

# Do Transitions from Liberation Movements to Political Parties Guarantee Good Governance? The Case of ZANU-PF and the ANC

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## Abstract

The purpose of this study is to examine the transition of liberation movements into political parties and whether that guarantees good governance or not. Since the end of the Second World War and the Cold War, the number of democratic states has increased on all continents. African states began to explore democratic governance from independence and the end of apartheid. Furthermore, the liberation struggle fought by many African movements led to independence and 'decolonisation'. The emergence of these liberation movements was to emancipate and liberate their respective states so that the rule of oppressive imperialists such as the British could come to an end. The transition of the former colonial states ensured that the movements which fought the liberation struggle turned into political parties. The study uses the cases of the Zimbabwe African National-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) in Zimbabwe and the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa to interrogate the transition into political parties and examine if good governance has been achieved because of that. The study has found that the implications of former liberation movements turning into political parties have not had the foreseen intentions. With the neo-patrimonial theory, the study substantially examines whether ZANU-PF and the ANC have been in accordance with or against the dynamics of good governance informed by liberalism values.

**Keywords:** Liberation Movements, Political Parties, ZANU-PF, ANC, Good Governance, Accountability, Rule of Law, Government Efficiency.

## 1. Introduction

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, many African states adopted a system of democracy. The problem for African States with this democracy would be that it was Eurocentric. Due to the fight for liberation, many African liberation movements had been conditioned during negotiations for independence to accept democracy as the new system of governance. Democracy came with a very crucial point of transition. The transition not only occurred for the political system of the liberated states, but it also came, by default, for the liberation movements themselves. Through a democratic elections procedure, ZANU in 1980 and the ANC in 1994 switched from being freedom fighters into political parties contesting for political power and the ruling governments of their respective states. In Southern Africa, the South West Africa People's Organisation (SWAPO) transitioned from a liberation movement to a political party. However, the study did not use SWAPO in Namibia because, at its independence in 1990, its former coloniser (South Africa) retained 'enormous power of its former colony' (Saunders 2017). Furthermore, the study uses the cases studies of ZANU-PF and the ANC because they are former liberation movements that advanced their struggle under British Empire rule, even though the ANC did so indirectly under the Union of South Africa when it was first established in 1912.

In as much as ZANU-PF and the ANC function as a single structure in their respective states, as former liberation movements and the incumbents of governance, operations of the former liberation movements do not necessarily have to maintain the current operations of governance. Clapham (2012) differentiates the transformation of liberation movements into political parties as deconditioning from winning the war against colonial oppression and imperialism to winning and championing the new emerging war against socio-political and economic issues about poverty, governance as a holistic concept, unemployment, and development. Idowu (2020) argues that good governance in Africa has been a major challenge facing the continent and that people have been denied good governance over the years. While liberation movements in Africa were key structures that fought against colonisation; they have not been able to chart a functioning government for their respective states (Idowu 2020).

Fighting a war as a liberation movement is an action that only wants the result of the victory and triumphs over oppression, whereas running a government as

a political party involves multiple goals, priorities, and interests to be considered to provide good governance as the most valuable variable (Clapham 2012). Furthermore, once the liberation struggle has been completed, what used to be a liberation movement transitions into a political party, as ZANU-PF and the ANC have done, and assumes power to be the incumbent of a national government in the State. It could be argued that the problem with this transition for these liberation movements is that they never got the opportunity to learn how to conduct themselves as political parties in power. Zondi (2017) states that the liberation movements were so preoccupied with fighting for freedom that the chance to train how to function in office never presented itself. Anan (2010) says, 'Good governance is perhaps the single most important factor in eradicating poverty and promoting development'.

African Union's 50-year development and transformation programme denotes that good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and the rule of law are key in Africa's political and economic transformation (Mbaku 2020). Moreover, the African Development Bank (2016) states that good governance should be built on an 'effective state, mobilised civil societies and an effective private sector'. With these three stakeholders, governance management is ensured not to be limited to the government alone (Sharma 2018). According to Mbaku (2020), African states have continued to build on the governance gains achieved since independence. However, this has been met with many challenges. Among the challenges, corruption, democratic erosion, leadership challenge, state capture of relevant institutions, and insecurity are eminent (Idowu 2020).

The crucial transition from being a liberation movement into a political party is intense and very important to each State's new era. Consequently, given that politics resides in a global community, the transitional breakthrough must be made with precision so that it does not have a negative political ripple effect on the rest of the world. That kind of effect could also affect the international political economy. The Lancaster House Agreement and the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA) [also the Multi-Party Negotiation Forum after CODESA 2 broke down in 1993] functioned as robust negotiation platforms for both ZANU-PF and the ANC because, during the negotiations, new constitutional dispensations were discussed, which allowed the movements to turn into political parties (Hating & Brink 2000).

The difficult transition raises questions about whether the former liberation

movements were ready to govern and whether governance under their leadership guarantees good governance holistically with their struggle credentials. According to Huntington (1991: 9), democracy involves free and fair elections and refers to the French Revolution's dictum of 'liberty, equality and fraternity' as a benchmark for the ideology. Due to the struggle for freedom these liberation movements had engaged in, they have been granted unlimited freedom of authority by the principles of democracy they have fought for. Secondly, the liberation movements have articulated the ills of the previous government, but it is not clear that their rhetoric will translate into better governance. Lastly, unlike South Africa, Zimbabwe did not have a coordinated rubric for post-conflict governance, especially as most African countries had been caught up in the politics of the Cold War.

Given these insecurities about governance, the study question is, to what extent has the transition of ZANU-PF and the ANC from liberation movements to political parties led to good governance in Zimbabwe and South Africa, respectively? This question uses these two southern African states to overview governance by former liberation movements across Africa. Kraay (2007) worked on the worldwide governance indicators project with the World Bank's financial institution. In his 2007 study, Kraay found six indicators of good governance for various countries, including Zimbabwe and South Africa. Out of the six, the three indicators are accountability, the rule of law, and governance efficiency.

The accountability variable is used because of how those in power (incumbents) are selected and replaced. The Rule of Law variable is used because of citizens' respect and the State's institutions that govern interactions (Kraay 2007). The governance efficiency variable is used because of the government's capacity to formulate and implement policies. This section of the study will investigate the findings of both ZANU-PF and the ANC's ability to achieve good governance by using the indicators of accountability, the rule of law, and government efficiency. This study will examine whether the transition of liberation movements to political parties guarantees good governance in Africa by looking at ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and the ANC in South Africa.

It is important to have an explanation specifying exactly which methods were used and describe the strategy of the entire study. This study uses a mixed-methods design. The reason and purpose of this method is to clarify the qualitative results using quantitative findings. Most of the time, the literature

concerning good governance does not include statistics to correlate the status quo described through qualitative data. The quantitative data is derived from the Mo Ibrahim Foundation's Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2017) which represents the statistics of indicators in both Zimbabwe and South Africa for the years from 2000 to 2016. Mo Ibrahim index is used because it is a relevant scope for this study which bridges the gap in the literature with not personal views or political bias but qualitative data (Ibrahim 2017). The study focused on 2000 to 2016 because the latter of the 1990s were years of settling in as incumbents or negotiating towards that transition for both ZANU-PF and the ANC, respectively. The year 2000 represents the new millennium and a new political era around global politics after the Cold War. A general picture (in this case, the dynamics of good governance in Zimbabwe and South Africa) is depicted by quantitative results, which is further expanded, refined, and, most importantly, explained by the qualitative findings (Creswell 2008).

This research, firstly, explores the theoretical basis for the study and how that influences the dynamics of good governance by the two former liberation movements and explores literature around that. Following that, the study will summarise the indicators used to determine good governance. The study will only then proceed to explain the dynamics of good governance and what makes them so valuable to governance, which will be part of the findings of how ZANU-PF and the ANC govern as former liberation movements turned political parties.

## **2. Neo-patrimonialism theory.**

Much literature speaks to the struggle credentials of ZANU-PF and the ANC. Significantly, the gap thereof comes with the lack of acknowledging the fact that these liberation movements emerged in pursuit of achieving freedom (arguably if this freedom is economic, political or both). However, throughout the years of ZANU-PF and the ANC assuming power since 1980 and 1994, their governance capabilities have been questioned in terms of, among other things, accountability, government efficiency, and respect for the rule of law. The years 2000-2016 highlight patrimonialism has emanated in Zimbabwe and South Africa under ZANU-PF and the ANC.

Weber (1968), as a scholar of patrimonialism, tries to describe the forms of political authority, how legitimate they are and their domination from how they

are carried out traditionally compared to modern ones. Furthermore, Eisenstadt (1973) characterises neopatrimonialism as when states operate in patrimonial ways, in which informal institutions exist alongside formal institutions as per a liberal democracy. Chikwaza (2021) extends this definition in the case of Zimbabwe to state that neopatrimonialism, as the use of state resources for political legitimation, is used to secure voters' loyalty during the general elections. Masenya (2017) postulates that South Africa's neopatrimonialism contributes to inadequate service delivery. The neo-patrimonial theory is used to explore whether these aspects are the reasons why good governance is problematic for the governments of ZANU-PF and the ANC or not. In the case of ZANU-PF and the ANC, this would suggest that the transition into political parties from liberation movements means that good governance is questioned in their neopatrimonial operations. Whereas the former liberation movements subscribed to national liberation struggle theory to advocate for emancipation, as political parties, they try to subscribe to liberal democracy to achieve good governance, which neopatrimonialism compromises.

## **2. Literature Discussions on Good Governance and Liberation Movements**

Joseph (2001) provides an abstract definition of what would be considered good governance in a democratic dispensation. This would espouse freedom of information, a strong legal system and efficient administration, backed by political mobilisation of the disadvantaged through movements or political parties. In the twenty-first century, former liberation movements have proved to undermine their vows of upholding democratic principles as current political parties. In Africa, most former liberation movements have been the longest regimes in office, which compromises good governance. Southall (2013) adds that once former liberation movements assume office, they are characterised by emancipatory and authoritarian paradoxical qualities.

Geddes (1999) argues that there are different types of authoritarian regimes. Furthermore, Geddes (1999) articulates that these regimes are not democratic because members of civil society are prevented from exercising their democratic rights and participating willingly in democratic affairs. This compromises the concept of good governance. For example, the specific elections of Zimbabwe

in 2008 (among others) were filled with so much violence that the international community had to intervene because of the violations of human rights (Ncube 2013). The violence has come from the former liberation movement's grasp on power and seeing itself as the only true ruler of Zimbabwe. Given that ZANU-PF has led Zimbabwe into independence, it would consider its former enormously positive legacy reason enough to continue gaining authority to rule the State and be the incumbent (Clapham 2012).

With the ANC, the one-party dominance system favouring the former liberation movement compromises the concept of good governance in a democratic dispensation if state policies that are to be legislated would mostly be directed to the ruling party's interests and constituency. With the ANC arguably still considering itself a liberation movement, the political organisation benefits only those involved. Bateman (2015) substantiates this by referring to Alex Boraine as saying that the ANC is more concerned about the party and not good governance, and it conflates itself with the State. Good governance is characterised by indicators derived from the concept of democracy. The dynamics of good governance are the very things that could determine whether the former liberation movements' transition into political parties and as incumbents has guaranteed good governance.

Sharma (2010) perceives good governance as a prerequisite proponent for democracy. Indicators used by this study are the basic conceptions of a standardised democracy, which both ZANU-PF and the ANC incorporated during their transition into political parties, amongst other indicators (Hating & Brink 2000). For many African countries, colonialism has affected living standards across the whole continent. Particularly for Zimbabwe and South Africa, good governance was regarded as a process, with essential factors and variables that would primarily be a mechanism to tackle development issues, especially in the new emerging independent and poor states (Sharma 2008). For ZANU-PF and the ANC, their political participation in government is never questioned if their liberation credentials and attachment to the former struggle grant Zimbabwe and South Africa the fruits of good governance or not.

The scholarly studies and literature above deliberate more about the third wave of democratisation which former President of the United States of America, Ronald Reagan, spoke about at the latter part of the Cold War, and what Huntington wrote about in the 1990s, and how the ideology is the most

relevant in the international community in the twenty-first century.

### **3. Findings on the Dynamics of Governance.**

This section of the study will investigate the findings of both ZANU-PF and the ANC's ability to achieve good governance by using the indicators of accountability, the rule of law, and government efficiency. Of the three lines represented on the graphs, two lines represent Zimbabwe and South Africa, and the other represents the average of the African states regarding Accountability, Rule of Law, and Government Efficiency in the continent. The average line for African states' indicators is one key aspect because it proves, according to the Mo Ibrahim Index (2017), where Zimbabwe and South Africa lie on the graphs. This represents whether the states are doing well (above the average line) or badly (below the average line) in terms of Accountability, Rule of Law and Government Efficiency.

#### **3.1. Accountability**

Accountability is a factor that is deemed important for democracy and governance. Accountability as a variable determines that citizens and the State both have a role in ensuring that governance is effective and promotes democracy (Sharma 2008). Accountability would mean that members of the civil society of a state express their voice most commonly through elections, and the State's government would reciprocate that voice by making sure that the needs of the citizens and the interests of the State are met accordingly. The State has the responsibility to communicate with its constituents on the operations of the state affairs and account for the status quo.

However, both ZANU-PF and the ANC have been heavily riddled with the backlash on failing to be accountable to their citizens for many of their misfortunes. Former President of ZANU-PF and Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, has been labelled as an authoritarian who accounted only to himself and has been described as undermining the principles of democracy. Masunungure (2011) has mentioned that the Zimbabwean government under Mugabe was an authoritarian regime that only survived due to the coalition of the government and the military which would be ready to execute the type of politicking



Machiavelli illustrated in *The Prince*; that a leader must be feared (Milner 1996).

Any citizen who would question the governing ways of Mugabe would be at a security risk (Masunungure 2011: 47). The Gukurahundi Massacre of 1983 exemplifies how the government under ZANU-PF suppressed some of the Zimbabwean voices and failed to account for the heinous and brutal crimes against human rights. As juxtaposed to ZANU-PF, the ANC has had more than a few incidents whereby the ruling party in South Africa had failed to account for their inability to provide good governance and perpetuate injustices on its constituencies. The ANC's status of one-party dominance in the South African political landscape has perpetuated unfortunate circumstances, such as factional cadre deployment (Shava & Chamisa 2018: 1-2).

The ANC has been a political party, like ZANU-PF, that has occupied government based on the former liberation struggle. ANC members who have been part of that liberation struggle are known for occupying elite positions in government. Since 1994, the ANC has had victorious legitimate electoral campaigns. However, the party dominance and cadre deployment raise concerns about the decline of the government's response to public opinion and the holistic purpose of a multi-party system in a democratic dispensation (Brooks 2004: 1-4). However, there is nothing wrong with cadre deployment as a concept; problems only arise when the cadres deployed to be bureaucrats do not have the required skills or qualifications to provide good governance. Consequently, this undermines a ruling party's constitutional mandate, which fails to account for incompetency.

This kind of political behaviour compromises those who are qualified to develop South Africa domestically and internationally at the pace it should have. The problem with this cadre deployment is that whenever there is a misfortune due to corruption or an incident that needs to be accounted for by the government, justice never prevails because of the familiarities within the organisational structures. This shows that former liberation movements need to differentiate between governance and reward for activism during the liberation struggle. Whenever a political party rewards personal interests in the name of liberation struggles through the government institutions and resources, it undermines the guarantee of good governance. Under this subsection, accountability is invisible (Brooks 2004: 11). Twala (2014) says, 'The cadre deployment policy has been implemented by the African National Congress (ANC) and its alliance partners

in pursuit of its avowed intention to have loyal party hands on all the levers of power in government.’

Accountability is proportionally inclined in a democracy to have an inclusive aspect of constituents, not only at a state level but also in the international system. The world operates in a globalised system that includes most states in the world. This suggests that the type of governance accepted in the international community would include the variable of accountability.

The analysis of ZANU-PF and the ANC’s transitions suggest that the now-renowned political parties must abide by the international standards of how to account and let the constituents’ voices be heard without any security threats of democratic violation, especially that of operating as a liberation movement with the façade of a political party operating in a democracy in the twenty-first century. In International Relations, a state is recognised by its permanent population, determined territory, government, and the capacity of the State to engage with other states on an international platform. Accountability of political parties in government proves that the government is effective and abides by the rule of law; most likely, the international system would be more open to such a government regarding issues such as for example, trade.

### **Figure 1: African States’ Accountability**

are carried out traditionally compared to modern ones. Furthermore, Eisenstad (1973) characterises neopatrimonialism as when states operate in patrimonial ways, in which informal institutions exist alongside formal institutions as per a liberal democracy. Chikwaza (2021) extends this definition in the case of Zimbabwe to state that neopatrimonialism, as the use of state resources for political legitimisation, is used to secure voters’ loyalty during the general elections. Masenya (2017) postulates that South Africa’s neopatrimonialism contributes to inadequate service delivery. The neo-patrimonial theory is used to explore whether these aspects are the reasons why good governance is problematic for the governments of ZANU-PF and the ANC or not. In the case of ZANU-PF and the ANC, this would suggest that the transition into political parties from liberation movements means that good governance is questioned in their neo

**Source:** Mo Ibrahim Index 2017

The average of the rest of the African States' Accountability statistics was at the 30% to 35% level from 2000 to 2016. Generally, Africa as a continent lacks a sense of accountability, which would mean that African states have weak democracies. Specifically, of the states and governments understudy, Zimbabwe (under the ZANU-PF) is approximately 10% below the average line of the rest of Africa (Mo Ibrahim Index 2017).

Events such as the *Gukurahundi* Massacres in the 2000s are relevant examples of why Zimbabwe was regarded to have performed poorly by the Mo Ibrahim Index (2017) when it comes to accountability. As a perceived authoritarian regime, ZANU-PF has been a political party that does not ensure that good governance is essential. The neo-patrimonial theory would also suggest that selfish interests by the party elites abolish the concept of accountability.

Unlike Zimbabwe, South Africa, under the incumbent government of the ANC, was regarded to be doing better than its Zimbabwean counterpart but could improve. The ANC-led State averaged approximately 70% in terms of accountability, according to the Mo Ibrahim Index (2017). Even though during the first two years since 2000, South Africa had an average of 75% in accountability, the lack of hierarchy in the State's bureaucracy could be the reason why South Africa fell to the 60% level.

### **3.2. The rule of law**

Gumede (2018), 'The rule of law is the cornerstone of any constitutional democracy, ensuring that no-one is above the law and everyone is guaranteed fundamental human rights.' The Rule of Law Programme aims to protect the systems of democracy, challenge structural violence, protect civil and political rights, and challenge discrimination against people living in poverty.

The above quote has been stated to grasp the attention and expand the fundamental nature of this indicator. In the perspective of international law, many states in the global community abide by several laws which are binding through treaties because they are common and basic laws to people of the world, meaning it is in the interests of many states' foreign policy to achieve safety and safeguard their interests ultimately.

Serious efforts to entrench the rule of law in Africa came with the so-called third wave of democratisation in the 1990s. This democratic revival raised hopes of a new era of governance guided by the basic principles of constitutionalism, democracy, good governance, respect for human rights and respect for the rule of law. Promising signs of some progress have been overtaken by a steady decline, particularly in the last two decades (Fombad & Kibet 2018).

In Zimbabwe and South Africa, ZANU-PF and the ANC had to ensure both in their different struggles for freedom and democracy and as government incumbents that the Rule of Law is upheld in their states. The African Governance Report (2018) published by the United Nations (UN) has proven that the continent has progressed and improved on other government variables. However, a drop has been detected in safety, particularly in the rule of law (Fombad & Kibet 2018). ZANU-PF and the ANC's struggle for freedom in their respective states was solely to change the status quo of the legislature and, ultimately, the rule of law. With law comes order, and the standard of living is vitalised through this concept (Locke 1632).

The former liberation movements have come to obfuscate the limits of the law. ZANU-PF has been characterised mostly by violations of human rights and security threats to the people of Zimbabwe, whereas the ANC has been a conspirer to what is known as State Capture (Mbaku 2007). After the recent elections in Zimbabwe in 2018, the period of violence, which resulted in many people being hurt by the State's army and police, broke the virtue of the rule of law and undermined it. In South Africa, the issue of State Capture, as a severe form of corruption, has been the ongoing issue that delegitimised the stance of the ANC as a worthy organisation to head governance and subscribe to good governance (Mbaku 2007).

For the most part, after independence in 1980, Zimbabwe under the ZANU-PF was heavily militarised, and former President Robert Mugabe violated the rule of law on numerous occasions. Therefore, scholars such as Masunungure (2011), as previously stated, regard Zimbabwe as an authoritarian regime from the year 2000 onwards. For good governance to prevail, the State and the civil society must work together and ensure that the government's operational systems are effective and ultimately promote democratic values. Zimbabwe under President

Mugabe arguably did not experience this kind of interaction between the State and the civil society.

### Figure 2: Rule of Law

in the international community in the twenty-first century.

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**Source:** Mo Ibrahim Index 2017

An essential feature of the emergence of these former liberation movements was to make sure that the government rules and laws were inclusive of everyone. The rule of law essentially posits that no person is above the law. There is also a fine line and distinctive difference between 'laws' and the 'rule of law'. Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF finds itself below the average line for the rest of Africa line, whereas South Africa under the ANC finds itself well above the average line for the rest of Africa and Zimbabwe.

According to the Mo Ibrahim Index (2017), Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF was averaging at the 20% level from 2000 to 2010. It was only from 2011 that Zimbabwe averaged at 30% and above. Furthermore, during 2015 and 2016, Zimbabwe had moved into the 40% average regarding the rule of law in the State. With concepts such as clientelism, nepotism and patrimonialism being prominent in the country, ZANU-PF has failed, to a large extent, to protect human rights be accessible and transparent. These positive concepts (and others) gather to form the rule of law factors. Failure to respond to these reflects negatively on the rule of law in a state and undermines the process of good

governance to take its course.

On the other hand, under the ANC, South Africa has been averaging 90% in terms of the rule of law. This is an acceptable score for South Africa and reflected well on the image of the ANC as the incumbent until corruption escalated to severe forms. The graph above suggests that South Africa has better political structures than most African states, including Zimbabwe. Therefore, the graph analyses that South Africa holds much nexus on average.

The South African Constitution clearly defines the powers of all three arms of government. This ensures that there is no overlapping of duties and responsibilities by the Legislative, Executive and Judicial arms of government. The Judicial system of South Africa is independent enough to ensure that good governance in terms of the rule of law is not undermined. The qualitative data now substantiates the quantitative data has proven through the Mo Ibrahim Index of 2017.

Mutua (2016) postulates that the rule of law is regarded as a solution that will ensure a successful, fair, and modern democracy that will lead to sustainable development and reflect good governance. The rule of law is a part of good governance that makes sure that it comes to pass. The rule of law is an important feature of good governance because it ensures that there is the promotion of human rights, equality, and no discrimination in the process of seeking good governance. Mukua (2016: 2) says, 'Liberalism predates and gives birth to political democracy which in turn is universalised in human rights'. The common thread that runs through them is the rule of law.

The former liberation movements had to restructure themselves a good deal before achieving good governance. Both ZANU-PF and the ANC must practise the dynamics of good governance. The former liberation movements understood this before being the incumbents, and they fought the struggle to achieve this.

There has been a lack of political change in Zimbabwe because there has been only one kind of governance under one kind of leader over time. Therefore, to maintain that one kind of governance in power, Zimbabwe has a record of violence, especially during the electoral years because ZANU-PF was militant in reprimanding civil society. This always led to the international system snubbing Zimbabwe in international affairs through economic sanctions. The leadership changes in the ANC have been vital, not only for the organisation but for the State too. Even in a one-party dominated system, there is a change of democratic

leadership when the civil society constantly chooses who should represent them.

The change of leadership in the ANC shows the face of liberalism to an extent. With the constant change in the organisation comes the eventual change in the administration of the State's government. The transition into the democratic dispensation is not entirely a wrong turn, but the leadership crisis makes it seem like the system is not a guarantee for good governance. Good governance is a concept that is spearheaded by leaders of the State. Regardless of how liberal the system is, if the leaders are patrimonial in execution, the domino effect threatens the dynamics of good governance. This leads to the decay in development through many channels, such as corruption.

### **3.3. Government efficiency**

Government efficiency is crucial to this study because from the onset, the study enquires about the former liberation movements' ability to provide good governance, as political parties, in the democratic dispensation. Good governance would not be a good government without it being efficient. The efficiency of a government determines the goodness of its governance. The former liberation movements were self-tasked to emancipate their respective countries and people from colonialism and apartheid. Also, as has been explained, liberation movements have not been given the right platforms to integrate themselves with effective governance prospects. It is further argued that because the liberation movements lack studying governance as political parties, they are liable to have government inefficiency from time to time.

Carrick (1988) argues that a government is not an institution that is generally the producer of efficiency, yet it is an institution that comes about with ways and systems of incentives and controls to provide such efficiency. As political parties, ZANU-PF and the ANC have the authoritative complement to produce such good governance. In the modern global system, Olayele (2004) suggests that almost every democratic State has political parties. ZANU-PF and the ANC are ruling parties that have proven from their first years of democracy to be political parties who are sure to be sufficiently capacitated to occupy government and formulate and implement policies. This, ideally and according to international standards, would guarantee government efficiency and ultimately good governance (Kaufmann, Kraay & Mastruzzi 2008). The problem, however, seems

to be the implementation part of the policies.

However, it has been argued that ZANU-PF and the ANC have a similar problem of a leadership crisis which would lead to the inefficiency of the government. The literature concerning this aspect is so minimal in addressing how the former liberation movements' lack of progressive transition may have led to the poor leadership skills in government. Bad leadership comes bad governance by default, and with good leadership comes efficient and good governance. Olayele (2004) says, 'Any analysis of the Zimbabwe crisis will have to place at its centre, the critical role and extent to which political parties contribute to reversing the gains of democracy as political institutions with the aggregative function of assembling and promoting policy platforms for voters through internal party practices.'

In the year 2000, under former President Mugabe, ZANU-PF passed a referendum on land redistribution to compensate the people of Zimbabwe for the atrocities and injustices of the colonial era. ZANU-PF, in this case, did not see the threshold of causing government inefficiency because, in its authority, the party claimed it was acting rightly within the interests of the people and the State at large (Gumede 2018). At the time, the economy of Zimbabwe was declining. ZANU-PF's actions seemed to be accustomed to how a liberation movement would act on the land issue. The expropriation of white-owned land boosted the ZANU-PF's popularity among black people in Zimbabwe and instilled hatred towards white Zimbabweans. The lines were drawn in the liberation struggle regarding who your enemy and liberator were. ZANU-PF used this political communication method to draw lines between black and white Zimbabweans in the democratic dispensation that espoused inclusivity (Masunungure 2011).

ZANU-PF did not carefully consider the implications of its actions on the economy. Economies around the world are interrelated. Given this pragmatic nature, Zimbabwe was punished by the international community with economic sanctions in 2001 because of the land reform programmes. This positioned the Zimbabwean government in the State of inefficiency (Mararike 2018). As the incumbent political party and former liberation movement, ZANU-PF should have carefully contemplated acting in the interests of the economy then. Economic sanctions are political strategies used by the hegemonic powers of international relations to distribute and exact their power on smaller states like Zimbabwe that would not follow democratic governance channels (Addis 2001).



This is why the neo-colonialist strategy of sanctions was passed on Zimbabwe by the global community as international diplomacy (Masaka 2012: 54-56).

At the dawn of democracy in South Africa, the ANC as the ruling party made sure to amalgamate the State into a unitary Republic. The former liberation movement fought to have a diverse country where all people living in it would have the same opportunities and equal rights, as per the definition of democracy. The ANC played a role in assuring that the government spheres were also structured so that it would allow government efficiency to take place in South Africa.

As the ruling party, the ANC is responsible for ensuring that government operates smoothly and justly. The ruling party must look after the governmental institutions and ensure that inefficiencies of patrimony do not tamper with the efficiency of the government. In this case, consistency in implementing domestic and foreign policies is vital and would guarantee good governance. However, this is likely not the case in South Africa, as it has been challenged to implement policies over the years since the democratic dispensation. This resulted in an economic decline which directly affected the country's development.

The ANC's leadership has proven to act less like a political party serving the interests of all South Africans but rather serving a few individuals who were part of the liberation struggle. Unfortunately, this kind of governance does not mean much for the integrity and efficiency of the government (Zondi 2019). Arguably, corruption in South Africa must be one of the instigators of government inefficiency. Corruptionwatch (2019), 'Corruption and international perceptions of corruption in South Africa has been damaging to the country's reputation and has created obstacles to local and foreign direct investment, flows to the stock market, global competitiveness, economic growth and has ultimately distorted the development and [the] upliftment of our people.'

The statement above shows that the efficiency of the South African government is under threat because of corruption. That kind of leadership shatters South Africa or Zimbabwe and any developing country that seeks to have good governance for development. To fulfil the statements above, in the new political landscape of South Africa, which entered post-1994, some ANC officials have done damage to the government by causing so much inefficiency that their defence comes from hiding behind the former liberation movement. The quote from former President Jacob Zuma that 'the ANC came before South

Africa' further proves that the former liberation movement still operates like that, only with the façade of a political party (Chigumadzi 2016). The statements above come together and conceptualise that those liberation movements turned political parties must respect their oath of office. In this way, they would also be legitimising themselves in international relations as anchors of democratic rule and abiding by constitutionalism; the Rule of Law and accountability indicators combined to deliver overall governance and efficiency.

### Figure 2: Overall governance

called third wave of democratisation in the 1990s. This democratic revival raised hopes of a new era of governance guided by the basic principles of constitutionalism, democracy, good governance, respect for human rights and respect for the rule of law. Promising signs of some progress have been overtaken by a steady decline, particularly in the last two decades (Fombad & Kibet 2018).

In Zimbabwe and South Africa, ZANU-PF and the ANC had to ensure both in their different struggles for freedom and democracy and as government incumbents that the Rule of Law is upheld in their states. The African Governance Report (2018) published by the United Nations (UN) has proven that the continent has

**Source:** Mo Ibrahim Index 2017

The overall governance provided by ZANU-PF and the ANC is measured by the efficiency of other factors like Accountability and the Rule of Law. With these factors, incumbents like ZANU-PF and the ANC are propelled to perform exceptionally as Zimbabwe and South Africa governments, respectively. This leads to the government being efficient because service delivery, socio-political and economic development and other forms of development are sustained.

According to the graph above, from 2000 to 2009, most African states averaged about 40% in terms of overall governance (Ibrahim Index for African Governance 2017). From the year 2010 to 2016, the numbers for overall governance improved to 50% average for the rest of Africa. Considered a third-world continent, Africa

suffers from downgrading situations such as conflict, lack of development, weak economies, and political instabilities. These factors affect governance in a bad way, meaning that good governance is very low at percentages of 40% to 50%.

Zimbabwe under ZANU-PF averaged approximately 30% in overall governance performance from 2000 to 2012. During these times, Zimbabwe was on the path of expropriating land without compensation, which led to the political and economic instabilities that led the global community to put sanctions on the ZANU-PF-led government. These sanctions threatened the efficiency of the Zimbabwean political landscape and economic prosperity, which eventually provided for good governance via government efficiency (Mararike 2018). From 2013 to 2016, Zimbabwe averaged about 40% in overall governance because of the interventions that came from the global community because of violations that occurred due to the restructuring of the State.

The inefficiency of government in Zimbabwe was due to a series of incidents of electoral violence in the State. The electoral violence demines the factors of good governance such as Accountability and the Rule of Law. With these dynamics and factors not being upheld, governance is compromised to be as respectable and effective as it should be. During the struggle years, ZANU-PF fought for freedom so that these concepts were integrated into government; however, as a political party, ZANU-PF has mostly violated these factors, leading to inefficiency of governance.

Looking at South Africa under the ANC, the State's overall governance peaks higher than the rest of Africa and the Zimbabwean average. From 2000 to 2004, South Africa averaged about 60% in overall governance. Perhaps this could be because the State was still fresh in democracy and still finding its feet in governance. With issues of the past, South Africa needed to provide governance that would be versatile and diverse and includes all South Africans.

That is why from 2005 to 2010, South Africa improved on its average, being at the 70% level. Issues such as lack of service delivery, inequality, poverty, and other socioeconomic challenges deemed South Africa to fall back to the 60% average level from 2011 to 2016 because of the inefficiency of governance in the State. This leads to examining the failures and achievements of the ANC as the ruling party.

#### 4. Putting the findings into further context

The neo-patrimonial approach explains the plausible leadership crises under ZANU-PF and the ANC that unfold due to a lack of good governance. October (2015) postulates that the ANC has never considered itself a political party but is rather still challenged being a liberation movement. ZANU-PF's grip on power has the same relic of consequence in Zimbabwe. Consequently, this study postulates that the political parties still operate as liberation movements, which causes a deficit in the democratic processes and undermines the whole liberation struggle (October 2015). Liberation movements sought to enter a struggle fighting for democracy as a concept to a state's ideology.

In as much as the political landscape of both Zimbabwe and South Africa changed into a 'democratic' dispensation, ZANU-PF and the ANC did not follow the same relic of consequence. During colonial and apartheid rule in Zimbabwe and South Africa, black people's socioeconomic conditions were mainly in a dire situation that needed rapid intervention, which the former liberations movements provided. However, in their new political dispensation, socioeconomic conditions in both Zimbabwe and South Africa have not changed as the transition from oppression intended. Masenya (2017: 150-159) says, 'Historically, neopatrimonialism derives from the socioeconomic and political system established by colonialism and white minority rule, but it has also been a characteristic of African politics since independence.'

The quote above substantiates the reality in both Zimbabwe and South Africa. Chikwaza and Chikumbu (2021) further argue that neopatrimonialism in Zimbabwe has been institutionalised. This makes it impossible for good governance and democratic values of making a free choice during elections to prevail. In South Africa, voter turnout has been influenced by the population's socioeconomic status. The ANC often uses state resources to lure voters during elections to legitimise their reign. This is stated because most people living in South Africa are poverty-stricken, the economy keeps on declining with high unemployment rates, and there is a huge lack of accountability to those undermining good governance. Ultimately, this study finds that both ZANU-PF and the ANC, as political parties, hold the same relic of consequences of the oppressors they fought as liberation movements.

The transition from liberation movements into political parties was meant to

see democracy prevail. However, patrimonial governance prevails in both states causing informal institutions to run parallel to formal ones. From 2000 to 2016, the authoritarian rule and corruption in Zimbabwe and South Africa are the clandestine patron-client networks that undermine good governance to prevail (Francisco 2010). The neopatrimonialism theory thus sustains that Zimbabwe and South Africa under ZANU-PF and the ANC initiate informal institutions such as authoritarianism and corruption to exist alongside formal institutions legally recognised by the constitutions of both states.

There has been a lack of political change in Zimbabwe because there has been only one kind of governance under one kind of leader over time. Therefore, Zimbabwe has a record of violence, especially during the election years, because ZANU-PF was militant in reprimanding civil society. This has always led to the international community snubbing Zimbabwe in international affairs. The leadership changes in the ANC have been vital, not only for the organisation but for the State too. However, it has perpetuated a dominant one-party system in the South African political landscape. The study uses the evidence above to State that the transition these former liberation movements underwent leading to political parties did not guarantee good governance because of inconsistencies and contradictions in what was agreed upon during the transition and what is happening in governance after the transition. This further proves the notion that the distribution of resources that gives rise to clandestine patron-client networks is based on the interests of a political party in a state. Therefore, the authoritative regime and one-party dominance in Zimbabwe and South Africa have subjected this study to analysis based on what the paper stated above, specifically with the indicators of good governance.

## 5. Conclusion

ZANU-PF and the ANC are both solid representations in history and the present day of what their respective states, Zimbabwe, and South Africa, went through during the colonial era. Both Zimbabwe and South Africa have a common past of being colonies of the British empire. Because of this, ZANU-PF and the ANC emerged as liberation movements to abolish the injustices that colonialism, imperialism, and apartheid inflicted on the people of both countries based on political, economic, and social authority.

Liberation movements like ZANU-PF and the ANC have inherited the chosen governments' responsibilities in their respective states (Clapham 2012: 11). ZANU-PF and the ANC have undergone rigorous and thorough negotiations to become political powers and assume government authority. The Lancaster House Agreement for ZANU-PF and the CODESA talks for the ANC were platforms for both organisations to transform and ultimately transition from liberation movements to political parties. The emerging political parties vowed to uphold the concept of democracy and its principles at the negotiations for the transition.

The new dawn of democratisation raised the responsibilities of these political parties to conform to governing, not just governing but to provide good governance. Based on the dynamics of good governance, one could measure whether a political party subscribed to good governance. The essence of using these dynamics of good governance was to examine and explore whether the transition of former liberation movements into political parties has led to good governance and the implications thereof.

This study concludes that the transition of former liberation movements into political parties has not led to good governance. This is based on the difference between the operations of a liberation movement and a political party. However, the study acknowledges that there have been aspects of good governance by both ZANU-PF and the ANC. This is based on the concept and the international standard of what democracy is and what it should be by the dynamics of good governance. Both ZANU-PF and the ANC have demonstrated good governance capabilities and execution to a certain extent. The study stands on its position that the transition did not lead to good governance due to the inconsistencies both ZANU-PF and the ANC have shown in governance.

Throughout the study pointed out the lack of containing the dynamics that are considered to provide good governance. The study research also found that this lack of containment is due to the leadership crises ZANU-PF and the ANC have had in their organisational structures. As incumbents, both ZANU-PF and the ANC have acted as liberation movements. It is still embedded in them that they are the rightful heirs to the government throne in their respective states. This organisational mentality causes some leadership crises because that shifts priorities from using the national resources for the organisation and not for the benefit of the State and its citizens. Therefore, the Neo-patrimonial theory was

used to define the study's theoretical framework.

Liberation movements did not emerge based on what government should be like but rather on what it should not be. At the formation of ZANU-PF and the ANC, the organisations emerged because the entity that governed the country before had oppressed, marginalised, discriminated against and isolated most of the society in the politics of the State. Therefore, the liberation movements sought to liberate and change the status quo, ultimately causing a revolution of ideas, bringing about the dawn of democracies in both states. Based on the arguments of this study, the study research also concludes that the transition of ZANU-PF and the ANC reflects inconsistencies in governance because the turning of these liberation movements into political parties did not focus on the fact that they intended to govern, but rather on liberating a society.

ZANU-PF and the ANC should act in the interests of their citizens in their respective states. As political parties who have pledged to ride on the democratisation wave, these two political parties should determine a strong leadership in their organisations so that there is no lack of capacity to provide good governance. This research recommends that ZANU-PF and the ANC start acting as political parties and not always consider themselves liberation movements. Both these organisations have indeed liberated their respective states; however, that struggle ended, and a new fight had begun against social, political, and economic development issues that most, if not all, African states face. Acting as political parties would suggest that the interests of the citizens are met by advancing these developmental issues, and the principles of democracy are intact. This would mean that the dynamics of good governance would improve in terms of accountability because there would be efficiency in government and respect for the rule of law.

Ultimately, respecting and executing the dynamics of good governance to the core as political parties, ZANU-PF, and the ANC can potentially escalate their respective states to the status of developed states. With this being the case, the sovereignty of both states would strengthen in the international system, and the voice of Africa as a continent would be respected and recognised because of the efficiency in government and respect for democratic principles. This would lead to self-reliance for both states. Lastly, as political parties, the former liberation movements should prioritise formulating and implementing progressive policies for their respective countries because that results in direct

and foreign investments. Investments are crucial for any country's development and economic growth, which helps curb unemployment, poverty, and crime, which are huge concerns for both states. All these need a rigorous and thorough strict persistence on the dynamics of good governance mentioned above in the study.



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