Why Burundi intervenes in the DRC: Self-interest or Pan-Africanist considerations?

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Abstract

Questions have abounded as to what Burundi’s motives and interests have been in sending troops and spearheading the intervention in the eastern DRC. With reference to the case of Burundi’s intervention within the framework of the East African Community’s (EAC) response to the growing conflict in the eastern DRC, this article considered a broad range of what Burundi’s motives and interests might be. This included security and stability, both nationally and regionally, regional political dynamics and the position of Burundi within this, and trade and business opportunities.

However, this article argues although all of these have explanatory power, some of the complexity and nuance of the intervention is missed if we do not place it within the context of Pan-Africanist considerations, including that of African integration, African self-reliance and agency, and African ownership of and control over its own resources.

Keywords: Burundi, peace intervention, pan-Africanism, Great Lakes Region, DRC
1. Introduction

Burundi was the first country to offer troops to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2022 as part of East Africa’s peace mission after a wave of attacks from the rebel group known as Mouvement du 23 Mars (M23). On 4 March 2023, Burundi’s armed forces deployed troops to the eastern DRC according to the framework of the East African Community Regional Force (EACRF). The troop deployment is part of the implementation of the Nairobi agreement and the Luanda roadmap on the peace process in the DRC. The peace process was initiated as an attempt to find a solution to the security and humanitarian crisis caused by M23. Although the objective of the rebel group is not expressed in clear terms, the M23 seeks to control the eastern part of the DRC, an area which is endowed with a lot of strategic minerals. This area is located near the border between the DRC and two of its eastern neighbours, Rwanda and Uganda. Notably, Burundi and the DRC are both member states of the East African Community (EAC) and they share a significant borderland that includes Lake Tanganyika and the whole western part of Burundi. Peace initiatives in the Great Lakes Region have typically understood the conflict in individual states as being part of a regional problem with cross-border implications.

Questions have abounded as to what Burundi’s motives and interests have been in sending troops and spearheading the intervention in the eastern DRC. Peace missions in Africa emerged in the 1990s and grew ever since with justifications ranging from national security to other more people-centred approaches justified by United Nations and African Union peacebuilding principles. Drawing from international relations theory, justifications for interventions can be located within realist, liberal, and constructivist frameworks. Typically, analyses concerning justifications for interventions tend to be situated within realist assumptions, with an emphasis on national interest and state security concerns. But from a more constructivist perspective, critiques of interpretations based solely on self-interest have been growing. These critiques include that the realist approach is too state-centric, reductionist, cynical, and—as applied to the African context—misses what might be termed pan-Africanist considerations. These pan-Africanist considerations include a growing sense of African agency, which perhaps manifests in the form of a kind of African loyalty, or banding together, and resistance to interference from ‘outside’.

With reference to the case of Burundi’s intervention within the EAC’s response to the growing conflict in the eastern DRC, this article considers a broad range of
what Burundi’s motives and interests might be. This includes security and stability, both nationally and regionally, regional political dynamics and the position of Burundi within this, and trade and business opportunities. But it also considers the colonial legacy and the ways in which, as is argued by decolonial scholars, the colonial legacy lives on in every aspect of how African states and societies function. Through such a pan-Africanist and decolonial lens, we can bring nuance to the more typical realist interpretations of Burundi’s intervention, by understanding the unique relationship, and loyalty, that Burundi has to the DRC, the Great Lakes region, and the East African community more broadly.

This article begins by situating our discussion on Burundi’s motives and interests within realist and constructivist frameworks, including a discussion on pan-Africanist considerations. It then briefly explores intervention on the African continent in relation to two aspects: invited versus uninvited intervention and external versus internal intervention. This is followed by a brief mapping of the context of Burundi’s intervention within the unfolding situation in the DRC. Burundi’s motives and interests are then explored along the following four themes: security and stability, both nationally and regionally; regional political dynamics and the position of Burundi within this; trade and business opportunities; and what we’re terming pan-Africanist considerations and the colonial legacy.

2. Theoretical approaches to understanding the deployment of peacekeeping forces in Africa

There are several driving factors that can cause a state to get involved in the political and domestic affairs of another state in international relations. All driving factors can be located within a variety of theoretical perspectives—namely, the realist perspective, the liberal perspective, and the constructivist perspective.

From a realist perspective, the number one reason why a state would interfere in the affairs of another state is national interest. States are seen to be the most important actors in the international arena, and territorial integrity and military might are emphasised in order to protect the state as an entity. In the context of Burundi’s intervention in the DRC, it can be argued that Burundi seeks to protect its national interests because the conflict in a neighbouring state can lead to instability in Burundi and, as such, constitutes a national security threat. Critiques of the traditional realist perspective have included that it is state-centric, reductionist, and cynical (Hendricks
From a liberal perspective, the individual and not the state, is at the centre of the international system, and individuals are seen to be the building blocks of state power (Moravcsik 2001). This makes establishing institutions that ensure the rights and liberties of individuals a very important task. Liberals are concerned about militaristic foreign policies because wars are expensive and require building militaristic powers that can fight foreign states but can also hurt and oppress citizens on the flip side (McDonald 2009). The flaws of the liberal school include the blindness to inequality, the assumption that there are universal truths, and generalization which results in the use of a one-size-fits-all methodology to approach challenges (Keohane 2012; Wendt 1995). Both the liberal and realist theories are critiqued by the constructivist theories for their over-reliance on objectivity, amongst other things.

From a constructivist perspective, it is understood that our reality is constructed based on intersubjective relations (Wendt 1995). In terms of intervention, while the realist perspective can help us understand Burundi’s intervention in DRC to a large extent, it misses some of the complexity and nuance underlying the multifaceted relationships that African neighbouring states have with one another and the continent. Manifestations of this can be seen in the emphasis by the African Union and individual African states on ‘African Solutions to African Problems’, the principle of subsidiarity, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). These considerations not only place people at the centre of intervention as opposed to placing the state at the centre, but also speak to issues of African agency, African resistance to external ‘interference’, pan-Africanist interests, and the decolonial concern of addressing the ongoing colonial legacy.

3. Pan-Africanist considerations

In terms of understanding these pan-African considerations, an understanding of the historical contexts and its link to the current realities and aspirations of African states is necessary. Aneche (2019, 70) argues that while classical African regionalism was based on pan-Africanism born out of a shared commitment to decolonize—from the colonial administration, and later neo-colonial shackles—modern-day African regionalism is focused on achieving continental unity, collective self-reliance, economic transformation, and creating an agenda for solving African developmental challenges. Understanding the pan-African drivers and aspirations can bring nuance and complexity to understanding the relations between African states. Pan-Africanism is an intellectual,
political liberation movement relating to the aspiration of people of African descent around the world (Walters 1997, 34). The goal of pan-Africanism was the education, liberation, and unity of Africa.

Pan-Africanism was historically concerned with anti-colonial struggles or national wars of liberation, the decolonisation of Africa, the abolition of all forms of racial segregation and discrimination, and the rejection of economic dependence, neocolonialism, and imperialism (Tageldin 2014). Post-independence Africa saw the drive for integration and unity continue through the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) and the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Amongst other reasons, this drive was a response to the last vestiges of colonialism, as well as to spur political and economic progress on the continent; it was also a political instrument to deal with coloniality and global apartheid as it affects the continent.

For decolonial scholars, the arrival of colonialization in Africa did not leave just the legacy of colonial administration, it also brought several structures with it that have been woven into African societies, including into its knowledge systems, governance, and cultures (Grosfoguel 2011). Decolonial scholars critically discuss these interwoven structures, which they argue have remained after the end of colonialism, particularly in control of the economy, authority, gender, sexuality, and control of subjectivity and knowledge as discussed by Quijano (2000) and reiterated by other decolonial scholars (Grosfoguel 2011, 11). They argue that decolonization through “delinking” is necessary—namely, to restructure the five-century political and economic system of “global apartheid: an international system of minority rule whose attributes include: differential access to human rights; wealth and power structured by race and place; structural racism, embedded in global economic processes, political institutions, and cultural assumptions; the international practice of double standards that assume inferior rights to be appropriate for certain “others”, defined by location, origin, race, or gender (Booker and Minter 2001).

From a pan-Africanist and decolonial perspective, it is argued that, firstly, African conflicts have their roots in the colonial legacy, and that the colonial legacy would need to be addressed for the deep roots of the conflict to be resolved. Secondly, it is argued that international intervention is intertwined with political and economic self-interest, approaches to resolving conflict that are Eurocentric, divorced from African realities, and therefore less likely to be sustainable. The resistance to the International Criminal Court by African states is an example of the ways in which international intervention is increasingly being perceived to be ‘interference’ (Finnemore 1996; Jones 2001).
Increasing attention is being given to African agencies, including through the emphasis by the African Union and individual African states on ‘African Solutions to African Problems’, the principle of subsidiarity, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).

The catchphrase “African solutions to African problems” was coined by the eminent political economist George Ayittey in response to the behaviour of the international community in the crisis in Somalia (Institute for security studies 2008). This phrase which became famous after the neglect Somalia faced in the wake of its Civil War in 1991, explains an approach to conflict across the continent that points to the development of ideas, concepts, approaches, and practices in peacebuilding by Africans. The logic here is that, when Africans develop their own ideas, they will be more committed to their implementation due to the resulting sense of ownership. This has been a major policy direction for the African Union and other sub-regional blocks across the continent. In this sense, Burundi’s intervention in the DRC represents an Africa-led approach to conflict in a neighbouring state which is arguably justified under the African Union by the ill-defined principle of subsidiarity.

The principle of subsidiarity prioritizes local actors first and suggests that higher authorities will not get involved in matters unless the local authorities are unable to manage them (Djilo and Handy 2021). It is a concept that originated in the EU. The concept is still to be defined in Africa, as there are practical and legal matters that affect the application of this principle. This challenge is exacerbated by the undefined nature of the relationship between sub-regional blocks and the AU, especially with regard to operationalizing the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA). The 2011 Kenya-in-Somalia case is an example of the application of this because it was justified by Kenya’s proximity to the problem, apart from the threat to Kenya’s national security (Throup 2012). Kenya had waited for AU intervention which did not come. Kenya’s intervention in Somalia is almost similar to Burundi’s deployment of forces into DRC. However, in the case of Burundi the military deployment was decided in agreement with the Congolese authority at both the bilateral and regional levels. In Kenya’s case, Somalia expressed discontent with what it considered a unilateral decision by Kenyan authorities (Throup 2012).

Another justification under the Africa Union is the R2P. The responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing is an important global principle since the adoption of the UN World Summit Outcome Document in 2005 (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect n.d). The African Union (AU) as it is called today emerged out of the need to build the
right structures for accomplishing the responsibility to protect. The creation of the AU out of the Organisation of Africa Unity (OAU) saw the organisation’s development of the appropriate structures for peace interventions that have the potential to respond to African challenges (Khadiagala 2017). The R2P is justified on the basis that interventions by African states and regional bodies are based on the R2P principle, as an intervention on a larger international scale might come too late after major damages have already been done. Examples are the cases of the Rwandan genocide which received zero international responses in the first 100 days, resulting in the killing of thousands of people (Bellamy and Dunne 2016). Another example is the Somali conflict which was ignored for several years before a concerted international effort saw a transitional federal government established in 2013 (Loubser 2012).

4. Burundi’s motivations and interests in intervening in the DRC

From a recent historical perspective, the intervention by Burundi in the DRC is not a new phenomenon. Burundi armed forces were involved in the 1996 war that led to the toppling of Mobutu’s regime. They fought alongside the Rwandan and Ugandan troops. This coalition of armies together with a remnant of Congolese rebels operating under the leadership of Laurent Désiré Kabila, formed the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL). Under former President Pierre Buyoya, the Burundian army also played a role in the 1998 Second Congolese War (known as the First African World War as it involved around nine countries fighting in support of or against Laurent Désiré Kabila who was trying to get rid of Rwandan and Ugandan forces). At the same time, then Burundian rebels from the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD-FDD) were supporting Laurent Désiré Kabila’s troops as they fought against the Rwandan, Burundian, and Ugandan forces. This type of collaboration cemented ties between former rebel officers from the CNDD-FDD and officers from the Congolese Army, the FARDC. When the CNDD-FDD came to power in Burundi, the wartime ties remained between officers from both sides, and today these relationships still influence some of the decisions and actions taken by both governments regarding the security situation in the Great Lakes Region.

The Burundi troops deployed to the DRC have the mission of securing the areas left by the M23 rebel group during its withdrawal from the region of Masisi, Sake, and Kirolirwe, among others. Members of the EACRF from other contributing countries have been committed to securing other areas, depending on the unfolding dynamics in
North Kivu and on the movements of M23.

In this section three of the themes that capture Burundi’s motives and interests are explored that could perhaps typically be understood as falling within the traditional realist framework—namely, security and stability, both nationally and regionally; regional political dynamics and the position of Burundi within this; and trade and business opportunities.

**Security and stability**

Arguably, the primary driving motivation for Burundi’s intervention is that of security and stability. The instability in South and North Kivu represents a serious threat to security and stability in the region, especially along the border that Burundi shares with the DRC and because of existing tensions across the Great Lakes Region (International Crisis Group 2022). Burundi’s political leadership is particularly sensitive to potential threats from the DRC. In the past there have been several skirmishes on Burundi territory, particularly in the western provinces of Bubanza, Bujumbura, and Cibitoke. During the attacks lives were lost, and properties were destroyed or looted. The attacks were carried out by armed groups under Burundian rebel leaders such as General Aloys Nzabampema (Deutsche Welle, 11/27/2022) with his FNL faction and other rebels claiming to belong to Red-Tabara. The proliferation of armed groups in the proximity of the border area is a common security threat for both countries.

In addition to armed groups, there is a perceived inability of the central government in the DRC to impose its authority at the periphery (Defis Humanitaires, 4/4/2023). The power vacuum prompts neighbouring states to take additional security measures. This explains why there is a lot of interest in ensuring that the security situation in the shared border area is under control and the pragmatic steps that the Burundi government has made to maintain safety for the citizens are implemented. The steps include, among other things, the deployment of troops along the border and the bilateral agreement with the DRC government to collaborate in tackling the problem of armed groups.

Since 2015 and following the electoral and political crisis that erupted in Burundi, an armed group known as RED-Tabara was created with the claimed intention of restoring the Arusha Peace Accords and the Rule of Law in Burundi. The armed group is made up of Burundi refugees who, with the support of Rwanda, managed to establish an operation centre in South Kivu, around the cities of Uvira, Fizi, and the surrounding mountains. The latest action from Red-Tabara was carried out in 2021
when it launched a mortar attack against the Melchior Ndadaye International Airport in Bujumbura and then returned to the DRC where its fighters have a rear base (News24, 19/9/2021). There have been other attacks in Cibitoke and Bubanza provinces in the past, but all ended unsuccessfully. However, every attack carried out, whether successful or not, increases a sense of insecurity for the local population and they cannot continue with their daily work in a normal way. For this reason, the government of Burundi has concluded a bilateral agreement between Burundi and the DRC armies to carry out joint operations aimed at eradicating armed groups like Red-Tabara (Deutsche Welle 2022).

The second security-related factor or issue is related to the spillover effects of violence that are linked to the ongoing fighting in the east of this country (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa 2015). Since 1998, the consequences of violence in eastern DRC have prompted the exodus of thousands of Congolese people, some of whom sought refuge in Burundi. According to the UNHCR, even today Burundi still hosts more than 85,000 Congolese refugees on its soil. As one of the most densely populated countries in the Great Lakes Region, the presence of Congolese refugees on Burundi’s small territory increases the already unbearable demographic pressure the country is experiencing. According to recent statistics, Burundi has above 400 people per square kilometre with a territory of only 27,834 square kilometres (The Global Economy n.d). The big number of Congolese refugees living in Burundi represents an additional burden to a country which is struggling to find sustainable solutions against problems of food insecurity, shrinking arable land, and environmental challenges linked to increased use of firewood as observed in Musasa, Kinama, Kavumu, Bwagiriza and Nyankanda—the main camps with Congolese refugees (Mpabansi 2023). These are located in the northern and eastern provinces of Burundi.

Regional politics and the position of Burundi

The second factor is related to regional politics. The Democratic Republic of Congo recently became a member State of the East African Community (EAC). Reasons behind the DRC’s move to seek membership in this regional bloc include the benefits of a regional security architecture which is being developed along with the establishment of an EAC standby force. As a member of the EAC, Burundi is under the obligation to offer support to a member state in a difficult situation. During the various meetings held by EAC heads of state and governments, it was agreed to combine efforts aimed
at stabilizing the eastern provinces of the DRC which have been plagued by violence for several decades now. EAC efforts to support the DRC could be understood in the framework of applying African solutions to African problems which has a regional and continental dimension. Burundi’s intervention is a contribution to these regional and continental efforts towards peace in the DRC. These dynamics of regional integration are increasingly playing a role in determining the evolution of bilateral and multilateral cooperation inside and outside the EAC. Burundi takes this evolution into consideration as it has serious implications regarding the country’s positioning in the region.

When the DRC joined the EAC in March 2022 there was a lot of hope regarding opportunities that would open in different economic and cooperation sectors (Mwangangi 2022). For the DRC becoming an EAC member state made a lot of sense as the country has a shared border with five out of six members of the community (Byeirs 2023). This had direct implications for the improvement of the security situation, the development of collective projects aimed at improving economic and trade infrastructure, and other activities related to regional integration (Buchanan-Clarke 2022). However, since the renewal of M23 attacks in North Kivu, there have been voices criticising the decision made by President Felix Tshisekedi to join the EAC. Those opposed to this decision have been expressing anger at the attitude of the Rwandan government which is accused of supporting the M23 rebel movement. The rebel movement is accused of being responsible for the loss of many lives and a massive exodus of the population from North Kivu (Githui-Ewart 2023). Since the renewal of M23 attacks, several military and diplomatic incidents occurred between the DRC and Rwanda and worsened the already strained relationships (Adunimay 2022).

They include, for instance, the severing of diplomatic relations through the closing of the Rwandan embassy in the DRC and the suspension of Rwandair flights to Kinshasa. In January 2023, the Rwandan forces shot at a Congolese warplane, thus escalating tensions between the two countries (Reuters 2023). It is believed that Rwanda and Uganda’s governments represent key allies of the rebel movement which is wreaking havoc in eastern DRC. The position or attitude of both governments (Rwanda and Uganda) is considered hypocritical by a number of Congolese political actors and members of some civil society organisations. This explains why some of the peace initiatives have not been successful, as they are hindered by mistrust between the different government leaders in the region. Paul Simon Handy from ISS notes correctly that “the region’s political culture is dominated by short-term alliances that conflict with Tshisekedi’s vision of cooperative security” (Handy 2023). He also points to a serious
problem of competition between regional blocs such as EAC, SADC, or ICGLR over who leads peace initiatives, which becomes a barrier to achieving any tangible results.

Political tensions, and diplomatic and military incidents imply that the DRC has to develop alternative ties with other neighbours. It is in this perspective that Burundi comes into the picture. The focus on Burundi as a regional ally has implications for the evolution of the security and stability in Eastern DRC. First of all, if the DRC can be assured of a reliable ally along the border with South Kivu with the military capability to address the security challenges, it can focus on the situation in North Kivu. Burundi represents this possibility and has demonstrated its willingness and ability to do so by deploying troops to protect the border area. But Burundi, in doing so, is also ensuring its own security while fighting armed groups believed to be sponsored by the Rwandan government. Since 2015, there were reports of Burundian refugees from camps in Rwanda being given military training to attack Burundi via the DRC (Anderson 2017). This has led to political tensions between Burundi and Rwanda. At some point the tensions were so high that even the borders between the two countries were closed.

Even though in recent days the Burundi-Rwanda diplomatic ties have been renewed, there is a sense from the DRC that Burundi is still a more reliable ally than its neighbours in the north. Apart from the alliances created to boost security in the region, particularly in the East of the DRC, there are economic considerations, this time on behalf of Tanzania which is eyeing a regional trade expansion. The economy of Tanzania has been booming for several years and the government is looking for new markets. With its population of around 95 million people, the DRC represents an important market for Tanzanian and other East African products. Burundi is located between the two countries and will, in the near future, have to play the role of not only a transit zone for trade operations between Tanzania and DRC but also look for its own opportunities in this vast untapped market. Burundi’s active involvement in the geopolitics shaping the relationships between Tanzania, the DRC, and other regional actors is based on how the country could benefit from the evolving political, security, and economic dynamics in the EAC and Central Africa regions.

**Trade and business opportunities**

Besides security challenges, there are economic and trade issues that the DRC could solve in collaboration with the EAC as a whole and with each of the community members, particularly those connected to the DRC (Buchanan-Clarke 2022). With a
population of around 95 million people, the DRC represents a huge market for the EAC. Being the most integrated economic bloc in Africa (East Africa Community 2020), the EAC is also in a position to offer the DRC many advantages in terms of trade facilities, infrastructure development, and ease of doing business.

Burundi is strategically located between the DRC and Tanzania and can play a pivotal role in enhancing trade links between the two East African giants. The development of a project known as the Central Corridor aims at connecting the region through transport infrastructure, especially roads, rail, and waterways. Due to the landlocked position of Burundi, it is important for the country to be an integral part of the Central Corridor project. It is precisely in this framework that the railway connecting the port of Dar es Salaam to Kindu in the DRC is being developed with sections of the railway passing through Musongati, Gitega, and Bujumbura in Burundi (Xinhua 2022). This will play a significant role in opening-up new transit roads and markets for Burundian producers (agriculture, mining, manufacturing, etc.). It is in this perspective that Burundi is playing an active role in ensuring that the Eastern part of the DRC is secured. The absence of stability and security in the region is an obvious hindrance to all the ambitious projects the countries within the EAC are developing at bilateral, multilateral, or regional level.

5. Pan-Africanist considerations in relation to Burundi’s intervention

In a discussion in which he problematises African agency, Tieku (2013, 530) shows that Burundi’s peace process used a ‘Pan-Africanist approach … [which] created the space for African governments to assert their independence and to develop novel conflict instruments such as the Great Lakes Regional Initiative.’ He argues that bilateral and multilateral cooperation between African states is ‘one of the major enablers of African agency.’

As was discussed earlier in the article, central to the push for African integration and the formation of the EAC, were the pan-Africanist considerations of self-reliance, African agency, and African ownership of and control over its own resources (Aniche 2020). The development of the Central Corridor speaks to these same considerations. As was also alluded to earlier, Burundi’s intervention in the DRC represents an Africa-led approach to conflict in a neighbouring state. Not only are Burundi and the DRC both members of the EAC, but more significantly, they have been part of the Great Lakes Regional Initiative (GLRI) and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) which both emerged out of the understanding that conflicts in states
Within the Great Lakes Region are irrevocably interconnected.

When M23 first emerged in April 2012, the ICGLR intervened on the basis of the Ezulwini Consensus, which emphasised that regional organisations needed to be empowered to intervene. The Ezulwini Consensus is a common African position on the proposed reform of the United Nations (UN) adopted by the African Union (AU) following the report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that was adopted in 2005. Tunamsifu (2017) argues though that efforts by the ICGLR were undermined by the fact that two of its members, Rwanda and Uganda, were implicated in the emergence of M23, and thus it became impossible to find consensus or to take action against responsible member states.

Although much has been written about Rwanda-Burundi and Rwanda-DRC relations, and particularly the contentious position that Rwanda holds in the region, far less has been written about Burundi-DRC relations. Burundi and the DRC are the only countries within the EAC where French is used as a key official language that dominates political, trade, and diplomatic exchanges. This plays an important role in their rapprochement. Burundi and the DRC also share a colonial legacy where they were both under the Belgian colonial authority. These factors play a role in developing bilateral agreements and in building trust between the two countries.

6. Conclusion

This article has considered a broad range of what Burundi’s motives and interests might be in terms of its intervention in the DRC within the framework of the East African Community’s (EAC) response to the growing conflict in the eastern DRC. Possible motives and interests that were explored included security and stability, both nationally and regionally, regional political dynamics and the position of Burundi within this, and trade and business opportunities.

This article has discussed that in terms of intervention, while the realist perspective can help us understand Burundi’s intervention in the DRC to a large extent, an additional layer of complexity is the multifaceted relationships that neighbouring African states have with one another and with the continent. Manifestations of this can be seen in the emphasis by the African Union and individual African states on ‘African Solutions to African Problems’, the principle of subsidiarity, and the Responsibility to Protect. These considerations not only place people at the centre of intervention as opposed to placing the state at the centre, but they also speak to issues of African agency, African
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