

# THE SOUTH AFRICAN ELECTION OF 2014: RETROSPECT AND PROSPECT

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## 1. Introduction

The outcome of the 7 May 2014 general elections in South Africa would seem to indicate, at first glance, that the business of democracy is continuing as usual. As *Table 1* suggests, the African National Congress (ANC) may have obtained its lowest ever share of the vote, yet it obtained a result that was in many ways remarkable given its 20 years in power. Indeed, far from choosing to turn the rascals out, the electorate returned them with a resounding 62 per cent of the poll, only marginally less than in 1994. Further, it re-elected the ANC in eight out of the nine provinces (it having always previously won outright in seven or more). Correspondingly, the Democratic Alliance (DA) continued its steady rise in the polls, defying oft-made predictions that it in 2009 it was approaching its 'racial ceiling' (that is, that while able to aggregate the votes of racial minorities, it is unable to attract the votes of black Africans). Thirdly, while much hype has accompanied the birth of the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), the latter's securing of over six per cent of the votes — while highly creditable for a party formed only months before the election — may define it as a new 'third' party along the lines of the United Democratic Movement (UDM) in 1999 and the Congress of the People (Cope) in 2009. As with the EFF, both of these were essentially breakaways from the ANC, and both proved unable to maintain their share of the vote after a reasonable first showing. This points to a fourth dimension of election 2014 — the continuing squeeze of the smaller parties, and the seeming drift towards a *de facto* two-party system, within the context of ANC party dominance (Southall 2014).

ANC intellectual Pallo Jordan (2014) has compared the result of

the 2014 election with that of 1994, and concluded that South Africa is coming to resemble a 'normal' democracy, with the DA having taken the place of the New National Party —NNP (and drawing its votes from the same electoral basis). Such a 'normal' democracy does not, self-evidently, exclude the representation of parties other than the big two, yet it manages to severely constrain their electoral territory. This and other tendencies are illustrated by *Table 1*:

There is much to be said for the 'business as usual' perspective on the 2014 elections. Nonetheless, it is arguable that if we dig beneath the surface, then the outcome also points to undercurrents that are likely to challenge the character of South African democracy. In what follows below, I suggest:

- first, that while continuing to remain solid overall, the foundations of the ANC's vote are beginning to crumble;
- second, that the DA gives every indication that it will continue to rise in the polls;
- third, that even if the EFF proves no more able than the UDM and Cope to sustain a significant political presence, its appearance suggests a new dimension to 'third' party politics.

## **2. The ANC: Defying expectations — but for how long?**

The ANC entered the election against the background of opinion polls that suggested that it might be hauled back to just over 50 per cent of the vote. Widespread labour disputes, highlighted by the tragedy of Marikana (when police killed 44 striking mineworkers) and the long running strike on the platinum mines, combined with other depressing news to contribute to declining confidence in the economy. The death of Nelson Mandela in December 2013 symbolised for many the end of an era, reinforcing narratives that the ANC had lost its idealism, and had become the vehicle of a political class out of touch with its historic constituency amongst, notably, the poor. Indeed, a continuing high level of popular protests among communities around the country highlighted deep-seated discontent with government performance on the ground. Meanwhile, the coalition which had elevated Jacob Zuma to the presidency had begun to dissolve, and the President himself, a major asset in the elections of 2009, had become a major electoral liability, with numerous allega-

**Table 1: Summary Results of the National Elections <sup>1)</sup>**

Party	Percentage of Votes					Number of Seats				
	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014
ANC	62.7	66.4	69.7	65.9	62.2	252	266	279	264	249
DP/DA	1.7	9.6	12.4	16.7	22.2	7	38	50	67	89
NP/NNP	20.4	6.9	1.7	-	-	82	28	7	-	-
IFP	10.5	8.6	6.9	4.6	2.4	43	34	28	18	10
COPE	-	-	-	7.4	0.7	-	-	-	30	3
EFF	-	-	-	-	6.4	-	-	-	-	25
Other Parties	4.7	8.5	9.3	5.4	6.1	16	34	36	31	24

tions that he had used state office to benefit his family and those around him at public expense. Further, the tripartite alliance which linked the ANC to the South African Communist Party (SACP) to Cosatu (the Congress of South African trade unions), was openly divided. Not only had the expulsion of Julius Malema, the former president of the ANC Youth League from the ANC in 2012 led to the creation of the EFF, but Cosatu was faced by the prospect of a breakaway to its left by forces congregated around the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (Numsa). In short, the ANC entered the election on the defensive, under widespread attack for having failed to reap the dividends of democracy (Southall 2014).

In the event, of course, the ANC managed to turn the difficult situation it was facing around. Which other governing parties around the world would not be delighted to secure a 62 per cent victory at the polls? How did the ANC manage to achieve this, seemingly against the odds?

The immediate answer is that South African voting behaviour is rooted in political identity, and for the majority of black South Africans this means that they identify with the ANC. This is their default position, so come an election campaign, the ANC works hard to ensure that identity turns into votes. In successive studies of the ANC's election campaigns in 2009 and 2014, Anthony Butler has demonstrated the organisational strength and finesse of the ANC. It is based upon a profound and methodical approach to election campaigning, which begins as much as a year before any particular election. It is shaped by extensive research (from polls to focus groups), and is carefully adapted to provincial peculiarities. It draws upon a mass membership, with branches located in virtually every community across the land, with cross membership of Cosatu enabling it, among other things, to mobilise numerous school teachers and public officials on its behalf. Furthermore, it usually centres its campaigning around its leader, while simultaneously keeping the temperature of its electioneering low (so as not to provide undue opportunities to its opponents). Lastly, it is able to call upon massive financial resources: quite how much money it throws into its campaign it is difficult to ascertain, but there is no doubt whatsoever that the amounts it can call upon dwarf those available to even the DA. Nor is it shy of diverting state resources to its cause (Butler 2009, 2014).

If this is the general picture, there are always difficulties peculiar to any individual campaign. In 2014, embarrassing instances of Zuma being roundly heckled at mass gatherings led to his appearances being

very carefully controlled. The ANC faced a particularly difficult challenge in Gauteng, where the party's provincial organisation was hostile to Zuma's leadership, trade unions with large memberships (notably Numsa) were refusing to campaign for the party, and there was widespread opposition to the 'e-tolling' of the major highways. Furthermore, as will be elaborated below, both the DA and the EFF posed new problems which the ANC had to negotiate. Nonetheless, overall, the ANC juggernaut managed to steamroller its way to a comfortable victory in circumstances which were more difficult than in any previous election. Even so, there are grounds for arguing that the ANC should be worried. I highlight two here:

First, the electoral demography is changing. The voting age population (VAP) is becoming younger. Whereas in 1996 36 per cent of the population was in the 15-34 age group and 24 per cent in the 35-64 category, by 2011 the former proportion had increased to 44 per cent and the latter had decreased to 21 per cent. While on the whole we may accept that younger people are likely to vote in much the same way as their parents, it is generally accepted that their levels of commitment to a particular party are likely to be less strong. Prior to the election, then Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe warned that voters were increasingly inclined to judge the ANC not by its 'glorious history' but by its performance in government (*Financial Times* 2014). Although he was not referring specifically to the 'born free' generation, it is more than likely that he had such voters particularly in mind. In any case, as Schulz-Herzenberg (2006; 2009) has demonstrated, levels of party 'partisanship' are declining, suggesting movement towards a more open political terrain. It is relevant, in this regard, to note that whereas the ANC obtained the votes of some 53 per cent of the VAP in 1994, its similar proportion came down to 35 per cent in 2014.

The fluidity of the electorate is further illustrated by registration trends. The Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) is credited with having undertaken the chore of registering eligible voters efficiently, and it claims to have arrested a decline in the level of registration, increasing it from 77 per cent in 2009 to 81 per cent in 2014. However, Schulz-Herzenberg (2014b: 20-24) has pointed out that because the IEC based its calculations upon the population size as reported by the census of 2011, rather than from updated estimates of an increasing population as offered by Statistics South Africa in 2013, it overestimated the level of registration, which falls back to 78 per cent if the latter figures are

used. In other words, well over 20 per cent of the VAP is either unable or disinclined to vote.

While this is bad news for democracy in general, it is rather worse news for the ANC than for its principal rivals. This is for the simple reason that, while the population as a whole is becoming increasingly urbanised, registration levels tend to be higher in rural areas than in urban areas, yet it is in the former where the ANC is at most advantage. It is only the ANC which can claim to have established a deeply rooted organisational structure of branches in the rural areas, these in turn backed up at election time by the authority of traditional leaders, which since 1994 have been brought in line with the ruling party and who play an important part in mobilising the vote. Rural bias in voting patterns is also shaped by the preponderance of women amongst the registered electorate (55 per cent). In short, as the tide of migration from rural to urban areas continues, so it is likely to erode the foundations of a rural vote which plays a major role in sustaining ANC hegemony. In contrast, urban populations — increasingly subject to a greater diversity of influences — are likely to be more discriminating (fickle!) in their political affiliations.

The second challenge which confronts the ANC which can be usefully highlighted is that hitherto it has not been faced by a party of opposition which has been seriously capable of appealing to the majority black African vote. The latter has never been unanimous. While the majority portion has always gone to the ANC, there have always been significant minorities of black Africans who have voted for other parties: some because they are invested in rival political traditions (such as the Pan Africanist Congress —PAC), some for ethnic-political reasons (for example, the Inkatha Freedom Party [IFP] of Chief Mangosothu Buthelezi), some because for one reason or another they have wanted to register a protest vote against the ANC leadership without abandoning the ANC tradition altogether (the UDM and Cope). In short, there is much to be said for the argument that while disillusion with the ANC has become widespread, many ANC voters have stuck with the ruling party because for them there has been no credible alternative party to vote for. However, the evidence — borne out by the 2014 election outcome — is that this situation may be changing.

Let us start by examining the increasingly credible challenge being offered by the DA.

### 3. The DA's ever rising ceiling

As *Table 1* indicates, the DA's vote has increased remarkably since 1994. In that year, despite the DA's predecessor, the Democratic Party, having punched well beyond its weight, and despite the fact that the new democratic constitution largely reflected its political principles, it polled a miserable 1.7 per cent of the vote. Its appeal was always going to lie mostly with the racial minorities, yet in 1994 the latter — if not celebrating with the ANC — largely plumped for the devil they knew, the National Party (NP, later the *New National Party*). The story is now well known how, in subsequent years, NP/NNP inability to decide whether to coalesce with the ANC or to espouse opposition led to internal divisions, its unlamented demise, and the migration of its support base to the DA. Under the assertive leadership of Tony Leon, the DA proceeded to claim the overwhelming majority of white and Coloured votes. This was achieved through a mix of robust opposition and the absorption of other parties (notably Patricia de Lille's Independent Democrats alongside much of the NNP) in the guise of coalition. In so doing, it was to earn the scorn of the ANC as the party for whites, the further accusation being made that it wanted to take the country back to *apartheid*. And so on and so forth. Whatever the flow of insults, Tony Leon could legitimately claim, with his characteristically insouciant belligerence: 'Job well done!'

Under Helen Zille, who replaced Tony Leon as leader, the DA has sought very deliberately to change its profile. On the one hand, it has continued to consolidate its hold over the racial minorities (aided by the fact that under the influence of President Thabo Mbeki, the ANC was to become increasingly Africanist, despite its continuing to formally adhere to a non-racial platform). On the other, it has recognised that ultimately, in a country where three quarters of the population is black African, it has to expand its appeal to African voters if it is to continue to grow.

To be fair, the DA's strategy is backed by far more than just cynical electoral calculations. It espouses a significantly different ideological path to the ANC. Its mantra of an 'open opportunity society' argues that societal benefit is more likely to be fostered by enabling individuals to better themselves within a broadly free-enterprise economy than by ANC emphases upon collectivism and extensive state intervention. Yet

whatever the merits of such a position, they have to be sold to a black African majority for whom the DA's origins in the former white parliament, and its forthright backing of capitalism (in contrast to the ANC's ambiguous attitude towards a still white-dominated private sector), arouses considerable suspicion.

The DA's efforts to expand its support base have both style and substance. Style has been transformed, led forcefully by the Xhosa-speaking Zille leading her troops into the townships, bedecked by the DA's blue T-shirts, and emulating virtually all the dancing and celebratory techniques previously the property of the ANC. White decorum has given way to black *joi-de-vivre*, along with DA loud challenge to the ANC's monopoly claim to have driven the struggle for liberation. Substance has changed too. Major efforts have been made to recruit black Africans into the party machinery, and to promote their role in the National Assembly and the provincial legislatures. With Helen Zille choosing to serve as premier of the Western Cape after the election in 2009, Lindiwe Mazibuko assumed the role of leader of the opposition in the National Assembly, despite her youth and inexperience. In the most recent contest, the DA's charge in the strategically important province of Gauteng was led by the impressive Mmusi Maimane, who launched out on what Jolobe (2014) describes as an 'Obama-like' campaign. Following the election, with Mazibuko opting to resign to study abroad (and thereby to avoid a bruising fight to maintain her parliamentary leadership), Maimane has taken her place, backed by a team of MPs a significant number of whom are black African. Today, the DA archly claims to be the true party of non-racialism, contrasting its multi-coloured hue with the overwhelmingly African membership of the ANC.

The transformation of the DA has not been without its tribulations. Zille's endorsement of DA-style affirmative action and black economic empowerment (BEE) has aroused the ire of some of the party's old guard, who complain that stress on pigmentation rather than individual merit contradicts the party's ideology of merit and individualism. Counter-critics have responded that South Africa's history demands deliberate efforts at redress, claiming its consonance with JS Mill and historic liberalism (Vigne and Lipton 2014). Further, as the party cohort in parliament grows, it risks the intra-party struggles which since 1994 have so overtly characterised the ANC — although Zille lays great stress upon the fact that intra-party battles are fought openly in democratically run contests. Whatever the costs, the increasing racial diversity of the



DA's assembled ranks in parliament and elsewhere ensure that the ANC's constant sniping at its being a party for whites sound increasingly hollow.

The assertion that the DA is confronted by a 'racial ceiling' has been a constant of analytical focus upon its potential for expansion (for example, Maloka 2011; Southern and Southall 2011). A consensus has built around the impermeability of the DA's racial image (that is, as a party objectively defending historically accrued racial privilege), blocking the significant expansion of its black African voter base. Focus-group research amongst black middle class voters (regularly touted as the DA's particular target group) has backed this unwanted perception (Everatt 2012, Ngoma 2014). Basically, the findings that emerge are that black voters admire the DA in many ways. They value its role in demanding accountability from an ANC which many view as increasingly corrupt, and many endorse a view that it is likely to perform better at delivering services and promoting an efficiently functioning economy. Even so, most blacks participating in focus groups have nonetheless stopped short of saying that they are prepared to vote for the DA. Quite simply, it goes against the grain of their interpretation of history, and their sense of identity as Africans. Come election time, they imply, they opt either return home to the ANC, vote for a party such as Cope which resonates with the liberation tradition, or simply abstain from voting.

Such findings constitute bad news for the DA. However, the DA has set out to prove such prognostications wrong. Even if the carefully devised photogenic images which it regularly conjures up (often a jauntily dressed Helen Zille flanked by party attired black groupies) owe as much to modern electioneering techniques as to reality, they state that there are increasing numbers of black Africans happy to openly identify with the party. Furthermore, whereas in 1994 it was difficult for 'white parties' to campaign freely in black areas, now the legitimacy of the DA staging rallies in 'ANC territory' is widely admitted. It follows, too, that success breeds success. Today in control of the Western Cape provincial government and a fair sprinkling of local municipalities around the country, the DA has largesse to provide in terms of political opportunities for the ambitious. This means that at times it gets burnt by the politically unscrupulous, yet this goes with the territory of power. The upshot of these and other factors is that the DA is beginning to increase its black African vote significantly.

Overall, the DA reckons that some 760 000 of its enlarged vote

in 2014 (4.09 million, up 1.15 million on 2009) came from black Africans. Presuming that it had already attracted something of a black vote in earlier years, this would seem to suggest that about a quarter of its support is now coming from black voters. Yet what the socio-economic profile of these voters are remains something of a mystery, demanding further analysis. It could well be that while black middle class individuals are increasingly prepared to vote for the DA, they are not yet prepared to admit it!

None of this disproves the view that the DA is constrained by a 'racial ceiling' — yet it does suggest that somehow the height of the latter is raising! Perhaps if — as seems quite possible — Maimane succeeds Zille as leader before the 2016 local government elections, the DA may snub its critics by bursting right through its roof and sweeping to power in one or more further metros (Nelson Mandela in Eastern Cape the most likely, with Johannesburg a reasonable possibility).

Such a triumph might be facilitated by the lower turnout rate which is customary in local government elections, and a greater propensity of ANC voters to register protests. One outcome in various councils across the land might be the need for power at local level to be exercised by coalitions. But who would coalesce with whom?

#### **4. The EFF – Survival beyond infancy?**

The EFF was a product of two intersecting events: Malema's expulsion from the ANC and the Marikana massacre. When his final efforts to remain in the ANC had failed, Malema had been freed from political constraints and enabled to present himself as a champion of the poor. While the striking mineworkers at Marikana had repudiated ANC politicians, they had lionised Malema, who had yoked support for their wage demands to the need for radical economic transformation. The EFF soon positioned itself as the vehicle for all those who had lost patience with the ANC. Initially it looked as though it would target the youth, particularly after the collapse of ANC Youth League structures. But soon it cast its net much wider, appealing to the unemployed and blacks who felt their upward mobility was blocked by white racism. Appropriating a populist-militarist persona, with Malema its 'Commander in Chief' atop an army of red-bereted foot-soldiers, the EFF proclaimed itself a government-in-waiting (Sosibo 2013).

The EFF's manifesto was radical nationalist. The state would be

empowered to take over all land without compensation; it would take 60 per cent ownership of mines, banks and other sectors of the economy; the Reserve Bank would be nationalised; state-owned enterprises would be placed under worker control; BEE and affirmative action would be vigorously pursued; sustainable development would be promoted by local beneficiation of mineral resources and small enterprises; a minimum of wage of R4 500 per month would be instituted for all full time workers; salaries of public servants would be increased by 50 per cent; existing social grants would be doubled; free quality education, health-care, houses and sanitation would be provided for all; privileges for politicians would be curbed; and the EFF would enhance the accountability of state institutions (EFF 2013).

The articulation of its programme enabled the incorporation into the EFF of a number of various individuals and small pre-existing organisations which were already dismissive of the 1994 settlement and of the ANC for collaborating with the white capitalist establishment. Its radicalism also appealed to young black activist intellectuals for whom the ANC had become too staid. Given the lack of an organisational structure on the ground, the resultant political amalgam was glued together by the popular appeal of Malema, who grew in stature throughout the campaign.

The EFF's claim to be a government-in-waiting was as nonsensical as its programme was unrealistic, yet this was scarcely a constraint for a party which in essence was articulating a cry of pain from impoverished communities which felt that they had been left out in the cold by the ANC. Yet ultimately its appeal was limited, largely confined to the platinum belt alongside the Malema followership in his home province of Limpopo. Even so, for a party which had very limited financial and other resources, its electoral performance — gaining 6.4 per cent of the vote, 25 MPs, the status of official opposition in Limpopo and North West, and a total of 30 representatives in provincial legislatures, was highly credible. The 2014 election saw the EFF replacing Cope as the third party in South African politics (Robinson 2014). Yet numerous doubts attend the prospects of its longevity.

For the moment, the EFF is indulging in political theatre to proclaim its difference from the political establishment. The challenge to established parliamentary culture by its adoption of a bright red political uniform (overalls for males, maids-wear for women) has already caused clashes with officials, its tactics already leading to EFF walk-outs and

expulsions from legislatures. An offer to the ANC to lend its support to enable it to secure a two-thirds majority to pass constitutional amendments concerning property rights in order to implement radical land reform was also designed to highlight its commitment to radical change. However, while such tactics may shake up legislative practice in the short term, it seems unlikely that they will make a significant impact in the long term. When it comes to the crunch, to the hard work of demanding accountability from government and debating proposed legislation, the EFF is likely to be found wanting — not merely because of the youth and inexperience of its representatives, but from their being far more geared to spectacle than the hard graft of critique. In this, they are unlikely to seriously challenge the DA.

Furthermore, although the EFF has injected a significant element of class politics into the parliamentary arena and although its vocal representation of impoverished elements is to be strongly welcomed, this will not go unchallenged. First, there is no guarantee that the EFF coalition will hold together (there is already suggestion of internal dissidence within its ranks, notably in Gauteng, and some evidence of discontented individuals heading back to the ANC) (*City Press*, 2014). It may well prove highly combustible, rivalling Cope in a rush to extinction.

Second, the unspoken truce which existed between the EFF and various groupings on the left which obtained during the election may well give way, especially if Numsa fulfils its promise to become the core of a new party of labour. Basically, such organisations viewed the EFF as populist and Malema — who has yet to have his day in court to defend himself against charges of corruption — as fraudulently radical. Nonetheless, they appreciated the need to take the EFF seriously, for it clearly had appeal for constituencies whose support they themselves coveted. Consequently, while it is possible that a new labour party could negotiate some sort of coalition or merger with the EFF, it is equally likely that the formation of a new movement around Numsa will lead to a battle for territory to the left of the ANC. Furthermore, EFF Mugabe-style radical nationalist populism is likely to sit uneasily alongside a more coherent socialist alternative articulated by Numsa, despite shared rejections of neo-liberalism and imperialism. And would Malema himself be prepared to subject himself to the bottom up democracy which Numsa is likely to espouse? Or would Numsa be prepared to fall in behind an ideologically wayward Malema? For the moment, all we can say with certainty is that we simply don't know. But what we do know is that

election 2014 has rendered the political situation more fluid than at any time since 1994.

## **5. Looking forward**

It has been widely asserted that significant change will only come to the post-1994 political landscape when there is a fracture within the tripartite alliance. Usually this has been taken to mean that change will only come when the organised left (Cosatu and the SACP) take their leave from the ANC. In echo of much interpretation of the ANC's history, this would give form to long standing tensions between 'nationalist' and 'communist' tendencies within the movement, enabling them to go their separate ways. The nationalist wing would thereafter be free to negotiate coalitions to parties to its right; the communist wing with organisations to its left. Politics would thereupon move towards a post-nationalist class basis, akin to Pallo Jordan's 'normal democracy'.

The problem with such prognostications is that they are simply too neat and tidy. What is true is that a significant reshaping of the party system is likely to come about only as a result of some rupture within the tripartite alliance. For all that the DA may continue to push its 'racial ceiling' upwards, it seems inherently likely that it will be able to make such constant inroads into black communities that it will become capable of dislodging the ANC on its own. What seems far more likely is that, whilst continuing to consolidate its rise as the major party of opposition, any catching up with the ANC will be as much dependent upon the latter losing votes to the left as to the DA picking up its votes to the right. Yet present indications are that that any such scenario will not come about in a clear cut fashion, not least because those continuing to back the tripartite alliance will launch a vigorous counter-attack upon their opponents.

Under Zuma, the SACP has been entrenched at the heart of government. Indeed, many would say it has disproportionate representation in the cabinet and in provincial executives, as well as having disproportionate influence in many policy decisions. It is highly unlikely to abandon such advantage, and while making hay while the sun shines, will seek to extend its grip on power beyond the Zuma presidency. Moreover, the fact that many trade union leaders at national and lower levels are members of the SACP provides it with major leverage within Cosatu, notably within public sector unions. Further, dual membership

of the ANC and SACP opens pathways to political office and upward mobility, access to material improvement for officials all wrapped up in the quasi-revolutionary rhetoric of the National Democratic Revolution. In short, the SACP is going to work desperately hard to keep the tripartite alliance together, and to portray those working to break it as counter-revolutionary.

When the tripartite alliance splits, it is therefore probable that it will not be a matter of the SACP or Cosatu breaking cleanly with the ANC. Rather, individual unions are likely to split into majority and minority factions, public sector union majorities largely adhering to the tripartite alliance, private sector majorities (which have benefited far less from the ANC in power) largely breaking with it. Even that is too simple, for a breach within Cosatu will also set off extensive intra-union rivalries, as the different factions scramble for members and the right to retain union names, buildings and financial resources. The struggle will be bitter — indeed, it has already started. The SACP is constantly calling for the unity of the working class in face of reactionary forces; Numsa general secretary, Irvin Jim, is repudiating Cosatu claims that his union's current strike action (July 2014) is primarily designed to destabilise the ANC; and the inter-union violence that has characterised the post-Marikana industrial conflict may well spread, reaching far into the workplace and communities as well as the wider political arena.

For the moment it is obviously impossible to predict how such political struggles will eventuate. However, if (more likely, when) Numsa leads the way to a new party of socialism, it will provide a more coherent alternative to the ANC than the EFF, and one that is more deeply rooted in workplace and social movement structures. While claiming that the ANC has betrayed its liberation heritage and is in bed with capital, it will seek to revive traditions of popular struggle (reminiscent of the 1970s labour movement and the United Democratic Front — UDF) which were independent of the liberation movement. How successful it will be in securing popular support and translating it into votes remains dependent upon multiple factors: not only whether it will collaborate or compete with the EFF, but also the strength of the ANC/SACP counteroffensive.

Few would be so bold as to suggest that a Numsa-formed party will be able to challenge the ANC for a majority. However, it is not so rash to predict that it will perform much better than either a Cope or an EFF, perhaps obtaining 15 or 20 per cent of the vote, thereby placing the ANC majority in peril, both nationally and in key provinces (notably

Gauteng). In such a case, the ANC could be forced into coalition — but whether with the DA or any new party of labour would remain to be seen (dependent upon what it likes to term the 'balance of forces').

Leaving aside any changes in policy which mounting electoral threat would propel the ANC into pursuing (presently, promises of radical shifts in economic policy vie with calls for the nation to group around the National Development Plan — NDP), the principal challenge may well be to the quality of democracy. Will the ANC opt to abide by the constitution, free elections, and 'normal democracy'? Or will it use state powers to entrench its domination by foul means as well as fair? We cannot know the answer yet, but we can expect that the years before the next national election in 2019 are likely to offer an exceptionally bumpy ride.

## Endnotes

1. Condensed from Schulz-Herzenberg, C (2014a: Table 4, 194-195).

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