Race and "the Animal" in the Post-Apartheid 'National Symbolic'

Benita de Robillard

Interdisciplinary Arts and Culture Studies, Wits School of Arts
University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa

Benita.derobillard@wits.ac.za

Ruth Lipschitz

Department of Multimedia, Faculty of Art, Design and Architecture,
University of Johannesburg, Johannesburg, South Africa

ruthl@uj.ac.za

ABSTRACT

This article addresses cultural formations of race and "the animal" within the contemporary post/apartheid setting. In opening up this question, we have in our sights the domain of the nationscape that Lauren Berlant (1997:26) terms the 'National Symbolic': namely, 'an imaginary, chimerical, and affect-laden screen projection through which citizens venture to "grasp the nation in its totality"' (de Robillard 2014:84). Our contention is that anti-racist politics in South Africa must confront the primal scene of the constitution of race through species and the 'zoologo-racial order' it installs (Kim 2016:17). By putting what is called the "animal" into question, we outline how the politics of animalisation intersects with what Claire Jean Kim (2016:20) terms 'race-species meanings'. We draw on scholars whose work has shown that what is construed as "human" and what the human constructs as "animal" produces a 'necropolitical' (Mbembe 2003:14) zone with fatal consequences for those who are animalised (Mbembe 2001:2; Wolfe 2012; Derrida 1988; Haraway 2007; Braidotti 2013). Our paper is predicated on Jacques Derrida's observation that a distinction is made in law between criminal forms of 'putting to death' and 'non-criminal putting to death' (Derrida 1988:278). Species difference, as we show, conditions this distinction. This process effects a politics of animalisation that functions as a racialising technology that can be transferred to any species, as the examples from the post/apartheid setting that we analyse attest. We conclude by using Donna Haraway's and Rosi Braidotti's interventions to speculate on a future-oriented path for rethinking the question of race in its relation to "the animal".

Keywords: race, the animal, non-human, South Africa, nation, post/apartheid.

> A posthuman ethics for a non-unitary subject proposes an enlarged sense of inter-connection between self and others, including the non-human … others, by removing the obstacle of self-centered individualism. (Braidotti 2013:49-50).

> Figuring the animal, we configure the human. (Clark 1997:169).

This article addresses cultural formations of race and "the animal" within the contemporary post/apartheid setting. When using the term post/apartheid we acknowledge that apartheid is not post: its material, ethical, and political, effects saturate the present.[1] In opening up this question, what we have in our sights is the domain of the nationscape that Lauren Berlant (1997:26) terms the 'National Symbolic': namely, 'an imaginary, chimerical and affect-laden screen projection through which citizens venture to "grasp the nation in its totality"' (de Robillard 2014:10).[2] The human/animal problem has resurfaced in the humanities with a renewed sense of urgency and has inaugurated the 'animal turn', which highlights the biopolitical features of the human/animal nexus (Wolfe 2012; Haraway & Wolfe 2016; Broglio, Sellbach & Turner 2018). Scholarship that examines the race-animal linkage in the South African context testifies to its roots in colonial and apartheid bio-necropolitical systems. This work details scientific racism's effects within the history of South Africa's racialising technologies with particular emphasis on the Sara Baartman and "Hottentot Venus's" constructions (Erasmus 2008). Other work includes literary analyses that track the race-animal constellation in contemporary novels.[3] Contemporary South African visual artists whose work has been understood to broach the race-animal question include Nandipha Mntambo, Jane Alexander, Dumile Feni, and Jo Ratcliffe.[4] Some scholarship has emerged which analyses representations of animals in contemporary South African visual cultures (Tully 2014; Lipschitz 2015). While it is important to attend to how, and with what effects, animals figure within visual cultures, we align ourselves with critical posthumanism and animal studies both of which, in their current forms, prioritise "the animal's" relation with vectors of power including, race, sex, gender, sexuality, and disability. Critical posthumanism and animal studies foreground the biopolitical stakes of the race-animal interconnection (Jackson 2013). It is to these stakes that we turn our attention in this paper. We do so through reading and conceptualising how racialising technologies in South Africa have always instrumentalised an animalising apparatus, which, as Petković (2016:37) shows, marks some deaths as criminal and others not. Our contention is that anti-racist politics in South Africa must confront the primal scene of the constitution of race through species and the 'zoologo-racial order' it installs (Kim 2016:17). Cary Wolfe (2012:110) foregrounds the salience of species for race in the following terms: 'race is absolutely central to the work of biopolitics, and it is impossible to talk about race without talking about species' (Wolfe 2016:xi). It is impossible because of how animality, as the condition of being

animal that is shared by both human and non-human animals, is deployed in the service of a politics of animalisation. Animalisation refers to a discursive organisation of power, that, like race itself, is a fantasised construct born of the production of knowledges of absolute species separation (Lipschitz 2015:27). Like the imagined distinctions of racist politics, animalisation has real bodily, material, and political effects. The politics of animalisation intersects with what Claire Jean Kim (2016:20) calls 'race-species meanings', which, in turn, entails framing "the human" as "white", as well as defining "the animal". Numerous scholars have shown that what is called "human" and what the human calls "animal" produces a 'necropolitical' (Mbembe 2003:14)[5] zone with fatal consequences for those who are animalised (Mbembe 2001: 2; Wolfe 2012; Derrida 1988; Haraway 2007; Braidotti 2013). Our argument is predicated on Jacques Derrida's observation that a distinction is made in law between criminal forms of 'putting to death' and 'non-criminal putting to death' (Derrida 1988:278). Species difference, as we show, conditions this distinction. This process effects a politics of animalisation that functions as a racialising technology which can be transferred to any species, as the examples from the post/apartheid setting that we analyse attest. One need look no further than some recent news reports and comments on social media in South Africa to locate how these racialising bio-necropolitical technologies are put to work. These examples stage the historical resonances of the race-species order within the present and reveal animalisation's racialising effects. In the concluding section, we draw on Donna Haraway's and Rosi Braidotti's interventions to set out a future-oriented path for rethinking the question of race in its relation to "the animal". As our epigraph suggests, this path leads to a posthuman ethics of self and other that is rooted in a network of expanded connections and responsibilities.

'Non-criminal putting to death' Derrida (1988:278)

The xenophobic violence that scars the post/apartheid nationscape is inextricable from the politics of animalisation that draws on 'race-species meanings' (Kim 2016:20) to distinguish liveable lives from those that are deemed "killable". The internalised work of this politics owes to a primary reduction in which "foreign" bodies are made abject and resignified as "animal" (Lipschitz 2018). Abjection ties the foreign body to that which is foul, impure and a threat to the sovereignty of the subject or social body: in other words, the abject is that which must be violently expelled for the sake of the security, or indeed purity, of the national body. Whether called 'dog' or 'lice' (O'Riordian 2015:[sp], *IOL* 2015:[sp]), the resiginification of the abject as "animal" effects a deadly slippage between metaphor and material bodies, as the deaths and displacement of South Africans mistaken as "foreigners" in the widespread violence of 2008,[6] as well as the

gruesome deaths of, Ernesto Nhamuave (2008) and Emmanuel Sithole (2015), both of whom were caught on camera, can sadly testify.[7] Part of what marks the political and psychological trauma of this animalising violence, is its Negrophobic focus: that is, both victim and perpetrator are marked as black (*Africa Review* 2015:[sp]). While the Negrophobic quality of this brutalising violence remains an unresolved political question, it demonstrates how racial animalisation is itself mobile and available for use through and across any body sufficiently othered as "animal". Agnes Salanje, a Malawian national who fled from Durban, makes this point abundantly clear (*IOL* 2015:[sp]): 'We could have been killed as these South Africans hunted for foreigners, going from door to door. … It's better to be poor than be hunted like dogs because you are a foreigner'. As Salanje's words evidence, abject bodies made animal are the overlooked core around which the complex of race, poverty, anger, and despair are organised. Yet her experience also makes explicit how the violence that produces the 'foreigner-as-animal', is 'bodily and bloodily linked to the abject formation of the killable' (Lipschitz 2018:16). The black body's abjection and animalisation is, as we explicate later in this article, historically inextricable from the instrumentalisation of 'race-species meanings' (Kim 2016:20).

Turning to another scene of racist animalisation, we now introduce cases in which white farmers have been charged with shooting and either injuring or killing black men who had worked on their farms. In the cases in question, the farmers claimed that they shot their employees because they mistook them for animals, namely baboons, monkeys, or, in one instance, a warthog. Most of these incidents unfolded in a fairly small region within the Limpopo province. As far as we have been able to determine, the first incident of this kind took place at Vogelenzang farm outside of Musina in June 2004 when Jewell Crossberg, a Limpopo farmer and businessman, shot and killed Jealous Dube. According to reports in the national media, Crossberg shot and killed Dube having fired at 'close range'.[8] These reports noted that Crossberg claimed that he had shot at Dube thinking that he was 'shooting at baboons' (*News24* 2008:[sp]). Crossberg was convicted of murdering Dube as well as four counts of attempted murder for shooting 'in the direction of four of Dube's co-workers' (*News24* 2008:[sp]). In 2008, the Supreme Court of Appeal (SCA) changed Crossberg's murder conviction to culpable homicide.[9] His sentence was therefore reduced from twenty to five years' imprisonment, 'two of which were to be suspended for 5 years' (*News24* 2008:[sp]).

The judgment was written by judge of appeal (JA) MS Navsa, with judges of appeal Brand, Ponnan, and Malan concurring. JA D Mlambo dissented. In support of the judgment, Navsa wrote that 'it is perhaps necessary at the outset to dispel the fundamental misconception that the appellant's defence was that he had mistaken the deceased for a baboon'.[10] In the dissenting opinion, Mlambo argued as follows:

> In the final analysis it is clear, in my respectful view, that having considered the evidence in its totality, the state established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant shot knowingly at his five employees, not to scare off baboons and by so doing intended to murder them, or proceed recklessly in the knowledge that he might.[11]

Navsa emphasised that the appellant's defence was that he thought that baboons, rather than workers, were present and responded to Mlambo's dissenting opinion in the following terms:

> What I cannot understand is why the presence or absence of baboons has assumed such heightened significance in this case. Because even if one were to accept – as my colleague Mlambo appears to – that the appellant falsely conjured up the baboons to explain his resort to his firearm, that hardly justifies the conclusion that the shooting was intentional.[12]

It falls beyond the purview of this article to evaluate the competing opinions that are contained in this SCA judgment. While the SCA's ruling on culpable homicide issues from what the majority opinion deemed to be irregularities in both the investigative procedure and eyewitness testimonies, media reports about the trial stated that Crossberg's defence was that he "mistook" the victim for a baboon. For our purposes, what needs to be appreciated is that these are the terms within which the event was interpreted and discussed in the nationscape and that this defence has since been used by other farmers in the Limpopo region.[13] While we cannot demonstrate that this is the case, we do not think that it would be unreasonable to assume that these alibis have a relationship to the success of the perceived "I thought he was a baboon" defence in the Crossberg case. Particularly, since most of the incidents have taken place in the Limpopo province where the farming and legal communities would no doubt have been concerned to follow developments in the Crossberg trial. That Crossberg's perceived defence can be misread as seemingly credible owes to its intersection with the zoologo-racial precept of the killable animal. For this reason, unlike JA Navsa, we discern that the 'presence or absence of baboons' has a 'heightened significance' in both the Crossberg and subsequent cases. This is a point to which we will return.

Race and "the animal"

In his recent book, *Critique of Black Reason*, Achille Mbembe (2017:54) confronts 'the scandal of humanity' that still scars the meanings of both 'Africa' and 'Blackness' in the present. This scandal is about how the line between the terms "human" and

"blackness" has been imagined, configured, and nourished; as if, paraphrasing Mbembe, in the ideological fabrication of race, to be "black" as well as "human" was an ontological impossibility. For Mbembe, when Frantz Fanon (cited in Mbembe 2017:46) says, 'I am a Human Being', he is positing the idea of a singular humanity in which human agents are not differentiated by race. To suggest this is to transgress an elaborate racial taxonomy in which to be 'black' as well as 'human' is put into question (Mbembe 2017:46). Indeed, it is this separation between the terms "black" and "human" that Fanon (1970) addresses and Mbembe's recent work challenges. Our intervention into the racist episteme that Mbembe charts hones in on how species meanings condition racist logics and technologies.

Species meanings have a long history that the so-called 'animal turn' in the humanities has interrogated in relation to, among others, configurations of sex, gender, race, class.[14] Instead of a firm and inviolable boundary that sets human apart from animal, the question of the animal that has surfaced in the humanities argues for the interrogation of this imagined binary difference.[15] Thus, rather than the "human vs. animal" in the oppositional imaginary that sustains racist thinking, the "human animal" performs an "always-already" impure and compromised border. This impurity signals an animality that is both disavowed and intrumentalised in the politics of life and death, and of making live and making killable.[16]

It is common cause that biological precepts produced in nineteenth-century Europe situated the species of "man" within the animal kingdom. As Zimitri Erasmus (2008:169-170) emphasises, Southern Africa was a site for the production of race science thinking which established the race-species order. The plantation, colonialism, and apartheid, Mbembe (2017:79-87) demonstrates, functioned as laboratories for the production of what he calls 'the black' – a term that signals a body without access to subjectivity; marked, in fact, by an unassimilable alterity that is both phantasmagorical and embodied. Mbembe reminds us that '[t]he Black Man is above all a body – gigantic and fantastic – member, organs, color, a smell, flesh, and meat, an extraordinary accumulation of sensations' (Mbembe 2017:39). In *On the Postcolony*, Mbembe (2001:1) locates this mode of blackness in a formation of racial animalising that imagines "Africa" primarily through 'the metatext about the animal – to be exact, about the *beast*' (emphasis in original). In this metatext, "the animal's" proximity to the carnal signals the body's primordial absence of reason. "The animal," then, is unchanged by the clarifying light of Enlightenment rationality which distances humanity's "natural origins". Enlightenment philosophy's dreamed disembodiment and disavowal of the animal within the human is at the very heart of the discourse of transcendence that underpins the problematic of the subject in Enlightenment thought. As Wolfe and Jonathan Elmer (2003:109) articulate, the Kantian 'transcendental turn' consisted in a profound 'desubstantialization of the

subject': a turning away from all that is corporeal, and thus animal, from all that Kant, in his *Critique of Practical Reason*, called the 'pathological'.[17] It is through the exclusion of the domain of the animal that the subject is secured as 'substanceless', and consequently, that rationality is privileged over embodied experience. The attribute "human" consolidates unto itself its social, moral, discursive, scientific, technological and egological power, and hence, its coherence, agency and autonomy. Thus, from Descartes's mind/body duality to Kant's assertion of the impossibility of "our" phenomenal access to, or empirical knowledge of, the noumenal thing-in-itself, *Ding-an-sich,* materiality is not only bracketed out but debased, abjected, and disavowed (Wolfe 2008:15; Wolfe & Elmer 2003:109).[18] In other words, the human body is rendered in the now utterly negated form, "animal". As Mbembe notes, for the European liberal humanist subject, turning a human being into an "animal" body effects a Fanonian (1970:10) 'epidermalisation' in which whiteness becomes the signifier of human, and it paradigmatic other, the black body of Africa, the signifier of all that is "animal". Mbembe signals the persistence of this philosophical syntagm in his critical re-examination of the meanings of black subjectivity in the discursive echo that binds the title of his *Critique of Black Reason* to Kant's *Critique of Practical Reason*. The liberal humanist expulsion of human animality is that which is alien to "whiteness" and "reason". Hence, it abjects the black body and resignifies it within a history of waste as that which is disposable, expendable. Under these conditions, the black body is not "human" enough, or it is non-human, sub-human, or formed in negation (Mbembe 2001:187, 2017:73). This foundational race-species order consolidates in racist terms what is essentially an unstable division of humanity from animality, and does so in terms in which "the animal" becomes the sign of the killable. The philosophical, historical, and pseudo-scientific elaborations of the race-species order are well-documented, for example, in discussions of the Sara Baartman event.[19] While the work of racial animalising is named in Mbembe's earlier work, we argue that thinking with "the animal" and the non-human is necessary to undo the persistence of the race-species order in the present.

Race, animality, and anti-racist politics

In this paper, we propose a theoretical enquiry into how difference and relationality in South Africa requires deconstructing the biopolitical violence that "the animal" enacts. We draw on the analytical levers that a human-animal studies critical perspective enables, since it allows us to focalise the work that animalisation does in the production of the "human" and the "animal" within the post/apartheid zoologo-racial machinery. Following Wolfe (2012:10), our purpose is not simply to add animals to a pre-established schema that determines which life forms matter, but rather, to think of "the animal" as a *dispositif*. For, as Wolfe clarifies in *Before the Law*, the architecture of racism as species

difference is not a 'zoological distinction' (Wolfe 2012:10). Species difference is not borne out of biological data, or the genomic fixity of the "properly" human, but, instead, birthed in the bio-necropolitical technologies of making killable. Animalisation is at the very root, and hence is radical in its etymological sense, of the primal scene of racism itself. This being the case, any anti-racist politics in post/apartheid South Africa must, in our view, confront the technologies of animalisation that operate within, and through, the race-species order.

This is something that Kim (2016) does in analysing the Black Lives Matter movement in the United States in relation to the killing of Harambe, the Western Lowland gorilla, at Cincinnati Zoo in May 2016. Kim elucidates how the zoologo-racial order animalises the unarmed black man whose death, multiple juries have found, is non-criminal when an armed police officer has seen in their gestures the phantasmatically threatening animal. In a different setting Clapperton Chakanetsa Mavhunga tracks animalising technologies in colonial Southern Rhodesia and postcolonial Zimbabwe by connecting 'the shared history of pesticides to the history of racial aggression' (Puar & Livingston 2011:8). Mavhunga (2011:152) excavates how racism operates as 'a form of species differentiaton' through the non-criminal elimination of life forms that are construed as 'pests' or "vermin" whether they are tsetse flies or so-called "guerrilla terrorists".

Disavowing animality

Kim's (2016) and Mavhunga's (2011) work establishes why contemporary anti-racist politics must dismantle the politics of animalisation that animates the race-species order. Doing so locates the question of human/animal relationalities within our shared anthrozoo past by problematising what both racism and speciesism construct as a firm and single bifurcation between these terms. In our view, anti-racist politics should neither be grounded on the affirmation of human biological continuity with non-human animals, nor should it be rooted in the repudiation of human animality (Lawler 2007). Neither strategy questions how the category of difference has been historically and politically constructed. To say, on the one hand, "but we are all animals" does not recognise how scientific racism and apartheid used a hierarchy of racialised human types to set up difference in discriminatory terms. To assert, on the other, that "human beings are not animals" is similarly to leave intact this western historical and philosophical formation of difference-as-discrimination. Neither trajectory complicates how to think about difference, or 'significant otherness' (Haraway 2008:97). It is necessary to complicate these terms when grappling with the complexity of racial, sex/gendered, and classed differences that mark the post/apartheid nationscape of embodied experience. While we recognise the imperative for those who

are positioned as other than human to say: 'I am a complete human being' (Fanon cited by Mbembe 2017:46), the difficulty with not moving beyond this gesture is that it retains the species architecture that denied humanity in the first instance. Remaking species architectures and interactions, as Braidotti (2013:104) encourages, promotes a politically engaged agency that 'combines critique with creativity'.

As the examples that proliferate in the post/apartheid present demonstrate, the desire to secure a "who" who is assuredly and unquestionably "human" is a vexed occupation, precisely because the loaded history of racialised species difference keeps resurfacing. The post/partheid 'National Symbolic' is replete with instances in which animals and race circulate to restage a racist past and anxious present. A prominent example is Penny Sparrow's Facebook post of early January 2016 in which, the previously unknown real estate agent, compared New Year's day beach goers to 'monkeys' adding that they 'obviously have no education (*sic*) what so ever (*sic*) and so to allow them loose is inviting huge dirt and troubles and discomfort to others … all I saw were black on black skins what a shame' (Nemakonde 2016:[sp]). Sparrow's racist remarks instigated a furious reaction on social media, the African National Congress lodged a complaint about her utterances with the Equality Court. Sparrow pleaded guilty to *crimen injuria* and the court issued a R150,000 fine. In 2017, yet another debate about the race-animality nexus took centre stage in the national media. It concerned a tweet that made a comparison between a dog and a black baby. The tweet included images taken at an event organised by 702, an influential commercial radio station in the Gauteng province. Every year the radio station organises what it touts as a community-building event in which listeners are invited to walk through the streets of a Johannesburg suburb in the company of their friends, families, and fellow citizens. Participants are permitted to walk with prams and companion dogs who are on leads. On the day of the event, a tweet appeared on the 702 timeline that instigated a heated discussion about black subjects and animals. The controversy ensued from what some Twitter users, listeners, and a number of the radio station's employees, took to be a humiliating and racist comparison that was being made between black people and dogs. The tweet, one of a series about the aforementioned event, included a photograph of a black man holding a baby positioned next to another photograph of a dog and was captioned thus: 'MTN702Walk Aaaw! Dog VS baby… who's cuter? Go ahead and evoke those broody feelings…'.[20] The following examples outline the criticism's tenor and discursive contours:

> So you'd compare human babies (black human babies) to dogs? And it's supposed to be what, cute?

> The problem started when we were told to forgive them without asking for forgiveness. Today we are labelled and regarded subhuman (cited in Nemakonde 2017:[sp]).

The station apologised and removed the tweet. The following day, Xolani Gwala, the broadcaster who hosted the station's breakfast programme, expressed his dissatisfaction with both the tweet and the station's apology. Omar Essack, CEO of Primedia, the company that owns 702, appeared on Gwala's show on the same day and 'admitted that the station had made a huge, grievous error … and apologized on behalf of the whole organization' (Annzra 2017:[sp]). In the programme that followed Gwala's, Eusebius McKaiser, host and public intellectual, stated that he shared Gwala's 'view that the tweet [was] disgusting' and although he thought Essack's apology sincere, he nonetheless was disturbed by the lack of empathy some listeners had with respect to the objections that were expressed about the tweet (cited in Annzra 2017:[sp]). McKaiser spends much of his three hours on air everyday provoking South Africans to reflect on their attitudes and practices in respect of race, gender, sexuality, class, and how these intersect. As is typical, he used the incident to probe why many of the station's black listeners were so angry and unsettled. On the station's blog, he is reported to have made the following arguments about the incident:

> the reason the tweet – or any images of black people being compared to animals – creates such outrage is due to the world's history of white supremacy and the past treatment of black people as subhuman … these are triggers of a global history through the ages and into the present presenting black people being subjugated. "It is entirely appropriate that it should trigger direct memories of white supremacy and anti-black racism when you see this kind of tweet" (cited in Annzra 2017:[sp]).

During McKaiser's show, it emerged that the 702 employee who wrote the tweet was a black woman, and not white, as some of the people who had complained assumed. One of Mckaiser's callers said that this information made them re-evaluate their reaction to the tweet:

> I read the tweet. I was shocked. It moved me basically. Obviously, I think it is a white person. But when I heard later on that it is actually a black girl, then it changed the story for me. The way I relate to dogs as a 35-year-old where I grew up in the villages, it is totally different from a 35-year-old who is a white guy…Obviously the child [girl] went to these model C schools. She has a different relationship with a dog. It is unlike mine. Maybe, it [her relationship] is more closer to how white people treat dogs. Maybe we need to educate her [in order] to understand a broader context. But I am still saying strongly, if it was a white person saying this, it would have been pure racism…If it is a black person, it is no longer a shock. Actually, we just need to educate the child to understand how other black people view the relationship with dogs. It is no longer a race issue for me (*TimesLive* 2017:[sp])

McKaiser's response to the information that came to light in the course of his programme was significant. He said that '[t]he race element in the conversation does not go out the window once you know a black person tweeted something. We have to talk about self hate and internalised oppression' (cited in *TimesLive* 2017:[sp]). McKaiser suggested that the only way to account for why the 702 employee made a comparison between black babies and dogs was because she had internalised what Nikil Pal Singh (2010:[sp]) has called the 'racist bestiary'. McKaiser's statement implied that there were no conditions, or circumstances, in which his colleague could have proposed kinship with animals that did not contaminate blackness with "the animal".

Embedded in Mckaiser's comments about 'self-hate' and the listener's comment about different relationships between dogs and South Africans of different racial groups are two interrelated factors: first, is a history in which, as Keith Shear's (2008:193) research establishes, black South Africans experienced dogs as 'powerful symbols of settler control' during the colonial period. As Shear (2008:195) confirms, 'dogs have been a favoured instrument of repressive regimes', including the apartheid state. The historical construction of the dog as a symbol and instrument of repressive force is replayed in the post/apartheid state's "management" of protests that it construes as violent. This was evidenced in the events around the #FeesMustFall[21] protests at the University of the Witwatersrand in Johannesburg in 2016. For the first time in the post/apartheid period, police dogs, along with tear gas, rubber bullets, and water cannon were brought onto campus to force the university's reopening. Violent clashes between the police and a number of the protesting students ensued. For some, the police dogs activated memories of how dogs became technologies of apartheid's brute violence, for instance, @sifiso790, who commented thus on Twitter: 'Poor students ask for free education and you bring the dog's (*sic*) out on them #Wits #witsshutdown #FeesMustFall2016' (cited in *Business Da*y 2016:[sp]).

One of the limits to McKaiser's analytical horizons is his failure to imagine forms of companionate inter-relationality between black subjects and dogs. A second limitation is that McKaiser's analysis of the perceived impossibility of what Joshua Bennett (2017) terms, 'black kinship with dogs',[22] does not recognise the animalising effects of biopolitical systems that have made it difficult (though not impossible) for black South Africans to live with, and therefore relate to, dogs. A case in point concerns the status of the domestic worker in relation to the domestic dog within the shared space of the middle-class suburban family home. Of course, as Jacklyn Cock's (1981) research has shown, black domestic workers in South Africa often labour under exploitative conditions. The domestic worker who is made subservient to the family, including their pets, is notionally included in, but effectively excluded from, the family's kinship bonds. This situation accounts for Julius Malema's comments when addressing the Oxford Union in 2015:

> The dogs of rich people in South Africa have got medical aid but their domestic workers, and the university workers, and the farm workers, the petrol attendants, the security guards, do not have medical aid. Neither do they have rights as workers.

McKaiser's concerns that his colleague's tweet might have indexed 'self-hate and internalised oppression', well-founded though they were, nonetheless, do not allow for the possibility of interspecies relationality that exceeds the terms bequeathed by the zoologo-racial order (Annzra 2017). In effect, Mckaiser's analysis tethers anti-racist politics to the disavowal of animality. We would argue that his statement reproduces, rather than deconstructs, the animalising logics of race thinking and the bio-necropolitical technologies they enable. In other words, it resecures, however unwittingly, the ideological foundations of a presumably stable ontological ground between the Enlightenment's conception of "the human" and "the animal". What is needed is a critical strategy that troubles the designation "human" which produces a hierarchy of bodies rendered other than human, killable, expendable, and abject. Put differently, to unravel the death-bearing structural violence that animalisation enacts, it is crucial to move beyond only saying "black people are not animals".

Let us remember that, in his judgment in the Crossberg case, JA Navsa stated that he couldn't comprehend 'why the presence or absence of baboons has assumed such heightened significance in this case'.[24] It is well understood that Limpopo is a poor rural province. It is also an important site of the unresolved politics of land claims and land restitution. As Cherryl Walker (2008:230) demonstrates, South Africa is riven by its long and 'violent history of racist land practices, deep inequalities and persistent poverty'. If we were to view the Crossberg case within the context of this history it would be difficult not to understand why the presence or absence of baboons was particularly significant. Furthermore, the ostensibly exculpatory "I thought he was a baboon/monkey/warthog" claims that farmers have used as alibis lay bare how: "the animal" structures race thinking on these South African farms; and, the risks animalising technologies (of which this alibi is one) present for the species who are caught in their crosshairs. In other words, these cases reveal how it is that 'race-species meanings' (Kim 2016:20) condition the production of black and white life and death in South Africa. Ernesto Nhamuave, Emmanuel Sithole, Jealous Dube, Jan Railo, and Bongumusa Duma died because they were animalised. Animalisation, Petković (2016:37) reminds us,

> comprises the discursive practices of associating animals/animalized humans with irrationality, [and] danger, … and "prove[s]" the inferiority and essential otherness of animals/animalized humans legitimizing the exploitation/death to which they are subjected – transforming murder into a noncriminal putting to death.

These cases expose the 'biosocial' (Haraway 2016:70-81) techniques through which '(potentially all, but historically highly specific) human beings are animalized' (Petković 2016:51).

Future-making in the present

Returning to McKaiser's analysis of his colleague's tweet, we think it is possible to interpret it in terms other than introjected self-hatred. Relations with non-human others, including animals, cannot be disavowed as this will not disrupt the production of race as species. As histories of oppression have demonstrated, the idea of human animality has been racialised and assigned to bodies in unequal ways. We are guided by Kim's injunction to remember that all 'human groups have participated very unevenly in the status and benefits of being "human"' (Kim 2013:470). Positioning the non-human animal in contemporary biopolitical thought is, as Wolfe (2013:6) tells us, not a 'category mistake'. Rather, it recognises how species meanings, and the technologies of animalisation they induce, constitute the putative ontological limits of racial differences. There is another horizon that approaching the question of the animal opens up. This involves rethinking the human/animal binary to induce futures, and worlds, based on nonhierarchical and multispecies forms of relationality. Haraway (2016:215) calls this the work of multispecies 'reworlding/s': reworldings that involve interrelated networks of connections in which participants are neither predefined nor unitary. For Haraway (2008:90, 97) 'significant otherness' signals this complex, 'material-semiotic' mode of relating. In a similar vein, Braidotti (2013:49-50) postulates that '[a] posthuman ethics for a non-unitary subject proposes an enlarged sense of inter-connection between self and others, including the non-human … others', and does so by decentring 'the human' from its priviledged ontology. Shifting the terms of the debate from singularities of being, as Haraway and Braidotti do, unmakes animalisation, which, as we have demonstrated, is the racialising technology *par excellence*. By moving from the singular to the multiple and already-connected, Braidotti and Haraway want to enliven a future in which webs of relationality tie us in differentiated, expanding but always-accountable forms of becoming. This 'reworlding' invites a reflexive ethics and politics in which "we" is in question rather than settled and centred. These terms modify Fanon's (cited in Mbembe 2017:46) concept of 'a common humanity' in which the 'Black Man' can claim 'I am a complete human being'. However, they do so by reframing the function of difference so that it cannot operate singly as a site of discrimination, but multiplies into a network of connections with the non-human. Significantly, these connections take aim at the historical racist categorisations that have partnered the "black body" and "the animal" in abjecting and deathly 'ontological choreographies' (Charis Thompson cited in Haraway 2016:100). Future-making through becoming human with others in multispecies reworldings animates agency without predetermining its directions.

Acknowledgements

We want to thank the editors for their assistance and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Thanks are also due to Yolo Koba and Gillian Wittstock for sourcing some of the texts. Benita de Robillard would like to thank the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation for the grant that supported her involvement in this research project.

Notes

1. Hence our preference for the forward '/' rather than the allusion to closure that accrues to the '-'. See Benita de Robillard (2014:5).

2. See Lauren Berlant (1997:26, 40, 43, 47, 103).

3. Consult, for instance, Willis (2010), Poyner (2006), Woodward (2008).

4. In addition to Lipschitz (2012, 2015, 2018), see, for example, Peffer (2003, 2009). Peffer (2003) applies a representational analysis of 'becoming animal' to the work of Jane Alexander and Dumile Feni. The concept of the 'humanimal' (Subirós 2011) figures large in the catalogue edited by Subirós (2011) on Jane Alexander's work. Van Robbroeck's (2011:38) essay in this catalogue, for instance, explores the human-animal frame in relation to a critique of the Enlightenment subject. Van Robbroeck (2007) examines the figure of the dog in contemporary works by Jo Ratcliffe and Willie Bester, amongst others.

5. As Jasbir Puar (2007:121) argues, Mbembe's formulation of necropolitics describes the 'biopolitical management of life' and how these processes can effect the 'propagation' of '"pure death"'.

6. Xenophobic violence has surfaced on numerous occasions in the post/apartheid era. One of the more convulsive episodes took place in 2008 when, as Lipschitz (2015, 2018) establishes, numerous African migrants from neighbouring countries were killed by South African citizens in a number of townships and informal settlements across the country. Many of the victims were South African citizens who were taken to be "foreigners". Another spate of xenophobically-motivated killings came to national attention in 2015. Since the victims were black Africans, commentators argued that it would be more accurate to view these episodes as Afrophobically and/or negrophobically inflected (Hassim, Kupe & Worby 2008). Ernesto Nhamuave, who was necklaced and burnt alive in front of journalists and the police, and Emmanuel Sithole, who died after being stabbed, became the most visible casualties of the 2008 and 2015 attacks.

7. For a more detailed exposition of abjection, xenophobic violence and the construction of the foreigner-as-animal, see Lipschitz (2015, 2018:13-29). On abjection and race in South Africa, consult Derek Hook (2014).

8. *News24* Farmer's murder sentence cut 20/03/2008. Date accessed 11/09/2017. [O]. Available: http//www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmers-murder-sentence-cut-20080320

9. The Court found that the State's version of events contradicted the objective facts (these being the position of the body in the veld and that only two bullets had been discharged by the appellant's firearm) and found that the State had erred in accepting the evidence presented by the three main witnesses (Crossberg v S (440/2007) [2008] ZASCA 13 (20 March 2008)). We would like to thank Fiona Park for sourcing the judgement and the conversations that have informed our analysis.

10. Crossberg v S (440/2007) [2008] ZASCA 13 (20 March 2008), page 2.

11. Elsewhere Mlambo wrote, 'In my view the presence of the deceased's body as well as the undisputed recovery of work tools in that vicinity fortifies the state's eyewitness' version that there were five employees on the scene, the deceased being one of them, and no baboons. It is stating the obvious that humans walk upright whilst baboons use all four limbs. In addition, humans are much larger than even the largest baboon. Objectively speaking therefore humans can be effortlessly distinguished from baboons'. Cited in Crossberg v S (440/2007) [2008] ZASCA 13 (20 March 2008) page 21.

12. Crossberg v S (440/2007) [2008] ZASCA 13 (20 March 2008) page 31.

13. For instance, Johannes Fourie who shot and injured one of his employees 'apparently mistaking him for a baboon' (*News24* 2014:[sp]). *News24* (2014:[sp]) reported that the 'court withdrew' a 'charge of attempted murder due to a lack of evidence' noting that Fourie was 'convicted for unlawful handling of a firearm'. Fourie was to serve a six-month jail term but was 'given an option to pay a R6000 fine to avoid imprisonment'. In 2017, another farmer, who is not identified in the report, wounded an employee 'having shot at him with a pellet gun' because he 'allegedly' mistook 'him for a monkey' (*News24* 2017:[sp]). Stephan Hepburn 'allegedly shot and killed farmworker, Jan Railo, 23, on a Limpopo farm on 1 February [2017]' when 'hunting with his wife' he 'apparently mistook Railo for a warthog'(*News24* 2017:[sp]). In one case outside the Limpopo region, a man, who the report only identifies as being 87-years-old, appeared in the 'Umzinto Magistrate's Court for allegedly shooting and killing [Bongumusa Duma] a 12-year-old boy he mistook for a monkey. The boy was climbing a guava tree on the man's property in Braemar … when he was shot in the head and the upper body' (*News24* 2017:[sp]).

14. See for example, Wolfe (2012), the themed issue of *Hypatia*, 'Animal Others', edited by Lori Gruen and Kari Weil (2012), McHugh and Marvin (2014), Broglio, Turner and Sellbach (2017), Giffney and Hird (2008), and Turner (2013).

15. Cognitive ethology has discredited the existence of a definitive human exeptionalism among other species (Wolfe 2003:1).

16. See Jacques Derrida (2008).

17. Through reading Nandipha Mntambo's artworks, Lipschitz (2012) illuminates how the relationship between desubstantialisation and "the animal" is also marked on the abjected female body.

18. Kant's idea of *Ding-as-sich,* as Wolfe and Elmer (2003:109) note, suggests that since the 'thing in itself' is neither conceptualisable nor perceivable, it cannot be known, and no concept of its essence as such can be postulated.

19. Refer to Daniela Petković (2016) for a discussion of the Baartman event in relation to the question of "the animal" and consult Gabeba Baderoon (2011). Using the term "event" is not to compress Baartman's biography and its ongoing political and symbolic effects into a single occurrence that is fossilised in a historical record. Rather, it is to suggest the ramified entanglement of Baartman's story in both the present as well as in the unsettled archive of race, sex, and animality in the South African imaginary. We use "event" to index that it was, and is, a 'political event' in Jacques Rancière's sense (Bassett 2016).

20. A screenshot of the deleted tweet can be viewed online at Nemakonde (2017:[sp]).

21. In 2015, the South African higher education sector was disrupted by a student driven protest movement that demanded free, quality, and decolonised university education. The protests were organised under the #FeesMustFall banner. The state responded by freezing tuition fee increases for the next year, rather than eliminating them; protests were repeated in 2016. Consult Booysen (2016) for a comprehensive description and evaluation of the protest's significance in the post/apartheid period.

22. Refer to Bennett's presentation at the 'Haptic Bodies: Haptic Animalities' panel at the Scholar and Feminist Conference 42 – Haptic Bodies: Perception, Touch, and the Ethics of Being' on March 4 2017. A video recording of his presentation may be viewed on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hRUxGkXHf2g. Date accessed: 24 September, 2017.

23. Refer to YouTube for a video recording of Malema's address: http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/in-sa-pets-have-medical-aid-not-workers-malema-at-oxford-20151127. Date accessed: 20 September, 2017.

24. Andile Mngxitama, the leader of the Black Land First (BLF) movement, made the connections between land, race, and animalisation that JA Navsa *et al*. did not think pertinent. When 12-year-old Bongumusa Duma's death was reported in the national media, Mngxitama tweeted as follows: '[a]nother black person killed, "mistaken" for a monkey by land thieves. Shouldn't blacks be officially declared monkeys. Maybe they will stop' (cited in The Citizen 2017:[sp]). The volatile Mngxitama has been discredited by reports concerning his involvement with the notorious Gupta family, who allegedly are responsible for corrupting multiple state-owned entities.

REFERENCES

Africa Review. 2015. Foreigners tell of being 'Hunted Like Dogs'. [O] Available: http://www.africareview.com/News/Foreigners-tell-of-being-hunted-like-dogs-in-South-Africa/-/979180/2692520/-/ijirbs/-/index.html Accessed 23 August 2017.

Annzra, D. 2017. Controversial tweet 'Triggers White Supremacy and Anti-Black Racism'. *702 News*. 24 July. [O] Available: http://www.702.co.za/articles/265606/opinion-controversial-tweet-triggers-white-supremacy-and-anti-black-racism. Accessed 20 August 2017.

Baderoon G. 2011. Baartman and the private: how can we look at a figure that has been looked at too much? in *Representation and black womanhood*, edited by G Chipembere. New York, Palgrave Macmillan:65-83.

Bassett, K. 2016. Event, politics, and space: Rancière or Badiou? *Space and Polity* 20(3):280-293.

Berlant, L. 1997. *The Queen of America goes to Washington City*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Booysen, S (ed). 2016. *Fees must fall: student revolt, decolonisation and governance in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Braidotti, R. 2013. *The posthuman*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Broglio, R, Sellbach, U & Turner, L. 2018. *Edinburgh companion to animal studies*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Business Day. 2016. Wits goes to the dogs: SAPS Deploys K9 unit on Campus 10 October [O]. Available: https://www.businesslive.co.za/bd/national/education/2016-10-10-wits-goes-to-the-dogs-saps-deploys-k9-unit-on-campus/ Accessed 10 October 2016.

Clark, D. 1997. On being "the last Kantian in Nazi Germany". Dwelling with animals after Levinas', in *Animal acts: configuring the human in Western history,* edited by J Ham & M Senior. New York & London: Routledge:42-74.

Cock, J. 1981. Disposable nannies: domestic servants in the political economy of South Africa. *Review of African Political Economy* 8(21):63-83.

de Robillard, B. 2014. "Our Caster" and the "Blade Runner": 'improper' corporealities cripqueering the post/apartheid body politic'. *Image & Text* 24:79-115.

Derrida, J. 1995. Eating well, or the calculation of the subject (interview with Jean-Luc Nancy), in *Points ...: Interviews, 1974-1994*, edited by R Weber, translated by P Connor & A Ronell. Stanford: Stanford University Press:255-287.

Derrida, J. 2008. *The animal that therefore I am*, edited by M Mallet, translated by D Wills. New York: Fordham University Press.

Erasmus, Z. 2008. Race, in *New South African keywords*, edited by N Shepherd & S Robins. Johannesburg: Jacana:169-181.

Fanon, F. 1970. *Black skin white masks*. Translated by CL Markmann. New York, Grove Press.

Giffney, N & Hird, M. 2008. *Queering the non/human.* Farnham: Ashgate Publishers.

Gruen, L & Weil, K (eds). 2012. Animal others, a themed issue of Hypatia: *Journal of Feminist Philosophy* 27(3).

Haraway, D. 2012. *When species meet*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Haraway, D & Wolfe, C. 2016. *Manifestly Haraway*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Hassim, S, Kupe, T & Worby, E (eds). 2008. *Go home or die here: violence, xenophobia and the reinvention of difference on South Africa.* Johannesburg: Wits University Press.

Hook, D. 2014. Racism as abjection: a psychoanalytic conceptualisation for a post-apartheid South Africa. *South African Journal of Psychology* 34(4):672-703.

IOL. 2015. King denies call to attack foreigners. 15 April. [O]. Available: https://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/king-denies-call-to-attack-foreigners-1847841
Accessed 22 August 2017.

Jackson, ZI. 2013. Animal: new directions in the theorisation of race and posthumanism. *Feminist Studies* 39(3):669-685.

Kim, C. 2016. Murder and mattering in Harambe's house. *Politics and Animals* 2(Fall):37-57.

Lawler, L. 2007. *This is not sufficient: an essay on animality and human nature in Derrida*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Livingston, J & Puar, J. 2011. Interspecies. *Social Text* 29(1):3-14.

Lipschitz, R. 2012. Skin/ned politics: species discourse and the limits of "the human" in Nandipha Mntambo's art. *Hypatia* 27(3):547-566.

Lipschitz, R. 2014. Animality and alterity: species discourse and the limits of 'the human' in contemporary South African art. PhD Thesis. London: Goldsmiths, University of London.

Lipschitz, R. 2018. Abjection, in *Edinburgh companion to animal studies*, edited by R Broglio, U Sellbach & L Turner. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press:13-29.

Mbembe, A. 2001. *On the postcolony*. Translated by AM Berrett, J Roitman, M Last, A Mbembe, S Rendall. Berkley, London & Los Angeles, University of California.

Mbembe, A. 2003. Necropolitics. Translated by L Meintjies. *Public Culture* 15(1):11-40.

Mbembe, A. 2017. *Critique of black reason*. Translated by L Dubois. Durham: Duke University Press.

Maponya, F. 2007. Anger at 'Baboon' Shooting Trial. *Sowetan Live*. 4 April. [O] Available: http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/sowetan/archive/2007/04/04/anger-at-baboon_shooting-trial. Accessed 8 September 2017.

Marvin, G & McHugh, S. 2014. *Routledge handbook of human-animal studies*. New York & London: Routledge.

Mavhunga, C. 2011. Vermin beings: on pestiferous animals and human game. *Social Text* 29(1)151-176.

News24. 2008. Farmer's Murder Sentence Cut. 20 March. [O]. Available: https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmers-murder-sentence-cut-20080320
Accessed 12 September 2017.

News24. 2014. Farmer Mistook Worker for Baboon. 25 March. [O]. Available: https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/Farmer-mistook-worker-for-baboon-20140325
Accessed 12 September 2017.

News24. 2017. Farmer Shoots Worker After 'Mistaking him for Monkey. 25 March. [O]. Available: https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/farmer-shoots-farm-worker-after-mistaking-him-for-monkey-20170309
Accessed 12 September 2017.

O'Riordan, A. 2015. Zwelithini's lice comment only deflects attention for parasitic royal households. *The South African Civil Society Information Service*. [O] Available: http://www.sacsis.org.za/site/article/2365 27
Accessed 27 May 2016.

Peffer, J. 2003. Animal bodies/absent bodies: disfigurement in art after Soweto. *Third Text* 17(1):71-83.

Peffer, J. 2009. *Art and the end of apartheid*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Petković, D. 2016. A Tiger will perhaps tear you to pieces, but he will not steal your life: the politics of animal use in Barbara Chase-Riboud's *Hottentot Venus: a novel. Brno Studies in English* 42(2):35-55.

Poyner, J (ed). 2006. J.M. *Coetzee and the idea of the public intellectual.* Ohio: Ohio University Press.

Puar, JK. 2007. *Terrorist assemblages: homonationalism in queer times*. London & Durham: Duke University Press.

Shear, K. 2008. Police dogs and state rationality in early twentieth-century South Africa, in *Canis Africanis: a dog history of Southern Africa*, edited by L van Sittert & S Swart. Leiden Boston, Paderborn & Singapore, Brill Publishers:193-216.

Singh, N. 2010. A world cup of a special type. *Social Text*. [O]. Available: www.socialtextjournal.org/periscope/world-cup-2010/
Accessed 12 March 2012.

Subirós, P. 2011. In Africa and beyond: reflections on Jane Alexander's mutant universe, in *Jane Alexander surveys (from the Cape of Good Hope)*, edited by P Subirós. New York & Barcelona: Museum of African Art and Actar:10-25.

Supreme Court of Appeal South Africa. 2008. *Crossberg v. S (440/2007) [2008] ZASCA*.

Timeslive. 2017. Person who Compared Black Babies to Dogs in Tweet is Black Herself. 24 July. [O]. Available: https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2017-07-24-person-who-compared-black-babies-to-dogs-in-tweet-is-black-herself/ Accessed 15 August 2017.

The Citizen. 2017. Blacks must wear white boards saying "don't shoot, I'm a monkey". 3 March [O]. Available: https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1449753/blacks-must-wear-white-boards-written-dont-shoot-im-a-monkey/ Accessed 13 March 2017.

Tully, AM. 2014. Figuring the animal autobiography: animals and landscapes in Daniel Naudé's exhibition "African scenery and animals". *Journal of Literary Studies* 30(4):104-127.

Turner, L. 2013. Introduction: the animal question in deconstruction, in *The animal question in deconstruction*, edited by L Turner. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press:1-8.

Van Robbroeck, L. 2007. Speaking dogs: undoing the human in art. *Art South Africa* 6(1):48-53.

Van Robbroeck, L. 2011. Harbinger of night: Jane Alexander's posthumanism in *Jane Alexander surveys (from the Cape of Good Hope),* edited by P Subirós. New York & Barcelona: Museum of African Art & Actar:38-62.

Vhahangwele, N. 2016. Penny Sparrow compared black people to monkeys, and questioned why they are allowed on beaches. *The Citizen*. 4 January.[O] Available: https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/927765/kzn-estate-agent-calls-black-people-monkeys/ Accessed 9 September 2017

Vhahangwele, N. 2017. 702 in hot water for comparing black kids with dogs. *The Citizen*. 23 June. [O] Available: https://citizen.co.za/news/south-africa/1582541/talk-radio-702-in-hot-water-for-comparing-black-kids-to-dogs/ Accessed 15 September 2017

Walker, C. 2008. *Land-marked: land claims and land restitution in South Africa*. Johannesburg: Jacana Media. Athens: Ohio University Press.

Willis, D (ed). 2010. *Black Venus: they call her Hottentot*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press & Chesham: Combined Academic.

Wolfe, C. 2003. *Animal rites: American culture, the discourse of species and posthumanist theory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Wolfe, C. 2009. Flesh and finitude: thinking animals in (post)humanist philosophy. *SubStance* 37(3):8-36.

Wolfe, C. 2012. *Before the law: humans and other animals in a biopolitical frame.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.