Worlds Apart: Social Attitudes to Restitution in South Africa

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Abstract

Given the urgency of redressing South Africa's unjust legacies of the past, we interrogate the nature of support and opposition to restitution in South Africa. Informed by responses to the nationally representative South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), we contend that South Africa remains deeply polarised when it comes to addressing these unjust legacies, with race being the major fault line. When it comes to restitution, South Africans are worlds apart on three levels. We are worlds apart across racial groups; we are worlds apart within racial groups, and we are worlds apart in the kind of language we wish to use in framing our pursuit of equality. In the final analysis, while South Africans may be unified in the acknowledgement that the inequality gap is too high, and perhaps even unified in a desire for change, there is a fundamental disagreement about the desirable vehicles we hope to employ.

Keywords: race; inequality; restitution; policy attitudes; social change; South Africa

1. Introduction

Much to the chagrin of its citizens, South Africa remains a highly unequal, impoverished and untransformed society. These realities are unsurprisingly highly racialised. Colonialism and apartheid in South Africa institutionalised race-based exploitation and marginalisation which led to the socio-economic and political exclusion of black South Africans, as well as their systematic dehumanisation. This has left the post-apartheid government with the urgent

task of redressing this legacy, which it does through a series of compensatory and preferential racial policies. While many South Africans support the principle of racial equality as constitutive of social transformation, there is often a gap between public support for the equality principle and public support for equality policies. This is especially strong among white South Africans and is often conceptualised as a principle-implementation gap (Dixon et al 2007, 2017; Roberts et al 2011). This paper interrogates the nature of support and opposition to restitution in South Africa. Put simply, how strong is support for restitution and what is the profile of support/opposition to restitution in South Africa? Furthermore, how influential are socio-demographic factors in explaining restitution attitudes, and, if not, what might other explanations can be offered?

Although there has been scholarship on the nature of public support for equality policies in South Africa, they are not always based on nationally representative samples. Furthermore, we note that previously, the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), our dataset, did not use the term restitution/compensation. Instead, it gauged support for existing equality policies such as affirmative action and land redistribution. As such, while this paper investigates the strength of support/opposition to restitution, it equally presents an opportunity for us to assess restitution discursively. That is: how strong is support for restitution in South Africa when it is conceptualised as an individual and collective moral responsibility to compensate for the damages of the past? Thereforee, this paper also touches on our social justice vocabulary and how we frame the pursuit of racial equality.

We argue that attitudes towards restitution remain deeply polarised, with race being the major fault line. We also observe variations based on geography and class. Opposition is especially high among white South Africans, with Indian and Coloured attitudes being closer to those of white South Africans. Furthermore, we note that support for restitution-as-compensation among black South Africans is not as high as anticipated, especially when compared to support for current government redress policies such as affirmative action and land redistribution. We conclude that when it comes to restitution, South Africans are worlds apart on three levels. We are worlds apart across racial groups; we are worlds apart within racial groups; and we are worlds apart regarding the language deemed appropriate to frame our pursuit of equality.

2. Attitudes on restitution and policies oriented toward racial redress: a literature review

What determines and/or explains support or opposition to race-targeted policies? The literature tends to focus on explaining white opposition to the implementation of racial policies such as affirmative action, thus rendering race a robust predictor of support and opposition (Krysan, 2000). This focus on race is common in American and South African literature. That notwithstanding, both contexts are characterised by noteworthy differences. For example, while blacks constitute a minority in the US, in South Africa, the pursuit of racial equality through race-targeted policies occurs in a black African majority context. This focus on race stands in contrast to other racially bounded societies such as Brazil, where the status of race as a decisive factor in anticipating support and opposition to redress policies remains inconclusive. For example, most Brazilians support affirmative action policies, with opposition mainly influenced by education (college degree holders) located among the middle-class and sectors like the media (Telles & Paixao 2013; Santos & Queiroz 2010). At the same time, support for affirmative action rises significantly (65 to 87%) when the beneficiaries are class-targeted (low-income) as opposed to race-targeted (Santos & Queiroz 2010). In American scholarship, explaining white opposition to racial policies aimed at racial equality remains the central pre-occupation. This opposition is sometimes framed through a principle-implementation gap. Though whites typically favour racial equality in principle, this support is offset by opposition to race-conscious policies meant to address racial injustice (Dixon et al 2007). Three often cited explanatory variables include self-interest (collective), racism, and ideology.

Opposition to race targeted policies can be a function of group/collective interests and intergroup competition. As Dixon et al (2017, 98) describe, "[s]tructural inequalities are bound up with realistic conflicts of interest, which in turn explain why dominant group members resist policies that challenge the status quo." As such, racism and racial progress are perceived as a zero-sum game which whites are now losing (Norton & Sommers 2011). This account is nuanced by the nature of race-targeted policies. Here, the distinction is made between race preferential policies such as affirmative action which "challenge directly whites' proprietary claims and socio-economic outcomes", and race compensatory policies, "which focus on helping the disadvantaged to develop skills to achieve

(eventually) a better life." (Dixon et al 2017, 94) In addition, policies fostering equality of outcome receive more hostility than those limited to fostering equality of opportunity as the former is perceived as more threatening to the entitlements afforded by status and economic hierarchies (Dixon et al 2017, 94).

Opposition can also reflect negative attitudes (prejudice/racism) towards historically disadvantaged groups (Sears & Henry 2005). Here, a contrast is made between old-fashioned racism and 'modern' forms of racism which tend to be subtler. The latter is coined differently by different authors (e.g.'laissez-faire racism' (Bobo et al, 1997); modern racism (McConahay 1986)), and captures 'attitudes that mix racial and non-racial themes, such as the mixture of racial antagonism with non-racial traditional values…' (Sears & Jessor 1996, 752-3). In South Africa, these concepts associated with subtle racism resonate with the concept 'white talk', which refers to discursive repertoires that are resistant to transformation and used strategically to maintain positive self-presentation, ensuring that negative attitudes towards blacks is not considered racist (Steyn & Foster 2008, 28). Examples of non-racial smokescreens in this regard include crime and corruption.

Opposition to race-targeted policies also has ideological bases such as economic and political conservatism. In this example, opposition reflects a principled aversion to 'big government', predicated on a commitment to free-market capitalism (Durrheim 2010). Kent and Wade (2015, 823) have illustrated the politicisation of genetic knowledge in Brazil, arguing that genetic data is used '…to deny the existence of human races in general; to deny their relevance specifically for Brazil and to deconstruct black identity.' More broadly, opposition to affirmative action is seen to undermine the idea of Brazilian national identity as a racial democracy. In South Africa, ideological opposition to racial policies is varied, invoking constitutionalism (Maphai 1989), non-racialism, and Marxism (Alexander 2007).

Research on public attitudes to restitution in South Africa has typically analysed attitudinal data towards prominent forms of government led restitution such as land reform and redistribution, affirmative action and education and sports quotas. Using 2003/2004 SASAS data, Durrheim (2010) finds that opposition to racial redress is polarised along racial lines, citing group self-interest, inter-group prejudice and distrust of government as bases for opposition (we confirm this racial polarisation using 2015/2016 data). Roberts et al (2011)

have assessed national attitudinal data in South Africa between 2003 and 2009 specifically on affirmative action, noting that attitudes continue to be racially polarised, with support being particularly high among black South Africans and low among whites. Furthermore, affirmative action enjoys more support when the beneficiaries are women and the disabled as opposed to when they are race-targeted. Looking to lessen the principle-implementation gap in South Africa, Dixon et al (2007) have examined the relationship between the Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis and attitudes toward government led restitution. They find that more contact leads to less opposition among whites, which is significant given generally low levels of support for race-conscious policies among white South Africans. They also find, curiously, that more contact is associated with lower levels of support for race-targeted policies among black South Africans, speculating that contact nurtures cross-racial solidarity and could also weaken political activism (Dixon et al 2007: 871).

Our contribution to the literature on support/opposition to restitution and race-conscious policies is twofold. Firstly, with few exceptions (e.g. Krupnikov & Piston 2016), the broader literature tends to focus on explaining resistance among members of historically advantaged groups, specifically white Americans (Krysan 2000). We respond to this by observing and explaining the levels of support for restitution/compensation among Black South Africans as a historically marginalised group. Secondly, the literature on support for restitution in South African has tended to focus on restitution in terms of government interventions such as sports quotas, affirmative action and land reform and redistribution. While these fall under the concept of restitution, the word restitution was not used in these surveys. In the 2016 SASAS survey, the term restitution was introduced and was translated in some local languages as compensation, and defined as action taken to repair the damages of the past. More importantly, restitution was conceptualised as an individual, interpersonal and collective moral responsibility (Swartz 2016). Examples in the survey included: (1) It is essential that all white South Africans take action towards repairing the damages of the past; (2) Black South Africans should demand restitution / compensation; (3) voluntary contributions from white South Africans into a restitution fund;(4) restitution fund funded by a compulsory tax on white South Africans; (5) intergroup dialogues on restitution. Therefore, this article also brings attention to the relative impact of policy framing. While the current scholarship pays

attention to issues of framing by distinguishing between race-preferential and race-compensatory policies, we focus on the nature of support for restitution as an individual, interpersonal moral responsibility as opposed to an account where agency is exhausted by the state.

3. Data on Attitudes to Restitution

The quantitative data used in this study is from the 2016 round of the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), a national survey series that has been annually fielded by the Human Sciences Research Council since 2003. In line with quality standards for attitudinal surveys, the questionnaire utilised in the survey was translated into all major languages in South Africa. The survey series has been designed to yield a sample of adults (aged 16 and older). Each round of interviewing consists of a sample of 500 small area layers (SALs) as primary sampling units, stratified by province, geographical sub-type and majority population group. Within each sampled area, an equal number of visiting points (dwelling units) is randomly selected as secondary sampling units. In the third and final sampling stage, a single representative person is drawn with equal probability from all persons aged 16 years and older at the visiting point using the Kish Grid method (for a discussion of this method, see Kish 1994). The realised sample size for the 2016 survey round consisted of 3,079 interviews. The data was then weighted to be nationally representative –all data represented in this paper is weighted unless otherwise indicated.

A range of socio-demographic independent variables were included in SASAS to capture data on respondent's socio-economic status. To provide a definitive measure of an individual position within the country's socio-economic hierarchy in South Africa we employed several of these variables. The first of these was the Living Standard Measure (LSM) index. This indicator is comprised of more than thirty questions on household assets and access to services and was designed by the South African Advertising Research Foundation. The measure partitions the population into ten groups –ranging from the wealthiest at 10 to the poorest at 1 –based on their access to assets and services. In addition, to LSM, we also utilised a question on the highest level of formal education a respondent had completed. Using responses to this question, we created a continuous educational attainment variable that measured the years of formal schooling (0-16). Finally, we utilised

two questions on subjective socio-economic status in order to counterbalance these more objective indicators. Respondents were asked about their level of perceived wealth and then respondents were queried about which social class they belonged to. First, respondents were asked if they and their family were: (i) wealthy, (ii) very comfortable, (iii) reasonably comfortable, (iv) just getting along, (v) poor and (vi) very poor. Later, respondents were asked if they would describe themselves as belonging to the (i) lower class, (ii) working class, (iv) middle class, (v) upper middle class and the (vi) upper class.

Fieldworkers conducted interviews during the last quarter of each calendar year by means of face-to-face contact. Interviews of this type represent a social interaction. The same social norms that regulate other face-to-face conversations (like concerns about social desirability) will affect the responses generated during such interactions. Consider a now infamous example in the United States, when interviewed about racial integration of schools in the 1970s white survey respondents expressed more support for integration when interviewed by African American fieldworkers (Hatchett and Schuman 1975). This should attune us to the ways in which the racial group membership of interviewers may influence interviewees' responses when asked about a sensitive issue like restitution (for further discussion of 'response bias', see Krumpal 2013). To resolve this problem, the SASAS administrators deployed its fieldworkers to ensure that respondents were interviewed (as far as possible) by co-racial interviewers.

This research was preoccupied with three central questions. They included: (i) how strong is the level of support for restitution in South Africa? (ii) how are these attitudes divided along key socio-demographic fault-lines? and (iii) how influential are socio-demographic factors in explaining restitution attitudes? To an answer these questions, we constructed a comprehensive index that measures attitudes towards restitution in the country. Subsequently, we conducted a series of statistical tests to discern the role played by socio-demographic factors in predicting pubic opinions on restitution. A series of bivariate tests were conducted to determine subgroup differences, while multivariate regression techniques were used to discern how effective socio-demographic factors in explaining public opinion on restitution.

4. Building the Index

To assess support for restitution, SASAS respondents were asked seven questions about different approaches to restitution. To avoid non-response to these questions, respondents were primed on the subject before being asked the questions. In this context, priming refers to a procedure in a survey that improves the ease with which a specific concept is recalled by the respondent (Tesler 2015). It is well-established that in a survey interview, a respondent's crystallised attitudes can often be primed by new information given by a fieldworker. Respondents in SASAS were read a definition of restitution in South Africa, the exact phrasing of this definition is as follows: "By restitution/compensation we mean the actions that should be taken to address the damages of the past such as Black Economic Empowerment, land reform and additional taxes for white South Africans". Respondents were then asked whether they agreed or disagreed with seven statements –the distribution of responses to these statements is depicted in Figure 1.

Figure 1: National Attitudes towards the Restitution and Compensation in South Africa



Source: HSRC SASAS 2016.

A slim majority (54%) of adult South Africans endorsed the proposition that all white South Africans take action towards repairing the damages of the past. Only 48% of the adult population favoured a voluntary compensation fund that would be financed by white people. Much less agreement (34%) was found for an official tax on the white minority. The proposition that corruption by white South Africans during apartheid should be acted on only received support from roughly half the general public. Many more people favoured holding small multi-racial discussions to decide what level of restitution is fair. But it was clear, and perhaps surprising, that many in the country wanted to forget the past. Indeed, we found that almost three-fifths (57%) of adults thought that their fellow South Africans should move on and stop talking about restitution. Overall, what is perhaps most unexpected about the data gathered here is that there is not a greater level of support for the approaches to compensation outlined in Figure 1.

To better explain the pattern of results observable in Figure 1, we need to consider how closely correlated the seven items are to each other. A good first step is to conduct a simple pairwise correlation matrix to ascertain the strength and direction of association that exists between these seven variables. To achieve this, all those who answered 'don't know' to the seven questions were coded as missing. The results of this straightforward test are displayed in Table 1 and show a positive linear relationship between most of the seven variables. Almost all of the coefficients in the table are greater than 0.5 indicating robust correlations. As such, the results indicate that the propensity to support one restitution measure increases the likelihood to support others. The only exception is the PAST variable –here the reported coefficients are not as robust as the other variables. The observed coefficients are also negative although this is to be expected. The outcomes of Table 1 suggest that responses to the seven items can be combined into a single index.

Table 1: Pairwise Correlations between the Seven Restitution items

	ESSENTIAL	DEMAND	CORRUPTION	PAST	VOLUNTARILY	EXTRATAX
DEMAND	0.658					
CORRUPTION	0.647	0.659				
PAST	-0.383	-0.405	-0.373			
VOLUNTARILY	0.641	0.643	0.727	-0.416		
EXTRATAX	0.605	0.678	0.641	-0.394	0.663	
FAIR	0.562	0.620	0.618	-0.317	0.713	0.627

Source: HSRC SASAS 2016.

Used Bonferroni-adjusted significance level.

Notes: The exact wordings of the seven items are: (i) "It is essential that all white South Africans take action towards repairing the damages of the past" (ESSENTIAL); (ii) "Black South Africans should demand restitution/compensation" (DEMAND); (iii) "Corruption by white South Africans during apartheid should be investigated and acted on" CORRUPTION); (iv) "We should forget the past, move on and stop talking about restitution/compensation" (PAST); (v) "A restitution/compensation fund to which white people can voluntarily contribute should be set up" (VOLUNTARILY); (vi) "A restitution/compensation fund should be set up by implementing an extra tax on white people" (EXTRATAX); and (vii) "Small group discussions should be held between black and white South Africans decide what restitution/compensation is fair" (FAIR).

Table 2: Inter-item Correlations (covariances) and Cronbach's Alpha on the Seven Restitution items

	item-test correlation	item-rest correlation	average inter-item covariance	alpha
ESSENTIAL	0.824	0.747	0.888	0.876
DEMAND	0.840	0.771	0.881	0.874
CORRUPTION	0.850	0.783	0.867	0.872
PAST	0.529	0.365	1.066	0.921

VOLUNTARILY	0.853	0.791	0.880	0.872
EXTRATAX	0.826	0.752	0.890	0.876
FAIR	0.801	0.720	0.914	0.880
Test scale			0.913	0.898

Source: HSRC SASAS 2016.

In order to test the validity and reliability of combining the seven items in Table 1 into a single index, we conducted a Cronbach alpha and the results of this test are portrayed in Table 2. We can observe a very high α coefficient (0.898) indicating that the items share covariance and are probably measuring the same underlying concept. Furthermore, we used principal-component factor analysis to confirm that all observed variables correlate well with each other. Where appropriate, the response scales on the variables were reversed and then the seven variables were combined and transformed into a 0 to 10 Support for Restitution Index. The higher the value on this index, the greater the level of support for restitution-as-compensation.

5. The Support for Restitution Index Findings

The Support for Restitution index was built to ascertain the level and profile of support for restitution in South Africa, in addition to the influence of socio-demographic factors in explaining restitution attitudes. To begin with, the mean of the Support for Restitution Index was 5.16 (SE=2.57) indicating that public endorsement for compensation is more moderate than we may have been imagined. Indeed, the distribution of the index can be described as relatively bimodal with distinct peaks at either end of the probability density function. Secondly and unsurprisingly, attitudes toward restitution were racially polarised. While support was above average among the black African majority, it appears that belonging to a racial minority reduces support for restitution. We also observed geographical differences, noting that those living outside of the Western Cape are more likely to favour compensation. Finally, while objective and subjective measures of socio-economic status (class) suggest that more affluent South Africans are less supportive of restitution/compensation, socio-economic status nonetheless retains a limited explanatory power.

5.1 Subgroup Differences

To better identify differences in support for restitution amongst the general population, we looked at the mean Support for Restitution Index scores across selected subgroups. First, we look at differences between the country's four main population groups. We found significant differences in mean index scores between these groups. The Black African majority (M= 5.68; SE= 0.08) had the highest mean score followed by the Indian (M= 4.11; SE= 0.17); Coloured (M= 3.71; SE= 0.14) and White (M= 2.54; SE= 0.15) minorities respectively. To better understand these results, we produced four unweighted histograms for the index, one for each population groups. As can be seen from Figure 2, the probability distribution of the index is skewed left in the case of the white minority indicating the relative uniformity of opinion amongst this population group. The distribution amongst the Coloured minority and the Black African majority is more bimodal, suggesting division within these communities on the issue of restitution. The histogram for the Indian minority is comparatively unimodal and shows that this group tends to gravitate towards a neutral position on issues of compensation.

Figure 2: Histograms for Support for Restitution (0-10) Index by Population Group

Source: HSRC SASAS 2016.



We also looked at how mean scores on the index differed by three selected subgroups (Table 3). We did not observe any substantial gender differences in how people scored on the index. In addition, we discerned only minor attitudinal differences by age group. However, it did appear that older South Africans were marginally more supportive of restitution than their younger counterparts. To further test this tentative finding, we conducted an analysis of covariance and found that attitudes towards restitution did indeed differ significantly by age group ($F= 2.87$, $p= 0.022$). However, when we adjusted our analysis for population group, our index scores no longer differed by age group at a statistically significant level ($F = 1.24$, $p = 0.290$). In order to better understand if age is driving attitudes on this issue in South Africa, we will test the relative strength of age in our multivariate regression analysis.

Table 3: Mean Support for Restitution (0-10) Index by Selected Subgroups

	Mean	Std. Err.	[95% Conf. Interval]		Skewness	Kurtosis	N
Total	5.16	0.05	5.06	5.25	-0.28	2.18	2986
Gender							
Male	5.14	0.07	4.99	5.28	-0.23	2.23	1219
Female	5.17	0.06	5.06	5.29	-0.33	2.12	1767
Age Group							
16-24	5.14	0.12	4.81	5.47	-0.19	2.11	445
25-34	5.36	0.10	5.10	5.62	-0.38	2.46	656
35-49	5.14	0.09	4.86	5.42	-0.27	2.10	759
50-64	5.07	0.10	4.76	5.37	-0.38	2.18	670
65+	4.74	0.13	4.35	5.13	-0.04	1.84	456
Provincial Residence							
Western Cape	3.13	0.11	2.91	3.34	0.36	2.19	391
Eastern Cape	5.89	0.11	5.67	6.11	-0.30	2.18	424
Northern Cape	4.83	0.16	4.51	5.14	-0.46	2.47	221
Free State	5.87	0.15	5.57	6.18	-0.54	2.58	206
KwaZulu-Natal	5.84	0.10	5.64	6.03	-0.41	2.45	577
North West	4.93	0.14	4.66	5.20	-0.31	2.69	210
Gauteng	5.30	0.12	5.07	5.53	-0.58	2.55	443
Mpumalanga	5.07	0.18	4.71	5.43	-0.23	2.03	232
Limpopo	5.11	0.17	4.78	5.43	-0.06	1.68	282

Source: HSRC SASAS 2016.

Given the country's history, we may expect people's opinions on restitution to vary by their province of residence. In Table 3, we find that there are significant differences in support for restitution by province. Adult residents of the Eastern Cape (M=5.89; SE =0.11), Free State (M= 5.87; SE =0.15) and KwaZulu-Natal (M= 5.84; SE= 0.10) reported higher mean scores than other provinces. Out of all nine provinces, the lowest mean scores were reported by adult residents in the Western Cape (M= 3.13; SE =0.11). An analysis of covariance found that views on restitution varied significantly by provincial residence even when adjusting for population group (F= 21.57, p= 0.000). It could be argued that socio-economic differences within each province contributed towards this observed disparity. An individual's position on the country's socio-economic ladder may be the main factor driving opinions about compensation. In order to adequately measure the strength of individual predictors of attitudes towards restitution, we now turn to the multivariate regression analysis.

5.2 Identifying Determinants

We conducted two standard ordinary least square (OLS) regressions with the Support for Restitution Index as the dependent. The first regression model included standard personal demographic attributes as well as other control variables like political affiliation.

Independent socio-economic variables (i.e. LSM and educational attainment) were introduced into the second model. Using beta coefficients, we can test the relative strength of each variable in the models to discern their effect on the dependent. The results of the two models are depicted in Table 4.

The R-squared of Model I means that approximately 22% of the variance is accounted for by this model. The fit of our regression model is only marginally improved with the addition of the socio-economic variables in Model II. Although the size R-squared is reasonable, these suggest that there are other variables that would explain variance that our models are not accounting for.

Table 4: Linear (OLS) Regression for Support for Restitution (0-10) Index

	Model I				Model II			
	Coef.	Std. Err.	β	Sig.	Coef.	Std. Err.	β	Sig.
Female	-0.200	0.135	-0.039		-0.236	0.141	-0.046	
Age	0.008	0.005	0.047		0.008	0.005	0.051	
Rural	-0.145	0.164	-0.026		-0.176	0.176	-0.031	
Population Group (ref. Black African)								
Coloured	-0.950	0.198	-0.107	***	-0.942	0.207	-0.107	***
Indian	-1.697	0.248	-0.109	***	-1.535	0.294	-0.096	***
White	-2.571	0.227	-0.294	***	-2.299	0.275	-0.265	***
Provincial Residence (ref. Western Cape)								
Eastern Cape	1.791	0.214	0.229	***	1.583	0.238	0.200	***
Northern Cape	1.092	0.267	0.062	***	1.007	0.278	0.058	***
Free State	1.912	0.222	0.162	***	1.830	0.232	0.157	***
KwaZulu-Natal	1.874	0.206	0.279	***	1.849	0.214	0.272	***
North West	1.046	0.230	0.099	***	0.837	0.252	0.074	**
Gauteng	1.046	0.230	0.099	***	0.837	0.252	0.074	**
Mpumalanga	1.001	0.302	0.101	**	0.922	0.311	0.094	**
Limpopo	0.938	0.284	0.110	**	0.753	0.305	0.088	*
Educational Attainment					0.015	0.020	0.019	
Living Standard Measure					-0.124	0.060	-0.080	*
Obs.	2924				2721			
R-squared	0.217				0.225			
Root MSE	2.285				2.283			
***** p<0.001,**p<0.01,* p<0.05**								

Source: HSRC SASAS 2016.

Notes: 1. The models present the coefficients, standardised beta coefficients, the standard errors, and the statistical significance of the linear regression models, 2. Positive coefficients indicate support for restitution; and 3. The regressions control for the respondent's political affiliation and marital status.

In Model II, formal educational attainment was positively correlated with the dependent but not at a statistically significant level. The LSM indicator, on the other hand, was associated with attitudes towards compensation at a statistically significant level ($p<0.05$). The more affluent the individual, the greater the likelihood that the individual will not support restitution. However, we must note that the size of the observed coefficient ($r= -0.12$; $\beta= -0.08$) was smaller than we may have anticipated. To further assess the effect of socio-economic status, we substituted the LSM variable with more subjective measures of financial position. The results did not significantly alter our earlier conclusions about the influence of economic standing on the dependent variable. Overall, the outcomes of the second model suggest the limited explanatory power of socio-economic status when seeking to understand variation in attitudes towards restitution amongst the general population.

Population group was a robust predictor of the dependent in Table 4 even controlling for a range of other social and economic variables. In both models, the pattern of results was similar. Belonging to one of the country's racial minority groups reduced the likelihood that an individual would favour restitution. Using the Black African majority as the reference group, we observed a distinct hierarchy amongst minority groups. An individual belonging to the White ($r= -2.30$; $\beta= -0.27$) group had a higher coefficient than either the Indian ($r= -1.54$; $\beta= -0.10$) or the Coloured ($r= -0.94$; $\beta= -0.11$) groups in Model II. We also observed the predictive power of provincial residence in the table. Even accounting for population group, political affiliation and socio-economic status, we found that an individual's provincial residence had a significant effect on their endorsement of restitution. It appears living outside the Western Cape made adults more likely to favour compensation. In Model II, the provincial dummies with the largest coefficients were the Eastern Cape ($r= 1.58$; $\beta= 0.20$), Gauteng ($r= 1.30$; $\beta= -0.22$) and KwaZulu-Natal ($r= 1.85$; $\beta= 0.27$). In both models, age was not a statistically significant predictor of attitudes towards restitution.

6. Worlds apart: Racial attitudes and preferences for restitution

When it comes to restitution/compensation in South Africa, we are worlds apart across racial groups. In addition, we are also worlds apart within racial groups, especially when we consider that among the black African majority, support

for restitution can be described as lukewarm. We characterise this support as modest in character considering the findings of other studies of racial attitudes toward racial policies, where support for redress policies like affirmative action in employment and education and land reform tend to be significantly higher among black South Africans (Dixon et al 2007; Durrheim et al 2009; Durrheim 2010; Roberts et al. 2011). Although we framed the concept of restitution around new ideas and examples, the definition of restitution used in the 2016 SASAS survey was nonetheless associated with existing state-driven racial policies. As such, to reason inductively and anticipate higher levels of support among black South Africans was not unreasonable.

Why do South Africans inhabit different worlds when it comes to restitution aimed at redressing the nation's unjust legacies of the past? Does in-group favouritism and prejudice towards other racial out-groups hold any explanatory power? In order to test the relative influence of racial attitudes on support for restitution, a multivariate analysis was conducted. More specifically, the modelling concentrates on select measures of out-group prejudice, racial threat, feelings of personal and collective racial discrimination, racial distrust, the frequency and quality of inter-racial contact, and in-group identification. The dependent variable used in the modelling is the support for restitution index described in the preceding sections of the article. Given the nature of the index scaling, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis is undertaken.

With respect to the racial attitudes measures employed as independent variables in the analysis, out-group prejudice is measured using an index constructed from eight constituent measures that ask about the extent to which different population groups in South Africa are seen firstly as negative or positive, and secondly as hostile or friendly. Responses to the items are captured using an end-anchored, 11-point scale, and have been averaged together so that the overall prejudice score uses the same 0-10 scale, with 0 representing low prejudice and 10 a high degree of prejudice towards racial out-groups. Perceived racial threat is an index that has been constructed by averaging together responses to four attitudinal statements. Two of the statements relate to realistic or material threat and are phrased as follows: "People of other race groups in South Africa are trying to get ahead economically at the expense of my group"; and "people of other race groups in South Africa tend to exclude members of my group from positions of power and responsibility". The second two items focus on capturing

symbolic threat and were stated in the following manner: "The traditions and values that are important to people of my race are under threat because of the influence of other races in this country"; and "other race groups in South Africa will never understand what members of my group are like". All four items were coded using a five-point agreement scale, which were subsequently reverse scaled so that higher values represented a greater sense of threat (1=low; 5=high threat).

The frequency of racial discrimination is a measure combining responses to two questions. The first asked respondents "How often do you personally feel racially discriminated against?", while the second item enquired "how often do you feel that members of your race group are racially discriminated against?". Both items used a four-point frequency scale, with the coded responses being 'always', 'often', 'sometimes', and 'not at all'. Again, these scales were reversed so that higher values represent greater perceived discrimination (1=none; 4=always), after which the responses to the two questions were averaged together. Racial distrust is an index that averages together the responses to two items: "People of different racial groups do not really trust or like each other"; and "People of different racial groups will never really trust or like each other". The two items both employed a five-point agreement scale, which were reversed so higher scores represented greater distrust. The reliability of the two items was adequate for the sample ($\alpha = .774$).

Regarding racial contact, two measures were used for modelling purposes. The first measure addresses the frequency of contact with other race groups, both as acquaintances and as friends. This was addressed through a series of questions that first asked respondents "How many (black/coloured/Indian/white people) do you know, at least as acquaintances?", with responses provided for each population group. The coded response categories were 'none', 'few', 'some', 'many' and 'very many'. This was followed by a second set of items asking, "Of (black/coloured/Indian/white people) that you know, how many would you consider to be friends?", with a response again provided for each population group and using the same scale. For each respondent, the racial contact score was an average of the six responses provided for people of other population groups. The index retains the same five-point scale (1=none; 5=very many) and has a high internal consistency ($\alpha = .828$). The second contact measure focuses on the quality of racial contact experienced by respondents. It is based on a score derived by averaging together responses to two statements: "When I come into contact with other race

groups we almost always interact as equals", and "when I come into contact with other race groups, contact is almost always friendly". The items were reversed scored and averaged together, so that higher scores represent a more favourable assessment of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive).

Lastly, in-group identification consists of two items expressing agreement with statements about belonging to one's population group and a third item on the perceived degree of in-group racial attachment: i) "being a member of my race group is an important part of who I am as a person"; ii) "there are some things about my race group today that make me feel ashamed"; and iii) "to what extent do you feel attached to those who belong to the same race group as you?". The three items failed to produce a reliable index measure ($\alpha = .223$), so they are included as separate variables of in-group identification in the modelling. The first and third items were reverse scaled so that higher scores signified, respectively, a greater belief in the importance of in-group identification and a stronger level of in-group attachment.

The multivariate analysis makes use of a set of basic socio-demographic traits. Apart from gender (a dummy variable for female respondents) and age (in years), marital status is captured using a four-category scale (never married, married, widowed and separated/divorced). A detailed labour force status variable is included, ranging from the unemployed to full-time employees and pensioners to students and learners. Educational attainment is included in the form of a continuous variable measuring completed years of formal education. Household size is included as another standard inclusion. The primary socioeconomic measure that has been chosen is self-rated poverty status, which has been collapsed into a three-category scale (poor, just getting by, and non-poor). As additional controls, the models include two geographic measures, namely province and geographic type (urban formal, urban informal, rural traditional authority areas, and rural farms), as well as political party identification.

In terms of our modelling approach, we firstly (and separately) examined the individual effect of each racial attitude's indicator on support for restitution for each population group, while including basic personal socio-demographic attributes, geographic location and political party affiliation. We then ran a model where all the racial attitudes variables are jointly entered. These regression results are presented in Table 5.

Table 5: Summary of the influence of racial attitudes on individual support for restitution based on separate OLS models for each population group, 2016

	Black African	Coloured	Indian	White
	B	β	B	β
MODEL 1				
Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high)	0.072	0.118*	-0.034	-0.016
MODEL 2				
Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat)	0.199***	0.067	0.039	- 0.099
MODEL 3				
Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always)	0.023	-0.034	-0.066	0.000
MODEL 4				
Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high)	0.192***	0.094	-0.031	0.029
MODEL 6				
Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5)	-0.042	-0.083	0.091	0.052
Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree)	-0.080*	0.051	-0.066	-0.011
Attachment to people of same race (1-5)	0.049	0.033	-0.169*	-0.239***
MODEL 7				
Prejudice towards the out-group (0=low; 10=high)	0.039	0.071	-0.009	-0.070
Perceived racial threat (1=low; 5=high threat)	0.132**	0.153*	0.062	-0.015
Frequency of racial discrimination (1=none; 4=always)	-0.014	-0.071	-0.104	-0.059
Racial distrust (1=low; 5=high)	0.114**	0.021	-0.100	0.113
Racial contact (1=none; 5=high)	-0.086*	-0.025	0.126	0.186*

Quality of racial contact (1=negative; 5=positive)	-0.028	-0.049	-0.138	-0.129
Importance of belonging to one's race group (1-5)	-0.020	-0.144	0.115	-0.006
Ashamed of race group (1=strongly agree; 5=strongly disagree)	-0.003	0.041	-0.010	0.020
Attachment to people of same race (1-5)	0.032	-0.041	-0.101	-0.260***
No. obs	1315	305	254	239
R-Squared	0.109	0.506	0.313	0.480
R-Squared (racial attitudes only, excl. background variables)	0.055	0.140	0.078	0.221

Source: HSRC SASAS 2016.

Note: All models included socio-demographic, geographic and political identification variables, though the coefficients for these other measures are not presented here. Standardised beta coefficients are displayed in the models. Statistical significance is denoted as follows: *=p<0.05, **=p<0.01, ***=p<0.001.

In models 1 through 6, the individual testing of the racial attitudes measures shows that out-group prejudice yields little statistical effect on support for restitution. In the case of coloured adults, out-group prejudice was associated with a slightly more favourable view of restitution, but the effect is relatively weak. While the variable is statistically insignificant for other population groups, it is, however, interesting to note the sign of the coefficient. For black African and coloured adults the coefficient is positive, while it is negative for Indian and white adults. So the tendency is for out-group prejudice to reduce support for restitution among Indian and white adults but promote support for coloured and black African adults. Similar to Durrheim et al (2009), we note that perceived racial threat is only a significant predictor of restitution support among black African adults, with feelings of material and symbolic threat leading to a greater demand for restitution. Reported personal and collective racial discrimination was not a determinant of support for restitution for any population group. This is an interesting finding, as it suggests that unfair treatment on the basis of

race, directed at oneself and one's population group, is not on average a notable determinant of restitution attitudes. Racial distrust again appears to exert an influence on the demand for restitution exclusively among black African adults, with those expressing greater distrust generally favouring restitution more strongly.

With respect to racial contact, the frequency of contact is only significant for white adults, where increased contact with other population groups increases support for restitution. Again, although not statistically significant, the sign of the coefficients are noteworthy in the other cases. For black African and coloured adults, increased contract with other population groups has a small negative effect on the demand for restitution, while for Indian adults it has a marginally positive effect. If the quality of the contact variable is left out of Model 5 (results not shown), the coefficient for black African adults achieves statistical significance at the 95% confidence level (p=0.024). As for the quality of contact, for black African and coloured adults, more positive interracial encounters tend to produce a slightly less favourable view of restitution, with no effect present for Indian or white adults. These findings tend to confirm the presence of an 'ironic' or 'sedative' effect of interracial contact on the attitudes of historically disadvantaged groups (Cakal et al 2011; Dixon et al 2013, 2017).

In terms of in-group identification, Model 6 shows that, on average, a belief in the importance of in-group racial belonging is not significant for any population group. Furthermore, the absence of an emotional sense of shame regarding one's race group leads to slightly lower support for restitution among black African adults but not for other population groups. However, feeling an actual sense of racial attachment significantly reduces support to racial redress for white adults and, to a lesser degree, Indian adults. This mirrors the broader literature which anchors white opposition to racial policies on collective self-interest.

In Model 7, all the racial attitudes variables are entered jointly. For black African adults, the positive effect of racial threat and racial distrust remain, while the sedative effect of frequency of racial contact becomes significant while the quality of contact loses its salience. For coloured adults, the significance of racial threat continues to demonstrate a positive association with support for restitution, while the quality of racial contact falls away. No other racial attitudes variables in the model are significant. In the case of Indian adults, none of the variables in this fully specified model exerts a bearing on restitution attitudes.

Lastly, for white adults, the most salient effect is in relation to in-group racial attachment, which significantly reduces restitution support. The only other significant effect is the frequency of racial contact, which tends to encourage a more accepting view of restitution.

In sum, the effects of racial attitudes on policy preferences are complex and varied for different population groups. Interpretation is further complicated by the fact that certain effects that are discerned when racial attitudes sub-construct items are individually modelled lose their salience once all the items are combined into a single model. Although a range of effects are present, based on the full model it was found that racial threat and racial distrust had the largest (positive) effect on support for restitution for black African adults, while in-group attachment had the largest effect in the cases of white adults. In the case of coloured adults, the racial threat is the sole racial attitudes variable yielding a significant effect on the demand for restitution, while none of the measures has a discernible effect in the case of Indian adults. As the R-Squared statistics in the table show, the combined effect of racial attitudes on policy opposition was modest for all except white adults, where the explanatory power was considerably larger. This begs the question as to what may account for the unexplained variance in the models, especially in the case of black South Africans. That is, we still do not know what underpins opposition to restitution in the case of black South Africans.

In this regard, there are possible avenues for speculation, particularly around how restitution is framed and the reality of social amnesia as a national posture regarding unjust legacies of the past. In the case of the latter, perhaps this relatively moderate support for restitution among the black African majority reflects a disposition toward social amnesia. The Institute for Justice and Reconciliation's reconciliation barometer noted that two-thirds of South Africans support the idea of forgetting the past and moving on (Wale 2013). In this survey, we defined restitution as compensation meant to address the damages of the past. As such, the middling levels of support for restitution among the black African majority could be symptomatic of this willingness to forget the past. This is because restitution evokes moral and civic engagement with a past we are all too willing to forget.

Support for restitution among black South Africans can be described as lukewarm when compared to support for government-led reform policies, such

as affirmative action and land reform. While we defined restitution in relation to policies like affirmative action and land reform, the examples of restitution we used conceptualised restitution as an individual and collective moral responsibility. This paradigm shift, and the results associated with it, are relevant for two reasons. Firstly, it indicates the possibility that within racial groups, we are worlds apart when it comes to thinking about who is ultimately responsible for restitution. This is a function of how restitution is framed, whether as an individual or government responsibility.

Framing restitution as an individual and collective moral responsibility means that the responsibility to do restitution falls on all South Africans. It is thus a responsibility we carry out alongside state initiatives. Perhaps the moderate support we find among black South Africans is predicated on a reluctance to embrace restitution as an individual and collective responsibility. This could be on two levels. Black South Africans may not feel that restitution requires anything of them because they are victims of historical and on-going racial injustice. Moreover, given that the examples provided mostly targeted white South Africans, there may be some level of scepticism and distrust that white South Africans can be expected to make restitution at an individual and collective level.

Secondly, the lukewarm support we observed might be predicated on the perception that the account of restitution advanced in the survey was punitive. That is, the examples targeting white South Africans could be viewed as a means of punishing them and thus unfair. This could be part of broader deference to a social cohesion argument wherein the survey's account of restitution is believed to foster social instability and conflict rather than transformation. Furthermore, it may be the case that the somewhat unenthusiastic attitude of black South Africans reflects a South Africa that is worlds apart when it comes to the type of language we want to use in pursuit of racial equality. If the speculation about the perceived punitive nature of restitution is anything to go by, then the modest levels of support could reflect a preference for softer terms like 'transformation' and even 'reconciliation', which have featured more extensively in South African public discourse.

Conclusion

This article represents one of the first nationally-representative, survey-based examinations of South African public attitudes framed explicitly around the concept of restitution. Much of the existing research and associated literature has relied on terms such as redistribution, redress and transformation. The experimental survey module on which the analysis is based builds on the recent theoretical contributions to the meaning and relevance of social restitution in contemporary South Africa made by Swartz (2016). There could not be a more opportune moment to build a more nuanced understanding of public predispositions towards restitution, and the factors than inform individual-level support and opposition. The challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment continue to afflict society and have fostered a growing tendency of frustration and discontent with the pace of economic and social transformation. This cuts across race, class, gender and generation, and is resulting in fundamental questioning and debate about the nature of the post-apartheid social compact, appropriate modes of social policy, and the kind of society that we want.

Our interrogation of the strength and profile of support for restitution in South Africa reveals deep polarizations around the fault line of race. Characterising South Africans as worlds apart within and between racial groups when it comes to resitution is foreboding. These deep divisions can impinge on the prospects of the kind of social cohesion that would obtain in a morally and politically just society. These divisions also reflect a level of social conflict that remains ominous for future projects around restitution and social justice, as they might be carried out in a country where social relations are increasingly estranged, culminating in a tipping point where racial inequality becomes intractable. This could fuel more radical voices, making it hard to normalise a social cohesion discourse on both the left, where change is a function of revolution, and the right, often characterised by persistent fear mongering.

ISSN 1013-1108

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