South Africa's efforts to Project Influence and Power in Africa
(2000 to 2017)

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Abstract

The article aims to explain the reasons and ways South Africa aimed to project influence and power on the African continent. It analyses the ways that SA projected influence through its foreign polices at the international and multilateral levels as well as the ways it used its military in support of its foreign policy goals. Case studies in this regard which are discussed include its involvement in Burundi, Darfur, Sudan, Libya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic and South Sudan. It is concluded that South Africa remained committed to its foreign policy goals but struggled to influence international and multilateral institutions to become involved or support these goals. Lastly, it concludes that South Africa's aim to project power in Africa was unsuccessful. Therefore, South Africa could no longer be seen as middle-power but rather as an ever-weakening State.

Keywords: *SA foreign policy; South National Defence Force; African Union, peace operations in Africa; projecting influence; power projection.*

1.   Introduction

To some, the phrase "power projection" suggests imposing regime change on a state far away from home for strategic gain. One key difference between great powers and other states is that great powers create external security for their region beyond merely protecting their own borders. Any country can have regional interests, but great powers also have regional responsibilities (Ladwig 2010: 1166, 1171). For instance, one of the most frequently claimed reasons to intervene militarily in another state's affairs is that such action will promote or protect international order. However, powerful states are mostly prone to intervene to promote an order or to protect a status quo that suits them (Finnemore 2004: 85). Such intervention policies lie at the boundary of peace and war in international politics. In this regard, Finnemore (2004: 8-9) suggests that deploying military force against another state is obviously not a peaceable activity, yet states take great pains to distinguish these actions from war. For example, states allude to interventions being on a small scale and having more limited objectives than wars; however, when the objectives are to replace whole governments, it is hard to see what is limited about the objectives except that they do not include territorial conquest and absorption (Finnemore 2004: 8-9).

State strength is an important commodity in the ability to project power. Within this paradigm, asserts Matveeva (2018: 713), a state is powerful if it can successfully confront internal and external threats. Weaker

states, by contrast, suffer from fragmentation, penetration by interest groups, lack of revenue, and have minimal responsibilities towards their citizens (Matveeva 2018: 713). Focusing specifically on military techniques it is possible to disaggregate military power projection into different aspects based on the political goals being sought and the level of force employed. Some of these, according to Ladwig (2010: 1166) relate to the employment of "soft" military power (such as securing sea lanes of communication, non-combatant evacuation operations, humanitarian relief, and peacekeeping), and others are primarily concerned with "hard" military power (such as showing the flag, compellence/ deterrence, punishment, armed intervention, and conquest). In conclusion, it becomes clear that power projection stems from a state's abilities to a) confront threats both internally and externally; and b) intervene militarily (either soft or hard) in another state's affairs within the boundaries of international law.

"Projecting influence" on the other hand is something much subtler and softer. There are two dominant approaches in international relations theory for evaluating the influence of external powers on domestic policies of other countries. The "rationalist" approach emphasizes the cost-benefit calculations for alternative courses of actions, whereby a state adopts norms, rules, and policies of international organizations if the benefits of adoption exceed the costs (Grabbe 2005: 112-135). The "sociological" or constructivist approach stresses processes whereby actors follow or promote certain norms or policies informed by social beliefs or whereby international institutions and states seek to convince third-party states to adopt or comply with certain norms or policies through persuasion or socialization (Pardo Sierra 2011: 234). At its core, "foreign policy" is an activity of the State with which it fulfils its aims and interests within the international arena (Petric 2013: 1). On the one hand, the aim of foreign policy to intentionally influence the international arena in line with the aims and objectives of the state's political activities (that are all geared towards its domestic interests) (Petric 2013: 2), is in line with the rationalist approach of projecting influence. On the other hand, foreign policy could also be seen from a constructivist approach when it becomes "*an organised activity of a State with which this State tries to maximise its values and interests in relation to other States and subjects who operate within the foreign environment*" (Petric 2013: 2).

Foreign policy, once formulated, can be implemented by various means (Neethling 2011: 136),this relates to the methods used to conduct foreign policy, or what is commonly known as the techniques or instruments of foreign policy. As summarised by Neethling (2011: 136-137), diplomacy is considered to be the traditional, peaceful and the most direct instrument of foreign policy. This technique is practiced by representatives authorised to act on behalf of the governments of states or other legitimate and recognised political functionaries. Neethling (2011: 136-137) further argues that the military (when used as an instrument in power projection) is generally associated with the coercive use of the armed force in a situation of war, but it may also include military approximations short of war, such as military threats, military intervention, military aid and related assistance. It could also involve the pacific use of the military in peace operations (Neethling 2011: 136-137). In these instances, the military could also be seen as a means to project influence. In conclusion, projecting influence is seen for the purposes of this article as non-invasive soft methods which

states practice through their foreign policy objectives, working with international organisations, and partaking in soft practices of military power such as peacekeeping.

The aim of the article is to ascertain the manner and effectiveness of South Africa during the period of 2007 to 2017 to have projected power and influence on the African continent. The article is thus structured in the following manner to answer two specific questions:

- How successful were South African foreign policy/diplomatic efforts to project power on the African continent?
- How effective was South Africa by means of its Defence Force to project power on the African continent?

As already pointed out in the theoretical exposition, the international and diplomatic influence of states relates to a significant extent with their military power, implying that diplomacy and military matters are never completely divorced. It is thus required to discuss the ways SA used its diplomatic or foreign relations to project influence as well as the way it used its military to project power in support of its foreign policy objectives.

2. Projecting influence in Africa

As concluded in the previous section, a state may aim to project influence beyond their borders through diplomacy and other peaceful efforts in order to influence or persuade other states in their policy-making to their own benefit. South Africa is no exception in this regard. By 2016, the number of diplomatic missions, consulates-general, consulates and international organizations in South Africa had increased to 341 (DPME 2016: 83). This made South Africa to have the second largest number of diplomatic offices accredited compared to any country. By 2016, South Africa had diplomatic representation in 124 countries globally and 47 countries in Africa (DPME 2016: 83). In addition, South Africa's main foreign policy objective during the timeframe (2010-2017) can be summarised as the promotion of multilateral activities that would enhance South Africa's economic and diplomatic relations on the African continent through its membership to international organisations, such as the United Nations (UN), the African Union (AU) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (Treasury 2018: 15). It is thus prudent to discuss South Africa's foreign policy efforts to project influence on the African continent through the UN, the AU and other multilateral activities, such as BRICS.

2.1   An overview of SA's Foreign Policy towards Africa (1994-2017)

Since the beginning of the democratic process to transform SA, Pretoria became one of the busiest diplomatic capitals in the world. By March 1999, diplomatic relations had been established with 164 countries and more than 70 international agencies (CWI 2016: 92). By this time, SA had formal relations with all the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Forum, as well as most of the other countries in the region. International respect for SA was seen in its chairing the

Commonwealth, as well as the Non-Aligned Movement. In addition, SA was playing key roles in the Indian Ocean Rim, the South Atlantic Zone for Peace, as well as leading the call from developing countries for the reform of the UN Security Council to reflect greater geographical representation - that is awarding permanent seats on the UN Security Council for Africa and South America (CWI 2016: 92).

During the period 1994 to 2008, SA's foreign policy was shaped into a 'developmental foreign policy' that could be understood as a revisionist foreign policy, in that it must strive for partnership between developing countries to vigorously reshape the global agenda to incorporate development issues. Subsequently, SA became fundamentally concerned about issues of securing financing for development (Landsberg 2005: 726). During this time, some of the supporters of the ANC considered the terms 'security' and 'development' to be inherently merged. A 'good life' was therefore considered to be the absence of insecurity and the presence of development (Jensen 2005: 553). The developmental state approach emphasized peaceful resolutions to Africa's conflicts through the direct intervention from SA's government. It also set SA up to be seen as a regional power that worked and identified with fellow African governments or states from the rest of the developing world. SA's foreign policy became generally more predictable, more Africa-centred and more cooperative (thus multilateral) in nature. As such, SA pursued its Africa policy within multilateral structures, specifically with the SADC and begun to merge the state's sense of security with that of the region (Prinsloo 2016: 7). Such a multilateral approach showed SA for the first time emerging as a 'middle power' whose leaders considered that it cannot act alone effectively but may be able to have a systematic impact in a small group or greater impact through an international institution (Prinsloo 2016: 7). South Africa's foreign policy during this period could be considered to follow a constructivist approach.

In general, it was not difficult to ascertain that strategic decisions made by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) were directly incorporated into government policy objectives. For instance, the strategic priorities contained in the 2009–2012 strategic plan of the SA Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) were directly based on the January 2008 Cabinet meeting of the ANC. The ANC's domestic policies were also adopted by government and then translated into foreign policy (Prinsloo 2016: 3).

It is thus not surprising that every new President of SA (who happens to be the ANC president too) would formulate new domestic policies which would then be translated into new foreign policy objectives. In this example, according to Prinsloo (2016: 3), during the ANC's 53rd National Conference held in December 2012, the party sustained its long held vision to build a 'National Democratic Society' (NDS) in SA. The creation of the NDS required the realization of the political, socio-economic and human rights through a redress of historical injustices. The ANC concluded that the state must promote growth and development, play an active developmental and leadership role in SA's economy and natural resources and promote the 'African Agenda'. Coincidently, in 2012 the government's National Planning Commission (NPC) headed by the Minister in the Presidency (of SA), introduced the 'National Development Plan - Vision for 2030' (NDP) (NPC 2012: 1). Similarly to the ANC's vision of the NDS, the NDP focused on the critical capabilities needed to transform the SA economy and society by 2030 (Prinsloo 2016: 3). Moreover, the recommendations of the NDP intrinsically linked SA's foreign policy objectives to its development trajectory.

In terms of foreign policy, the NPC recommended that SA had to become central to global political economic competition in Africa and advocated increased trade with its regional partners in Africa. The main objectives in terms of foreign policy-making should be to expand regional, continental and African trade, and to improve the country's leadership role in regional and global affairs (Prinsloo 2016: 3). Not surprisingly, DIRCO's strategic plan of 2013–2018 included the strategic priority of the 'African Agenda' (DIRCO 2013: 35). In DIRCO's "Revised Strategic Plan: 2015-2018" it is reiterated that the NDP is an overarching vision of the SA it is aspiring to achieve by 2030. In this context, it is emphasised that SA's foreign policy is predicated on the country's domestic imperatives (DIRCO 2015: 2). It acknowledges that the NDP is linked to the SADC development mechanism, the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan, and the continental programme as encapsulated in the AU Agenda 2063 Vision and trajectory (DIRCO 2015: 3). As a result of these new policy decisions taken under the Zuma administration (May 2009 to February 2018), SA started on a more rationalist approach to projecting influence.

However, a rising political threat from the left could make it increasingly hard for SA's ruling ANC to pursue domestic business-friendly policies while maintaining its trade union and left-wing support base. The most likely outcome of this trend would be for the ANC to adopt more populist policy in order to retain its core support base, although over the longer term a split into left-wing and centrist factions would become increasingly likely (BMI 2015: 8). By 2015, it was projected that SA would underperform its emerging market peers over the coming ten years owing to a range of factors, including intermittent power shortages, industrial action and divestment from the platinum and gold mining sectors. At the time, forecasted real GDP growth was be approximately 2.5% on average over 2015-2024 (BMI 2015: 25). How this domestic change in policies will affect SA's foreign policy is unknown but it may be expected that SA would need more investment acting as a gateway into Africa. From a perspective of a state being able to project power and influence, the domestic political developments were painting SA as a weakening state which will further deteriorate in the future. During this period under the Zuma administration, SA utilised two approaches quite successfully to project influence – at least in the first few years of the administration: a) development funding provided by SA; and b) pursuing influence within multilateral agreements and institutions, such as BRICS, the AU and the UN. This will be discussed next.

2.2.1   Development funding provided by South Africa

The approach SA took on development cooperation was seen as a tool to advance South African foreign policy goals and to become a globally competitive economy and an influential and leading member of the international community (Makue 2016). As stated in the previous section, these foreign policy goals were guided by domestic priorities or national interests. South Africa's foreign policy had the goal to consolidate the African agenda through its support for the AU, New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and sub-regional initiatives under the SADC and the South African Customs Union (Makue 2016). Notably, one of the key vehicles for development cooperation was to provide development funding through the African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF). SA's strong and growing commitment to

foreign aid and development assistance had put it on par with prominent emerging donor nations like China, Brazil, and India. Its foreign aid programs were, however, scattered across numerous institutions, including (Goitom 2011):

> The African Renaissance and International Cooperation Fund (ARF);
>
> Programs at the national, provincial, and local government levels;
>
> The India-Brazil-SA (IBSA) Poverty Alleviation Fund;
>
> Multilateral programs through concessional lending institutions such as the African Development Bank (AFDB) and the World Bank; and
>
> Southern African Customs Union (SACU) Agreements on Revenue Sharing

To address this fragmented line of development aid, DIRCO established a dedicated development agency to replace the ARF, called the South African Development Partnership Agency (SADPA) which would inform and direct SA's development assistance framework. The conceptual and operating frameworks for the establishment of were finalised by 2015 (DIRCO 2015, 27). In this regard, and specifically during this timeframe (2007-2017), it could be stated that SA was effectively projecting influence in certain regions and with certain partners, such as states and regional organisations. One of the successes was to become a member of BRICS.

2.2.2 BRICS

Participation in the BRICS grouping offered an opportunity for South Africa (SA) to deepen and broaden its cooperation with Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Moreover, formal association with an elite cohort of emerging powers increased SA's international profile and potentially enhanced its role in global decision-making (including the UN Security Council and the Group of 20 (G-20)), while reinforcing its leadership claims on the continent. In turn, SA's accession to the BRICS helped broaden the bloc's focus from mainly economic cooperation to development cooperation (Daniel and Virk 2014: 9). Joining the BRICS grouping, however, reinforced the perception that SA only managed to strategically position itself with other emerging powers in opposition to the traditional powers in order to use the BRICS forum for unilateral national political gain (Besada and Tok 2014: 77). It is clear that SA was getting itself ready to engage in continental power play, through efforts to increase their political sway, military projection and economic influence in Africa (Prinsloo 2016: 11). Although SA was energetically gaining membership in key institutions such as the BRICS grouping and the Group of 20, there was a risk — especially with Nigeria having overtaken SA in 2013 as Africa's largest economy — whether such a role might come to constitute "representation without power" (Adebajo 2016). Due to this risk, BRICS was probably one of the attempts by SA to project influence which could be the hardest to maintain. By 2017, many BRICS countries (Russia, Brazil, and SA) were struggling economically and/or politically and the movement had lost some influence in the global arena. It was, however, definitely an attempt by SA to project strategic influence.

2.2.3   South Africa and the African Union

Under the administration of Thabo Mbeki between 1999 and 2008, SA's foreign policy was increasingly shaped by an "African Agenda" which prioritised democratic governance, peace and security and accelerated economic growth. Mbeki played a key role in transforming the Organization of African Unity (OAU) into the AU between 1999 and 2002, and in enshrining the right for the organisation to intervene against military coups and in cases of egregious human rights abuses. SA became the first country to host the newly created AU in its port city of Durban in 2002. The country further helped to craft the institutions of NEPAD and the APRM, both of whose secretariats it hosts, along with that of the Pan-African Parliament (PAP). SA also contributed to AU peacekeeping missions in Burundi (2003–2004) and Sudan's Darfur region (2004–2007) (Adebajo 2016).

Amid SA's own continuing domestic socio-economic challenges, critics have noted that mercantilist approaches and parochial concerns have increasingly shaped its foreign policy towards Africa under President Jacob Zuma since 2009 (Adebajo and Cook 2016: 3-4). The most important shift in SA's foreign policy under Zuma was ending the frosty relationship forged between Thabo Mbeki and Angolan President Eduardo dos Santos. The strategic partnership that was established subsequently has given the SADC a more influential political role, and provided a powerful ally in both sub regional and continental diplomacy. Whereas Mbeki sought leadership at AU level, which he was sometimes unable to translate into leverage at sub-regional level, Zuma's Southern Africa diplomacy gave SA greater influence at the continental level. However, his foreign policy has been less strategic and more openly mercantilist than Mbeki's (Adebajo 2016). In furtherance of SA's continental ambitions, it controversially put forward the candidacy of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma to contest the position of AU Commission Chair which she eventually won (Adebajo and Cook 2016: 3-4) in July 2012, amidst strong opposition from Nigeria, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Rwanda. Notably, SA is the only African member of the BRICS bloc (Daniel and Virk 2014: 7). Dlamini-Zuma vacated the position in 2016 after serving only one four-year term, without enacting the radical administrative reforms of the Commission she had earlier promised (Adebajo and Cook 2016: 3-4). SA's efforts to project influence at the AU was bitter-sweet. Much was expected, especially under the leadership of Dlamini-Zuma but as mentioned above she left after only one term.

2.2.4 South Africa's Foreign Policy objectives at the United Nations

SA was one of the 51 founding member of the UN in 1945. On 12 November 1974 the UN General Assembly suspended SA from participating in its work, due to international opposition to the policy of apartheid. SA was re-admitted to the UN in 1994 following its transition into a democracy. SA was endorsed by the African Union (AU) and subsequently elected to serve as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council during the period 2007-2008. During its tenure as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, SA promoted the African Agenda namely peace, security and development. SA served again as a non-permanent member for the period 2011-2012 (Nations 2011). In 2011, SA, India, and Brazil all

served on the UN Security Council, joining the two veto-wielding BRICS permanent members, Russia and China (Daniel and Virk 2014: 21).

2.2.4.1 UN Resolutions supported by SA 2007-2017

The one reason, however, that will maintain SA's commitment to regional peacekeeping was the prospect that it could win a permanent African seat on a reformed UN Security Council (Adebajo 2016) but it was competing with other African countries for this privilege. It is the relative size of SA's economy that made it a credible candidate for a permanent seat on an expanded UN Security Council. In contrast, Nigeria, in addition to now having a larger economy, has a more established peacekeeping record than SA, having contributed 150,000 soldiers to peace operations since 1960. Nigeria was the fifth-largest contributor to UN peacekeeping by 2014 compared with SA at 13th (Adebajo 2014). Unfortunately, there had been no further real progress made towards the reform of the UN Security Council. China and Russia's permanent membership and veto power on the Security Council distanced Beijing and Moscow from Pretoria, New Delhi, and Brasília. Furthermore, SA, unlike India and Brazil, was also constrained by the AU's 2005 Ezulwini Consensus which favoured two additional African permanent members with veto power. In addition, placing the BRICS in the vanguard could potentially complicate reform efforts, given questions about the extent to which India, Brazil, and SA can claim to have overwhelming support for their UN Security Council candidacies within their own regions (Daniel and Virk 2014: 3). When one looks at the UN Security Council resolutions during the last ten years 2007-2017, some interesting facts come to light (see Table 1)

Resolution	Vetoed/ Abstained/ Against	Countries
1757(2007) – Establishes the Special Tribunal for Lebanon for prosecuting those responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri	Abstentions	China, Indonesia, Qatar, Russia, SA
1762(2007) – Terminates the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission in Iraq	Abstained	Russia
1775(2007) – Extends appointment of Carla Del Ponte as Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia	Abstained	Russia
1776(2007 – Extends authorisation of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan	Abstained	Russia
1803(2008) – Non-proliferation	Abstained	Indonesia
1828(2008) – Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan	Abstained	USA (United States of America)

1850(2008) – The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Abstained	Libya
1860(2009) – The situation in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question	Abstained	USA
1873(2009) – Extending the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus until 15 December 2009	Against	Turkey
1898(2009) – Extension of the mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus until 15 June 2010.	Against	Turkey
1907(2009) – Sanctions Eritrea over its role in Somalia and its refusal to withdraw troops from border with Djibouti	Against Abstention	Libya China
1929(2010) – Sanctions Iran over its nuclear program	Against Abstention	Brazil and Turkey Lebanon
1930(2010) – Extends mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Against	Turkey
1945(2010) – Extends mandate of expert panel monitoring sanctions against groups in Darfur, Sudan	Abstention	China
1953(2010) – Extends mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Against	Turkey
1958(2010) – Terminates residual activities of the Iraqi Oil-for-Food Programme	Abstention	France
1966(2010) – Establishes residual mechanism to conclude remaining tasks of the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia	Abstention	Russian
1973(2011) – Authorises the use of a no-fly-zone over Libya, with the explicit task of protecting the civilian population	Abstentions	China, Russia, Brazil, Germany, India
1984(2011) – Extends mandate of expert panel monitoring sanctions against Iran	Abstention	Lebanon
2023(2011) – Peace and security in Africa	Abstentions	China and Russia
2058(2012) – Extends mandate of the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus	Abstentions	Azerbaijan and Pakistan
2063(2012) – Extends mandate of the AU – UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur	Abstention	Azerbaijan
2068(2012) – Children in armed conflict	Abstentions	Azerbaijan, China, Pakistan, and Russia

2081(2012) – International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia	Abstention	Russia
2089(2013) – The situation in Cyprus	Abstention	Azerbaijan
2117(2013) – Small arms and light weapons, Arms Trade Treaty	Abstention	Russia
2182(2014) – The Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina	Abstentions	Jordan, Russian Federation
2183(2014) – The Situation in Somalia	Abstention	Russia
2194(2014) – International Tribunal – Rwanda	Abstention	Russia
2209(2015) - Chemical weapons in Syria	Abstention	Venezuela
2216(2015) - Situation in Yemen	Abstention	Russia
2220(2015) - Small arms	Abstentions	Angola, Chad, China, Nigeria, Russia, Venezuela
2240(2015) - Maintenance of international peace and security	Abstention	Venezuela
2241(2015) – Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Abstentions	Russia, Venezuela
2244(2015) - Situation in Somalia	Abstention	Venezuela
2252(2015) - Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Abstentions	Russia, Venezuela
2256(2015) - International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia(ICTY) International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	Abstention	Russia
2269(2016) - International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia(ICTY) International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)	Abstentions	Angola, Egypt, Russia, Senegal
2272(2016) - UN peacekeeping operations	Abstention	Egypt
2285(2016) - Situation in Western Sahara	Against Abstentions	Uruguay and Venezuela Angola, New Zealand, and Russia
2303(2016) - The situation in Burundi	Abstentions	Angola, China, Egypt, and Venezuela
2304(2016) - Reports of the Secretary-General on the Sudan and South Sudan	Abstentions	China, Egypt, Russia, Venezuela

2310(2016) - Maintenance of international peace and security	Abstention	Egypt
2312(2016) - Maintenance of international peace and security	Abstention	Venezuela
2317(2016) - The situation in Somalia	Abstentions	Angola, China, Egypt, Russian Federation, and Venezuela
2333(2016) - UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL)	Abstentions	France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom
2334(2016) - The situation in the Middle East (Israel's Settlements)	Abstention	USA

Table 1: Summary of vetoed and abstained UN Security Council resolutions (2007-2017)

Thus, in summary:

In 2007, 55 resolutions were passed, four of which had abstentions from members.

In 2008, 64 resolutions were passed, three of which had abstentions.

In 2009, 47 resolutions were passed, four with either votes against them or abstentions.

In 2010, 58 resolutions were passed, six with either votes against them or abstentions.

In 2011, 65 resolutions were passed, three with abstentions.

In 2012, 52 resolutions were passed, four with abstentions.

In 2013, 46 resolutions were passed, two with abstentions.

In 2014, 62 resolutions were passed, three with abstentions.

In 2015, 63 resolutions were passed, eight with abstentions.

In 2016, 76 resolutions were passed, ten with abstentions.

Until March 2017, 11 resolutions were passed, zero with abstentions.

During the decade (2007-2017), 599 UN Security Council resolutions were passed; all of them went through (no vetoes) with 94 having either votes against them or abstentions (about 15%). The country which had the most times voted against a resolution or abstained was the Russian Federation with 23 times (the most common themes were Somalia (two times) and Sudan/South Sudan (three times). The most unpopular topic in the UN Security Council was tribunals (in Lebanon, former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda.) Remarkably, SA abstained from voting only once in 2007 against UN Security Council resolution 1757(2007) which aimed to establish the Special Tribunal for Lebanon for prosecuting those responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri. SA served for four years on the UN Security Council (2007-8 and 2011-12) as a non-permanent member but there were other African countries who also served a number of years, notably Nigeria also served four years since 2007 (2010-11 and 2015-16). Angola served for two years (2015-16) abstained a record five times from voting in the UN Security Council (all on different issues). Unfortunately, there is little legacy which SA left during its time at the UN Security Council and one cannot say that it projected great influence at the UN accept for pushing the African Agenda.

3. Power projection in Africa

It was concluded in the introduction that "power projection" is a much harder and more invasive form of intervention which a state adopts to assert itself within the international community to achieve their own foreign policy objectives. SA foreign policy changed under the Zuma administration from being more focused on continental mercantilism than on the development pathway through the AU taken under the previous administrations (Adebajo 2016). Nevertheless, to successfully achieve SA's stated foreign policy objectives (spearheading the African Agenda) at the UN and heading the AUC, require that SA should project power on the continent. This was done through peace operations under the auspices of the UN and the AU.

Prinsloo (2012: 62-72) briefly explained the difference between peace operations taken under Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the UN Charter: when a complaint on a threat to international peace and security is brought to the UN Security Council, its first action is usually to recommend that the parties try to reach agreement by peaceful means and it may set forth principles for a peaceful settlement, unless when in some cases the UN Security Council itself undertakes investigation and mediation. This may not always lead to a peaceful solution and more concrete steps may be necessary, such as the process of "peace-making". Such missions are taken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and could include inter alia peace-making or peace-building operations.

When a dispute leads to conflict which threatens international peace and security, the UN Security Council often issues directives to prevent further hostilities and may take measures under Chapter VII, rather than under Chapter VI, to enforce its decisions. Such measures are commonly referred to as "peacekeeping" missions and have an enforceable mandate (Prinsloo 2012: 62-72). All of the peace operations in which SA was involved in since 1994 taken were under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, i.e. peace missions with an enforcement or self-defence mandate.

3.1 UN and AU peace operations in Africa involving SA

Africa's first major contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security could be traced to the 1960 intervention in Congo-Leopoldville, as part of a broader UN peace operation. Since then, African states have contributed to global peacekeeping operations, mediation, and negotiation efforts through the deployment of Military, Police, and other civilian experts into conflict situations, both within and outside the continent (Aning and Edu-Afful 2016: 121). SA was a relative newcomer to peace operations - the country only became involved in earnest after the promulgation of the White Paper on South African Participation in Peace Missions in 1999 (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012: 22). In April 2001, Pretoria authorized for the first time peacekeepers to participate in the peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) under a UN mandate. A peace deal on the situation in the DRC was eventually brokered with the intense involvement of SA (CWI 2016: 95-96). To put things into perspective, as of 31 January 2017, there were nine UN peacekeeping missions established in Africa (see Table 3) but SA was involved in only three of them (Table 2) with a combined number of about 1400 uniformed personnel.

	MINU RSO (Western Sahara)	MINUS CA (CAR)	MINUS MA (Mali)	MONUS CO (DRC)	UNAM ID (Darfur, Sudan)	UNISF A (Abyei, Sudan)	UNMI L (Liberi a)	UNM ISS (South Sudan)	UNO CI (Ivory Coast)	AFRIC AN PK TOTA L #
SA	-	-	-	1354	41	-	-	23	-	**1418**

Table 2: SA's contribution to UN Peace Operations as of 1 Jan 2017

Name and country	Operational dates	Resolution no; Chapter	Total # of Uniformed Personnel (Authorised)
MINURSO (Western Sahara)	April 1991-present	Resolution 690 (1991); Chapter VI	227 (245)
MINUSCA (Central African Republic)	April 2014 -15 Nov 2017	Resolution 2149(2014); Chapter VII	12,104 (12,870)
MINUSMA (Mali)	April 2013 -30 June 2017	Resolution 2100 (2013); Chapter VII	11,880 (15,209)
MONUSCO (Dem. Rep. of the Congo)	July 2010 -31 March 2017	Resolution 1925 (2010), Chapter VII	18,692 (22,016)
UNAMID (Darfur, Sudan)	July 2007 -present	Resolution 1769 (2007); Chapter VII	17,256 (19,248)
UNISFA (Abyei, Sudan)	June 2011 – present	Resolution 1990(2011); Chapter VII	4,491 (5,326)
UNMIL (Liberia)	September 2003 to present	Resolution 1509(2003); Chapter VII	1,690 (1846)
UNMISS (South Sudan)	July 2011 - present	Resolution 1996(2011); Chapter VII	12,923 (19,001)
UNOCI (Ivory Coast)	April 2004 – 30 June 2017	Resolution 1528(2004); Chapter VII	2,396 (6,910)

Table 3: UN peace operations in Africa as of 2017

The breakdown of the Uniformed Personnel provided by African countries to specific UN Peace Operations in Africa looks as follows (Table 4) (UNDPKO 2017b):

	MINU RSO (Weste rn Sahara)	MIN USC A (Cent ral Afric an	MINU SMA (Mali)	MONU SCO (Dem. Rep. of the Congo)	UNA MID (Darfu r, Sudan)	UNI SFA (Abye i, Suda n)	UN MIL (Liber ia)	UN MISS (Sout h Suda n)	UN OCI (Ivor y Coast)	AFRIC A PK TOTAL

		Repu blic)								
Benin		74	416	474	1		1		17	**983**
Burkina Faso		44	1892	36	975				9	**2956**
Burundi		798	12		33				8	**851**
Cameroon		1064	17	19	8				10	**1118**
Chad			1337	11					1	**1349**
Congo		770	5							**775**
Cote d'Ivoire			7	1						**8**
Djbouti		9		11	140					**160**
DR Congo		9							1	**10**
Egypt		999	71	478	1087				1	**2636**
Ethiopia			1		2564	4357	1	1295		**8218**
Gabon		434								**434**
Gambia		5	3		310		10	20		**348**
Ghana	7	3	217	466	114	5	68	1019	15	**1914**
Guinea		12	868	24		1		1		**906**
Guinea-Bissau			1							**1**
Kenya			5	8	113			149		**275**
Liberia			49							**49**
Madagascar		1	1							**2**
Malawi				856	89				1	**946**
Mali		3		9					1	**13**
Mauritania			3	862					139	**1004**
Morocco		751		834					4	**1589**
Mozambique						1				**1**
Namibia					35	2		15		**52**
Niger		166	855	27					659	**1707**
Nigeria			220	6	1023	2	827	50		**2128**
Rwanda		1272			2513	6		2111		**5902**
Senegal		393	866	294	1096			4	736	**3389**
SA				1354	41			23		**1418**
Tanzania				1264	848	4		6	2	**2124**
Togo		1	1090	10	142		1	1	320	**1565**
Tunisia		46	48	45	49				22	**210**
Uganda							1	31	1	**33**
Zambia		745		1	119	1	14	35		**915**
Zimbabwe					35	10	6	38		**89**
AFRICAN TCC TOTAL	**7**	**7599**	**7984**	**7090**	**11335**	**4389**	**929**	**4798**	**1947**	**46078**

Table 4: Breakdown of African countries at each UN Peace Operation (2017)

In Table 4, it could be seen that Ethiopia (8 218), Rwanda (5 902) and Senegal (3 389) were the largest contributors to peace operations in Africa. Ghana provided troops (but in much smaller numbers) to all nine peace operations; Senegal and Nigeria do to six each. It can be deduced that even if you have a small footprint (such as Ghana) but it is in most of the missions, your level of influence increases overall in peace operations. This is quite smart. On the other hand, Ethiopia contributed thousands of troops to the three missions in Sudan and South Sudan. Clearly Ethiopia was attempting project influence and power as much as it can in its immediate region. In the same vein, Rwanda was also contributing thousands of troops to peace operations in its immediate regional vicinity. Obviously, to compete with countries such as Nigeria, Egypt and Ethiopia, SA will need to maintain its credibility as an international peacekeeper. As Nigeria has done in Liberia and Sierra Leone, SA should insist the UN ensure more equitable international burden-sharing in future peacekeeping missions (Adebajo 2016). By 2016, the SANDF ranked fifth in Africa, below Nigeria, Ethiopia, Algeria and Egypt (GlobalFirePower 2016).

3.2 Specific peace operations SA was involved from 2000 to 2017

Since 2000, SA was involved in six peace operations located in: Burundi; Darfur, Sudan; Libya; Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC); Central African Republic (CAR); and South Sudan. They will each be discussed next.

3.2.1 Burundi – AMIB/ONUB/AUSTF (November 2001 to June 2009)

The conflict between rebels created an extreme humanitarian crisis causing massive refugee flows, the disruption of agriculture (the mainstay of Burundi), starvation and deteriorating health conditions. Numerous attempts to broker peace agreements followed, and after lengthy negotiations led by former SA President Nelson Mandela, the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement was signed on 28 August 2000. The agreement proposed the setting up of a transitional government but was boycotted by some of the rebel groups and conflict continued. To create some form of stability, SA, under UN Security Council Resolution 1375, sent a South African Protection Support Detachment (SAPSD) of 754 personnel to Burundi in November 2001. This was SA's first deployment under its newly conceived White Paper on Peace Missions, promulgated in 1999. Together with the Burundian Army, their mandate was to provide support for the implementation of the Arusha Accord and to protect the 150 Hutu politicians returning from exile. This deployment was somewhat unusual in that the UN required a ceasefire agreement to be in place before deploying foreign troops to another country, which was not the case here. Hence, the deployment did not fall within the usual prescriptions of either a UN Chapter VI or VII deployment. Ongoing hostilities subsequently led to the expansion and establishment of the AU Mission in Burundi (AMIB), in April 2003, for a period of one year (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012: 23). Also, in April 2003, Domitien Ndayizeye, a Hutu - succeeded Pierre Buyoya as president, under terms of a three-year, power-sharing transitional government inaugurated in 2001. In November 2003, President Ndayizeye and Hutu rebel group Forces for Defence of Democracy (FDD) leader Pierre Nkurunziza signed an agreement to end civil war at the summit of African

leaders in Tanzania. Smaller Hutu rebel group, Forces for National Liberation (FNL), remains active (BBC 2016).

AMIB's troops came from SA, Ethiopia and Mozambique to monitor the peace process and provided security. AMIB was the first peacekeeping operation fully initiated, planned and executed by the AU, and AMIB represented a milestone for the AU in terms of self-reliance in operationalising and implementing peacebuilding. The AMIB succeeded in establishing relative peace to most provinces in Burundi, de-escalated a potential volatile situation and laid the foundations for reconciliation and reconstruction (Fafore 2016: 59).

On 1 June 2004, the AMIB force in Burundi was renamed the UN Operation in Burundi (ONUB). UN Security Council Resolution 1545 gave ONUB the mandate to operate under Chapter VII, and force levels were expanded considerably. Still under South African command, this mission now included troops from 41 countries. The total peak strength of the mission amounted to 5,665 uniformed personnel, which included 5,400 troops, 168 military observers and 97 police (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012: 24). In August 2005, Pierre Nkurunziza, from the Hutu FDD group, is elected as president by the two houses of parliament (BBC 2016).

Upon the withdrawal of the ONUB on 31 December 2006 the security situation remained precarious and SA's troops were requested to remain. This marked the beginning of Operation Curriculum as part of the AU Special Task Force (AUSTF). When a settlement was finally reached with the FNL and the Government of Burundi, SA's role as facilitator in the peace process came to an end. Their mandate expired in June 2009, with the last troops returning home in December of that year. This marked the end of eight years of South African involvement in peace operations in Burundi, and paved the way for elections to be held in a peaceful atmosphere (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012: 24). Even though today there are problems in Burundi gain, this was a mission where SA performed great, worked with the mandate of the mission and stayed until the end. This is a great example of where SA projected its influence successfully.

3.2.2 Darfur, Sudan – UNAMID (2007 and ongoing in 2017)

In 2006, UN support for the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) changed in character, which subsequently led to the formation of the hybrid UN-AU Mission (named UNAMID) authorised under Security Council Resolution 1769, in July 2007. This was established after the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005 (commonly known as the Naivasha Agreement), which paved the way for elections and the option of secession for the South. UNAMID's mandate was essentially to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers, to prevent the disruption of the Darfur process, and to 'protect civilians without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan'. In terms of the South African contribution to the AMIS/UNAMID mission, called Operation Cordite, in total 794 military personnel were deployed to the Darfur region. The first deployment took place in July 2004 as part of the AU mission, AMIS, which ended in December 2007 and was replaced by UNAMID in January 2008. The request by the UN was that the South African contingent be increased to a standard UN battalion-size force. Due to challenges in the infrastructure within the mission area, however, SA was unable to fully meet this requirement. The deployment has also been highly problematic for the South African contingent in terms of logistics, extreme weather conditions and the effect on personnel and equipment, cultural and

language barriers, and preparation and training for this mission. As most of the operations conducted are vehicle patrols, the lack of suitable vehicles – especially armoured personnel carriers – made the South Africans soft targets. In May 2006, for example, they were subject to 'several attacks, kidnappings, hijackings, ambushes and disarmament' by rebel forces, fortunately without any loss of life (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012: 30).

UNAMID was an expensive, complex operation. There were many features unique to UNAMID which affected its deployment, effectiveness and successes but they are not enough to determine if UNAMID was an optimal mechanism for the UN to maintain international peace and security. The issues clustered around this primary peacekeeping objective, therefore, goes beyond the obvious facts, such as that UNAMID took several years to muster up enough resources to actually commence successful operations (Prinsloo 2012: 338).

Relations between Sudan and UNAMID have never been good but have deteriorated in recent years. In 2014 Khartoum ordered UNAMID out of Sudan after it began investigating an alleged mass rape by Sudanese soldiers in Darfur. The government denies any wrongdoing by either its army or allied militia. Last year the government of Sudan refused to release rations and other essential supplies for international peacekeepers in Darfur. Some of the incidences in Sudan include an attack on 11 April 2010 when four South African UN Police personnel were abducted and two vehicles stolen. They were released sixteen days later. An attack on a UNAMID patrol in North Darfur on 12 November 2012 killed one South African; an attack on a UNAMID patrol on 17 October 2012 killed one South African in North Darfur; and an attack on a South African UNAMID patrol in North Darfur on 29 October 2014 injured three. The ambush was on a section dispatched from the South African battalion base to collect water (DefenceWeb 2016a).SA's withdrawal from the hybrid AU/UN peace support mission in Sudan also came as a result of the Sudanese government that had made it "increasingly difficult" for proper logistic support to be provided to deployed soldiers (DefenceWeb 2016b).

President Zuma announced the summary termination of the country's involvement with the hybrid AU/UN mission in Darfur, Sudan. A short statement issued by the Presidency noted that members of the SANDF were employed in Darfur in 2008 as part of UNAMID and that their termination would take effect from 1 April 2016 (DefenceWeb 2016a). The approximately 800 South African soldiers who were the final SANDF deployment in Sudan were then replaced by Pakistani and Sudanese elements to ensure continuity of operations in Darfur. SA had been part of UNAMID since its establishment at the beginning of 2008 as a successor to the AMIS, the then AU mission in Sudan (DefenceWeb 2016b). Unfortunately, UNAMID was not a success story and SA could neither effectively project its influence or power.

3.2.3   Libya – NATO/ AU (19 Mar 2011 – 31 Oct 2011)

Following mass protests in neighbouring countries Egypt and Tunisia, a group of people from Libya took advantage of the growing wave of rebellion in the region to launch their own version of anti-regime rallies in February 2011. What began as a series of peaceful demonstrations later turned into a bloody confrontation between Protestors and Government forces. The protest was occasioned by human right abuses, social

program mismanagement and corruption. The protest movement that began in the city of Benghazi located inside the Cyrenaican region began to spread to other major cities in Libya and swiftly evolved into an armed revolt. A greater number of the civilian population in Libya began clamoring for an end to the forty-two-year rule of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. In a sharp response to the growing rebellion, the Gaddafi regime ordered the national army to crush the protesters and to restore order. As the rebellion grew larger and became nationwide, the main opposition parties and their anti-Gaddafi forces established a provisional government (the National Transitional Council) in Benghazi. Protestors became targets of the regime and were frequently fired upon by security forces. The regime's crackdown was highhanded with massive civilian casualties (Aning and Edu-Afful 2016: 130).

On 17 March 2011, the UN Security Council voted by 10 in favour to none against, with five abstentions (Brazil, China, Germany, India and the Russian Federation), to adopt Resolution 1973(2011) on Libya. Resolution 1973(2011) allowed the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to enforce a no fly zone which eventually led to the death of Gaddafi (Ekwealor and Mtshali 2016: 26-28). It should be stated, that while African member states with seats in the UN Security Council were unanimous in support of Resolution 1973 regarding Libya, the AU opposed the NATO intervention in Libya (Fafore 2016: 53).

The AU's agency toward the Libyan crises went through a number of phases following the adoption of its roadmap in March 2011. The AU was emphatic that any solution to the Libyan crises must be predicated on the overall objectives of the Union (peace, stability democratic governance, and respect for human rights). In a swift response to the emerging crises in Libya, the AU Peace and Security Council (AU PSC), apart from expressing concern over the upheavals, also strongly condemned the excessive use of force to repress the demonstrators. Subsequently, the AU PSC agreed on a roadmap for resolving the Libyan crises. Once the roadmap was adopted, the AU appointed the SA leader, Jacob Zuma, to lead the AU's mediation effort in Libya. Although the roadmap was rejected by the NTC, the AU still went ahead to find a political solution throughout the entire period of the conflict (Aning and Edu-Afful 2016: 130-131). Libya was a big failure for SA – it did not vote against the game changing UN Security Council resolution 1973(2011) – "Authorises the use of a no-fly-zone over Libya, with the explicit task of protecting the civilian population"; neither could the President use his sway to have the international community leave it up to the AU to sort out. SA showed almost no projection of influence or power.

3.2.4 Democratic Republic of the Congo – MONUC/MONUSCO (30 Nov 1999-present)

By 1998, the conflict in the DRC was such that SADC feared it would spill over to become a region-wide war. An estimated 3.5 million people died as indirect casualties of war and 3.4 million became internally displaced, with hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing across borders into neighbouring countries (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012: 25). Following the signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in July 1999 between the DRC and five regional States (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe) in July 1999, the Security Council established the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC) by its UN Security Council resolution 1279 of 30 November 1999 (UNDPKO 2017a).

Fighting continued and it was not until the assassination of Laurent Kabila in January 2001 and his replacement by his son Joseph on 15 March 2001, that peace and reconciliation seemed possible. As the security situation deteriorated, so the mandate of MONUC was expanded under Security Council Resolution 1493, and later under Resolution 1856 in July 2007, under a Chapter VII mandate. SA was, however, still supporting a more robust strategy than the MONUC leadership did. The feeling was that the UN force was too small for this task (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012).

Although in 2009 an agreement was reached between Rwanda's President Paul Kagame and President Joseph Kabila of the DRC, fighting continued in north-eastern Kivu province, with civilians bearing the brunt of the violence. In 2010, as fragile stability briefly returned to the DRC, Kabila called for the withdrawal of MONUC. Violence, however, continued and in July 2010, MONUC was renamed the UN Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) in accordance with Security Council Resolution 1925. In terms of SA's involvement in MONUC, it was not until 2003 that the SANDF was in a position to make a military contribution. This initial deployment, named Operation Mistral, consisted of a task force headquarters, an infantry battalion group, engineer elements, logistics, medics, a military police unit and headquarters support unit. As at February 2010, the SANDF had three operations in the DRC (Heinecken and Ferreira 2012: 27).

By the end of 2016, a peace process was in place with the possibility of leading up to new elections. Joseph Kabila was still the president of the DRC. The AU PSC still reiterated its concern about the insecurity, violence and massacres of civilians in eastern DRC, despite the efforts made by the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC), as well as MONUSCO to neutralise negative forces operating in the region. Within this context, UN Security Council called for continued and enhanced joint operations between the FARDC and MONUSCO (AU PSC 2016). SA showed better leadership and involvement in the DRC. There was a certain amount projection of influence in the mission and in the region.

3.2.5 Central African Republic – MISCA/ MINUSCA (15 Sept 14 – present)

Going back to late 2012, the AU had been calling for action to deal with a resurgence of rebel activity in the Central African Republic (CAR). The issue had been caused by the rebels' grievance that President Francois Bozize of CAR did not honour a 2007 peace deal, which required the government to pay rebel fighters who laid down their arms. Consequently, the rebels - operating under an umbrella entity known as Séléka - pledged to oust Bozize from office. By the close of 2012, rebel activity was seeing an alarming increase, thus spurring the call for action to deal with the burst of violent clashes (CWI 2016: 28). The conflict in the CAR erupted when Séléka rebels launched attacks in December 2012 and took on increasingly sectarian overtones, as mainly Christian militias took up arms (UN 2016).

In March 2013, Séléka rebels in the CAR captured the strategic south-eastern town of Bangassou. The Séléka rebels took the action in violation of prevailing ceasefire accord with the government, which had been signed at the start of the year. By the last week of March 2013, the rebels had advanced on Bangui and by 24 March 2013, they had stormed the capital city and overthrown the government. President Bozize was reported to have fled the country and it was subsequently reported that he was actually in Cameroon. Ousted

President Bozize of CAR claimed in the first week of April 2013 that Chad was involved in the conflict and stated that Chadian special forces supported the Séléka movement onslaught (CWI 2016: 28-29).

At least a dozen South African soldiers apparently died in the violence, according to South African President Jacob Zuma. The incident caused a political fracas for Zuma at home, essentially forcing him to announce that he would be withdrawing his country's troops from CAR. French President Francois Hollande, who had also deployed hundreds of troops to Bangui, said that he would send more French troops to CAR to protect French citizens. He additionally demanded that the rebel fighters respect the people of CAR, and urged the formation of a transitional government of national unity. Michel Djotodia - the leader of the rebel Séléka alliance - declared himself to be the country's president. As March 2013 came to a close, Djotodia named a caretaker government with Nicolas Tiangaye as prime minister, and said elections would be held in three years. The undemocratic transition of power was frowned upon by the international community with the AU suspending membership of CAR from the body and imposing sanctions on Séléka leaders, including Djotodia himself. The AU also demanded that a transitional body be established in the CAR and tasked with moving the country towards democratic elections.

Following the continued escalation of the conflict, the UN Security Council authorised an AU-led International Support Mission to the CAR (MISCA) and a French-backed peacekeeping force (known as Operation Sangaris) through its Resolution 2127 (2013), to quell the spiralling violence (Limo 2016: 45). MISCA transitioned to the UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the CAR (MINUSCA) in 2014, due to the security requirements on the ground that called for a bigger force. MINUSCA is mandated to protect civilians and undertake the promotion and protection of human rights in CAR, among other key tasks (Limo 2016: 45) through UN Security Council resolution 2149 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

The new Government of CAR was established in March 2016; however, there remained deep concern over the presence of armed groups affiliated to the anti-Balaka and ex-Séléka movements and the persistent insecurity in different parts of the CAR. CAR was a very complicated environment where the French (would had the projection of power and are friends with Chad) warned the SA's to get out. SA overreached its capacity and it was soon evident to the world that SA had very little power of influence or power projection through the ailing SANDF.

3.2.6 South Sudan – UNMISS (July 2011 to June 2017)

The UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) will not be discussed as SA only had a few dozen troops there and it was unlikely that they had any power of influence or power projection.

4. Summary and Conclusion

From the data provided in Table 4, it was clear that SA failed to provide the numbers of troops and/or the footprint in multiple countries. It could therefore be deduced that SA would have struggled to project power or even project the same amount of influence in Africa when they were not participating as much or as focused. From the section on foreign policy, SA did not have a policy problem and it might be that the

problem was with the South African military.

The reality was, according to Adebajo (2016) that the 78,000-strong SA army lacked air-defence capacity; half of the navy's ships were obsolete; the country had no maritime patrol aircraft, long-range airlift and sea lift was almost non-existent. Pretoria's military brass hats often complained of being overstretched: conducting peacekeeping missions, patrolling SA's 4,471km land border and hunting rhino poachers in the Kruger National Park. Some estimates noted that half of the country's defence budget went to paying salaries. This, perhaps, explains SA's recent decision to withdraw all 797 of its troops from the UN mission in Darfur. Pretoria also appears to be tiring of its leadership role in the volatile eastern DRC (Adebajo 2016). The SANDF's inadequate capabilities and the mismatch between operations and resources have had severe consequences. Such inadequacies have been seen in the lack of aircraft lift capabilities to support soldiers in the CAR when they came under attack from Seleka rebels in Bangui in 2013 (Nagar 2015). The killing of 16 of its soldiers in the CAR in 2013 exposed its lack of regional knowledge in parts of Africa (Adebajo 2016). Moreover, the clashes in CAR placed much doubt on the capabilities of the SANDF to be really able to make a difference as expected on the continent (Respondent_C 2014).

Table 5 provides a summary of the actions SA took to project influence or power either through its foreign policies or military undertakings.

Action/ policy/ peace operation	Projecting influence	Projecting power (soft)	Projecting power (hard)
UN Resolutions supported by SA the last decade	Yes – African Agenda	no	no
SA's foreign policy towards Africa (2000-present)	Yes – BRICS, leading AUC	no	no
Development funding provided by SA	Yes – strategic partnerships. Humanitarian and development aid	no	no
BRICS	Yes – economic development	no	no
SA and the AU	Perhaps – leading AUC	no	no
UN and AU Peace operations in Africa involving SA (in general)	In some areas (DRC) for instance but not a continental leader.	no	no
The status of the SANDF	In the past (until mid 2000's)	Some (older PK missions)	No (CAR)
UN PK in Africa (general)	no	Older missions	No

AU PK in Africa	yes	no	no
Burundi – AMIB/ONUB/AUSTF (Nov 2001 to June 2009)	yes	yes	yes
Darfur, Sudan – UNAMID (2007 to present)	no	no	no
Libya – NATO/AU	Tried	no	no
Democratic Republic of the Congo – MONUC/MONUSCO (30 Nov 99-present)	yes	yes	sometimes
Central African Republic – MISCA/MINUSCA	yes	No -ineffective	failed

Table 5: Summary of SA's efforts to project influence or to project power

The ANC would certainly like to project influence and power on the African continent but the government apparatus it could use (by being the ruling political party) is letting them down. Its apparatus to project influence has been working to a degree but not perfectly. SA's foreign policy is dictated by its domestic policies and needs, and soon this may swing to the left. This will lead to more uncertainty among its partners in BRICS and Africa. Losing its morality, so carefully built up in the past, diluting the pureness of its foreign policies (for example the case between the ICC and the President of Sudan). Its apparatus to project power comes, typically as a middle power, through multilateral institutions. Soft power projection through peace operations is not that successful as the SANDF is not in a perfect operational status and may not be for years. It is clear that domestic policies and issues are influencing SA's power stance in the world. The ways in which SA portrays itself is extremely important. Should SA portray itself to be a middle power in the international context and a regional power in Africa, but it is clearly not, then the level of uncertainty towards SA will also increase. In order for SA to be considered a regional power in Africa and to be able to champion its causes, it has to adhere to at least four criteria: the claim to leadership, the necessary power resources, employment of foreign policy instruments and acceptance of the leadership role by third states (Flemes 2009, 136). It will only be able to do that with sound foreign policies and military capabilities in order to project influence and power. And peace operations remain some of the easiest ways for SA to do this.

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