

Analysing China's "Angola Model": A Pattern for Chinese Involvement in Africa?

Article DOI:

<https://doi.org/10.35293/srsa.v42i2.73>

Łukasz Jureńczyk

Faculty of Political Sciences & Public Administration
Kazimierz Wielki University in Bydgoszcz, Poland

Abstract

The paper discusses the relationship between the People's Republic of China and Angola in the 21st century in the broader context of Chinese economic activity in Africa. I discuss the effectiveness of the "Angola Model" of this relationship as a gateway for cooperation with Africa. The main research question is whether the "Angola Model" is an effective way to increase China's involvement in Africa and whether it has been applied to other countries on the continent? I hypothesise that the implementation of this model allows China to intensify economic cooperation with African countries because this model brings mutual benefits to partners. China gains access to energy resources, new markets and investment opportunities, while African states obtain loans, revenues from the sale of raw materials and assistance in infrastructure development. To some extent, the Angola Model also allows China to spread political influence, but the example of Angola shows that it has several limitations. China has implemented elements of economic cooperation characteristic of the Angola Model in many African countries.

Keywords: China; Angola; Angola Model; Africa, economic cooperation; political cooperation.

1. Introduction

During the Cold War, China implemented development projects in Africa, a flagship example of which was the railway line built in 1970-1976 from Tanzania to Zambia. Beijing also offered loans to the countries from the region and provided other forms of support, including medical aid. During this period, China supported several partisan and national liberation movements in Africa, including mainly in Algeria, Angola, DR Congo, Mozambique and Rhodesia / Zimbabwe. Some of those groups hesitated about whose patronage was better to accept, Soviet or Chinese. However, due to limited resources, China was much less visible on the continent than the Soviet Union, except perhaps except Tanzania under Julius Nyerere (Lanteigne 2016: 6).

In the years 1961–2002 Angola was almost constantly plunged in wars. During the Angolan War of Independence in the 1960s, China initially supported only the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA). When the Organization of African Unity (OAU) recognised the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), Beijing began to direct assistance to them as well. This assistance mainly involved the supply of weapons and supplies. In the early 1970s, when the Soviet-Chinese split was deep, Beijing stopped supporting the pro-Moscow MPLA in favour of FNLA and UNITA. According to one source, Beijing handed over 450 tons of armament to FNLA, and 120 Chinese military instructors trained its fighters in neighbouring Zaire (Copper 2016: 22). This turnover proved to be problematic because, after the withdrawal of the Portuguese from the country, the MPLA took control of Luanda. The civil war that broke out in Angola in 1975 put China in a difficult position. The Soviet Union tried to take advantage of this situation by strengthening cooperation with Cuba in Angola. It is worth mentioning that Angola was one of the first countries where symptoms of the collapse of the détente period in inter-block relations appeared (Ross 2009: 192). As the MPLA managed to stay in power, eventually in 1983 Beijing recognised its government and in 1984 began commercial cooperation. Beijing began seeking friendly relations with the MPLA, giving up the support to UNITA. To some extent, this was a consequence of an attempt to normalise relations in the West and strengthen economic cooperation with developed countries. China, among others, wanted to gain access to modern technologies,

markets and investments (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 116).

In 1988, the then President of Angola, José Eduardo dos Santos, visited Beijing in order to reach an agreement regarding the purchase of weapons. A year later, he refrained from criticising the Tiananmen events. That same year, China granted Angola a US\$121 million loan to buy Chinese products. In 1992, donated US\$183,000 to help rebuild post-war damages and adopted the contract to build 600 flats in Luanda (Copper 2016: 69-70). A large budget surplus in China enabled President Jiang Zemin to initiate the “go out” policy. It consisted of government support for Chinese enterprises investing abroad through state-owned banks. African countries, including Angola, with significant mineral reserves and little competition, have become a natural direction for these investments (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 116). The 27-year civil war in Angola ended in 2002 with the signing of a peace agreement between the MPLA and the UNITA.

The subject of this paper is the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and Angola in the 21st century as a pattern for Chinese involvement in Africa. The paper aims to analyse and evaluate the relationship between these states in a broader perspective of China’s involvement in Africa. The main research problem is whether the “Angola Model” is an effective way to increase China’s involvement in Africa? The main thesis is that the implementation of the Angola Model allows China to intensify economic cooperation with African countries. It especially gives China access to energy resources, enables the implementation of infrastructure investments and opens up absorbent markets for Chinese exports. To some extent, it also allows the spread of political influence of China, but the example of Angola shows that it has several limitations. This is due to both the efforts of African authorities to maintain full sovereignty and the reluctance of African people towards China’s exploitative attitude.

The implementation of the Angola Model in Africa and the world is to ensure China’s energy security and long-term economic development. Many politicians, researchers, experts and journalists see China as an emerging great power with too many ambiguities in its policies. This is due to dynamic economic growth and the spread of influence in the world, in the absence of political and military transparency. The recent voracious energy strategy that China has launched around the world, and especially in Africa, with contempt for Western values, deepens criticism of Beijing’s policy by Western observers. The fear is justified because so far China has not been able to satisfactorily prove and justify its self

proclaimed “peaceful rise”. This is due to both nationalist internal policy and the increasingly assertive attitude towards neighbours over numerous territorial disputes. An additional argument is China’s increasing military activity in the far regions, including in Africa (Kai 2017: 42, 119).

2. The Literature on China and Angola

Due to substantial credit support from state-owned banks, Chinese oil companies expanded their investment in regions around the world, including in politically unstable countries such as Angola, Sudan, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Myanmar (Zhao 2017: 149; Lee 2012: 75-92). In recent years researchers devote more and more attention to China’s partnership with African countries. First of all, this applies to oil-based agreements with states such as Sudan and Angola. Nevertheless, China’s presence is also significant in other African countries, including South Africa, Nigeria, and Zambia. Investments are implemented primarily on the oil and mineral market as well as the financial market (Gaudreau 2016: 220). Development support for Angola, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Equatorial Guinea, but also other African countries is often discussed in the literature. Some analysts argue that the race for resources is the main reason for China’s aid and investment activity in Africa (Strange, et al., 2013: 7). China’s focus in providing this support on the possibility of gaining access to natural resources is criticized in the literature. For example, in Angola, China spent US\$8 billion to get rights to the country’s most productive oil fields (Copper 2016: 182, 192).

China engages in Africa following the principles of South-South Cooperation, which primarily include: partnership, solidarity, equality, mutual respect and mutual benefit, respect for sovereignty, bilateralism and multilateralism, collective self-reliance and shared responsibility (South Centre: 2). As part of the concept, developing countries exchange raw materials, technology, knowledge and support financially for mutual development. The involvement in Africa is based on the perception of China as a historic leader of third world countries, ready to cooperate with any partner. In this way, China has become a key economic actor in Africa (Duggan 2016: 218-219). In the propaganda dimension, China presents a commitment to Africa as a willingness to support developing countries in achieving mutual benefits. Concerning its activities, Beijing refers to

the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which are the ideological basis of its foreign policy. These principles are mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence (Nathan and Ross 1997: 4). Concessional loans for major infrastructure projects are one of the main activities in building China's image in Africa as a state supporting the economic development of the poorer countries (Rønning 2016: 66).

The authors also note that the "Loan for Oil policy" implemented in Africa, but also other regions, such as South America, is expected to lead to the increased influence of China in the world (Arduino 2015: 223). China has increasingly ambitious investment plans for Africa. For example, in May 2014, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang, in a speech made at the World Economic Forum in Abuja, Nigeria, presented a vision of China's support for the project of connecting all 54 capitals with a high-speed rail network (Chan 2017: 166). At the same time, China is increasing its military activity abroad. Ascension of China in the global economic and political order has resulted in increased involvement in peacekeeping missions. China wants to be considered a state that is increasingly responsible for maintaining global peace and security. But in reality, this is a way to secure current and future overseas investments. Another activity in this respect was the involvement of the Chinese navy in anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden and the construction of military supporting facilities in Djibouti (Kam 2017: 190). At the bilateral level, both economic carrot and stick are being used by China to exert geopolitical influence and advance its foreign policy goals. China's generous economic support for developing countries makes them friends all over the world, including in Africa (Li, Kemburi and Hongzhou 2015: 16).

The partnership between China and Angola is known as the "Angola Model". This model is based on the principles of South-South Cooperation. It is mainly based on cooperation in the area of raw materials and development support under resources-for aid programs. The Angola Model comes from a 2004 Sino – Angolan oil agreement, under which China Exim Bank granted the government of Angola a loan of US\$2 billion for post-war reconstruction. This model was meant to be a win-win solution in cooperation between equal partners. The Angola Model primarily consists of granting low-interest loans to nations which are more reliant on commodities, such as fossil fuels or mineral resources, as collateral (Lanteigne 2016: 195). Under the agreement, developing countries

guarantee the supply of raw materials, mainly crude oil, to Chinese enterprises. In turn, they take part in the implementation of development projects in individual countries, as was the case in Angola (Hess and Aidoo: 109). A characteristic feature of the Angola Model is that Chinese engagement is quick and loans are large (Vines 2016: 133).

The Chinese model of cooperation based on preferential conditions for granting loans without giving preconditions was very well received by the Angolan authorities. The lack of a requirement for transparency in spending funds created the possibility of embezzlement of some funds by Angolan officials at various levels (Hao and Zweig 2016: 9). Bilateral relations are pragmatic and strategic for both China and Angola. Unlike aid and loans by Western donors, Chinese ones are without political preconditions and are intended to lead to mutual benefit (Vines 2016: 131). African countries with non-democratic governments can benefit from China's no-strings-attached, no-questions-asked approach to cooperation with African countries. Thanks to this alternative, they can reject the conditions imposed by Western states and international financial institutions controlled by them. Angola is the crowning example of such a situation, whose authorities, after some consideration, rejected credit support from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and the United Kingdom. On the latter, the Angola Embassy in London issued a press release in which it criticised London's conditional approach while praising Beijing's unconditional offer (Gow 2010: 107). Over the decade, Beijing pledged as much as US\$19.7 billion to Angola in aid for oil (Copper 2016: 82). About 70 per cent of the loans was spent on Chinese material, equipment, and labour (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 123).

China is criticised by Western researchers and commentators for strengthening economic cooperation with African countries in which fundamental human rights are repeatedly violated. This applies primarily to Angola, Sudan, and Zimbabwe (Blanchard and Shen 2015: 6). The partnership between Angola and China discussed in scientific studies usually focuses on doubting its morality (Begu et al. 2018: 2). The authors point out that China's investments in Angola are leading to enrichment and thus to the strengthening of the undemocratic mechanisms in the Angolan regime. This is at the expense of the masses, which remain in poverty, without participating in profits from the sale of oil. Social protests are silenced by the Angolan security forces (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 110).

It is also emphasized that undemocratic African regimes strengthen cooperation with China for mutual benefit, which is in a way a “marriage of convenience” (Corkin 2011: 1). Oil-focused Chinese relations with Angola and other African countries have been variedly labelled as part of “Africa’s second scramble” and “Beijing’s oil diplomacy” (Aidoo 2013).

3. The Specific Dynamics of Chinese-Angolan Relations in the 21st century

The strengthening of Chinese-Angolan economic cooperation is a consequence of the economic policy of Western countries. Donor states from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) grant loans to developing countries through West-controlled international financial institutions, mainly the IMF and the WB. However, these institutions require a number of transparency and good governance criteria to be met before granting development loans. To raise funds for post-war reconstruction, in 2001, Angola promised the IMF it would introduce structural reforms, including increasing transparency in oil revenues, reducing fuel subsidies, raising water rates, reducing borrowing, and privatising several state-owned companies. Although Angola did not keep these promises, in early 2003 German and French banks began to supply oil-backed credit to Angola (Duggan 2016: 218). However, Angolan authorities have not even initiated first steps towards greater openness and democratisation of the political system, including reform of the electoral system and the liberalisation of the media. President Dos Santos refused to introduce political reforms because they threatened the MPLA’s monopoly on power as well as its privileged access to the country’s oil wealth of people associated with it (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 115). For these reasons, the donors from the Paris Club lost interest in supporting Angola’s loans, which opened the way for Chinese capital. In turn, Beijing’s proposal resulted in Angola ending negotiations with the IMF.

In 2004 and 2007, Chinese Exim Bank granted Angola the first loans for reconstruction of infrastructure, mainly roads and rails. By 2009, Exim Bank had extended a total of US\$13.4 billion in oil-backed credit lines to the Angolan government. In 2011, China Development Bank also granted loans for US\$1.5 billion. The interest rate on loans from China was at a much lower level than Western banks could offer, usually at 1.5% above the London Interbank Offered

Rate (LIBOR). The repayment terms, which were spread over twelve years after five years of a grace period, were also very favourable (Duggan 2016: 218). Also, China cancelled Angola's outstanding debts that were due at the end of 1999 (Copper 2016: 70). This bilateral assistance was granted without the stipulations. In this way, China granted oil-backed loans to one of the most corrupt governments in the world without expecting it to introduce political reforms (Gaudreau 2016: 220).

In addition to banks, other parties of the 2004 Sino – Angolan agreement were fuel companies controlled by governments - from Angola - Sonangol, and from China - Sinopec Group's trading company and China International United Petroleum & Chemicals Co. Ltd. (UNIPEC). Petrochemical Corp, better known as Sinopec Group, acquired its first stake in Angola's oil industry (Vines 2016: 134). Assistance to Angola was linked to China receiving 10,000 barrels of oil per day. The loan agreement also stipulated that 70 per cent of the commercial contracts resulting from China's aid or investments would be awarded to Chinese companies, proposed by Exim Bank. This was the first transaction of this kind carried out by China (Copper 2016: 70).

China's credit line has been used almost entirely for infrastructure projects, which were implemented by Chinese state-owned construction companies (Duggan 2016: 218). For example, The China Railway Construction Corporation has implemented a flagship infrastructure investment. It rebuilt the 1,344-kilometer railway line linking coastal city Lobito in the west to Luau on Angola's eastern border for a price of almost US\$1.7 billion (Gutierrez 2018). The railway was opened on February 14, 2015. When implementing the investment, the Chinese company mainly used its equipment, machinery and partly also management staff and workers (Rønning 2016: 66). This investment was combined with a US\$1.2 billion renovation and expansion of the port of Lobito. The investment was carried out by China Harbor Engineering Company Ltd. (Duarta, Santos and Tjønneland 2014: 3). In turn, the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) obtained US\$211 million of the loan to reconstruct a 230-mile length of road from Luanda to Uige. Moreover, CRBC was contracted to construct a 107-mile roadway from Ondjiva to Huambo and a bridge over the River Dande. Several thousand of workers from China were employed to implement these investments (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 120). Chinese companies also carried out large investments in the area of housing construction. The

Kilamba New City project implemented 18 miles outside of Luanda included 750 eight-story apartment buildings, schools and retail stores. It was supposed to provide apartments to 500,000 people. In 2014, Chinese construction companies built five satellite cities around Luanda - Kilamba Kiaxi, Cacucaco, Zango, Km 44 and Capari. However, because of the non-optimal location, there were not enough people willing to buy new apartments.

Chinese telecommunications companies, ZTE and Huawei, in turn, took care of the establishment of Angola's LTE / 4G mobile networks (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 121). Human Rights Watch criticises the cooperation of Angola, Ethiopia and Zimbabwe with these companies over human rights concerns. It is feared that the devices installed by ZTE in these countries are to be used by their authorities to monitor telephone conversations and SMS messages and blocking of websites (Skjerdal and GusuIn 2016: 154). China also provided development assistance to Angola. For example, Exim Bank donated US\$200 million on various water and sanitation projects undertaken by Chinese companies (Copper 2016: 80).

Along with the loans and investments of Chinese enterprises, the focus of Chinese-Angolan relations has shifted from the security area to the economic one. Preparations for this cooperation were served by the visit of President Dos Santos to Beijing in 1998 and 1999. The basis for the new relationship formula was the 'framework agreement' signed in 2003 by Angola's Ministry of Finance and the Chinese Ministry of Trade. The development of diplomatic relations accompanied the strengthening of economic cooperation between China and Angola. In 2008, President Dos Santos revisited Beijing. In the first decade of the 21st century, members of his government visited China on nearly an annual basis. Due to the difference of potentials, return visits were carried out with lower intensity. In 2006, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao visited Angola and concluded a series of economic agreements. The MPLA and the Communist Party of China (CPC) also made interparty exchanges. It was to lead to closer relations between governments and parties, deepening cooperation and sharing best practices and experiences on governance issues of mutual concern (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 119). In November 2010, the Deputy Prime Minister Xi Jinping visited Luanda. He claimed that his visit marked a new phase in Sino-Angolan relations. The two countries established a strategic partnership during the visit. The parties agreed "to continue high-level dialogues, further exchanges between governments, legislatures and parties of the two countries and better communications on

bilateral ties and other major issues of mutual concern (...) The two sides also agreed that both countries will constantly improve their cooperation mechanism and enhance the level and quality of their economic and trade cooperation” (Hui 2010). At the same time, new economic agreements were signed, mainly in the transport, mining and construction sectors (Macauhub 2011). In May 2014, Angola was visited by Prime Minister Li Keqiang, which was the first visit of this rank in 8 years. During the visit, the heads of governments signed new agreements in the areas of energy infrastructure, construction, technology, medical care, finance and personnel exchanges (Vines 2016: 133). As part of the implementation of the agreements, Chinese agricultural experts and medical officers with farming equipment and medicines appeared in Angola. Cultural and sports exchanges were also deepened. The cooperation between China and Angola is coordinated by the Chinese Embassy in Luanda and the Embassy of Angola in Beijing as well as the consulates of Angola in Macau and Hong Kong, and Shanghai. Angola also participates in the Forum on China – Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and in the Macau Forum, a ministerial body aimed at deepening the cooperation between China and Portuguese-speaking countries (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 119-120).

Along with the tightening of economic cooperation, more and more Chinese business entities appeared in Angola. Already at the end of the first decade of the 21st century, more than 50 state-owned corporations and four hundred private Chinese companies were involved in projects in Angola. At the same time, there were 50,000 Chinese in the country, most of whom were workers implementing infrastructure projects (Copper 2016: 71). In May 2014, during the visit to Angola, Prime Minister Li Keqiang reported that 260,000 Chinese citizens out of a million Chinese working in Africa already worked in Angola. Some estimates at the time gave data reaching up to 400,000 Chinese working in Angola (Corkin 2013: 109).

The level of trade between countries also increased dynamically. While in the 1990s it oscillated in the range of US\$150-700 million annually, in 2000 it exceeded US\$1.8 billion, in 2005 it reached US\$6.9 billion, in 2008 - US\$25.3 billion, in - 2013 US\$36 billion (Vines 2016: 131), and in 2018 - US\$28 billion (Trade Map 2018b). China is the main importer of goods from Angola. In 2018, their value was US\$25.7 billion with a share of 60.28% of Angolan exports (Macauhub 2019). That year, more than 99% of goods exported from Angola to China were fuels and fuel products (Trade Map 2018b). China is also Angola's

largest supplier. In 2018, the value of products bought in China was US\$2.3 billion (Trade Map 2018a), with a share of 14.56% of Angola imports (Macauhub 2019). The main goods purchased from China were electrical and mechanical equipment, electronic equipment, mechanical and electronic parts as well as iron and steel products (Trade Map 2018a). Angola has become one of China's main trading partners in Africa. By 2006, Angola accounted for half of China's imports of petroleum from Africa. Sometimes it was the world's largest source of oil imports to China. Later, Saudi Arabia took priority, and Angola came in second (Copper 2016: 69). It is worth mentioning that, in addition to oil, Chinese companies are also investing in Angola in the diamond mining sector.

Economic cooperation between China and Angola has raised serious controversy, in and out of Angola, mainly because of internal politics. In Angola, the political system is monopolized by the MPLA and policymaking is dominated by the executive branch. Angolan President José Eduardo dos Santos is one of the biggest proponents of China's increased involvement in Africa. For him, the partnership with China became the basis for a significant acceleration of the country's economic development. Contracts between Chinese enterprises and Angola's elites, however, have no transparency and are associated with deep corruption. Most of the investment gains go to the family and mate circles related to President Dos Santos. The masses do not benefit from the sale of crude oil while remaining in chronic poverty (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 19, 109-110). A significant part of Chinese aid goes to the pockets of Angolan state officials. The process has been labelled "transparent looting". The scale of embezzled funds is astronomical and could reach as much as US\$6 billion in one year, which was sixth of the national budget. The crown example was the US\$2 billion committed for the construction of the international airport in Angola. The investment was not implemented because these funds disappeared (Copper 2016: 71). Transparency International's 2018 Corruption Perceptions Index placed Angola in 165 places among 180 countries and territories, confirming a very high level of its corruption (Transparency International 2018).

Corruption and social injustice exacerbate the citizens' anxieties and protests against both the Angola authorities and Chinese companies. Despite this, in Angola, where democratic mechanisms are limited, anti-Chinese fears are almost absent both in the political rhetoric and the public sphere. This is due to the political regime, which is closed and restrictive towards citizens and other

entities. Authorities have silenced criticism of China's growing role in Angola, deep corruption, labour abuse, job competition and other related issues. But, Chinese citizens have been the targets of violent attacks by local criminal groups, including robberies, beatings, kidnappings and even murders. The Angolan government, however, dismissed suggestions that all this was organised targeting of Chinese nationals (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 20, 129-130). Withholding this kind of information was possible because Angolan journalists are regularly targeted with threats, harassment and cyber attacks. In January 2017 President Dos Santos approved a set of new media laws known as the Social Communication Legislative Package, which enabled the government to control and censor critical information online. The authorities established the Angolan Regulatory Body for Social Communication, which has the power to control, suspend and ban websites without judicial oversight (Freedom House 2018). In 2018 World Press Freedom Index Angola was classified in 121 places out of 180 countries surveyed (Reporters Sans Frontieres 2018).

In turn, there is no confirmation in the data of the practice defined by the world media as "land grabbing", which is large-scale land acquisition. In practice, the purchase and lease of land in Angola by Chinese companies is very limited. This is confirmed, inter alia, by China's involvement in the agricultural sector of Angola. Beijing has signed a five-year contract with the Angolan Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development to open seven farms on 80,000 hectares of land. This area, however, remained the property of the Angolan government, as did the annual harvest from these farms. After five years, the farms were to be transferred to Gesterra - a national agricultural company under the Angolan authorities (Wu and Zhang 2017: 9).

Economic cooperation between China and Angola has rapidly tightened. Chinese construction companies have begun building housing estates, railways, roads and bridges, as well as creating telecommunication networks. China quickly became the main recipient of Angolan oil, the profits of which enabled the financing of infrastructure projects (Hess and Aidoo 2015: 109). Angola was able to build a relatively strong economy and a large army thanks to oil exports. In the 21st century, Angola became an "oil giant" and one of the fastest developing African countries, the so-called "Lion economies" (Shaw 2016: 115). For this reason, the Republic of South Africa, as a regional power and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), which unites the countries of South

Africa, has only limited leverage in Angola (Hartmann 2016: 92). Nevertheless, Western countries using ideological apparatus such as “human rights”; etc. still classify Angola as “failed state” (Yanping 2017: 165).

The Angolan authorities are happy to accept preferential loans from China and welcome investments by Chinese companies. At the same time, however, they do not want to be dominated by China as they strive for neutrality. For this reason, they try to diversify their economic partners by maintaining commercial relations with Western countries. This is also due to the belief that Angola’s development needs are too great to be met by one economic partner. In addition, Angola uses the contradictions between China and the Western states to get the greatest benefits (Hao and Zweig 2016: 9). The increase of China’s economic involvement in Angola is impressive, but this does not translate proportionally to an increase in political influence. Chinese influence in Angola is overstated by Western media. Angola is very attached to protecting its sovereignty from external interference and does not allow any country to dominate it economically, and especially politically (Vines 2016: 137-138). Despite China’s significant involvement in Angola in the XXI Century, the country is still seen as neutral. Both China, the US and other Western countries can buy oil from Angola, and in some cases even cooperate in its extraction (Zweig 2016: 34).

4. Conclusion

China’s economic involvement in Angola shows a model approach towards developing countries, especially those with significant deposits of energy resources. The implementation of the “Angola Model” gives Chinese enterprises access to raw materials, including crude oil, opens markets for Chinese industrial goods, and allows Chinese entrepreneurs to invest in partner countries. China’s partners, in turn, receive access to no-strings-attached credit lines provided on favourable terms and have revenues from the sale of natural resources. In addition, Chinese companies are involved in the development of their infrastructure. China implements elements of economic cooperation characteristic of the Angola Model in many African countries, but to some extent also outside Africa. In some of them, the possibility of implementing this model is limited due to armed conflicts and political instability that increase investment risk. Also, while this model allows for strengthening economic relations, the possibility of extending

political influence to partner countries goes into constraints, which is confirmed by the example of Chinese involvement in Angola.

- Corkin, L (2013), *Uncovering African Agency: Angola's Management of China's Credit Lines*. Farnham: Ashgate.
- Transparency International (2018), "Corruption Perceptions Index 2018" (Available at https://www.transparency.org/cpi2018?gclid=Cj0KCQjwjOrtBRCcARIsAEq4rW6Nofub-7hSGz9sCGY_5EkaqsHXBWVC46bs_DQRTpN9dn931XoS6AaAiLcEALw_wcB, accessed 14 September 2019).
- SAIS-CARI, "Data: China-Africa Trade". (Available at <http://www.sais-cari.org/data-china-africa-trade>, accessed 14 September 2019)
- Duarta, A; Santos, R and EN Tjønneland (2014), "Angola's Lobito Corridor. From Reconstruction to Development", *Angola Brief*, Vol 4, No 5, pp. 1-4. (Available at <https://www.cmi.no/publications/file/5120-angolas-lobito-corridor.pdf>, accessed 18 September 2019).
- Duggan, N (2016), "China's changing role in its all-weather friendship with Africa", in Harnisch, S; Bersick, S and J-C Gottwald (eds), *China's International Roles. Challenging or supporting international order?* London and New York: Routledge.
- Farnell, J and PI Crookes (2016), *The Politics of EU-China Economic Relation. An Uneasy Partnership*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Freedom House (2018), "Freedom on the Net 2018 – Angola", 1 November. (Available at <https://www.refworld.org/docid/5be16b2c4.html>, accessed 6 June 2020).
- Gaudreau, M (2016), "Plurality in China's South-South Cooperation: The Case of Rice Projects in Mali", in Cao, H and J Paltiel (eds), *Facing China as a New Global Superpower. Domestic and International Dynamics from Multidisciplinary Angles*. Singapore: Springer.
- Gow, J (2010), "Travelling Hopefully, Acting Realistically? UK-China Interactions", in Ross, RS; Tunsjø Ø and Z Tuosheng (eds), *US-China-EU Relations. Managing the New World Order*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Gutierrez, J (2018), "Revived Rail Freight Service Angola-Congo", 26 March. (Available at <https://www.railfreight.com/corridors/2018/03/26/revived-rail-freight-service-angola-congo/?gdpr=accept>, accessed 18 September 2019).
- Hao, Y and D Zweig (2016), "Introduction: Sino-US Energy Competition in Resource-Rich States", in Hao, Y and D Zweig (eds), *Sino-US Energy Triangles. Resource Diplomacy under Hegemony*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hartmann, Ch (2016), "Leverage and Linkage: How Regionalism Shapes Regime

- Dynamics in Africa”, in Bogaards, M and S Elischer (eds), *Democratization and Competitive Authoritarianism in Africa*. Heidelberg: Springer.
- Headley, T (2018), “China’s Djibouti Base: A One Year Update”, *The Diplomat*, 4 December. (Available at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/12/chinas-djibouti-base-a-one-year-update/>, accessed 20 September 2019).
- Herbling, D and D Li (2019), “China’s Built a Railroad to Nowhere in Kenya”, 19 July. (Available at <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2019-07-19/china-s-belt-and-road-leaves-kenya-with-a-railroad-to-nowhere>, accessed 12 June 2020).
- Hess, S and R Aidoo (2015), *Charting the Roots of Anti-Chinese Populism in Africa*. New York: Springer.
- Hoyt, TD (2016), “US-China Cooperation: the role of Pakistan after the Death of Osama bin Laden”, in Ping, JH and B McCormick (eds), *China’s Strategic Priorities*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hui, L (2010), “China, Angola Establish Strategic Partnership”, 21 November. (Available at http://www.gov.cn/english/2010-11/21/content_1749808.htm, accessed 18 September 2019).
- Kai, J (2017), *Rising China in a Changing World. Power Transitions and Global Leadership*. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kam, S (2017), “China and the Threat of Terrorism”, in Boon, HT (ed), *Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Kleine-Ahlbrandt, ST (2015), “Navigating an uncertain future. US-China relations and maritime security in the Asia-Pacific”, in Li, M and KM Kemburi (eds), *New Dynamics in the US-China Relations Contending for the Asia-Pacific*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Lanteigne, M (2016), *Chinese Foreign Policy. An introduction*. Third edition. London and New York: Routledge.
- Lee, J (2012), “China’s Geostrategic Search for Oil”, *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol 35, No 3, pp 75–92.
- Li, M; Kemburi, KM and Z Hongzhou (2015), “Growth of China’s Power: Capabilities, Perceptions, and Practice”, in Li, M and KM Kemburi (eds), *China’s Power and Asian Security*. London and New York.
- Nathan, AJ and RS Ross (1997), *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China’s Search for Security*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Ltd.
- Reporters Sans Frontieres (2018), “2018 World Press Freedom Index”. (Available

- at <https://rsf.org/en/ranking/2018>, accessed 6 June 2020).
- Rønning, H (2016), “How Much Soft Power Does China Have in Africa?”, in Zhang, X, Wasserman H and W Mano (eds), *China’s Media and Soft Power in Africa. Promotion and Perceptions*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ross, RS (2009), *Chinese Security Policy. Structure, Power and Politics*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Shaw, TM (2016), “African Agency Post-2015: The Roles of Regional Powers and Developmental States in Regional Integration”, in Levine, DH and D Nagar (eds), *Region-Building in Africa. Political and Economic Challenges*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Shepard, W (2019), “What China Is Really Up To In Africa”, *Forbes*, 3 October. (Available at <https://www.forbes.com/sites/wadeshepard/2019/10/03/what-china-is-really-up-to-in-africa/#214e9c4d5930>, accessed 10 June 2020).
- Shichor, Y (2017), “Maximising Output while Minimising Input: Change and Continuity in China’s Middle East Policy”, in Boon HT (ed), *Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Skjerdal, T and F Gusu (2016), “Positive Portrayal of Sino–African Relations in the Ethiopian Press”, in Zhang, X, Wasserman H and W Mano (eds), *China’s Media and Soft Power in Africa. Promotion and Perceptions*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- South Centre (2009), “South-South Cooperation Principles: An Essential Element in South-South Cooperation”. (Available at https://www.southcentre.int/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/South-South-cooperation-Principles_EN.pdf, accessed 4 June 2020).
- Strange, A; Parks, B; Tierney, MJ; Fuchs, A; Dreher, A and V Ramachandran (2013), “China’s Development Finance to Africa: A Media-Based Approach to Data Collection”, CGD Working Paper 323. Washington DC: Center for Global Development.
- The State Council (2015), “China’s Military Strategy”, Beijing, May. (Available at http://english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2015/05/27/content_281475115610833.htm, accessed 10 September 2019).
- UN Peacekeeping (2019), “Troop and Police Contributors. Ranking of contributions by country (as of 31 July 2019)”. (Available at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>, accessed 18 September 2019).
- Vines, A (2016), “Angolan Agency and Chinese and US oil politics, 1975–2014”, in

- Hao, Y and D Zweig (eds), *Sino-US Energy Triangles. Resource Diplomacy under Hegemony*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Macauhub (2011), "Visit by 'future leader of China' to Angola boosts bilateral relations", 31 January. (Available at <https://macauhub.com.mo/feature/visit-by-future-leader-of-china-to-angola-boosts-bilateral-relations/>, accessed 18 September 2019).
- Wu, F and H Zhang (2017), "Introduction: A rising China and the future of world resources", in Wu, F and H Zhang (eds), *China's Global Quest for Resources. Energy, Food and Water*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Yanping, X (2017), "The Global Energy Governance Structure and China-Europe Energy Relations", in Zhou H (ed), *China-EU Relations. Reassessing the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership*. Singapore: Springer.
- Zhao, H (2017), "China's Energy Quest in Southeast Asia: 'Mercantilist Rise' debated", in Wu, F and H Zhang (eds), *China's Global Quest for Resources. Energy, Food and Water*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Zweig, D (2016), "Modelling 'resource diplomacy' under hegemony: the triangular nature of Sino-US energy relations", in Hao, Y and D Zweig (eds), *Sino-US Energy Triangles. Resource Diplomacy under Hegemony*. London and New York: Routledge.

