others – were designed from the outset to serve as legitimacy-building tools to bolster its image as a reliable friend of the continent that has the best interests of Africa at heart. Moreover, the fact that China successfully lobbied for the inclusion of a relatively insignificant economy of South Africa *vis-a-vis* other members of the fulcrum served to give credence to suspicions of Beijing's relentless drive to enhance its legitimacy for the express purpose of expanding yet further its presence on the continent.

This paper demonstrated the nature of Sino-Africa relations at the time when BRICS has set out to change the levers of power in the realm of the global economy against the backdrop of the 2017 conference resolutions of the Chinese Communist Party. Three years on, BRICS remains an important part of the Chinese equation tipped to safeguard the interests of both African countries and Beijing in the process. It showed that while strides were made to diversify BRICS-Africa trade, trade between BRICS and the continent remains stubbornly dominated by mineral resources, a fact that may in many ways be a function of Sino-Africa trade being dominated by the same. The jury is still out to see how

this would have affected Chinese economic diplomacy towards Africa when it hosts the next policy conference in 2022 and the extent to which BRICS-Africa relations will reflect Bejing's current policy proclamations and those to come in the future.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

"Manufacturing Consent" revisited. China's image in selected South African media in the opening phase of the Covid-19 pandemic

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Abstract

As the Covid-19 pandemic reached South Africa in early March 2020, fear and distress gripped the nation. In the various debates, discussions, and narratives, one notable absence was any substantial critique of China in South Africa media. This is odd given the ample evidence concerning the origins of the virus. With so much of the pandemics narrative shaped by the media, what constitutes truth and fiction became opaque and murky. Added to this malaise are allegations that China is exporting its authoritarian press censorship culture abroad. In developing a methodology which asks if "China is crafting its image", this research examines a sample of South African media between March and June 2020 to ascertain if negative critiques of China are being censorship within South African media. Two dailies, *The Star* and *The Citizen*, as well as a number of online media publications are used as the study's sample. The data collected is cross analyzed against the five filters of Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model to determine if China is *Manufacturing Consent* within South Africa media. There is conclusive evidence that censorship is taking place within South African media.

Keywords: Censorship, Manufacturing Consent, Media analysis, South Africa, Covid-19

1.Introduction

By April 2020, an estimated 3.9 billion people, or half the world's population were in lockdown so to contain the spread of Covid-19 (Meo et al. 2020). With so many people virtually under house arrest, the appeal and agency of the news grew considerably with breaking news becoming highly sensationalized. As radio, television, and online media flooded the world's attention at the hourly rate with morbid statistics, the threat of second and third waves, causality modeling, or possible vaccines, Covid-19 came to occupy a large amount of space in our collective imaginations.

In the fury of so many voices, opinions, and editorials, what came to constitute fact and fiction became unclear. Contributing to this opacity was an aggressive narrative pushed by mainstream media which only put forward regurgitated information without critical analysis nor did tolerate alternative views. In a study by Kashdan (2020), a psychologist by profession, he questioned the consequences of suppressing alternative ideas and perspectives during the Covid-19 crises. To Kashdan, there is something profoundly wrong in claiming a "single right approach" in lieu of the absence of reliable date to derive courses of action. The mis-information surrounding the Covid narrative led in part to Rapeli and Saikkonen (2020) to call reporting on Covid-19 as the "biggest disinformation crises we have ever faced".

The above observations helped to inform the basis of the 2020 *Freedom House* Annual Report[1] which remarked on the stifling of independent media during the pandemic making accountability difficult, and hampering the dissemination of vital information (Freedom House 2020). 91 of 192 countries (47%) experienced restrictions on the news media as part of the response to Covid-19 and Government restrictions on free speech and criticism were imposed in at least 72 states (Ibid). In the Czech Republic, Serbia and Italy, journalists were prevented from attending press conferences, accessing information from health authorities or documenting the operations of law enforcement officials. In Turkey, several journalists were detained in reprisal for reporting on the pandemic. In Slovenia, a journalist who filed an information request about the measures adopted by the government to fight the pandemic was the target of a smear campaign by media close to the ruling party. In South Africa and the DRC journalists were attacked and in Rwanda a journalist spent 11 months in jail for reporting on Covid. In

Zimbabwe, the Comoros, and Tanzania, reporting on Covid issues has proven difficult if not impossible.

Throughout the world independent journalism is being stifled and one example which highlights this point is the case of hydroxychloroquine. Touted by the former US President Donald Trump as a possible remedy to Covid-19, the mainstream media were quick to paint the claim as lunacy, suggesting that the drug would "enhance" the effects of Covid-19. Using studies published in the prestigious academic journals of the "*Lancet*"[2] and the "*New England Journal of Medicine*"[3], mainstream media successful persuaded public opinion on the dangers of the drug (Joseph 2020, Piller & Servick 2020). Resultantly, research trials on the drug were abandoned as the focus of Covid-19 zoned in on "lockdowns." However, in June, both journals retracted their study's after it was found that the data collection process was faked. The readily available, affordable, and easy to manufacture aspects of the drug could be a reason why a narrative on its controversy was pushed. Whatever the case maybe, reporting on Covid-19 appears to follow one mainstream narrative.

In a cursory analysis of South African media, one alternative view notably absent from the Covid-19 debate was critique of China. While an international discourse developed concerning an inquiry into the origins of the virus, South African media gave no attention to this. Given the virus's massive impact on the South African economy, it is natural to inquire on the origins of such a devastating event. The lack of such a narrative within South Africa points in the direction of censorship. Thus this research sets out to find if China is censoring negative reporting of itself. This question will be answered with the help of the Manufacturing Consent theory (Herman and Chomsky 1988). Manufacturing consent refers to the elites, governments, and big finances stranglehold on what is perceived as "independent media" (Herman & Chomsky 1988). In the media's role of defending social hierarchies of capitalism, they create propaganda to protect the ruling classes. This is achieved through reporting through a narrow, biased lens which ensures that audiences or "the public" accept their position in the unequal and unfair structure of society.

To ascertain whether censorship is occurring, a sample of South African print and online media between the months of March and June 2020 is analyzed for critiques of China. While the lack of critiques proves nothing, the research frames its aim by asking if China is crafting its image? Censorship is not only about

removing information deemed harmful, but about replacing that potential negative information with something "newsworthy." This analysis, will be cross-analyzed against Manufacturing Consent's "Propaganda Model" to ascertain if China is censoring South African media.

The research topic is important because growing evidence shows that China is exporting its censorship values effectively weakening global rights mechanisms (Link 2002: 7, Mackinnon 2008, Cook 2013, Xu 2014, HRW 2020). King (2013) noted that China's efforts are tantamount to the "most extensive efforts to selectively censor human expression ever implemented". The 2019 edition of *Reporters Without Borders* ranked China's press situation as very serious, the worst rank on the five-point scale (RSF 2019). What was previously known as the *Great Firewall* which prevented Chinese citizens from seeing foreign criticism, has evolved into the *Great Cannon* which is attacking critics themselves, whether they represent a foreign government, are part of an overseas company, or join real or virtual avenues of public protest (HRW 2020). Elizabeth C. Economy differentiated the concepts noting where the *Firewall* blocked, the *Cannon* is able to adjust and replace content as its travels across the internet (Economy 2018, Hern 2015). In its totality, this research advocates how free speech, a vital component of democracy, is cleverly being impacted on. Democracy needs a healthy and free media to hold government accountable, cover and promote a wide range of ideas, serve as a forum for a spectrum of voices, highlight and investigate problems, and encourage active citizenship and informed decision-making (Lovaas 2008: 36). As noted by Prasad and Flier (2020), more lives may be lost by suppressing or ignoring alternate perspectives, some of which may at least in part ultimately prove correct.

2. Manufacturing Consent

The 1986 "Inventing Reality: The Politics of News Media" by Michael Parenti brought attention to the subtle but profound ways in the which the media influence and manipulate the public's perception of reality. A key to this manipulation is disguising the fact that the media is the controlling institution of capitalism, which serves the interests of the rich and powerful elite. To Parenti, the persistent media failure when taken in the aggregate, serves as a conscious reification of the political and social status qou in America, that the media are a

conservative force rather than a liberal one (Berlet 1987). He argues that the mass media "exert a subtle, persistence influence in defining the scope of respectable political discourse, channeling public attention in directions that are essentially supportive of the existing politico-economic system" (Berlet 1987). Parenti writes:

> the most important effect of the news media is that they set the issue agenda for the rest of us, choosing what to emphasize and what to ignore or suppress, in effect, organizing much of our political world for us. The media may not always be able to tell us what to think, but they are strikingly successful in telling us what to think about (Parenti 1986: 23, Lovaas 2008).

Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky took the work of Parenti further in the 1988 *Manufacturing Consent* which provided a searing critique of media and their relation to power. The authors described the mass communication media as "effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda function, by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions, self-censorship, and without overt coercion."

In developing a "propaganda model" (PM), the authors traced the routes by which money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public (Herman and Chomsky 1988). The central tenet of the PM thrashed the idea that the media are not the "check" on political power that they portray themselves to be. The PM was described by Shemeli (2016) as an "analytical framework that attempts to explain the performance of US media in terms of the basic institutional structures and relationships within which they operate."

The PM consists of five filters. Each filter helps to distort the reporting of news and creates an agenda which suits the powerful. The first filter refers to the ownership, profit orientation and size of the media. As a business, media owners are first and foremost interested in profitability and the welfare of their stakeholders. They envision growth to reap higher profits. Their evolution into mega corporations, trans-national corporations and conglomerates has an impact on what is then considered to be "news." Effectively big finance trumps critical journalism as journalists (employees) often end up defending the interests of elites, governments, and institutions. Journalists are not normally kept under

control through top-down intervention, but by journalist's internalization of priorities and definitions of news worthiness that conform to the institutions policy (Herman & Chomsky 1988). As journalism becomes run like a business, news is diminished as profit takes center stage (Lovaas 2008: 62).

The second filter; advertising, implies that media corporations generate very little revenue from sales and subscriptions and instead the bulk of their income is derived from advertising. According to Lovass (2008: 89), "advertising is the life blood of newspapers." Because media corporations are not commercially viable without the support of advertisers, they must tread carefully and diligently so not to disturb the sensitivities of big business. The power that advertisers have over media is seen in the June 2020 boycott of Facebook (FB). Citing concerns over its indecisiveness on hate speech, 400 advertisers boycotted the social media giant. As 98% of FB's revenue ($70 Billion in 2019) is derived from advertisers, FB CEO Mark Zuckerberg lost $7Billion dollars from his net worth virtually overnight as a result of the boycott (Datoo 2020).

Media corporations thus must cater to the political affiliations and economic imperatives of their "funders." Critical analysis, neutrality, and impartiality then become less valuable. Products which pay the most to be advertised then become prioritized effectively promoting an economic way of life. Media corporations are effectively businesses which sell other businesses. By this understanding, and using the classic print newspaper as an example, a newspaper effectively sells "space." Advertisers buy space within a newspaper to flaunt their products and the people who read this newspaper can then be considered "products".

The third filter refers to the "special access" that the elite, government, and institutions have to the media. These actors know the ins-and-outs of the media game and have a major say in the news narrative. For example, if a mining company is in conflict with a local community, it is more than likely that the newspaper will interview the mines PR official while ignoring local community leaders. Hypothetically, to return the favor, the mine could take out a series of advertisements. The *New York Times* for example, one of the most powerful media corporations in the world charges an average of $150,000 for a full page ad. The business of the news is thus a highly political game, with the highest bidder winning.

In its sum, the third filter exemplifies how the media represents certain privileged echelons of society while suppressing the voices of others. To Chomsky,

"the general population doesn't know what's happening, and it doesn't even know that it doesn't know" (Aljazeera 2017). This "editorial distortion" results in an over-reliance on powerful sources to inform its view. Journalists and editors then must constantly "toe-the-line" and be careful not to offend those who can make or break it. This phenomenon applies to both national and local media, with the elite media setting the agenda. Elite media would include major corporation media, national television and country-wide radio which set the general framework. They will determine, select, shape, control, and restrict information with the purpose of serving the interests of dominant elite groups. Local media will adopt to this structure and report little on news of substance (Aljazeera 2019).

The fourth filter, "flak" refers to the media's insistence that it avoid negative responses in the form of letters, complaints, lawsuits, or government action in the way it handles its business. The fear of flak hinders independent journalism because certain kinds of facts or opinions could instigate flak. The aim of flak is to put free-thinking media on the defensive, fostering an image of an unfairly critical media with a 'liberal bias.' Well-directed and funded flak generates fear in media companies, creating another important filter in the propaganda model (Lovass 2008). This shapes an agenda where targets are constructed and others camouflaged. In doing this, the media is forced to protect itself, by discrediting sources, crashing stories, and diverting the conversation. The media will emphasize certain issues, frame issues which suit it, filter information, and bind the debate to its own limits.

The fifth and final filter refers to the point that in manufacturing consent, the public requires an enemy and a target. On either side of the 1990s, communism and the war on terror have provided the *newspeak* to which the US mainstream media follows without second thought. The purpose of creating an ideological target is to support the major social control mechanism. Social control is the study of mechanisms in the form of patterns of pressure, through which society maintains social order and cohesion. Social control is typically employed by group members in response to anyone it considers deviant, problematic, threatening, or undesirable, with the goal of ensuring conformity (Carmichael 2014). In creating an enemy or target, other news worthy topics are deflected.

In their entirety, the five filters help to make big finance media into a creator of history. Chomsky notes that by shaping history in a certain way it (media)

will "…(make) certain things appear, certain things do not appear, certain questions be asked, other questions ignored, and issues framed in a particular fashion" (Aljazeera 2017). In the 1997 *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda*, Chomsky claims that "it's also necessary to completely falsify history." Using the Vietnam war as an example, he states that there has been a huge effort to reconstruct the history of that war. Elaborating on this censorship, Chomsky notes;

> If people try to enter the system that do not have that point of view they are likely to be excluded along the way, after all no institution is going to happily design a mechanism to self-destruct, that's not the way institutions function. So they all work to exclude, marginalize or eliminate any dissenting voices or alternative perspectives, because they are dysfunctional to the institution itself.

In sum, if George Orwell's *1984* novel was fantasy, *Manufacturing Consent* is the real life version of Orwell's dystopia. Orwellian dystopia denotes an attitude and a politics of control by propaganda, surveillance, disinformation, denial of truth (double think) and manipulation of history. Orwell's observations on thought control, doublethink, newspeak, and Big Brother, are terminologies deployed by Chomsky more than often.

3. Methodology and Definition of Terms

The study aims to find out if China is censoring South African media. The easiest way to solve this would be to ask the editors in the sample study directly. This however is unlikely for two reasons. Firstly, the scope of the research can be easily construed as unpalatable. Secondly, editors represent the highest authority or final say in a publication. They thus would not admit to their editorial powers being diluted.

The research's chief challenge is how to prove censorship. How does one analyze variables which are unknown? To solve this debate, the research purports that the lack of negative critiques concerning China are being replaced with something positive. We often think that censorship as the act of removing, but it can entail the act of replacing. The research question of, is "China crafting

its image?" will be deployed to ascertain censorship. Crafting its image refers to positive stories in the press instead of negativity. The timeframe for this is between the months of March and June 2021, when the Covid outbreak had erupted in South Africa.

Regarding the sample, the study examined printed press media and online media. Two printed press publications formed the bulk of the study, *The Citizen* and *The Star*. The researcher's location, and ease of access to the two printed publications offered, is the main reason for this choice. Both papers can be considered both popular and cosmopolitan. Online media sources were found via a google search of "China South Africa", and clicking on the News option. Access to old newspapers was provided by local shopping centers.

This examination will be cross-analyzed against the five filters of *Manufacturing Consent*. The research hypothesizes that China is censoring negative content of itself in South African media and replacing it with a positive image of itself. A political analysis conceptualization is deployed while borrowing terminologies from both media and propaganda studies.

The study will deploy a content analysis framework which is beneficial when taking into account political developments, categories or themes of coverage on selected media in a selected time period. Also referred to as "thematic analysis", this framework gives the researcher scope to observe, inquire, correlate and make assumptions on data. In framing the information and events into interpretable themes, a "reality" will be constructed for the reader. As defined by Entman, framing means to "select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation (Lechman & Brighton 2019).

The media, media corporations, media conglomerates, big finance media, and mainstream media all refer to the same thing. These different typologies all denote ownership by large corporations controlled by elites and oligarchs in tandem with government. The study does not differentiate between online media, social media or print media because they are all in one form or the other regurgitations of one agenda. Like many large corporations, these publishers—or "owners"—share resources with other South African papers. As a result, similar if not exact stories can often be found within another paper from the same publisher. For example, *The Business Report* can be found in all the papers of

Independent News around the country (Lovaas 2008:17). Another example, is the *Sowetan* and *Timeslive* who share the same articles and *News24* and *SABC* which share the same articles word for word. To Lovass this "decreased competition and diversity of opinion" and the "homogenization" of news and media contents results in part because of the high cost of entry into the market (Lovaas 2008: 68).

South Africa media is on the dissection table using American tools (terminologies). This is not over-reaching as there is no avoiding Pax-Americana and its system of hegemonic capitalism. The majority of South African newspapers "world news" sections, copy and paste heavily from AFP (Agence France-Presse) based in Paris, AP (Associated Press) based in the US, and Reuters which is based in the UK. Thus, the Propaganda Model is apparent in South African English daily newspapers (Lovaas 2008).

China, refers to the political state of China PRC (Peoples Republic of China). China and the Chinese Government are perceived as the same entity in this paper. China is viewed as a superpower in this research.

4. Discussion

The Western backed "inquiry" into the virus is one component of the larger hegemonic struggle between *Pax-Sinica* and *Pax-Americana*. The April US withdrawal from the World Health Organization (WHO) is one, in some recent tit-for-tat reactions between the two superpowers. As the metaphorical microphone of the inquiry, the White House suggested that the WHO is a puppet of China (BBC 2020). This was because as late as January 2020, China was confident that Covid-19 was non-transmissible from human to human; a message the WHO was relaying. Indeed, on January 30th 2020, WHO Head Dr Tedros Adhanom stated that "the Chinese government is to be congratulated for the extraordinary measures it has taken to contain the outbreak" (WHO 2020). He further noted that "China is actually setting a new standard for outbreak response and it's not an exaggeration" (Ibid).

Based on the above comments, the US accusation has merit. This narrative though, one critical of China, has been ignored in the South African media. Is it possible that China has exported its authoritarian press censorship culture to South Africa?

What would be the reason for doing such? The most obvious reason is that

where China invests heavily, such as in South Africa, the investments need to be protected. Statistics show that China is South Africa's principal trading partner over the past decade with a 11.18% year-on year increase. In 2019 South Africa exported to China $10 billion worth of goods while importing a massive $16 billion worth of Chinese goods (Trading Economics 2021). The surge in trade between the two countries has resulted in a quarter of the entire Africa-China trade. This overwhelming trade reliance coupled with massive loans such as the recent $2.5 billion Eskom loan gives China a profound authority and legitimacy within South African executive structures and poses a threat to South Africa's sovereignty (Khumalo 2018).

Where Africa's previous colonizers disseminated their knowledge in the form of a religion and language, China never sought to enforce its culture, instead choosing to restrict so to control information. This statement sheds light on why instruments of global communication such as *WhatsApp*, *Facebook, Twitter, Youtube,* and *Google* are banned in China (Doffman 2020). *Pax-Sinica* not only bans these communication devices but has exerted its influence within these instruments. For example, a mid-April Covid-19 documentary which analyzed the origins of the virus was banned from *Facebook*. Similarly, *Youtube* said on May 26th 2020 that it was investigating the removal of comments critical of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) from its platform, saying that the filtering approach appeared to be "an error."

Controlling, banning or restricting information is only one element of how censorship works. Potential space which criticism would occupy need be filled. South African media has chosen to fill space concerning China with a public agenda of goodwill. Such a sentiment corroborates with what *Freedom House* President Mike Abramowitz said; "many governments are finding that on social media, propaganda works better than censorship" (Ingram 2019).

The issue of how public agenda is shaped by in the media was put forward particularly well by Robin. In analyzing television coverage in the aftermath of 9/11, he noted how the overwhelming majority of the coverage was pro-US (Robin 2006). Robin describes how network executives later admitted to tailoring their coverage in order to avoid the appearance of criticizing US foreign policy which would have has disastrous effects for the journalists, reporters, or media houses involved in the reporting. To Robin, public relations campaigns are designed not simply to arouse public awareness, but also to influence government action.

China's public agenda of goodwill can be seen in the following headlines;

- "Africa needs China's aid now more than ever"
  (IOL, March 29th)
- "SA receives medical supplies from China"
  (SANews.gov, April 14th)
- "A friend SA can count on
  (The Star, April 15th)
- "China is a friend indeed to SA in fight against Covid-19"
  (IOL, April 15th)
- "McDonalds sorry for sign"
  (The Citizen, April 15th)
- "China in pound seat"
  (The Citizen, April 15th)
- "Racism must not strain SA's Sino ties"
  (IOL, April 25th)
- "China says it's ready to help SA fight spread of COVID-19"
  (EWN, April 17th)
- "South African expert lauds China's information sharing"
  (CGTN-Africa, April 20th)
- "South Africa: Time to Make South Africa's Relationship with China Mutually Beneficial"
  (Daily Maverick, April 20th)
- "Coronavirus: how China plans to restore its image in Africa"
  (The Africa Report, April 20th)
- "Coronavirus diplomacy': China's opportune time to aid Africa"
  (The Africa Report, April 24th)
- "There are lessons for SA from China's successful battle against Covid-19"
  (IOL.co.za, May 4th)
- "Lessons for Africa: 5 key interventions made by China in combating Covid-19"
  (IOL, May 5th)
- "China is lending Africa a hand during the Covid-19 pandemic"
  (IOL, May 7th)
- "Opinion: China-Africa solidarity in action amid Covid-19 fight"

(IOL, May 13th)
- "Ramaphosa expresses gratitude for China's unwavering assistance"
  (IOL.co.za, May 18th)
- "Undeterred by Covid-19 pandemic, China and Africa hold hands, building a community of a shared future for mankind"
  (M&G, May 29th)

From the above headlines, there is no denying that China is a generous partner. In highlighting the above examples, the criticism is not against the attributes of the "goodwill" but rather why "goodwill" is the only narrative about China. One example which exemplifies this is the case of the goodwill Chinese doctors.

On April 3rd, *The Citizen* ran a front page headline entitled "China, Cuba to the rescue of SA docs." The ensuing article, however, focused entirely on the upcoming Cuban deployment. Within the article, South Africa's Health Minister, Dr Zweli Mkhize requested Chinese and Cuban doctors. On April 3rd, *The Star* published a statement from Sello Mashao Rasethaba, chair of the South African United Business Confederation and chair of the State Information Technology Agency. In it, Rasethaba declares that the "South African government should with immediate effect invite Chinese and Russian doctors" (Rasethaba 2020).

With the arrival of Cuban doctors 24 days later on April 27th, *MoneyWeb* published an article about the arrival entitled "SA asks China for doctors as Cuba sends medical staff." Within this article, Dr Mkhize again requested foreign doctors. The article, however, focuses on Chinese doctors, when in fact there are no plans to send Chinese doctors to South Africa.

The absence of critical reporting and a public agenda of Chinese good will suggests that China is crafting its image in South African media. This in foreign policy analysis can be considered an exertion of soft power in support of its economic hard power. A decade ago, China's leverage within South Africa became clear when South Africa refused to issue a visa to the Tibetan dissident the Dalai Lama. More recently, in 2018, Azad Essa's weekly column was promptly cancelled after writing about the persecution of Chinese Muslims. He linked this to the fact that Chinese corporations own a 20% stake in the South African publishing house *Independent Media*.

According to *Independent Media's* website, it's combined readership across different platforms totals 17.1 million local and international readers. The

website declares that some of its "quality publications" include 20 of South Africa's "most prominent newspapers" such as the *Star* in Johannesburg, *Cape Times* and *Cape Argus* in Cape Town and the *Mercury* in in Durban. One of *Independent Media's* biggest shareholders is *Interacom Investment Holding Limited* which compromises of China International Television Corporation (CITVC) and China-Africa Development Fund (CADFUND). *Naspers*, another top South African publishing house with popular titles such as *News24, City Press* and *Die Burger*, is heavily intertwined with the business prospects of *Tencent*, a Chinese social media corporation. In Naspers 2020 interim results announcement, Naspers generated $2 billion from its ecommerce sector, and $8 billion from its social and internet platforms, $7.8 derived from *Tencent* (Naspers 2020). Media24, which is one of the top 4 media houses in South Africa, and is a different entity on its own, shares the same offices with Naspers.[4]

In the last 15 years, China has been targeting African viewership via the "10,000 Villages" project which has brought modern digital satellite TV networks to many parts of the continent. Dubbed as a philanthropic gesture, the project gives Beijing a tight grip on Africa's communication infrastructure and control of how it is portrayed in the media there. The benefactor of this project is China's "*StarTimes*" which now controls TV networks in Malawi, Kenya, Rwanda and Zambia. In the latter, StarTimes entered into a joint venture with the Zambian National Broadcaster (ZNBC). The deal gave the Chinese player a 60% share in the broadcaster for 25 years.

China thus crafts it image so to ensure it can continue to execute the power behind the scenes without interference. As noted by Huntington;

> The architects of power in the United States must create a force that can be felt but not seen. Power remains strong when it remains in the dark; exposed to light it begins to evaporate (Barsamian & Chomsky 2001 :8, Lovaas 2008)

An example of this "execution behind the scenes" is seen in the diplomatic spat of China recalling its South African Ambassador Lin Songtian. The case was only picked up by Peter Fabricius of the *Daily Maverick*.

Withdrawing an Ambassador is one of the highest forms of political protest a country can enact which is the diplomatic message of unhappiness. Beijing's decision to withdraw their Ambassador according to Fabricius was due to

Pretoria's failing to appoint a South African Ambassador to China for over a year. It appears that the Chinese want only Siyabonga Cwele, a former South African Intelligence Minister (2008-2009), Minister of State Security (2009-2014) and Minister of Telecommunications and Postal Services (2014-2018). South African authorities have refused to issue Cwele with a security clearance thus preventing his appointment. From Cwele's previous Ministerial postings, it is quite evident why China are adamant on Cwele only.

Even the case of Cwele aside, why China would want to withdraw its highest government representative in South Africa in the week prior to the South African lockdown is a definite flex of its political muscle. By removing its "go-to-guy", the possibility of direct links with China in a time of crises were out of the question.

5. Findings

Application of the five filters against the above narrative reveals that China is manufacturing consent in South African media.

In terms of ownership there is clear evidence that China is a major stakeholder of one of South Africa's biggest Media conglomerates; the *Independent Media Group*. *The Star*, is a subsidy of this corporation. Another top heavyweight of South African Media, *Naspers*, receives the overwhelming majority of its revenue from its China operations. There are only four "big: media corporations in South Africa. With two under the yolk of China, there is a reason for concern here.

In terms of advertising, the notion of "Chinese good-will" appears to be a well-placed advertisement. This repetition of good-will is propaganda. A working definition of propaganda is the "spreading of ideas, information, or rumor for the purpose helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a person (Manzaria & Bruck 2013).

In terms of elites, governments, and institutions, Chinese elites have considerable interests in the South African private sector and government state operated entities. How these elites are perceived by the South African public cannot be left to chance. As noted by Rosenberg (2020), elites control of the mass media and education institutions helps to guide the national political discussion and frame issues. Confucius Institutions are now at South Africa's top Universities including the University of Cape Town, University of Johannesburg, University of the Western Cape, Rhodes University, Stellenbosch, Wits, and

Durban University of Technology. According to Chomsky, "state propaganda supported by the educated classes and when no deviation is permitted from it, can have a big effect" (Chomsky 1997).

In terms of flak, the case of Azad Essa stands out. Furthermore, the lack of critique against China is overwhelming which suggests there is a coordinated response to "manage information." This is a cause of concern for a neutral media and informed citizenry.

Lastly, regarding target, despite US ideological hegemony in South Africa, China is not an enemy or target as it is in the US press. In June 2020, both the FBI director and US Secretary of State both denounced China as a "great threat to the US" and a "national security concern." These topics are not present in South African media.

6. Conclusion

As China comes to control more resources and power over South Africa's domestic elites, there will be less need to use a benevolent form of hegemony. With time China will be able to confidently wield a harder type of hegemony. The ongoing Chinese-Australian trade war is a perfect example of how China, when provoked can retaliate. China's May 2020 decision to stop accepting beef from Australia's four largest abattoirs and slapping tariffs of more than 80% on Australian barley imports highlights the changing face of war. As a result, Australia's 2020 exports to China fell by $2.3 billion. South Africa's national power utility, Eskom has been encouraging municipalities which are in arrears to trade it municipal land to shave off debt (Mabuza 2020). At the same time, Eskom keeps accepting massive loans from the Chinese government. This relationship requires deeper analysis.

There is a clear correlation between propagandistic messages sponsored by state actors, and changes in the political rhetoric of those targeted (Lechman & Brighton 2019). As the South African mind becomes programmed for Chinese propaganda, democratic rights will naturally erode. Lack of critical thought and debate will also be hindered, as Chomsky remarks, "as long as people are marginalized and distracted and (they will) have no way to organize or articulate their sentiments" (Chomsky 1997). As noted by Shemlis (2016), realities are preferred to be fabricated and disseminated to the masses.

While the use of internet for strategic disinformation predates the 2016 US Presidential election, the disruption of that election, along with others in Africa, India and the Brexit Referendum, has brought into sharp relief the scale at which online political propaganda is now being deployed (Lechman and Brighton 2019). As the actors behind it acquire more resources and learn from their successes and failures, and as more "innovation" is piled on our current systems of ubiquitous information, we are likely to see a continuing evolution of disinformation strategies and tactics.

Lastly, a further cause for concern is the migration of censorship to other parts of life. Already, censorship is targeting academia. According to Steve Tsang, Director of the School of the Oriental Studies China Institute at the University of London, the Chinese government is interfering with academic life in the UK (Maxwell 2019). In North America, the pressures exerted by Beijing have led to self-censorship at American universities, which is hampering debate and driving researchers away from topics likely to offend the Chinese leadership (Maxwell 2019). Maxwell gives an example of the case of the University of California who after inviting the Dali Lama to speak, saw Beijing freeze funding for Chinese scholars wishing to attend the school. If this pattern continues where the press and academia are increasingly being censored, then there is really no safe space left for critical reflection.

8. Disclosure

No conflict of interest.

(Endnotes)

[1] Freedom House is an US based non-profit focused on democracy, political freedom and human rights. Their annual report in part assesses the health of the World's democracy.

[2] Mehra, M. et al. 2020. Retracted: Hydroxychloroquine or chloroquine with or without a macrolide for treatment of COVID-19: a multinational registry analysis. The Lancet

[3] Mehra, M. et al. 2020. Retraction: Cardiovascular Disease, Drug Therapy, and Mortality in Covid-19. N Engl J Med. DOI: 10.1056/NEJMoa2007621.

[4] Naspers and Media24 both list 40 Heerengracht, Cape Town as their offices.

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BOOK REVIEW

Book Review

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Serges Dyoyou Kamga (eds.), The right to development in Africa: Issues, constraints and prospects. Ibadan: Pan African University Press, 2020, 773 pp.

The main focus of the book is the manifestation of the contentious issues of the Right to Development (RTD) as a constitutive feature of the human rights discourse in Africa. In spite of the many noble and comprehensive development initiatives on both, the global level and the continental level, aimed at the development of individuals and societies in Africa, by and large, Africa remains systematically under-developed, especially in comparison to the Global North.

Central to the shared argumentation of the contributions is that on one hand, international law and the United Nations (UN), particularly the Security Council *inter alia* are instrumentalised and politicised. The latter is meant to systematically police Africa and its institutions in order to comply with the so-called international standards, supposedly in the interests of Africa and the international community. Ironically, the so-called international community is deliberately loosely defined, if defined at all, which compounds the challenges of identifying duty-bearers responsible for, and accountable to the beneficiaries of the RTD. On the other hand, the lack of political will to implement and enforce international, continental and regional treaties and agreements, while hiding behind the façade of state sovereignty, is a major challenge for African countries. Admittedly, state sovereignty has not yielded equality of nations, in the view and perspective of most African countries. Several intra-Africa treaties and agreements have collapsed due to a deliberate lack of funding and under-funding from respective governments who are parties to the said treaties, conventions and agreements, for example.

Meanwhile, on the national level, and indistinguishable from the continental level, a lack of political will to implement and enforce treaties, conventions,

agreements and even national constitutions prove to be a challenge. What exacerbates the problem in sovereign domains is that, most governments in Africa are engrossed in corruption and lack institutional infrastructure to support their respective constitutions. As such, corruption is largely responsible for the lack of development as envisioned by RTD in African countries. Some African governments refuse to account to the regional bodies that they are a part of, and they refuse to account to the continental body, the African Union (AU) as well as refuse to account even to their own respective electorate. Further compounding the realisation of the RTD is the politicisation of judiciary systems in various African countries. Some courts in a number of countries are arguably perceived to be enabling various regimes to conceal corruption to their citizens. Therefore, impunity weakens governments' abilities to perform their rightful duties of the RTD.

The Afro-decolonial approach is proposed in this book. This approach hinges on African philosophies such as *Ubuntu* and *Letšema* as well as conventions that are Afrocentric such as gender-justice and gender-mainstreaming. The intimated Afrocentric philosophies and conventions promise greater and sustainable solutions to intra-African trade, interaction (free movement of persons and goods) and connectivity (owing to the benefits of the Fourth Industrial Revolution [4IR]), with a hope to then cascade these down into the respective sovereign domains of Africa. Intra-African trade, for example, is meant to disentangle Africa from the very clutches of modernity's capital and its institutions as encapsulated in the Bretton Woods institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organisation (WTO) and international law itself.

Knowledge and knowledge-production emerge as key principles to attaining the RTD especially for women and children. There is need for decolonial approaches to knowledge-production and knowledge-dissemination that will counter the commodification of knowledge as endorsed by capitalist orientated colonial establishments. There is need to chart a different pathway to attaining self-actualisation and self-knowledge for Africans. It is equally imperative to consider making accessible decolonial knowledge, including free tertiary education, by Africans for Africa in pursuit of the RTD.

Methodologically, the book largely historicises and situates Africa in relation to the human rights discourse in general, but the RTD in particular. The book juxtaposes African nations with one another, as it simultaneously

juxtaposes Africa with the rest of the world. There is a strong sense of centering Africa and its nations in the narratives of the book. This is commendable as Africa then becomes the centre from which Africans engage the world. There is also a palpable sense of deliberate decolonial approaches and narratives in the book. The African experience, thought, being and perspective is given its due ontological and epistemological space. The book mainly leans towards the qualitative methodology with an exception of one chapter that uses a mixed-methods methodology, albeit in a limited fashion.

Meanwhile, there are three general categories of audiences who would benefit from this book. They are scholars, policy-makers and both, under and post-graduate students. While the general target audience of this book are scholars in the humanities and social sciences in general, this book will particularly find resonance with Law, Journalism, Development Studies, History, Sociology, Philosophy, Political Science and International Relations scholars. To add, policy-makers whose interests are to remain current and relevant in their spheres of influence would certainly appreciate this book. Lastly, this book would, no doubt, benefit both, under-graduate and post-graduate students in the humanities, Law and social sciences; however, anyone with an inquiring mind on the machinations of the world would find it accessible in terms of language and depth of content and analyses.

Despite the foregoing narration of accolades in terms of substance and relevance, this book is not immune from gap(s) and limitations which are common to most intellectual productions of this nature. For example, the call for a reformed UN Security Council (UNSC) system is a tired argument. It is highly unlikely for the call to be heard now. It is being deliberately muffled. It is an established fact that Modernity and institutions born of it use the UNSC system to reconfigure the asymmetrical global economic power dynamics that are skewed in favour of itself and the Global North, to the detriment of the Global South and Africa in particular. While this book is not aloof to the challenges of development in Africa, it says very little on a different path way other than adding its voice to the calling for a reformed UNSC system. The book also seemingly and unwittingly endorses institutions such as international law, state sovereignty, and practices that enable global coloniality. While the book promises to be decolonial in its approach, it articulates very little the steps or methods needed to be taken in order for Africa to realise a decolonised (decolonial) world.

The other apparent limitation is that, while the book does not claim to speak authoritatively on all 54 African countries, it is rather limited in that only five African countries are analysed. The five countries in focus are: Cameroun, Nigeria, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. Albeit, this observation can be countered by the fact that the authors reflected in the book are made up of a rich mix of African scholars from a lot more African countries than analysed.