Political Security in Southern Africa: Historical, Contemporary and Futuristic Perspectives

Clayton Hazvinei Vhumbunu

School of Social Sciences

University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa

Abstract

Political security has been widely argued to be one of the fundamental pillars of development, stability and prosperity, as it in turn lays the ground and conducive environment for the attainment of other forms of human security, namely economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security and community security. Political security, as stated by the United Nations Human Development Report (994), entails defense against the different forms of political oppression, respect to human rights, and protection from threats of militarization. Therefore, the purpose of this paper was to establish the extent to which the concept of Political Security is applicable in Southern Africa within the context of a fast-globalizing landscape through analyzing historical and contemporary trends as well as forecasting future trends and patterns of political security in Southern Africa. Methodologically, the paper used secondary data sources to examine historical and contemporary trends in political security within Southern African countries whilst the International Futures (IFs) model, a comprehensive integrated modeling system, was used as a forecasting tool to establish the likelihood of political security within the different Southern African countries and future political security dynamics and complexities within Southern African countries whilst at the same time providing an outlook of the situation within the next 12 years. The study results show varying levels of political security in the region, with the majority of the Southern African states showing worsening political security situation by 2030, except Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles, and South Africa. Recommendations are suggested in the form of national and regional policy and strategic interventions that are key in strengthening political security within Southern Africa.

Keywords: *political security, human security, Southern Africa, globalization, human rights*

1. Introduction

Political security remains one of the crucial components of human security. Whilst other human security components, namely, economic security, food security, environmental security, health security, personal security and community security, have an equally tremendous bearing on peoples' lives and livelihoods. Political security remains unique and distinctive in the sense that it lays the foundation for the creation of a conducive environment for the attainment of other forms of human security. With the increasingly dynamic

global security environment, considering the complexity and unpredictability of the global political, economic and military trends and patterns, political security has turned to be a critical source of potential conflict and instability at national, regional and continental level. Of late, the upsurge of popular uprisings, the Arab Spring, popular uprisings against fundamental human rights infringements as well as the fight for the different forms of justice in Africa and beyond has been given rise to by the incessant and flagrant threats to political security. In Africa, various mechanisms have been adopted at national, regional and continental level especially at the turn of the millennium to address, protect and promote political security although challenges still persist in terms of democratization, state repression, curtailment of freedoms and civil liberties, human rights abuse, militarization of civilian governance, and democratic expectations. This paper therefore seeks to evaluate Political Security in Southern African countries from a historical contemporaneous and futuristic perspective within the context of a fast-globalizing landscape.

2. Methodology and Scope of the Study

Methodologically, this paper utilizes secondary data sources to examine historical and contemporary trends in political security within Southern African countries. The International Futures (IFs) model was used as a forecasting tool to establish the likelihood of political security within the different Southern African countries and future political security dynamics and complexities within the countries of focus whilst at the same time providing an outlook of the situation within the next seven years. IFs is a comprehensive global integrated assessment modeling system created by a Professor of the University of Denver (USA)'s Joseph Korbel School of International Relations (*see* International Futures, 2018). It is useful in forecasting, scenario-testing, strategic thinking, global trend and pattern analysis, policy analysis and development planning as it incorporates sub-model data on economic, socio-political, agriculture, population, education, health, international relations, infrastructure, energy and technology. The data is gathered from a wide range of international sources for over 180 countries from the year 1960 up to time horizons into the future as far as 2100 (*see* International Futures, 2018). In this paper, IFs was used as a forecasting tool to establish the likelihood of political security within the different Southern African countries and future political security dynamics and complexities within the countries of focus whilst at the same time providing an outlook of the situation within the next seven years. Thus, the period under review is from 1990 to 2025.

    The start period of 1990 was chosen since that is the year when most of the Southern African countries had attained independence, except of course South Africa which attained multiparty democracy in 1994. The analysis will thus focus on the following two indices from the International Futures related and relevant to political security of measurement; that is, the *Civil and Political Freedom (CPF) Index,* and the *Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG).* The CPF Index analyses indicators related to sub-categories of civil liberties and political rights through the sub-categories of conducting elections, political pluralism and participation, functioning of government (democratic expectations), freedom of expression and belief, freedom of association and organization, rule of law, and individual human rights and personal autonomy. These are keys in measuring political security in any society. On the other hand, the *Ibrahim Index of African Governance* scores

of *Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and Human Rights, Rule of Law, Participation,* and *Rights* which are also critical measures of political security as guided by the United Nations Human Development Report (994) definition which consider political security as defense against the different forms of political oppression, respect to human rights, and protection from threats of militarization. Both the CPF Index and IIAG were used in a complementary fashion to provide a more comprehensive measurement of political security in Southern Africa within the stipulated timeframe.

In terms of scope and delimitation, the paper focused on Southern Africa as defined by membership to the Southern African Development Community (SADC) sub-regional organization. Thus, analysis was confined to the 15 SADC member states, namely Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

3. Background and Context to Political Security in Southern Africa

Political security has for long been identified as an essential component of the developmental agenda across the globe. In Africa, political security was long recognized and acknowledged as one of the salient pillars of continental unity, integration and human development as the founding fathers of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) were very "conscious of the fact that freedom, equality, justice and dignity [were] essential objectives for the achievement of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples" and that it was an "inalienable right of all people to control their own destiny" (OAU Charter 1963: 1). Even the Constitutive Act of the African Union of July 2000 which gave way to the transformation of the OAU into the African Union was explicit that African leaders were determined to "promote and protect human and peoples' rights, consolidate democratic institutions and culture, and to ensure good governance and the rule of law" (AU 2000). Over and above, the continental body has in place complementing legislative and policy frameworks such as the African Charter on Human and People's Rights of 1981, the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance of 2007, the African Peer Review Mechanism, among others.

At regional level, several sub-regional organizations have also developed and adopted several legal and policy frameworks that engender political security for the ultimate attainment of sustainable human development, peace, and prosperity. In Southern Africa, SADC has included among its five core principles the principle of human rights, democracy and rule of law as fundamental for all its Member States whilst making one of its objectives to "consolidate, defend, and maintain democracy, peace, security and stability" (*see* Article 4 of the SADC Treaty 2014:5-6). In addition, frameworks such as the Protocol on Politics, Defence and Security of 2001 were instituted for political security and related objectives. All these global, continental, and regional legislative, institutional and policy frameworks for promoting political security are complemented by a plethora of more or less structures and systems at national level in Southern African countries.

However, despite the existence of such systems and structures, political security, as manifested and measured through the level of democratization, the level of state repression, the level of tolerance towards civil liberties and freedoms (such as freedom of speech, press freedom, electoral democracy, *et cetera*), level of democratic expectation and level of justice; has had different experiences in terms of implementation within the Southern African region since the decolonization phase in the 1960s and 1970s, up to the present day. The dynamics have been varied, as political security as been influenced and affected a vast of factors at play, be they economic, political, social and cultural at all spheres, that is, national, regional and international.

Since the decolonization, Southern African countries have largely struggled to create a political environment that does not threaten people's basic human rights, freedoms and liberties. Most of the countries have embraced multi-party democracy, as manifested in multipartism, but in essence national politics has been dominated by liberation parties that are typically exhibited authoritarian in outlook (*see* Makinda 1996; Du Toit 1995; Southall 2003). Thus, the embrace of democracy has been piecemeal, hence the intense struggles for democratic reform since the 1960s and 1970s against the dominant authoritarian democracies across the region as citisens clamour for more genuine democracy that promotes and protects their rights and freedoms.

Since the decolonization phase up to now, the majority of Southern African countries are still ruled by dominant liberation parties, such as the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa; Zimbabwe National African Union (Patriotic Front) in Zimbabwe; South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) in Namibia; *Frente de Libertação de Moçambique* (Frelimo) in Mozambique; Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) in Tanzania, Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) in Botswana; and Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) in Angola, among others. Admittedly, such dominance has been explained by different factors ranging from lack of viable alternatives, weak opposition parties, public perceptions and trust dynamics, abuse of state power and resources by the ruling liberation parties (*see for instance* Lekalake, 2017; Dorman, 2006; Melber, 2002; Bauer and Taylor, 2005). However, it is not necessarily about political parties typologies, rather the crux of the matter is how the political parties and governments in the sub-region have espoused the progressive and cardinal tenets, canons and principles of basic human rights, fundamental freedoms and justice whose sum total makes up political security. Such is manifested in the adoption and strengthening of relevant laws, policies, programmes, institutions and structures that prevent the root cause of political insecurity, namely poor governance.

Whilst a number of scholars have analyzed democracy, human rights and democratization in the various Southern African countries (*see for instance* Berger, 1998; Comaroff and Comaroff 1997; Du Toit 1995; Southall 2003; Kanyenze and Jauch 2016; Good 2004; Mulinge and Milazi 2002; Saul 1997), there has not been a comprehensive study that has analyzed the historical, contemporary and futuristic trends and patterns of political security in Southern Africa. The conceptual scope and purview of most of these studies has been narrowed on few selected indicators of political security, *viz,* level of democratization, media freedom, human rights, *et cetera.* Accordingly, this paper has assisted to fill that apparent gap with the use of empirical data.

4. Conceptual Analysis

A discussion on political security deserves to be preceded by a thorough conceptual analysis just to clarify the meaning of the concept, define its conceptual scope, and explain not only its evolution within the context of a rapidly globalizing landscape and mass struggles over democracy but also its relevance to the discussion on change and continuity in Africa.

The United Nations Development Programmes (UNDP)'s Human Development Report of 1994 is often cited as having heralded the broadened conceptualization of human security, in its sub-report on the 'new dimensions of human security'. This signaled a monumental transposition from the traditional narrow conceptions of security which viewed security in military and state border/boundary-centric terms as "protection of national interests in foreign policy" or as "security of territory from external aggression" (UNDP 1994:22) to a more extensive and wider perspective. The report notes;

> *Human security can be said to have two main aspects. It means, first, safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and depression. And second, it means protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life – whether in homes, in jobs or in communities. Such threats can exist at all levels of national income and development [...] Human security means people can exercise [their choices] safely and freely* (UNDP, 1994:23).

With specific reference to political security, which is one of the seven dimensions or categories of human security as highlighted earlier on, is considered key on the basis that it entails that people should live in a society that honours their fundamental human rights without threats of political repression, torture, ill-treatment, unjust imprisonment and other related human rights violations. As such, political security has been considered by the UNDP (1994:32) as "one of the most important aspects of human security" whilst authors such as Singh (2015:81) have concurred, arguing that its political insecurity is "a source of social and economic securities for human beings and an existential threat to the state at large".

In this conceptual clarification, a distinction has to be made between political security and political stability. Political instability is a manifestation of absence or deficiency of the political security although political stability is not guaranteed by political security.

All in all, one can note that political security remains a contested and complex concept in theory and practice. Perhaps, that is why Baldwin (1997: 13-17), asks an avalanche of questions in his attempt to critically dissect and anatomize the concept: *"security for who?", "security for which values?", "how much security?", "from what threats?", "by what means", "at what cost?",* and *"in what time period?"* Scholars such as Møller (2000: 7) have averred that political security embodies various aspects that are distinct but interrelated, concerning the relationship between the state and its citizens as well as "political aspects of international relations". Indeed, given the fact that the dimensions of political security encompass the level of democratization, protection against state repression, freedom of the press and speech, respect for human rights and civil liberties, and democratic expectations; the role of the state would be critical and indispensable.

However, whilst states are created to protect citizens through rendering political security, the same states, as Møller (2000: 7) argues, can also "constitutes a threat to their security" through giving rise to "too strong and oppressive Leviathans". To Hassan (2015), on the other hand, the source of threats to political security are primarily the absence of a responsible, people-centered, effective and democratic governance, stressing that external threats to political security also exist as evidenced by cases of foreign intervention, international migration, cross-border crimes, international disputes, among others which have complicated the application of the concept of political security as a result of rapid globalization. Such requirements and necessities constitute the factors behind the persistence of the political security *problematique* in Southern Africa since the 1960s.

Therefore in order to advance the political security of citizens, Møller (2000) suggest the vital need to balance between authority, legitimacy and power of the state, and ensure that the state apparatus are used and controlled with utmost responsibility. Singh (2015) concurs, submitting that organizational stability and vibrancy of state structures are paramount in ensuring political security, adding that inclusive, democratic and legitimate governance often presents greater chances for political security of their citizens. Such would require adept political innovation and prudent statecraft in light of the ever-intensifying globalization forces whilst also being complemented by craft literacy and craft competence in public governance.

A conceptual analysis of political security may not be sufficient without defining its conceptual scope. Admittedly, the UNDP's Human Development Index of 1994, which is hereby used as one of the major sources for this analysis, reflects a rather narrowed definition of the concept given the emerging global security complexities. The exclusion of democracy and other governance dimensions as components of political security may be argued to be a limitation of the concept. It has to be conceded and appreciated that broadening the concept of political security by integrating the above and other related dimensions and components will assist to clear conceptual ambiguity and constructively make the concept of political security more comprehensive. However, such an undertaking may make evaluation very difficult and less precise which would consequently distort the assessment intension of the paper given the fact that democracy is too broad a concept on its own.

Therefore, for the purposes of analysis, this paper has employed and applied the concept of political security as defined above in order to fit into the *Civil and Political Freedom Index* and the *Ibrahim Index of African Governance* that have been used as part of the evaluation tool.

## 5. Analyzing Political Security in Southern Africa: Past, Present and Future

As indicated above, the analysis focused on two indices related and relevant to political security of measurement; namely, the *Civil and Political Freedom Index* and the *Ibrahim Index of African Governance.*

5.1 Political Security in Southern Africa Measured against the Civil and Political   Freedom (CPF) Index

The Civil and Political Freedom (CPF) Index analyses indicators related to sub-categories of civil liberties and political rights. The political rights related to the conduct of elections, political pluralism and participation,

and functioning of government (democratic expectations). On the other hand, civil liberties are measured by four sub-categories relating to freedom of expression and belief, freedom of association and organization, rule of law, and individual human rights and personal autonomy. The sum total of all these sub-categories makes up the CPF Index which in turn is a fundamental measure of political security in a society.

Graph 1: Civil and Political Freedom Index (History and Forecast) for SADC Countries

Source: Graph constructed by author using data from International Futures (IFs), Version – V7.31 (2018)

The above graph shows the levels of civil liberties and political freedoms in Southern Africa configuration between 1990 and 2018, whilst also projecting on how the future will hold between now and 2025. The source of the data is the Freedom House Index, whose ranking is between a scale of 2 (least free) to 14 (most free). On the general picture, it can be noted from the Graph 1 above that the period preceding 1990 was characterized by an environment of limited civil and political freedoms in Southern African countries. From 1991 up to 1993, there was a sharp decline in the CPF Index from 6, 27 to 5, 57. This was followed by a sharp increase to a peak of 7, 79 in 1995 before the CPF Index plummeted to 7, 68 by the year 1997.

The sharp increase in the period leading to 1993 may be explained by the fact that most of the Southern African countries were beginning to embrace and inculcate the values and virtues of democracy as most of them were in their third decade after declaring independence from colonial rule. Effectively, all of the countries had attained their independence by 1968 except Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The governments were stabilizing, with minimum threats to political security. What has to be noted, though, is that between 1990 and 1995, only two out of the 15 Southern African countries recorded a dwindling CPF Index, that is, Botswana and DRC, which both experienced a negative point decrease (*see* Annex 1, Table 1).

In DRC (then Zaire), this is understood in the context that the period under review was presided over by Joseph Desire Mobutu (Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga), a military dictator who had

forcefully seized power from President Joseph Kasa-Vubu through a coup in 1965. It is during his reign, that his Popular Movement of the Revolution/*Mouvement Populaire de la Revolution* (MPR) government oversaw the intensification of widespread human rights abuses, erosion of rule of law and democracy, and curtailment of civil liberties and political rights of citizens. The Human Rights Watch World Report for 1993 (np) noted;

> Human rights in Zaire deteriorated substantially during 1993, with pervasive lawlessness and government manipulation of ethnic conflicts leading to widespread abuses against civilians. […] In April, authorities launched a crackdown on members of the opposition, including politicians, unionists, independent newspapers, and human rights activists – the first wave of political detentions by security forces since 1990.

Similarly, the Human Rights Watch World Report of 1994 (np) reported;

> The human rights situation in Zaire continued to deteriorate during 1994, with widespread abuses against a population with no recourse to the rule of law. Extrajudicial execution, arbitrary arrest, illegal detention, torture, rape, looting by government troops, and rampant corruption were the hallmarks of government in President Mobutu Seses Seko's twenty-ninth year in power.

Just as in any dictatorship, the motivation was to thwart any opposition voices that may be considered disloyal to the establishment and also constituting a serious threat to the MPR's hold to power. All this contributed to political insecurity in Zaire, and consequently reflected a negative bearing on the CPF Index of the whole Southern African sub-region (*see* Annex 1, Table 1). This negative point decrease in Botswana maybe explained by the tightening grip to power by the BDP governing party against of a strengthening tide of opposition parties especially in the run up to the 1994 elections where the position party Botswana National Front (BNF) ended up securing a record 13 parliamentary seats out of 40 seats (*see* Maundeni 2005).

For the decade between 1997 and 2007 as shown on Graph 1, Southern African countries experience an increase, and therefore improvement, in political security indicators of civil liberties and political freedom (from 7, 68 to 8, 14). However, the three countries of Malawi, Swaziland and Zimbabwe experience a drop in CPF index by a single point each. As for Zimbabwe, there has been alleged human rights abuse and restrictions on civil and political freedoms especially from a CPF index score of 7 in 1992 to a record low CPF Index score of 3 in 2008 (*see* Annex 1, Table 1). This serious political insecurity has been caused by the Robert Mugabe regime's use of repression, intimidation, arbitrary arrests and unlawful detentions of opposition party leaders and their supporters as well as activists, human rights abuses, and suppression of dissenting voices as well as freedom of the press and journalists through the use of repressive legislations such as Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act (AIPPA) and the Public Order and Security Act (POSA), both enacted in 2002. However, the CPF Index for Zimbabwe immensely improved from 2009 up to 2013 during the Government of National Unity (GNU) which facilitated the working together of various

political parties and ultimately improved political tolerance, respect of human rights and protection of civil liberties and political freedoms.

Similar to Zimbabwe, Swaziland has also had a poor record of human rights and democracy since the turn of the millennium which has also impacted on the regional CPF index. From 1990 up to 2002, the country's CPF Index has been 5, only punctuated by an increase to 6 between 1997 and 1998 (*see* Annex 1, Table 1). The CPF Index for Swaziland declined to a very low score of 4 in 2004 and remained constant up to the year 2016. The explanation maybe that the country, which is an absolute monarchy rule by King Mswati since 1986, has the tradition and political culture of silencing dissenting voices, banning political parties and civic movements as well as abusing human right (Motsamai 2011; US Department of State 2011). For instance, in 2008 the government promulgated the Suppression of Terrorism Act which is used to ban any political parties that threaten the authority and power of the incumbency whilst also committing acts of arbitrary arrests, torture, illegal detentions, and denial of fair trial whilst also limiting press freedom (*see for instance* Amnesty International 2011; Motsamai 2011; African Commission on Human and People's Rights Report 2006; US Department of State 2011).

The Amnesty International Report (2011:6-7) noted;

> Political activists continue to be subjected to arrests and trials under security legislation, as well as common law charges such as treason, with some of these matters never brought to conclusion. [...] The most persistent forms of ill-treatment of people taken into police custody are severe beatings and suffocation torture, occurring in both informal settings and at police stations.

A recent past analysis of how the Southern African countries are performing in terms of the CPF Index depicts a positive picture although the disturbing fact is that the improvement is very minor. Between 2010 and 2017, the region's CPF Index increased from 7,81 to 8,01 as shown on Table 1 above. This shows an overall political security improvement in the region in the period under review. At individual country level, all the SADC countries registered an improvement in CPF Index except Angola and Botswana which had the same CPF Index scores of 5 and 11 respectively.

However, an analysis of the quality and magnitude of CPF Index improvements between 2010 and 2017 would reveal that these are very minimal; except for Lesotho and Madagascar which registered CPF Index score increases that exceed 1 percent (*see* Annex 1, Table 1). In addition, another disturbing trend apparent in the period between 2010 and 2017 is that notwithstanding minimal improvement, three SADC countries recorded CPF Index scores that remain below average, namely Angola (5), DRC (4,1), Swaziland (4,02) and Zimbabwe (5,02) (*see* Annex 1, Table 1).

This may be explained by the various infringements on human rights, civil liberties and political rights of citizens in these four countries in the period under review. In Angola, there was use of excessive force and unlawful detentions by the government to suppress anti-government protests in 2011 against President Jose Eduardo dos Santos misgovernance, whilst press freedom, access to information, and freedom of assembly

was curtailed (*see* Human Rights Watch World Report 2012: 86-88). This continued, throughout then period under review, with the promulgation of Press Law on November 2016 which threatens free speech and media freedom in Angola (*see* Human Rights Watch World Report 2017: 78; Human Rights Watch World Report 2015: 58-62; Human Rights Watch World Report 2014: 78-83). All these compromised the political security in Angola, thereby weighing down the regional CPF Index average.

The case of DRC's low CPF Index may be explained by the continued use of violence, intimidation, arbitrary arrests, trumped-up charges, and heavy handedness by President Joseph Kabila's government against protesting public, opposition members and activists in the period under review (*see* Human Rights Watch World Report 2012:104-109; Human Rights Watch World Report 2013:96-102; Human Rights Watch World Report 2015:187-193; Human Rights Watch World Report 2017:221-225). This has always worsened in the run-up to elections, as was the case with massive arrests, physical attacks and detention of protesting citizens and opposition political party members towards the November 2011 elections whilst it was reported that approximately 171 people were killed by the Congolese security forces in 2015 and 2016 during protests against the government as the country prepare for December 2018 national elections (*see* Human Rights Watch World Report 2018:173-174; Human Rights Watch World Report 2014:103-107). The same trends and patterns of political insecurity have been experienced in Zimbabwe and Swaziland.

In the overall, Southern African countries show that they will register a very slight improvement in the regional CPF Index from an index score of 8,05 in 2018 to 8,32 in the year 2025. This is not encouraging and is a sure sign of challenge of political insecurity within the region as the CPF Index score is just above average.

5.1 Political Security in Southern Africa Measured against the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IAAG)

Graph 2: Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IAAG) for SADC Countries

Source: Graph constructed by author using data from International Futures (IFs), Version – V7.31 (2018)

Graph 2 above indicates the collective ranking of Southern African countries as a region on the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) for the years 2015 to 2017, with projections up to the year 2025. However, it has to be stated that the IIAG governance framework consist of four categories, namely, (a) *Safety and Rule of Law,* (b) *Participation and Human Rights*, (c) *Sustainable Economic Opportunity,* and (d) *Human Development.* The IIAG ranking scores from 0 (least quality of governance) to 100 (highest quality of governance).

Table 1 below provides a more streamlined presentation of the indicators that are more relevant to political security in Southern Africa, focusing only on the five indicators of *Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and Human Rights, Rule of Law, Participation,* and *Rights.*

Table 1: Selected Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) indicators for SADC Countries (2007 - 2016)

	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	Annual Average Trend from 2007-2016
Safety & Rule of Law[1]	63.3	62.6	61.8	61.6	61.8	61.3	61.3	61.1	61.7	61.9	-0.16

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[1] Comprise sub-categories of Rule of Law, Accountability, Personal Safety and National Security

Participation & Human Rights[2]	56.4	56.0	55.7	56.0	56.0	56.4	56.9	56.8	57.9	57.8	+0.16
Rule of Law[3]	65.3	65.4	64.4	64.1	64.1	64.3	64.5	66.1	66.4	66.3	+0.11
Participation[4]	59.8	58.5	56.9	56.8	56.9	57.5	58.2	59.0	59.1	58.3	-0.17
Rights[5]	50.6	50.3	49.9	49.8	49.3	49.8	50.3	49.2	51.2	50.8	+0.02

Source: *Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG, 2018)*

What can be noted from Table 1 above is that Southern African countries have a mixed record of performance across the five indicators of *Safety and Rule of Law, Participation and Human Rights, Rule of Law, Participation* and *Rights.* Within the period under review, Southern African countries AIIG Index scores relating to *Safety and Rule of Law* have decreased from 63,3 recorded in 2007 to 61,9 recorded in 2016. The same applied to *Participation,* wherein the countries show a decline from an index score of 59,8 in 2007 to 58,3 in 2016 (*see* Table 3 below). However, whilst there is an annual decline over the past decade, it can be noted that there is an improvement in the last five years from the year 2012 to 2016. This is positive, although there is scope for improvement. When analysis is focused on individual country level, the depicted picture is that some countries that are not performing well. For instance, Madagascar, Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Tanzania have improved immensely in terms of *Safety and Rule of Law* between the year 2012 and 2016, whilst seven countries in Southern Africa are the highest regional performers as of 2016, *viz,* Mauritius (82,7), Botswana (81,6), Namibia (78,1), Seychelles (74,0), South Africa (67,1), Lesotho (66,6), and Zambia (66,4). On the contrary, Mozambique, Madagascar and Malawi show deteriorating situation with regard to *Safety and Rule of Law* (Table 3 below).

In as far as *Participation and Human Rights* is concerned, Mauritius, Namibia, South Africa, Seychelles and Botswana are the highest performers in Southern Africa whilst DRC, Swaziland and Botswana show a deteriorating trend during the period 2007 and 2016 (*see* Annex 1, Table 2 and Table 3 below). Although Botswana's *Participation and Human Rights* record remains among the best performers in Southern Africa, it however, depicts a deteriorating trend over a period of time.

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[2] Comprise sub-categories of Participation, Human Rights and Gender
[3] Comprise sub-categories of Judicial Independence, Judicial Process, Access to Justice, Property Rights, Transfers of Power, and Multilateral Sanctions
[4] Comprise sub-categories of Political Participation, Civil Society Participation, Free and Fair Elections, Election Monitoring Agencies, and Legitimacy of Political Process
[5] Comprise sub-categories of Freedom of Expression, Freedom of Association and Assembly, Civil Liberties, Human Rights Conventions, Human Rights Violations, and Protection against Discrimination

In the overall, by interpretation, therefore, Mauritius, South Africa, Namibia, Botswana and Seychelles have shown to have better political security in the region as compared to their peers. On the contrary, there levels of political security are lower in the Southern African countries of Madagascar, Swaziland, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and Angola (*see* Annex 1, Table 2 and Table 3 below).

Table 3: Trends and Patterns in IIAG Safety & Rule of Law, and Participation & Human Rights Indicators for SADC Countries (2007 - 2016)

COUNTRY	SAFETY & RULE OF LAW (2016 SCORE)	10-YEAR TREND (2007-2016)	ANNUAL AVERAGE TREND (2007-2016)	PARTICIPATION & HUMAN RIGHTS	10-YEAR TREND (2007-2016)	ANNUAL AVERAGE TREND (2007-2016)
Angola	45.9	+2.1	+0.23	37.0	+2.9	+0.32
Botswana	81.6	-1.2	-0.13	66.9	-3.3	-0.37
DRC	28.2	-3.2	-0.36	32.7	-3.9	-0.43
Lesotho	66.6	+0.2	+0.02	64.6	+0.8	+0.09
Madagascar	54.7	-8.6	-0.96	61.8	+1.0	+0.11
Malawi	62.7	-7.1	-0.79	64.2	+5.1	+0.57
Mauritius	82.7	+2.0	+0.22	77.5	+0.4	+0.04
Mozambique	52.7	-11.7	-1.30	56.5	-0.5	-0.06
Namibia	78.1	+2.3	+0.26	75.5	+5.6	+0.62
Seychelles	74.0	-1.3	-0.14	69.5	+9.0	+1.00
South Africa	67.1	-3.3	-0.37	74.7	-1.6	-0.18
Swaziland	59.4	+0.2	+0.02	24.6	-3.6	-0.40
Tanzania	62.9	+1.2	+0.13	61.5	-1.3	-0.14
Zambia	66.4	+1.4	+0.16	57.7	-0.9	-0.10
Zimbabwe	46.0	+5.8	+0.64	42.8	+11.6	+1.29

Source: 2017 Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) Report (2017)

In the outlook, as clearly shown on Graph 2 above, it can be seen that Southern African countries as a region will collectively improve their IIAG Index in a progressive fashion as follows: 47,9 (in 2018), 48,9 (in 2020), 49,7 (in 2022), and 50,9 (in 2025). This depicts below average political security levels except in 2025 when the projects IIAG Index will be slightly above average, thus signifying political security challenges in the region. This, of course, is based in the current situation relating to national laws, policies, systems, institutions and structures that are not optimally promoting and providing political security to regional citizens.

Compared with other regions, specifically in Eastern Africa, Western Africa, Central Africa and Northern Africa, one can note that Southern Africa is performing is behind North Africa and East Africa in terms of political security both in contemporary terms in the outlook by 2025 as shown on Graph 3 below.

Graph 3: Comparative Analysis of African Regions on Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IAAG)

Source: Graph constructed by author using data from International Futures (IFs), Version – V7.31 (2018)

By 2025, North Africa will be having relatively better political security than other African regions with a projected IIAG Index score of 53,2 whilst the most politically insecure region in Africa by 2025 will be Central Africa with a projected IIAG Index score of 43,1. Other regions' projected IIAG Index scores by 2025 will be as follows; East Africa (51,3), West Africa (49,9), and East Africa and Horn of Africa (43,7). Thus, in the overall political security remains a challenge not only in Southern Africa, but also across the whole continent as countries continue to struggle on almost all the components essential for the attainment of political security.

6. Conclusion and Recommendations

The results of the analysis and discussion have demonstrated that there are varying levels of political security in the Southern African region. Whilst most of the countries show an improvement both on the CPF Index scores and IIAG Index scores, the improvement on all the indices relevant to the contribution of political

security continue to be very minimal and non-substantial. The main drivers of political insecurity, as discussed above, have been leadership deficiencies, absence of strong institutions of governance, prevalence of culture of misgovernance, inability of national governments to address the lives and livelihoods of citizens, non-professionalization of security sectors, as well as limited power (and at times limited political will) in SADC to intervene and assist in addressing political insecurity issues in affected member states.

The conclusion from the historical, contemporary and future projections is that most of the countries in the Southern African region are having challenges in committing to democratization, respect of human rights, freedom of speech, media freedom, and electoral democracy, administration of justice, democratic expectations and protection of citizens from abuse mostly by state apparatus. As hinted in the paper, political security has largely been threatened by the tendency of ruling governments to resort to heavy handed approaches, arbitrary arrests, illegal detentions and unjust imprisonment, systematic torture, and different forms of human rights infringements whenever their hold to power is threatened. With the fast changing global landscape in terms of democratization clamours, human rights activism, intensifying electoral competition, and use of social media in the information age,

It has also been noted, however, that the few countries that have for long been idolized as beacons of democracy in the region are slowly sliding into political insecurity as shown by diminishing political security dividends; these are Mauritius, Botswana, Namibia, Seychelles and South Africa. On the other, there are countries in the region that continue to be hotspots of political insecurity, with very inconsistent and sluggish strides towards change; these are Swaziland, DRC, Madagascar, Zimbabwe and Angola.

Therefore, to addressing the political security problématique in Southern Africa, this paper recommends interventions key at both the national and regional level. First, there is need to strengthen national institutions of democratic governance which can be pivotal in providing checks and balances in the exercise of power by state organs. Strengthening fundamental institutions of governance, justice delivery and law enforcement remains indispensable so as to enhance political security through preventing the abuse of power and executive overreach that usually manifest in compromised judiciary and law enforcement. For instance, almost all the countries identified as having very weak political security have national human rights commissions, media commissions and election commissions whose principal functions are to deal with issues related to human rights, electoral rights, and media freedom yet they fail to address such issues with in an effective, fair and just manner. Most of them exhibit traits of being captured by the ruling elite.

Secondly, laws should be reformed to open up the democratic space, citizen participation and free expression, tolerance and respect for human rights and also curb impunity. In a complementary fashion, regional and sub-regional organizations should play a more pivotal role in ensuring political security by upholding their own legal and policy frameworks. For instance, the existence of the SADC Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections should be a guarantee for free and fair elections in Southern Africa if these were to be implemented in their letter and spirit. Therefore mechanisms should be put in place for the effective implementation of such regional frameworks and related instruments.

Related to this, Southern African countries may need to put in place a collective peer review mechanism for self-monitoring purposes so as to improve political security in the region. Perhaps, this can be modelled along the AU's African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM). In the meantime, those SADC countries that are not yet part of the AU PR Forum such as Zimbabwe, Botswana, DRC, Madagascar and Swaziland (*see* African Peer Review Mechanism-African Union 2018), should all seriously consider signing the APR Memorandum of Understanding to allow room to improve on democracy and political governance as well as economic governance and management which all improve political security. However, this would only succeed if accompanied by a monumental shift in approach and ideology within SADC from a political culture or tolerance and non-interference, to a more active and transformational approach in order to cultivate a culture of political security in the region. Such an intervention will nurture the spirit of democratization, human rights and freedom in the region.

Thirdly, it would also boost political security in Southern Africa if more civil society organizations double their efforts and supporting towards lobbying and advocacy for democratization, constitutionalism and good governance so as to reinforce political security.

Lastly, Southern African countries need to address other underlying structural issues that critically influence political security attitudes such as sustainable national development, inclusivity, employment creation, citizen economic empowerment and poverty reduction.

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ANNEX 1

Table 1: Civil and Political Freedom Index (History and Forecast) for SADC Countries

	Angola	Bots	Democratic Republic of	Lesotho	Madagascar	Malawi	Mauritius	Mozambique	Namibia	Seychelles	South Africa	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zimbabwe	Zambia
1990	2.000	13.00	4.000	5.000	8.000	3.000	12.00	4.000	11.00	4.000	7.000	5.000	5.000	6.000	5.000
1995	4.000	12.00	3.000	8.000	10.00	11.00	13.00	9.000	11.00	10.00	13.00	5.000	6.000	6.000	9.000
2000	4.000	12.00	3.000	8.000	10.00	10.00	13.00	9.000	11.00	10.00	13.00	5.000	8.000	5.000	7.000
2005	5.000	12.00	4.000	11.00	10.00	8.000	14.00	9.000	12.00	10.00	13.00	4.000	9.000	3.000	8.000
2010	5.000	11.00	4.000	10.00	6.000	9.000	13.00	9.000	12.00	10.00	12.00	4.000	10.00	4.000	9.000
2015	5.000	11.00	4.000	11.00	8.000	9.000	13.00	9.000	12.00	10.00	12.00	4.000	10.00	5.000	9.000
2020	4.991	11.17	4.220	11.30	8.325	9.471	13.43	9.674	12.41	10.20	12.23	4.059	10.29	5.053	9.250
2025	4.996	11.37	4.429	11.63	8.565	9.843	13.91	10.37	12.86	10.38	12.50	4.143	10.63	5.124	9.482

Source: Graph constructed by author using data from International Futures (IFs), Version – V7.31 (2018)

ANNEX 2

Table 2: Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IAAG) for SADC Countries

	Angola	Bots	Democratic Republic of	Lesotho	Madagascar	Malawi	Mauritius	Mozambique	Namibia	Seychelles	South Africa	Swaziland	Tanzania	Zimbabwe	Zambia
2015	0.387	0.588	0.345	0.477	0.467	0.452	0.662	0.440	0.538	0.647	0.569	0.395	0.490	0.419	0.477
2020	0.409	0.609	0.367	0.500	0.480	0.467	0.682	0.469	0.566	0.660	0.587	0.408	0.512	0.441	0.493
2025	0.428	0.628	0.389	0.518	0.490	0.473	0.699	0.500	0.588	0.672	0.606	0.426	0.529	0.464	0.511

Source: Graph constructed by author using data from International Futures (IFs), Version – V7.31 (2018)