

Heritage routes for the liberated South Africans: using oral history to reconstruct unsung heroes and heroines' routes into exile in the 1960s

SIFISO MXOLISI NDLOVU*

Introduction

The concept of exile¹ in South Africa can be differentiated into two categories. The first category consists of internal exiles and the second is defined by external exiles. The latter resided beyond the borders of South Africa. They settled in Bechuanaland, Tanzania, Zambia² and also overseas.

The majority of Africans in South Africa, as residents of townships designated for Africans, lived in internal exile. In terms of the 1913 Land Act and the Urban Areas Act of 1922 Africans were declared by the white Minority state as sojourners in 87% of their own country. Also, a form of social excommunication known as banning into exile created a special class

-
- South African Democracy Education Trust (SADET)-Pretoria
 - 1. The topic of exile politics has been subject of research elsewhere, see for example, M. NKOANA, *Crisis in the Revolution*, London, 1969; P. BANDEIRA (pseudo.), 'Letter from Lisbon', *New Leader*, 48, No 2, 1965, pp. 6-10; P. Lewis, *The Politics of Exile: Paraguay's Febrerista Party*, (Durham, 1968); L. EDINGER, *German Exile Politics: The Social Democratic Executive Committee in the Nazi Era*, (Berkeley, 1956); B. WOLFE, *Three Who Made a Revolution: A Biographical History*, New York, 1961; H. BERNSTEIN, *The Rift: The Exile Experience of South Africans*, (London, 1994); E. MALOKA, *The South African Communist Party in Exile: 1963-1990*, (Pretoria, 2002); R. SEGAL, *Into Exile*, (London, 1963). Other attempts to portray the meaning of exile are reflected in various historical novels written by, among others, Mongane Wally Serote, Bloke Modisane, Zakes Mda and Lewis Nkosi; theatre and plays by Mda and John Kani. Other articles about exile are published in ANC journals such as *Sechaba*, *Mayibuye* and *Dawn*. These are available at both the Mayibuye Archives, University of Western Cape and ANC Archives, University of Fort Hare. See for example, *Sechaba*, 'South African Exile Literature', Vol. 5, No. 9, September, 1971.
 - 2. The precolonial terms will be used interchangeably with post-colonial terms, namely Bechuanaland (Botswana), Tanganyika (Tanzania), Northern Rhodesia (Zambia).

of internal exiles.³ Section 5(1) (b) of the *Native Administration Act of 1927* empowered the State President, whenever he deemed it expedient in the public interest, ‘without notice to banish to exile and order any tribe, portion of a tribe, or individual African to move to any stated place’. After the banning of the ANC and the Pan African Congress (PAC) in April 1960 many South Africans went into exile. Most were under the threat of arrest. A large number were young would-be freedom fighters aiming to receive military training in exile. Others were eager to continue with their education. This exploratory paper focuses on external exiles who were members of the African Nationalist Congress (ANC) based in the African states of Tanzania and Zambia. It is part of a broader research project about the history of the liberation movements in South Africa conducted by SADET.⁴

The mapping of routes in South African history was first popularised through the Bantu ‘migrations’ theory⁵ that was in turn abused by historians (and others) to fit the ‘empty land’ thesis in South Africa. Etherington is of the opinion that these ‘migrations’ and the accompanying ‘empty land’ thesis were significant with contemporary political struggles in South Africa. Julian Cobbing and John Wright have noticed how F.A van Jaarsveld spectacularly misused Omer-Cooper’s formulation of the ‘mfecane’ in 1971 in an attempt to show that land distribution in contemporary South Africa was historically generated by the black devastations of the early 19th century.⁶

This paper discusses different ‘migrations’ and routes in contemporary times. These routes are from apartheid South Africa to various localities within the African continent (and the wider world). The paper will focus on

-
3. G. NAUDE, ‘Banning in South Africa: A Technique of Repression’, in C.R. Hill (ed.), *Rights and Wrongs*, (Baltimore, 1969).
 4. Brown Maaba from the University of Fort Hare and Sello Mathabathe from the Wits University History Workshop, as members of SADET’s consortiums, are focussing on the PAC. Also the Free State Provincial Archives’ Military and Stalwarts Veterans Project runs an Oral History Project that complements the SADET Oral History Project which at present does not focus on the Free State Province. Please note that this paper forms Part A of a chapter about the ANC in Exile, 1960-1970. The chapter will be published in the forthcoming Volume 1 of SADET’s publications.
 5. On the discussion of these issues see J. KI-ZERBO, *General History of Africa*, California, 1990, chapters 10-12, and K. SHILLINGTON, *History of Africa*, (London, 1995), Ch. 4.
 6. See N. ETHERINGTON, ‘The Great Trek in Relation to the Mfecane: A Reassessment’, *South African Historical Journal*, 25, 1991, pp.3-21; J. COBBING, ‘The Mfecane as Alibi: Thoughts on Dithakong and Mbolompo’, *Journal of African History*, 29, (3), 1988, pp. 487-519; F.A. VAN JAARVELD, *Van Riebeck tot Verwoed 1652-1966*, (Johannesburg, 1971), pp 114-5; C.F.J. MULLER, *Die Oorsprong van Die Groot Trek*, (Johannesburg 1974), pp. 94-104.

localities within Southern [and East] Africa; particularly their historical significance in as far as South Africa's struggle for democracy is concerned. This is done in order challenge the notion and widely shared prejudice that while South Africa is a part of Africa geographically; it is not culturally and politically, and certainly not economically. From the various oral testimonies⁷ and archives it becomes apparent that economically, culturally and politically, South Africa is linked to the various regions in Southern Africa. For example, the economic link was made obvious by the migrant labour system, meaning that, Africans in South Africa had experiences of working and living together with their counterparts from Bechuanaland and the Central African Federation (Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia). Politically, the rising tide of African nationalism during the 1960s and the coming of independence in Africa meant that political ties between the different liberation movements in Southern Africa were cemented. This is an integral and resolute part of South Africa's historical heritage. Moreover, the politically inclined and South African based citizens from the above-mentioned colonies were members of the African National Congress.⁸ Culturally, the journeys to exile undertaken by South Africans through Bechuanaland and Southern Rhodesia were made easier by the shared language, traditions and customs of both Nguni and Setswana speakers. This road to the north has a long history' amongst Africans in South Africa. The journeys to 'exile' began with pre-colonial political dynamics in the area

-
7. The question about the merits and demerits of oral history [and traditions] has in the last few years received substantial theoretical treatment. See J. VANSINA, 'Lessons of 40 Years in African History', *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 25, 1992; D. HENIGE, 'The Problem of Feedback in Oral Tradition: Four examples from the Fante Coastlands', *Journal of African History*, 1973; C. VAN ONSELEN, 'The Reconstruction of a Rural Life from Oral Testimony: Critical Notes on the Methodology Employed in the Study of a Black South African Sharecropper', *Journal of Peasant Studies*, April 1993; K. BARBER, *I could Speak Until Tomorrow: Oriki, Women and the Past in a Yoruba Town*, (Washington, 1991); E. TONKIN, *Narrating our Pasts: The Social Construction of Oral History*, (Cambridge, 1992); C. HAMILTON AND J. WRIGHT, 'Making Precolonial Histories in South Africa', unpublished paper, nd; I. HOFMEYR, *We Spend Our Years as a Tale that is Told': Oral Historical Narrative in a South African Chiefdom*, (Johannesburg, 1993).
 8. A perfect example is James Chirwa who was born in Malawi, Michael Dingake and Fish Keitsing both Bechuanaland citizens. See, F. KEITSING, *Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC Underground*, (Gaberone, 1999); M. DINGAKE, *My Fight Against Apartheid*, (London, 1994).

now referred to as Kwa-Zulu Natal.⁹ Various communities from this region migrated to areas now referred as Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Pockets of these societies exist up to this day and include amaNdebele in Zimbabwe. In his short article, 'BECHUANALAND road to the north', Martin Legassick further explains the historical significance of this route during the colonial era. He noted that some of the travelers who used the route were members of the London Missionary Society and Cecil Rhodes, amongst others. The fear of incursion from the Germans led to Bechuanaland being declared as a British Protectorate in 1885 and the rise of Cecil Rhodes Chartered Company that also operated along this route.¹⁰ South African activists soon established the route as a gateway to freedom.

The 1957 Zeerust anti-pass campaign and the Bechuanaland Protectorate as the Gateway to Freedom

In 1958, well before the banning of the ANC and PAC, the first large group of ANC members, some 4-500 from the Dinokana area in Zeerust, went into exile in the then colony of Bechuanaland. Most of them were from the baHurutshe of the Gopane and Moiloa chiefdoms. They fled after participating in the 1957 campaign against the issuing of passes to African women in the Zeerust area. A sizeable number had also protested against certain chiefs who collaborated with the South African state in implementing Verwoed's Bantu Authorities Act.¹¹ The exiles included Chief Abram Moiloa.¹² In February 1958 *New Age* reported:

As though from a battlefield women and children are fleeing as refugees from Zeerust. After the last shooting at Gopane, villages emptied and people fled into bushes. Some found their way to Johannesburg to join

-
9. In order to understand some of these dynamics see J. WRIGHT, 'The Dynamics of Power and Conflict in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region in the late 18th and early 19th centuries: A Critical Reconstruction', (Ph.D., UW, 1989). Of course it will be ahistorical to equate the political dynamics of that era with those that took place in apartheid South Africa.
 10. M. LEGASSICK, 'BECHUANALAND Road to the North', *Africa Today*, April 1964.
 11. See *New Age*, 'New Zeerust Clashes: 4 killed, people determined Not To Accept Passes', 2/1/1958; 'Zeerust Accused on Murder Charge', 2/10/1958; *Cape Times*, 1/1/1959; *Rand Daily Mail*, 3/1/1959. At least two of these, Alfred Gopane and Edward Lencoe, temporarily fled from the area after being confronted by incensed community members. See also H. BERNSTEIN, *For Their Triumphs and for Their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa*, (London, 1985), Part 4.
 12. Botswana National Archives, (hereafter BNA), Divisional Commissioner South, (DIV.COM.S) .6/12, "Refugees to the BP from Gopane in Transvaal", Extracts from letter from Mary Benson to Defence and Aid Fund, 18 May, 1961.

husbands and fathers there: others made their way into Bechuanaland: still others sleep in the hills...Baphurutse tribesmen from Johannesburg who have gone home to look for their wives and children say they are unable to trace them.¹³

One of the leaders of these people was an ANC executive member in Zeerust named William Senna. His son recalls that as a youngster he was an eyewitness of police brutality against those who had organised protest against pass-laws at Dinokana in Zeerust in 1957. As he explains:

It was during this period that after that shooting where six (6) people were killed that our people ran away into Botswana-then Bechuanaland Protectorate- to escape that difficult moment. And as the result of that uprising our village became besieged [by the oppressors]. There was ...a state of emergency declared where my parents could not even stay in the village...my father was actually in the leadership of that uprising.... Yes, they were members of the ANC and then he was even one of the ANC executive members of that particular area. And they managed to escape to Botswana....¹⁴

These refugees were to provide an important link for post-banning cadres of the ANC going into exile. The refugees settled in Bechuanaland – mainly in the villages of Lobatse and Ramoutswa – without the permission of the British colonial authorities.¹⁵ They were destitute, having left everything; including their cattle behind in South Africa. The chiefs in the area allowed them to settle on a rent-free basis. Various Bechuanaland chiefs and colonial administrators played a stabilising role regarding the welfare of the refugees.¹⁶ As a relief measure, many of the men were provided with employment in road construction and the women worked at various irrigation schemes. Defence and Aid Fund in London headed by Canon Collins also provided necessary help.¹⁷ By 1961 it was reported that their

-
13. “Refugees flee from strife-torn Zeerust: chiefs, with police backing, start reign of terror” in *New Age*, 13/2/1958.
 14. Simon Senna interview by Sifiso Ndlovu, SADET Oral History Project, Mafikeng, 10/3/2002.
 15. *Cape Times*, 1/1/1959; *Rand Daily Mail*, 3/1/1959. A few others went to the baKwena and baNgwaketse ‘reserve’ areas.
 16. BNA, Div. Com. S.6/12, T.F. Betts Report on “Refugees: Bechuanaland Protectorate”, Mafeking, 15/7/1961.
 17. The Defence and Aid Fund organized assistance to political trialists, prisoners and their families. It also provided some form of financial support to the ANC when sources of finance were extremely limited during the early 1960s. See Mazisi Kunene interview by Sifiso Ndlovu, SADET Oral History Project, Durban 9/9/2000, 10/12/2000. Canon Collins’ office sent Mary Benson to assess the situation in 1961 and E.R. Watts, a livestock officer based in Serowe acted on behalf of the Defence and Aid Fund, see BNA, DIV.COM.S.6/12.

numbers had dwindled from the original 460 to about 350. Some had returned home and others were moving backwards and forwards and between their old lands and new, to plough both, and pay tax in neither place. Apparently, ‘as long as they keep out of the village in the Transvaal they are all right’.¹⁸

The presence of the refugees placed the Bechuanaland authorities in an awkward position. They did not want to offend the South African government by openly supporting refugees, nor did the authorities wish to encourage the latter to remain permanently in the protectorate. At the same time, they could not ignore their presence. In 1960, for example, J.D.A. Germond, the Divisional Commissioner of Lobatse found it ‘difficult to understand’ the true reasons behind the continued presence of the refugees. He had believed that the situation was developing satisfactorily. Germond had no doubt that, with the added assurances given to him by T. van Rooyen, the Zeerust based Native Commissioner, the remainder of the refugees would return to their homes. He argued that the main reason why the refugees did not want to return to South Africa was that their leader, William Senna, encouraged them not to go back. It was reasonable, he admitted, for Senna to believe that he could expect sterner treatment at the hands of the vindictive Chief Alfred Gopane and white authorities, as had happened to others who had dared to return to Dinokane. Germond suggested to van Rooyen that he should bring Chief Alfred Gopane to Lobatse, and in his presence, discuss with William Senna and others, the problem about their return to South Africa.¹⁹ Subsequently, protracted negotiations took place among Bechuanaland authorities, the South African Bantu Affairs Department officials including surrogate chiefs, and the South African exiles. These meetings focused on their relocation to South Africa. Sometimes these talks involved Seretse Khama. Thus in 1960 the Lobatse based Divisional Commissioner reported that:

Seretse (Khama) came to see me the other day and asked for information about the Bakhurutshe Refugees. He said Col. Colins [Canon Collins] was coming to stay with him and had shown interest in the Bakhurutse Refugees and would certainly question him about them. I gave him my special file... When he returned the file Seretse told me

18. BNA, DIV.COM.S.6/12, “Refugees to the BP from Gopane in Transvaal”, Extracts from letter from Mary Benson to Defence and Aid Fund, 18 May, 1961.

19. BNA, BNA, DIV.COM.S.6/12, “Refugees from the BP to Gopane in the Transvaal”, letter from Divisional Commissioner in Lobatse to Government Secretary in Mafikeng, 26/7/ 1960.

that he had spoken to a few of the refugees and that they did not appear to know what they wanted.²⁰

However these refugees did know what they wanted: freedom from the oppressive South African government. Possibly Khama did not know that most of the 'refugees' were fully-fledged members of the ANC.²¹ Unlike before, entry into Bechuanaland became complex and was regulated after South Africa declared itself a republic in 1961. The country was required to revise its legal relationship with the various protectorates, particularly with regard to access by citizens of each territory. Consequently, travel documents were compulsory for persons wishing to enter South Africa or the protectorates after the 1 July 1963. Eric Louw, the South African Minister of Foreign Affairs, announced that the government would establish fourteen passport control posts to monitor the flow of people to and from Bechuanaland. During the Nationalist Party Congress held in September 1963 the Minister of Justice, John Vorster, urged all farmers who lived in the area close to Bechuanaland to inform his department of any illegal activities and promised to take immediate and drastic steps to increase the security of the boarder.²² By January 1964, fifteen border control posts were in operation along the border with Bechuanaland. Some of these areas included Gopane (Schilpadhek), Witdraai, Ramathlabana and Buffelsdriftheek.²³ Vorster was adamant that he would establish more control posts if the need arose. Such public announcements did not dissuade the ANC from consolidating its external network.

The early years: building and consolidating the external network

William Senna the Bechuanaland based ANC activists soon established contacts with the ANC head office in Johannesburg, especially with Joe Modise, a member of Umkhonto weSizwe underground Fish Keitsing, a Bechuanaland born ANC activist was responsible for establishing the 'road

20. BNA, DIV.COM.S.6/12, "Refugees to the BP from Gopane in Transvaal". Savingram from Divisional Commissioner, Lobatse to District Commissioners, Lobatse and Gaborone, Divisional Superintendent of Police (B.P.) and the Government Secretary, Mafeking, 12/10/1960.

21. BNA, DIV.COM.S.6/12, "Refugees to the BP from Gopane in Transvaal". See the lists that provide details of those who went to exile and confirmed their ANC membership.

22. *The Star*, 19/9/1963.

23. South Africa Parliament House of Assembly Debates, 29 April 1963, cols.4913-4915; 24 January 1964, col. 254. Look for the names of the designated border posts in one of the parliamentary debates publication (Hansard). See also R. Dale, *Botswana: Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa*, (Westport, 1995).

to freedom'. He was born in 1919 of a peasant family. He came to South Africa at the age of twenty-three as a migrant worker. He became one of the original members of the African Mineworkers' Union, led by J.B. Marks. Keitsing joined the ANC in 1949 and became the leader of the Newclare Congress Branch and its volunteer in-chief during the 1952 Defiance Campaign. He was charged with others in the Treason Trial of 1956-1961 and was deported by Verwoed to Bechuanaland. Before he left, Walter Sisulu asked him to set up a safe house in Lobatse. As a result, Keitsing became a key figure in the establishment of the 'freedom road'. He handled literally all exiles from the moment they arrived in Bechuanaland until he saw them off to Zambia and beyond.²⁴

Keitsing worked closely with Joe Modise, relaying messages and cash from him. He was primarily responsible for moving people north to Tanganyika (Tanzania), via Southern and Northern Rhodesia. In the earliest years of the underground network, from 1960-62, Keitsing had neither phone nor vehicle. William Senna's son, Simon, who left Zeerust to join his exiled parents in Bechuanaland, also assisted Keitsing and William. Let him tell his story:

Without our parents at home who had crossed over to Botswana in order to avoid police brutality I began to act as a courier for the ANC. Later I joined my parents in Botswana and I also continued my schooling there...I was taking messages from the ANC headquarters in Johannesburg to Botswana via Zeerust. I used to meet Ntate Mokeba, Urea Mokeba and the old man Mampuru. I also assisted some of the activists to cross the Zeerust border into Botswana...²⁵

Other ANC activists joined Keitsing later. These included ANC veterans like [Uncle] Dan Tloome,²⁶ Botswana born ANC activist like Michael Dingake, Mack Mosepele and Motsamai Mpho a founder member of Bechuanaland

24. See, F. KEITSING, *Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC Underground*. See also, W. EDGE, *The Autobiography of Motsamai*, (Gaberone, 1996), Chaps 1-4; When Nelson Mandela left on his secret trip to Africa he recalled that during January 1962 he slept at Keitsing's house when his flight to Dar es Salaam was cancelled. Mandela turned down a suggestion by the head of security branch to stay at Government House because he 'preferred the simple but warm affection of F.K. and his wife', see N. Mandela Diary in Department of Justice, WLD 578/64 Lists of Exhibits, R13, Department of Justice, National Archives, Pretoria. .

25. Simon Senna interview by Sifiso Ndlovu, SADET Oral History Project, 10/3/2002, Mafikeng.

26. Born in the Free State, Tloome was active was active in both the ANC and the trade union movement and was elected to the ANC's national executive in 1949, and in that capacity he made an important contribution to the planning of the 1952 Defiance Campaign. In 1963 he was placed under house arrest but fled South Africa and went to settle in Botswana.

opposition party-the Bechuanaland People's Party (BPP).²⁷ Others who were sympathizers, included Klaas Motshidisi, a young union activist from Palapye; Anderson Tshepe, a Francistown resident who had obtained military training in China. These men worked as drivers and couriers who provided safe houses when Keitsing asked them to. This small, informal but highly effective network worked tirelessly for about six years. Dingake, who was attempting to form a bigger ANC structure in Bechuanaland, was arrested in Rhodesia in 1965.²⁸

Keitsing helped most of the ANC leaders who left South during the early 1960s. They included Oliver Tambo, ordered to leave by the National Executive Committee of the ANC in April 1960, when the ANC and PAC were banned. Tambo left together with Yusuf Dadoo of the SACP and Ronald Segal, editor of *Africa South*.²⁹ Dadoo was to write later:

It was with reluctance and a heavy heart that I set out on my secret journey from Johannesburg on that fateful day in April 1960 -- the day that the Prime Minister Verwoed was shot whilst on the Rand Easter Show. I was heading for Bechuanaland, now Botswana, after having bidden (farewell) to my mother at a pre-arranged rendezvous on the way. The journey was sorrowful partly because of the wrench of parting from my aging mother and other members of the family, but mainly because of having to leave the major arena of the struggle, which was within the country and at a time when many of the important leaders were in detention under the state of emergency. Was it right for me to leave the scene of battle when underground required every man jack to be at his post? My own desire was to be among the people...It was decided after some lengthy discussions that I should proceed to join Oliver Tambo...³⁰

Frene Ginwala, who had settled in Tanganyika and worked as a journalist, was involved in arranging the plane for Dadoo's, Segal's and Tambo's escape.³¹ There is no doubt that the colonial government of Bechuanaland was unhappy with the presence of the South African exiles in their territory. Because of security concerns in Lobatse, Tambo and Dadoo were moved to

-
27. M. DINGAKE, *My Fight Against Apartheid*; W. EDGE, *The Autobiography of Motsamai*.
 28. F. KEITSING, *Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC Underground*, Chapter 5, W. EDGE, *The Autobiography of Motsamai*, p. 84; M. DINGAKE, *My Fight Against Apartheid*.
 29. See R. SEGAL, *Into Exile*, Chapter 7. Segal, as editor of Penguin African books, was later to publish all sorts of important material, including Ruth First, Govan Mbeki, Brian Bunting, Jack and Ray Simons, amongst others.
 30. Dadoo Papers, Mayibuye Archives, University of Western Cape.
 31. See R. SEGAL, *Into Exile*, Chapter 7; H. BERNSTEIN, *The Rift: The Exile Experience of South Africans*, Part 1 for Segal, Tambo and Ginwala interviews.

Serowe where they were hosted by future Botswana Vice-President Lenyeletse Seretse, cousin of Chief Seretse Khama.³² The Bechuanaland authorities accused both Tambo and Dadoo of putting pressure on Seretse Khama to act as their agent and to facilitate their departure from the Protectorate in any way possible. As one report puts it:

SERETSE informed the District Commissioner of Police (from his sick hospital bed in Bulawayo) that the initiative at all times came from outside agents, whose name he could not disclose, but who were unknown to him. But during his trip to Bulawayo and after his return home, SERETSE kept the District Commissioner accurately informed of any messages which he received from sources connected with Segal and Tambo...and he did not want to embarrass the [Bechuanaland] Government by interfering.³³

A police intelligence report compiled in Francistown recorded the arrival of Oliver Tambo on the 12 April 1960 and that of Yusuf Dadoo on the 14 April 1960 who together with Segal, 'departed from Francistown late on Thursday 14 April 1960, by car, en route for Palapye. They left the territory by air from Palapye on the morning of 15th April 1960'.³⁴ From, Hilda Bernstein's book, *The Rift* and Segal's book *Into Exile* it becomes clear that initially Segal and Tambo wanted to drive through Southern Rhodesia. But when they got near the Bechuanaland and Southern Rhodesia border gate Ronald Segal's brother, Cyril, warned them not to use that route, as they would be arrested on arrival. Reluctantly, the two drove back to Francistown and joined forces with Dadoo who was against Tambo's and Segal's original idea. Eventually they proceeded south to Palapye where they boarded a plane to Tanganyika. This was after being issued with relevant traveling documents by the Indian government through the efforts of Ginwala. She explained to the curious Segal that they could not use the Francistown airstrip because the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association had turned down the aircraft's application for a landing permit controlled the property.³⁵ Twelve years later, in 1972, Dadoo commented:

It will soon be twelve years since that fateful April day in 1960 ... Why was the return not possible? Were the 12 years spent in the wilderness? There is a world of difference between reality and emotional yearnings! The desire to remain was and still remains strong and unshakable. But it

32. BNA. OPH Div. Comm. N. 9/2.

33. Ibid., report from Ngwato District Commissioner to Government Secretary in Mafikeng.

34. BNA, Div. Comm, N. 9/3.

35. R. SEGAL, *Into Exile*, Chapter 7; H. BERNSTEIN, *The Rift: The Exile Experience of South Africans*, Part One.

to be time and again tested on the anvil of the needs and requirements of the movements-of the South African revolution....³⁶

Needless to say, parting with loved ones was always a painful experience for the freedom fighters and others who went to settle in exile in order to build and fortify the ANC's external mission. In most cases it often led to families breaking up. For example, when Thandi Lujabe-Rankoe,³⁷ was ordered by the ANC to leave the country in December 1961 she decided to take along her cousin's two children, Thandi and Vuyani, without the permission of her aunt (Vina Tsele) who was their legal guardian. She wanted to lighten the burden on her aunt. The children's father, Mtutuzeli Tsele, had been erroneously arrested for pass offences in Alexandra Township and as a result had been forced to work as a potato farm labourer in Bethal, where the farm owner viciously murdered him. On the day Thandi left South Africa, she went to collect the children from their nursery school. On her way to the Johannesburg railway station, they met Mtutuzeli's brother, Benson Tsele, who was on his way home from work. Benson, a teacher by profession, was also an ANC activist and on noticing Thandi's heavy luggage, he became suspicious and wanted to know where they were going. He was not aware of any immediate plans for them to leave home. Thandi gave him a brief explanation and he promptly decided on the spot that he was also going to join other freedom fighters in exile. For Vina Tsele, it meant that the wounds of losing Mtutuzeli would not heal because unknowingly, she now lost her other son, Benson, together with two grandchildren and Thandi, her niece. After a difficult journey from Johannesburg to Bechuanaland, Northern Rhodesia they finally reached Tanzania.³⁸

Of the many examples that demonstrate the emotional anguish of family separation because of the demands made by the freedom struggle is exemplified by Ruth Mompoti. She was advised by Walter Sisulu, Moses Kotane and Thomas Nkobi to leave the country in 1962. She left South Africa through Bechuanaland. Mompoti was born on 14 September 1925 in Ganyesa, a rural village of African peasants ten kilometers away from the Transvaal town of Vryburg. After completing her Primary School Teacher's Diploma in 1944, Mompoti went to teach at Dithakwaneng (about seventy

36. Dadoo Papers, Mayibuye Archives, UWC.

37. Thandi Rankoe interview by Sifiso Ndlovu, Gaborone, SADET Oral History Project, 26/5/ 2002. See also Bechuanaland's police intelligence reports about Agnes Msimang, the wife of Mendi Msimang and Morseley Hadebe, the wife of James Hadebe who arrived in the protectorate on the 11 April 1961. They were accompanied by their children and were waiting for orders to proceed to Tanzania and join their husbands. BNA, Div.Com. North, 9/3.

38. See Thandi Rankoe interview by Sifiso Ndlovu. In 1968 Benson Tsele was amongst those killed during the Wankie campaign.

kilometers from Vryburg) for three years and later at Vryburg Higher Primary. The existing poor conditions affecting both African teachers and pupils influenced her political awakening. As a result, she joined the North West District Teacher's Union. Additionally, the overtly racist white population of Vryburg also politically conscientised her. The fact that some of her teacher colleagues were registered members of the Mafikeng branch of the ANC further inspired her politically. These colleagues had access to radical newspapers of the day, namely, *The Guardian* the *World*, and the *New Age* sent to them monthly by their Johannesburg based, politically conscious migrant labourer parents. These newspapers were to provide Mompoti with a broader, national picture regarding apartheid and politics in general. It was therefore not surprising that she eventually joined the 1952 Defiance Campaign.³⁹

In 1952, after her marriage, she settled with her in-laws who resided at Orlando West, Soweto. At the time her husband worked in Durban. Her neighbourhood boasted of prominent ANC members that included Diliza Mji, Duma Nokwe and Nelson Mandela, amongst others. Mompoti soon established contacts with her activists neighbours and soon became a member of the ANC and the Women's League. Her arrival in Johannesburg also coincided with the introduction of Bantu Education in 1953 and this compelled Mompoti to quit the teaching profession. She took part in organizing the ANC's campaign against Bantu Education. In 1954 she was one of the activists who launched the Federation of South African Women. Whilst still unemployed, one of her neighbours, employed as an administration assistant at Mandela and Tambo legal practice in Johannesburg, left her job to pursue her medical studies. In 1954, Mompoti applied for the administration assistant job and was successful. It was while working for Mandela and Tambo that Mompoti's political consciousness grew. She now had the opportunity to meet committed activists from across the colour divide and from various areas of South Africa. She soon became part of the network that organised the 1955 Congress of the People Kliptown mass meeting- including the 1956 women march to Pretoria. According to Mompoti, 'the organising of the march to Pretoria was not just organising the march. It started early in 1954, maybe even before that. The 1956 women's march was just the culmination of the real organisation'.⁴⁰

When the ANC was banned in 1960, Mompoti became one of the members that constituted the ANC underground. Most leaders of the ANC were

39. Ruth Mompoti interview by Sifiso Ndlovu. See also, H. BERNSTEIN, *The Rift: The Exile Experience of South Africans*.

40. Ibid. See also H. BERNSTEIN, *For Their Triumphs and for Their Tears: Women in Apartheid South Africa*.

arrested during the 1960 state of emergency, except Kotane. Mompoti was instructed by Walter Sisulu to join the underground network under the guidance of Kotane. Her underground collective included Henry Makgothi, John Mavuso and Bartholomew Tlhapane who, according to Mompoti, became a traitor. They had to print and distribute pamphlets so as to inform and communicate with the masses. It was a great risk for Mompoti to engage in this. It was against the law to be in possession of these banned materials and thus distribution became very difficult. Notwithstanding such problems, Mompoti successfully distributed these illegal documents in Soweto and other African areas. She survived detection by the security police until the end of the state of emergency.⁴¹

Mompoti was instrumental in the formation of women's tea clubs by female activists. These clubs operated throughout the country as a front of the banned ANC Women's League. This was an alternative strategy illustrating women's commitment to keep ANC branches alive during the state of emergency. These clubs represented networks extending to remote country districts including Mompoti's hometown, Vryburg. She was solely responsible for organizing women around this region. Their prime objective was the campaign against women carrying passes. Such campaigns proved to be effective in drawing mass support.⁴² But the security police net was closing on the ANC underground leading to prominent leaders like J.B. Marks going to exile in order to avoid arrest. As Mompoti explains:

when uncle JB [Marks] went,...the instruction came [from Kotane] that I must not get arrested. So I had to now go underground- those are the tribulations of my life. Well, [my husband's] family has to know that I'm a member of the ANC and that I'm now..., police are looking for me. In fact when the police came to look for me, when I really went underground, they went to my [Orlando West] house first and then they came again around then somebody told them that I live at my friend's place.... This young girl who was a niece of Duma Nokwe... ran to my friends house and said "aunt Ruth, the police are coming for you"... I was not even dressed, it was in the morning I had been cleaning and washing, so I just took off., I even had funny shoes... I was gone. And then from that day on, the police were looking for me. So I was told not to be arrested. I worked underground until the state of emergency was over.⁴³

41. *Ibid.* See also J. KIMBLE AND E. UNTERHALTER, 'We opened the road for you, you must go forward' ANC Women's Struggles, 1912- 1982, *Feminist Review*, 12, 1982, pp. 11-35 ; F. GINWALA, 'Women and the African National Congress', *Agenda*, 8, 1990, pp. 77-91.

42. Interview with Ruth Mompoti by Sifiso Ndlovu.

43. *Ibid.*

Eventually, after a protracted struggle with the security police, Mompati finally left South Africa in 1962. She left together with Themba Mqotha (Alfred Kgokong) and Flag Boshielo. Leaving behind her loved ones was the most difficult decision that she ever took in her life. Amplifying further she notes

well, first of all it was very difficult. I had two children, they were still very young. One was six years old; the other one was about three years. I just didn't know how I was going to do it. So I went home to see my mother. My mother was still alive. I told her that I'm going to school abroad for a year and I lied... So I left, through Botswana and then we went to Tanzania, .. in Tanzania, Tennyson Makiwane was the chief rep there, in 1962 in September. You remember that snow in 1962 in South Africa, it snowed the day before I was to leave, and I left... So [after a year] I told them "No, me I'm ready to go home", they said, "the people at home say it would be a waste of time for you to go... as Bartholomew Thlapane has decided to sing". I said "what about my children". So they said, "your children are better off without you, if you get there, they are going to be harassed by the police". I said "are they not being harassed now by my absence?". That's what happened, I stayed for another year, and in the end it was 27 years... One time we were working in this office, I was supposed to go home – I got a letter ..., I cried the whole day [thinking about the children].⁴⁴

There were other brave women who took a conscious political decision to leave apartheid South Africa. They include the twenty-one nurses who left South Africa in December 1961, just prior to the launch of *Umkhonto we Sizwe*. They settled in Tanganyika. The nurses left South Africa to protest against the introduction of the racist Nurses Act that divided the training of nurses according to race groups. When Tanganyika gained its independence on 9 December 1961, it decided to show its solidarity with the South African liberation struggle by asking the ANC to send a contingent of qualified nurses to the newly independent state. This was to replace the white British nurses who, for racist reasons, had resigned, as they were not prepared to work for a black government. There was a large number of expatriates working as civil servants and holding positions of authority in Tanganyika. Between 1961-62, Tanganyika was a nation with fewer graduates, a mere dozen African doctors and only one dentist for 12 million people. It was one of the poorest countries with the average salary of 20 British pounds; average life expectancy of 35 and 1 child in 4 died before the age of 15. Only half of the children received any education at all and there were only a few

44. [Ibid.](#) Finally, in 1972 the Botswana authorities granted her a visa. She was able to meet her children. She took them to exile and they stayed with her in Lusaka.

hundred-university students. The 5000 Europeans and 100, 000 Asians completely dominated the commercial, professional and technical sectors.⁴⁵

The South African nurses went through Bechuanaland and settled in Lobatse under the care and guidance of Keitsing. They were immediately transferred to Francistown where they temporarily resided under difficult conditions. In late January 1962, after a month in Bechuanaland, the group finally left for Tanganyika. The South African nurses included Kholeka and Edith Thunyiswa, Edith Ncwana and Edna Miya.⁴⁶ Albertina Sisulu, a qualified nurse, working in Soweto recruited Edith Thunyiswa and other nurses from the Witwatersrand. Johnny Makhathini recruited the nurses from the Natal-Zululand region. Govan Mbeki recruited those from the Eastern Cape region.⁴⁷ On their day of departure the nurses converged at Fordsburg, Johannesburg. From there the group departed in a bus driven by a white “student” from Wits University, disguised as a priest. When they reached the border post, the latter told the border authorities that he was transporting the nurses to a funeral of one of their colleagues in Bechuanaland. Edith Thunyiswa pointed out that the group only discovered at the border gate that the bus driver was a bogus priest. This was because of the clumsy manner in which he had tied his white collar. Luckily for them, the border guards were not as observant. The bus driver vanished immediately after he had dropped them at Keitsing’s place in Lobatse. The nurses do not know the identity of the ‘priest’ up to this day. Edith also stressed that the young twenty-one nurses were determined to reach Tanzania despite security and other

45. R. SADLEIR, *Tanzania, Journey to Republic*, (London, 1999), Chapter 21.

46. Interview with Edith Thunyiswa by Sifiso Ndlovu, SADET Oral History Project, Johannesburg, 8/7/2002. See also interviews of other nurses by Brown Maaba for the SADET Oral History Project; Maaba interview with Edna Miya, 19/7/2002, Durban; interview with Mary Jane Socenywa, 14/09/2002; interview with Kholeka Thunyiswa, New Brighton, 1/10/2002. See also M. RESHA, *‘Mangoana o Tsoara Thipa ka Bohaleng’ My Life in the Struggle*, (Johannesburg, 1991), p.210. Some of the nurses got married to Tanzanian citizens. Phine Luke married a Zimbabwean, and someone else married a Mr Swart from the Netherlands. Others, for professional reasons, later went to settle in Britain and other African states with their families.

47. S. Ndlovu and B. Maaba interview with Edith Thunyiswa, SADET Oral History Project.

unforeseen risks.⁴⁸ She used a Sotho-Tswana proverb to explain their courageous action, ‘Mangoana o Tsoara Thipa ka Bohaleng’, loosely translated this proverb means, ‘in times of trouble mothers are the only ones who are not afraid to hold the sharpest cutting edge of a knife with bare hands’. In contemporary South Africa, the proverb articulated the fact that women played an equally important part (together with men) throughout the long years of resistance and struggle for liberation. This story about the nurses is an important illustration of how the ANC had developed a policy of maintaining links with nationalists, political organizations, governments, solidarity and liberation movements in Africa and the wider world. The nurses were soon followed by large contingents of male cadres who proceeded to exile for military training.

The Freedom Road⁴⁹ and Freedom Ferry to Tanzania including some examples of MK cadres journeys to exile

The road to the north has a long history’ in South Africa. The journeys to exile began with pre-colonial political dynamics in the area now referred to

48. According to Thunyiswa the nurses were in their early twenties and committed to the struggle for freedom. There is a growing literature about women in politics including their role during the struggle for national liberation, see for example, S. GEIGER, *TANU Women: Gender and Culture in the Making of Tanganyikan Nationalism, 1955-1965*, (Portsmouth, 1997); I. STAUTON (ed.) *Mothers of the Revolution: The War Experiences of Thirty Zimbabwean Women*, (Bloomington, 1990). On life history as a tool of research about women life histories see, ‘What is so Feminist About Women Oral History?’, *Journal of Women’s History*, 2(1), pp.169-82, ‘Women’s Life Histories: Method and Content’, *Signs*, 11(1), 1986, pp.334-51; M. HALBWACHS, *The Collective Memory*, (New York, 1980); Popular Memory Group, “Popular Memory: Theory, Politics and Method” in R. JOHNSON et.al, *Making Histories: Studies in History Writing and Politics*, 1981; H. GENGENBACH, ‘Truth-Telling and the Politics of Women’s Life History Research in Africa: A reply to Kirk Hope’, *International Journal of African Studies*, Vol. 27, No. 3, 1994, pp. 619-627; P. ROMERO, *Life Histories of African Women*, (London, 1988); L. TOWNSEND, ‘Out of Silence: Writing Interactive Women’s Life Histories in Africa’, *History in Africa*, 17, 1990, pp. 351-58; PERSONAL NARRATIVES GROUP, (eds.), *Interpreting Women Lives: Feminist Theory and Personal Narratives*, (Bloomington, 1989); J. FENTRES AND C. WICKHAM, *Social Memory*, (Oxford, 1992).

49. Term taken from the International Refugee Council of Zambia Report on ‘Refugee Movements’, July 1966. This report includes photographs of scenes along the Freedom Road.

as Kwa-Zulu Natal.⁵⁰ Various communities from this region migrated and settled in areas today referred to as Tanzania, Malawi, Zambia, Mozambique and Zimbabwe. Pockets of these societies exist up to this day and include amaNdebele in Zimbabwe. In his short article, 'BECHUANALAND road to the north'. Martin Legassick explains the historical significance of this route to exile during the colonial era. Some of the travelers who used this road included members of the London Missionary Society and Cecil Rhodes. The fear of incursion from the Germans led to Bechuanaland being declared as a British Protectorate in 1885 and the rise of Cecil Rhodes Chartered Company that also operated along this route.⁵¹

Initially, the ANC network chartered aircraft to fly activists out of Bechuanaland. There were no roads connecting to Zambia and it was unsafe to travel through Southern Rhodesia. Modise and Keitsing were aware that they were not going to be able to use charters for a long time. Firstly; because South Africa and British governments would exert pressure on the owners and sabotage their planes, secondly; charters were very expensive for an organization that did not have sufficient funds. Therefore, the solution was to reconnoiter a route to Zambia.⁵² A concerned Hendrik van den Bergh who was then a Lt-Colonel in the South Africa Police and was later to be the head of BOSS announced in July 1963 that more than two hundred young Africans had passed through Bechuanaland in the past two months for sabotage training conducted by African states. He described the cadres as 'unemployed youth from 18 to 25 years old, who were recruited by the

50. In order to understand some of these dynamics see J. WRIGHT, 'The Dynamics of Power and Conflict in the Thukela-Mzimkhulu Region in the late 18th and early 19th centuries: A Critical Reconstruction', (Ph.D. Thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1989). Of course it will be ahistorical to equate the political dynamics of that era with those that took place in white controlled South Africa.

51. M. LEGASSICK, 'BECHUANALAND Road to the North', *Africa Today*, April 1964.

52. Complementing Keitsing's work, different international organisations were involved in easing the refugees' burden. They provided necessary logistical and financial support to the different liberation movements. The no-governmental organisations included amongst others, the International Refugees Council of Zambia (IRCOZ) headed by Dr Cato Aall, one of Tambo's acquaintances. The two were in constant contact and shared similar concerns on the subject of refugees. In one of his letters addressed to Cato Aall, Tambo argued that life for refugees must not become easy. They must start refugee life the hard way. This helps to condition for hardship 'that may arise further away from their home country by expectations of an easy life and joyous life in independent Africa or overseas.' For example, see letter from Tambo addressed to Cato Aall, 23/7/1965, ANC-Morogoro Papers, Box 11, ANC Archives, University of Fort Hare.

African Nationalist Congress and the Pan-Africanists for military training in Abyssinia, Tanganyika, Algiers, Egypt, Cuba, China and Russia'.⁵³

In the early 1960s among activists who used Botswana as a point of departure are Kenneth Abrahams, Joe Slovo, Arthur Hodgsons, Vivian Ezra, Arthur Goldreich and Harold Wolpe, amongst others. In 1963, Abrahams was abducted by South African security police from Bechuanaland and taken back to South Africa where he was subsequently jailed and later released.⁵⁴ In September 1963, Goldreich and Wolpe staged a dramatic escape from Johannesburg Security Police headquarters where they were incarcerated. They were held incommunicado together with a number of liberation movement leaders under the ninety-day law. Their escape route took them from Johannesburg to Swaziland. From there they flew over South Africa and landed at Lobatse in a chartered plane dressed as priests. As the plane touched down they jumped out, ran towards Bechuanaland police and shouted, 'we have never been happier to see policemen'.⁵⁵ The East African Airways that was supposed to fly them and twenty six other refugees to Dar es Salaam was sabotaged as part of dirty tricks campaign spearheaded by the South African state.⁵⁶

As a security measure, Ben Schoeman, the Minister of Transport, announced new regulations concerning the use of South African airspace following the dramatic escape. Elsewhere, John Vorster, the Minister of Justice, commented that Goldreich's and Wolpe's escape was a great loss in the campaign against subversion and noted, 'You do not lose a war by losing a skirmish now and again'.⁵⁷ After this escape, Schoeman asserted that transporting passengers he demonised, as "criminals" out of South Africa would be cause for South African Airways to reconsider their pool partnership agreement with BOAC, Central African Airways and East African Airways. Accordingly, he terminated East African Airways' permit allowing it to operate to Johannesburg and Durban. He also promulgated regulations tightening control over airspace and making it virtually

53. '100 Trainee Saboteurs fly North Week: Police tell how Bechuanaland is being used' in *Star*, 22/7/1963; 'Refugees on way to Tanganyika' 26/7/1963. See also R. DALE, *Botswana's Search for Autonomy in Southern Africa*, (Westport, 1995).

54. 'Abrahams: Britain's note to Pretoria', in *The Star*, 28/8/1963; M. LEGASSICK, 'BECHUANALAND Road to the North', *Africa Today*, April 1964.

55. *Ibid.*

56. See the picture of the burnt aircraft, 'Sabotage suspected: RAF officer flies to probe night blaze-Refugees Stranded', *The Star*, 29/8/1963.

57. 'Vorster: They were two of our biggest fishes', *The Star*, 28/9/1963 and 'Goldreich and Wolpe escape to Francistown: Flown from Swaziland dressed as priests'.

impossible for aircraft carrying refugees from the British Protectorates to cross South African skies. The regulations specified the airports within both South Africa and South West Africa at which aircraft traveling to and from British Protectorates must land. Before flying to or from Bechuanaland aircraft were required to land at Gobabis, Grootfontein, Grand Central, Jan Smuts, J.B.M. Hertzog (Bloemfontein), J.G. Strydom (Windhoek), Katima Mulilo, Keetmanshoop, Kimberley, Kuruman, Mafikeng, Mariental, Pietersburg, Rand, Upington, Vryburg and Wonderboom.⁵⁸ After landing, pilots were compelled to report to the nearest police officer or command, furnish all information in their possession in relation to their journey. No passenger would be allowed to leave the aircraft and no goods could be unloaded without the permission of the authorised person or police officer. Moreover, the pilot could not take off without obtaining prior permission.

The rank and file members of the ANC, though, did not use aircraft, but went north by ground and road transport. Keitsing took these members on the train up to Francistown. At this point, they rented a borrowed vehicle, and usually drove up to Livingstone in Northern Rhodesia. The first group that Keitsing took north was the twenty-nurses-one of them returned to South Africa because of health problems. It is important to note that the choice of routes to exile by the ANC was dictated by changing circumstances. Until December 1963 the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland were still loosely united under settler control as the Central African Federation. But by 1962 there were already sharp divergences in the policies of these territories towards the transit of refugees. By this time Southern Rhodesia government was working closely with the South African state hence it became risky for Keitsing to enter its territory.⁵⁹ In July 1963 *The Star* newspaper reported that the Southern Rhodesia government intended to intensify security measures along the Bechuanaland border after a discussion with their South African counterparts over matters of mutual interest. Six border posts were to be set up between Tuli and Plumtree at about thirty mile intervals in the remote area that was one hundred and eighty miles long.⁶⁰

Keitsing's operations became simpler after the Hodgsons purchased two Land Rovers for his use in 1962. Additionally, Keitsing benefited from a phone that was installed in his house. With the vehicles in tow Keitsing drove his charges north to Kazangula across the Kalahari Desert.⁶¹ During

58. 'Refugee Flight may Spoil Airline Pool' in *The Star*, 29/3/1963; 'Curbing refugees: Checkpoint Airfields Listed' in *The Star*, 17/9/1963; and also 'Air pool talks', *The Star*, 19/9/1963.

59. F. KEITSING, *Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC Underground*.

60. 'Rhodesia sets new Bechuana border watch' in *The Star*, 22 July 1963.

61. F. KEITSING, *Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC Underground*.

1963-64, this became a full time activity for him, with one return trip to the north after another. As a result of these developments and acquisition of badly needed resources, the ANC network became an efficient two-way operation carrying freedom fighters south and refugees, north.⁶²

A 1966 document by the International Refugee Council of Zambia on Refugee movements described the 368 miles route between Francistown and Kazangula as 'The Freedom Road'.⁶³ In the 1960s this bumpy ride to Kazangula entailed several day's journey in a rugged four-wheel drive vehicle. Approximately 248 miles of this route consisted of a bush trail heavily populated with animals but devoid of humans. The rugged nature of the track, much of this through the Kalahari Desert sand, and the splendid isolation made it necessary for the favoured form of transport, the Land Rovers, to be kept in impeccable condition. Extra fittings like spare petrol tanks (to lengthen the vehicle 's reach) were installed, and a number of tools and spare parts were bought to raise the chance of recovery or repair in the event of accidents involving animals or mechanical failures. Apparently, permanent landmarks of scrap motor cars in the form of irrecoverable breakdowns enlivened this trail. Because of its unique geographical position at the junction of four frontiers, Kazangula became an important spot since the end of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Here the freedom fighters and political activists boarded the "Freedom Ferry", as the Zambesi River crossing was the last hurdle for the activists. "Captain" Nelson Maibolwa, a Zambian who transported on average 25 refugees at a time, operated the ferry.⁶⁴ The crossing point was a geographical oddity where the four borders of Botswana, Zambia, Rhodesia and the South African controlled Caprivi Strip met. This was the last critical stepping stone for hundred of freedom fighters and political activists taking the arduous freedom trail from South Africa to the north. *Time* magazine commented in its 10 April 1964 issue that,

thousands more will follow as South Africa's black and colored people grow ever more restive under Hendrik Verwoed's oppressive regime.⁶⁵

62. *Ibid*

63. Term taken from the International Refugee Council of Zambia Report on 'Refugee Movements', July 1966. This report includes photographs of scenes along the Freedom Road, BNA, DIV.COM.S.6/12,

64. 'Freedom Ferry at Four Borders' in *The Star*, 23/9/1964; 'Africa: Captain Nelson's Freedom Ferry' in *Time*, 83, 10/4/1964, p.38. See the picture of Captain Nelson illustrated in both reports.

65. *Ibid*. 'Africa: Captain Nelson's Freedom Ferry'.

Around this time some of the [Zeerust refugees] also proceeded from Bechuanaland to Tanzania to undertake military training and become freedom fighters. Simon Senna, son of their leader William Senna, explains:

eventually yes, I decided to leave. Now on the 28th of February 1964 I crossed the Zambezi River with the group. And then we traveled ... it was very strenuous because we did not have money and we... but... of course Keitsing managed to take us to the river. It was quite a contingent up to Kasane village.... it was a little village or town before you cross the Zambezi into Zambia, so we crossed there by trucks organised by Fish [Keitsing]. He, he knew the network but he was working very closely with Joe Modise. We went to Livingstone; we then got into a train up to Lusaka and proceeded to Dar es Salaam...⁶⁶

In 1964 the young Senna and a group of MK cadres went for military training in Egypt. He was among the first of the many cadres to be trained by the Egyptian army at Saiqa. He maintains that this was one of the toughest and most rigorous military training courses the twenty-eight cadres ever went through.⁶⁷ The course took three months to complete after which they were emaciated. In order to recover and regain their strength they were compelled to stay in a Cairo hotel for an extra month by the Egyptian authorities. After that the cadres returned to Tanzania and reported that the Egyptian course was unsuitable for guerrillas but good for those who intended to become part of an elite commando force. They complained to the ANC leadership that such training could easily turn them to hardened, heartless killers who would take civilian life for granted. Thus training of MK cadres in Egypt was promptly discontinued. Senna and colleagues immediately left from Kongwa in Tanzania for further military training in the Soviet Union.

Another further illustration of demanding hazards of the journeys to exile is that of Isaac Makopo. He undertook this journey with a group of thirty-two MK recruits in 1962. This was before the establishment of the Kazangula route through the Zambezi.⁶⁸ This was the first ever large group of MK recruits to leave the country. Their trip began in Soweto to Bechuanaland where Keitsing received them. They continued their journey through Southern Rhodesia and crossed the border to Northern Rhodesia and finally to Tanzania.⁶⁹ The group included amongst others, Eric Mtshali from

66. Simon Senna interview by Sifiso Ndlovu, SADET Oral History Project, 10/3/2002, Mafikeng. See also interview with John Nkadimeng, SADET Oral History Project, 13 and 18/3/2001; 27/5/2001, Johannesburg.

67. Ibid.

68. Isaac Makopo interview by Sifiso Ndlovu, SADET Oral History Project, 24/11/2000; 12/10/2001; 4/2/2002, Pretoria.

69. Their contact in Southern Rhodesia was ZAPU's Dumiso Dabengwe

KwaZulu Natal, Lennox Tshali from the Cape and Lambert Moloi.⁷⁰ When they reached Tanzania, Makopo recalls that:

It was quite a distance, we were tired from sitting the whole night on the truck, walked a long distance to cross that border, diverging and crossing then back to the border gate and there we reported ourselves to the immigration. All right, immigration welcomed us, they were happy, they said okay, at the moment we are not going to process you. We will have to phone the special branch. We're now in Tanganyika. When we heard the words 'Special Branch' we said what? Special Branch? We almost scattered. Then they laughed at us and said no, but comrades, the special branch here is different from your special branch [in South Africa]. And you must be accepted by the Special Branch here as part of the procedure. We can't process you before the special branch meet you.⁷¹

From Tanzania they proceeded to Morocco to begin military training. They completed their basic military training course in six months and returned to Dar es Salaam in 1963. On their return journey the cadres heard news about the arrest of the Rivonia trialists from the ship's radio broadcast. This piece of bad news meant that the entire MK structure was now in tatters. It was now impossible for the internally based ANC leadership to receive them as trained cadres. Accordingly they had to remain in Tanzania for a longer period than intended. On their arrival in Tanzania, they presented a report to the leadership. The gist of the report expressed their dissatisfaction with the quality of their military training. To make up for the deficiencies, the leadership asked the cadres to proceed to the Soviet Union for further military training. Others were sent to Algeria. Makopo was part of the first large group of MK cadres that went to the Soviet Union and they were based in Moscow. The main thrust of training was in sabotage, explosives, other conventional weapons, politics and organisation of guerilla units. In the Soviet Union there were also members of other liberation movements such as the MPLA, Frelimo and SWAPO. In 1964, after completing their training, they went back to Tanzania and were the first group that settled in a newly established camp of Kongwa.⁷²

Makopo's and Senna's testimonies portray initial triumph over obviously difficult circumstances and conditions. The journeys to exile were not necessarily safe. Freedom fighters had to be ever vigilant against every manoeuvre by the South African regime and its allies. They aimed to annihilate the liberation movements, failing which, to make it impossible for

70. See Mpanza's interview by Jabulani Sithole and Tshali's interview by Moses Ralinala and Nhlanhla Ndebele for the SADET Oral History Project.

71. Makopo's interview by Sifiso Ndlovu, Pretoria.

72. Ibid; see also SHUBIN, *ANC: A View from Moscow*, (Cape Town, 1999), p.30.

them to realize their mission to attain freedom for the oppressed majority. The transportation and training in Africa and elsewhere were prime targets for South African Special Branch. We also need to be cognisant of the fact that in the early 1960s security was compromised within the ANC. This was because counter-intelligence to frustrate the enemy was non-existent. Moreover, some prominent members of the organisation were rightly or wrongly suspected to have undermined the ANC in this regard. Maintaining sound security depended on the maturity and responsible leadership committed to the organisation.⁷³

South Africa's Attempt to Sabotage the Freedom Road.

From as early as 1960s the colonial governments of Bechuanaland, the two Rhodesias and the Union of South Africa government were concerned about the security risks posed by the increasing numbers of “refugees” from South Africa. For example, an intelligence report from the Bechuanaland's Kasane based District Commissioner addressed to the Mafikeng⁷⁴ based Bechuanaland Government Secretary reported the following on the 20 April 1960:

On the 6th April 1960 I visited the Officer Commanding Special Branch, Livingstone. He informed me that his Department was becoming increasingly interested in the Eastern Caprivi Strip, from a security point of view. From information at his disposal he said it is rumoured that the South African Government are considering establishing military bases on the strip. He also stated that his Department was posting a security branch detail at Katimo Mulilo on the Northern Rhodesian bank of the Zambesi River to keep an eye on activities in the Strip. Please refer to my Intelligence report dated 22nd December 1958. The Officer Commanding also informed me that they were preparing for trouble in Northern Rhodesia and showed me a new barbed wire enclosed detention camp capable of holding several hundred detainees, which had just been completed.⁷⁵

Later the South Africans built a fully-fledged military base at Caprivi for security reasons. On 15 February 1960, a Bechuanaland Protectorate (Manchaneng) Police intelligence report noted that on 14 January 1960 members of the uniform branch of the South African Police visited Pilikwe. They are alleged to have counted the numbers of the baHurutshe exiles living there, and to have told them that their Headman (Chief) in the Transvaal wished them to return home. These policemen are alleged to have

73. Interview with R. September by Sifiso Ndlovu, Sadet Oral History Project. Security remained a problem throughout – indeed was in many ways more serious in the 1980s in exile.

74. Mafikeng was the capital of Bechuanaland until 1965.

75. 9/3.

crossed the border near Lobatse where they unsuccessfully searched for Chief Abram Moilola of the baHurutshe. They then proceeded to Pilikwe via Mahalapye but they still could not locate the chief who was at Kalamare at that time. The report further noted that an application by the Union Government for land on which to erect and maintain an air-radio beacon for surveillance at Mahalapye received a very cool reception at the Tribal General Purposes Committee meeting on 4 December 1959. The chief speaker against the proposal was Seretse Khama. His comment was that he did not relish the idea of allowing a government that openly expressed their hostility to all ideals that Bamangwato stood for. Undeterred, the South African government continued to ask the Bechuanaland government if an alternative solution to the problem could not be found and made subsequent representations.⁷⁶

The Bechuanaland regime kept reports about activities of South African police. For example, information from three different sources in Bechuanaland reported that between the 8 and 11 December 1961 two South African Police Special Branch agents were operating in the areas of Palapye and Serowe. When one of them was asked what the SAP special branch were doing in the protectorate, they replied that they 'were going to arrest refugees'. They were traveling in a Johannesburg registered car.⁷⁷

Some of the Botswana security police and civilians were enlisted as the eyes and ears of the South African regime and were paid for spying. There also existed good, trustworthy Botswana citizens who were against their compatriots. They would sneak out and go to where the South Africans freedom fighters were based in Francistown or Lobatse and would notify them and say 'comrades sit tight, the situation is bad. I am a member of the security of Botswana, its not everybody in our circles in the security who is genuine, or who is willing to help you. We want to advise you, never go in singles, rather in pairs, threes or fours so that when they try to kidnap you, at least one of you can run away and report so that some of us can play a part in order to save you'.⁷⁸ Winston Ngcayiya, an MK cadre who went to exile through Lobatse and Francistown, maintained that Botswana had an open surveillance system, meaning that when

you go anywhere they are there, you go to town, they are there with their bicycles. They used this system right through up until you go to

76. BNA, Div. Comm N. 9/3.

77. Ibid.

78. Interview with Winston Ngcayiya by Sifiso Ndlovu, SADET Oral History Project, 11/1/2001, Orlando West, Soweto. See also R. SEGAL, *Into Exile*. Some of the Bechuanaland citizens passed information to Segal that there were plans to kidnap him.

sleep. So they would openly tell you, I want to advise you, our security is not good. I am a moTswana, there are baTswana who are working for the boers, we are poor people here and they are bribing us-so keep to this [routine]....even sabotage can take place.⁷⁹

Ronald Segal's experiences in Bechuanaland corroborate Ngcayiya's testimony. He recollected that a security police agent always shadowed him and followed him to his hotel because 'Britain was still doubtless a power in the world, but her Special Branch, slouching lugubriously at the bar in the hotel, promised a precarious protection'.⁸⁰

A 1960 report by the various district commissioners noted that every African in the Bamangwato Reserve was in complete sympathy with the Africans in the Union of South Africa. They widely expressed the view that it was unfortunate that Verwoed had not been shot dead by his assassin in 1960. These commissioners construed this as a wish for blind revenge on a man who was held responsible for much African misery.⁸¹

Between 1960 and 1968 the South African police budget was doubled from R36 million to R72,1 million. The military budget also skyrocketed, from mere R44m in 1960 to just under R300m by the end of the decade.⁸² Police and army units were specifically trained and equipped for anti-guerrilla activities. Members of the Security Police were extensively trained, both at home and abroad, in the techniques of psychological warfare that were applied to political prisoners with increasing savagery that led to twenty deaths in detention during the 1960s.

On the inter-border security front, the South African government and colonial governments of Bechuanaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia made a major breakthrough on the 27 September 1962 when they arrested a group of twenty-four South African students who were on transit to Tanzania. The group included three Bechuanaland citizens, amongst them Fish Keitsing.⁸³ Among those arrested was Simon Makana and Thabo Mbeki who was the leader of the students affiliated to the African Students' Association (ASA). On 31 May 1961 after the general strike, Mbeki, as ASA's national secretary told a mass rally that African students were breaking with their submissiveness and parochialism. He elaborated the

79. Interview with Ngcayiya. See also M. DINGAKE, *My Fight Against Apartheid* and R. SEGAL, *Into Exile*.

80. R. SEGAL, *Into Exile*, p.287. See also M. DINGAKE, *My Fight Against Apartheid*.

81. BNA, Div. Comm. N. 9/3. Ngwato District Intelligence Committee, Report to Government Secretary in Mafikeng.

82. B. BUNTING, *Moses Kotane*, (London, 1975).

83. W. EDGE, *The Autobiography of Motsamai*, p.85; and F. KEITSING, *Comrade Fish: Memories of a Motswana in the ANC Underground*.

fact that African students now identified themselves with the struggle of the African people. Prior to this they protested and striked over such issues as food, other complaints that included paternalistic attitude of school authorities, particularly boarding masters. From now on Mbeki promised, 'students will go on strike as a sign of their revolt against the system as such'.⁸⁴

What is interesting about the arrest of the South African students and others are the police surveillance and intelligence reports. These reports, to a large extent highlight the concerns and intelligence networks of the Rhodesian and South African governments. It appears that the South African Consulate General in Kenya had highly placed spies within the ANC whom they were not prepared to compromise at any cost.⁸⁵ For example, a top secret report from the Consul General in Kenya to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs in Pretoria, reported that the flight that fetched the students following their release was an East African Airways Charter Flight which flew from Nairobi to Dar es Salaam, refueled in Salisbury and picked up the passengers (students) in Francistown, from where it returned to Dar es Salaam. The ANC in Dar es Salaam and were in the region of R 1600.00. The person responsible for the payment was Tambo and a man introduced as 'Makweni'. The Consul General was very careful regarding its source and was very concerned that the invaluable informant should not be compromised and exposed. This person had to be protected at all costs:

In order not to jeopardise the possibility of information being obtained in the future from our informant, I must stress that the information given in this minute should be utilised with great circumspection since if this is not done our informant could be gravely compromised, in fact, if the information is not already available to the South African authorities, the publication of the names could very easily be traced by any logical person to one of the very weak links in what is considered a very secured chain. Unless telegraphic instructions to the contrary are received, the file copy of this minute will be destroyed in the Mission when receipted airmail schedule confirming safe arrival of the diplomatic pouch in the Department is received in the Consulate-General.⁸⁶

84. *New Age*, 4/1/1962.

85. See confidential report, 'South African Student Refugees: Prohibited Immigrants ex South Africa', Special Branch Headquarters, Salisbury, 26/10/1962, WLD 578/64, Dept of Justice, National Archives, Pretoria; see also W. EDGE, *The Autobiography of Motsamai*, p.85.

86. South African Consulate General, Kenya, letter to the Secretary for Foreign Affairs on 'Illegal Immigrants from South Africa', WLD 578/64, Dept of Justice, National Archives, 22/11/1962.

Another example portraying infiltration in the ranks of the liberation movement happened in 1963. Robert Manci believed that spies and informers were operating in the ANC after his arrest in Zeerust:

Now in 1963 I decided to leave the country, I was told that I should leave the country...it was our group (Soweto based MK cell) that said you have got to leave the country. I also felt I must go. Anything can happen. I felt that I must go and they said, "Well, you can leave the country". It is then when Hashe and the others came to take me out. But we discussed this thing with [Brian] Somani and Bonga; they are the ones who actually organised this... So I left by train to Zeerust and along the way we noticed that there was some movements of people we suspected as the special branch people, that is, the police... When we looked [together with Cable] on the other side we could see that there were police lining up on the other side of the railway line in Zeerust. Then we said no, we are in for it, there is no other way. When we got out, they just went straight to us; they just said "Hey come". It was as if somebody might have told them that look, these [ANC] people are coming. They simply said, "Come". And so they took us to Zeerust police station. I did not see Cable there at the [Zeerust] police station, they had [secretly] taken him away....Later I was sent to Robben Island and spent my sentence there...⁸⁷

The printed press also reported various incidences along the hazardous road to freedom. For example, in July 1963, *Drum* magazine covered a story titled "Drama of 12 Men on the Run: The Refugees who vanished".⁸⁸ This story was about the journey to exile of twelve young political refugees from South Africa who were arrested by authorities in Northern Rhodesia and their daring escape from the clutches of the police. The twelve men would neither deny nor confirm to the authorities and journalists that they were political refugees from South Africa. In the meantime, Kenneth Kaunda's United National Independence Party (UNIP) sent two officials and a lawyer, James Skinner, to interview the men. Simultaneously top Federal immigration officials drove 200 miles from Ndola in order to do likewise. Afterwards, they arrested the men on their arrival in Lusaka as Skinner tried, without success, to stop their arrest. Soon, Harry Nkumbula, head of the ANC (Zambia) and Minister of Education entered the fray after being told of the arrest. He stormed off to the immigration offices and demanded to see the

87. [The arrest and imprisonment of freedom fighters including rank and file members did not deter those committed to the struggle for liberation. They continued flocking to the camps in Tanzania and Zambia as oral history testimonies collected by SADET suggest.](#)

88. [Drum, July 1963, pp 67-70. See also the obliterated faces reflected in the pictures of the 'refugees' who were together with their lawyer and representatives from liberation movements in the then Northern Rhodesia \(Zambia\).](#)

men, proclaimed, 'No African is a foreigner in any part of Africa' and requested their immediate release.

The South African Police Act was amended to empower police to serve beyond the borders of South Africa. Thereafter Pretoria spies based at Wachthuis would now operate far afield; in Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia and 'most capitals of independent Africa'.⁸⁹ It was therefore not surprising that on 2 March 1963, 34 South African students entered Zambia through Kazangula on their way to Tanzania to take up scholarships arranged for them by the ANC. That same day the students were intercepted and apprehended by Northern Rhodesia Immigration Authorities who were still under the rule of the Central African Federation. All the 34 students, including three others, were transported to the Southern Rhodesian town of Bulawayo and from thence were handed over to the South African police. In a letter addressed to Kenneth Kaunda, then a Minister of Local Government, Tennyson Makiwane questioned the swiftness in which the authorities did all this. What seemed to irk the ANC most was the behaviour of the white immigration officials. The students were not returned to Bechuanaland from whence they came but sent to South Africa for prosecution.⁹⁰

The dirty tricks campaign waged by the South African state continued relentlessly throughout the 1960s. The South African government was aware of the successes of the ANC network operated by Keitsing, Modise and the Hodgsons. Consequently, they pressurised the Bechuanaland Protectorate to deport the latter. The Hodgsons were instructed by the District Commissioner of Lobatse to leave when suitable transport was available. If they did not, they would be prosecuted, and if found guilty, they would be deported back to England. The Hodgsons however defied the authorities and refused to move voluntarily.⁹¹

Immediately after sabotaging the plane that was supposed to transport Goldreich, Wolpe and other refugees, one of Keitsing's Land Rovers was damaged in September 1963 as it stood in the back yard of his house in Lobatse. As a safety measure, the Hodgsons were moved to a police camp in Gaborone. The bombing of the Land Rover was amateurish. Only the petrol tank and rear door were damaged.⁹² Elsewhere, the South African political refugees based in Swaziland increasingly feared for their safety and

89. See *Northern Star*, 29/1/1964; *Cape Times*, 28/1/1965; 11/1/1964; 9/12/1963; 'Vorster's spies at home and abroad' in *Sechaba* 3,(9), 1969.

90. T. Makiwane letter to K. Kaunda, 13/3/1963, ANC-Morogoro Papers, Box 13, ANC Archives, University of Fort Hare (UFH).

91. 'Seretse Khama to intercede for the Hodgsons' in *The Star*, 29/8/1963.

92. 'Lobatse inquiry into explosion in vehicle' in *The Star*, 19/9/1963.

clandestinely made their way through South Africa to Bechuanaland in 1964. They included amongst others, Reggy September.⁹³ This was because in 1963 the South African secret police abducted Rosemary Wentzel, a South African in exile whose husband was a political detainee. She was kidnapped from her home near Mbabane in Swaziland and transferred to a South African prison. She was detained under the ‘ninety- days’ law. Again, in 1963, the South Africa secret police kidnapped a South African university lecturer, Dennis Higgs, from his home in Lusaka. Within hours of the abduction, Simon Kwapepe, Minister of Home Affairs, launched a nationwide search and special checks were posted at all borders. It was to no avail as the fugitives and their captive had crossed the border on their way to South Africa. After relentless protest from Kaunda, the Verwoed government announced that Higgs was found bound, blindfolded and abandoned in a car in Johannesburg. However, the South African government indicated that it was going to apply for his extradition as he was on their wanted list. This was in connection with a murder case resulting from a bomb explosion at the Johannesburg railway station.⁹⁴

The South African security police also abducted Anderson Ganyile and colleagues at Qacha’s Nek in Basutoland during the early 1960s. This episode was executed clandestinely without the prior knowledge and connivance of the Basutoland authorities.⁹⁵ When the South African government was called upon to return Ganyile and colleagues, they refused and said he was wanted in connection with a murder case arising from the Pondoland Revolt. The sabotage campaigns by South African agents continued relentlessly and on 26 July 1964 a refugee centre was bombed in Francistown. The new centre would replace a building called ‘The White House’, which was used by refugees. This house was in a poor state and now a health hazard.⁹⁶ Another favourite method defining the state’s dirty tricks campaign involved the use of forged letters to implicate various leaders of the ANC. This was done in order to cause confusion and fracture within the

93. Interview with Reginald September by Sifiso Ndlovu, SADET Oral History Project, Cape Town and Pretoria; see also *The Star*, 27/7/1964.

94. ANC Memorandum, ‘Programme: Umkonto’, 4/9/1964, ANC-Morogoro Papers, Box 26, ANC Archives, University of Fort Hare.

95. South Africa United Front Newsletter and Press Statement on the case of Anderson Ganyile, 18/1/1962, ANC-London Papers, [MCHO2-Box 1], Mayibuye Archives, University of Western Cape. On the Pondoland Revolt see G. MBEKI, *South Africa: The Peasant’s Revolt*, (London, 1964).

96. ‘Centre is for refuge not sabotage’ in *The Star*, 30/5/1964; see also picture, ‘Bechuanaland blast: no arrests yet’, *The Star*, 27/7/1964.

organisation. Some of the forgeries were investigated and successfully traced by the ANC.⁹⁷

In 1965, during the House of Assembly debates in South Africa, Vorster, on 11 June said that he was aware of five camps in Africa at which saboteurs were trained. In various cases the accused had pleaded guilty to undergoing military training in Moscow, Nanking, Da-Bra-Zid in Ethiopia, or Kinkuzo in the Congo. In 1965 special anti-guerilla 'Mobile Police Units' began combat patrols on the borders of South Africa and SWA and in the Transkei and other reserves. Some of these units were later sent to Rhodesia. As well as this rival to the army, in 1965 the police established an Air Wing with reconnaissance planes.

Hitherto the police had arrested one hundred and thirteen persons on their way to undergo training, and eighty-five who had returned after their course. In 1965 at the trials in Pietermaritzburg, Pretoria, Johannesburg, and Cape Town during at least 38 men have been found guilty of having left South Africa for military training or attempting to leave, and at least seven of recruiting people for training. Some were said to be ANC or Poqo members. Sentences ranged from five to 15 years. Vast numbers of the men were already serving two-year sentences for having left the country without valid travel documents. Vorster noted that accomplices whose names were generally withheld gave evidence on behalf of the state. In some cases leave of appeal was granted. According to available police evidence, some of the men had been arrested in Zambia and Bechuanaland for being in those territories illegally. They were handed over to the South African police. Others were arrested on South Africa's borders.⁹⁸

On the military front, the South African government was getting stronger as they received significant support from western states, particularly France, from where they purchased three submarines. On February 22, 1967, Defense Minister, P.W. Botha, declared that a radar complex, which would provide an early warning system against enemy aircraft, protected South Africa's northern frontiers. He further alluded to the fact that the South African coasts were protected by the installation of the Decca navigational system at a cost of \$8.4 million.⁹⁹ By 1969 France became the leading supplier of arms to South Africa. In addition to the submarines, helicopters,

97. See BC 1081, Jack Simon Collection, 'Internal Issues, 1963-1990's', Dept. of Manuscripts and Archives, University of Cape Town.

98. South Africa Parliament House of Assembly Debates, 11 June 1965, col. 7198; SAIRR, *A Survey of Race Relations in South Africa*, 1965, p.63.

99. South Africa Defence White Paper, 3/6/1964. See also S. RATCLIFFE, 'The Shifting Dominance: The Foundations of the Armaments Industry during the 1960s', *Africa Perspective*, 25, 1984. Pp. 24-40

and Mirage jet aircraft already sold, Botha announced in May 1969, that South Africa, in co-operation with a French electronics firm, had developed the 'Cactus' air defence weapon system, officially approved and partly financed by the French Government. Additionally, the Impala striker-trainer aircraft was manufactured in South Africa under licence from the Italian firm, Machi, using a Rolls Royce engine manufactured in Italy.¹⁰⁰

Conclusion

Journey's into exile consisted of members belonging to the Congress Alliance. However, the majority of the trekkers were members of the ANC. They left via Bechuanaland and settled in Tanzania and later in Zambia. At first, the route proceeded via Southern Rhodesia. But this scenario was altered as security was tightened due to a joint border surveillance by the governments of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Consequently, as it became evident that Northern Rhodesia would cease to be a British colony, Keitsing and Modise conceived the alternative route into exile. It straddled the Zambezi River and the entry point in the north was Kazungula. It is because of such facts that one argues that the routes into exile, known as the Freedom Road, are part of the South African historical heritage sites and landscape. This heritage delineates the road to democracy in South Africa and its highest peak and summit are the 1994 democratic elections. To understand how South African reached the summit we need to appreciate the unselfish and selfless sacrifices of those who went along the road in the name of the struggle for liberation.

The rugged Freedom Road was defined by a landscape that incorporated camps like Kongwa in Tanzania and the Kalahari Desert in Botswana; graves of those who could not make it; name places like Zeerust/Dinokane border, Lobatse, Francistown, Bulawayo, Kazangula, Lusaka and Dar es Salaam; the White House in Francistown as one of the many safe houses along the route.¹⁰¹ Moreover, the people of Bechuanaland, Rhodesia, Zambia and Tanzania who have important stories to tell about exiled South Africans represent a part of our historical heritage. The historical sources stored at the various archives of Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia and Tanzania portraying untold rich histories about South African freedom fighters, cadres and others constitute part of our past in the present. In short, the history of South Africa extends beyond the demarcated borders. It is an inclusive history of Southern

100. [Africa Contemporary Record, 1969-1970, B 294.](#)

101. [On the politics of history and landscape, see W.T.J. MITCHELL, *Landscape and Power*, Chicago, 1994, Chapter 1.](#)

(as well as East) Africa. All these factors are instructive in terms of rewriting the history of the struggle for liberation in South Africa.¹⁰²

Opsomming

Erfenisroetes vir die bevryde Suid-Afrikaners: die gebruik van mondelinge geskiedenis om die roetes van die helde en heldinne na ballingskap in die 1960s te herkonstrueer

Talle Suid-Afrikaners het na die verbanning van die ANC en die PAC in 1960 die land verlaat uit vrees vir arrestasie. Uitgewekenes was afkomstig van 'n bree spektrum agtergronde en gemeenskappe. 'n Groot groep was voornemende vryheidsvegters wat militêre opleiding in die buiteland wou ondergaan. Ander wou weer graag opleiding in die buiteland voorsit. 'n Groot persentasie van die ANC en PAC leierskorps het gedurende die 1960's die land verlaat en het nuwe basisse in pas onafhanklike state soos Tanzanië en Zambië gevestig. Talle uitgewekenes het in ander Afrikastate beland, waarvan sommige in MK militêre kampe in Tanzanië. Ander het in Europa (veral Brittanje) en die VSA geëindig. Ander het gegaan na die USSR, Sjina en Oos-Europese lande waardeur hulle 'n internasionale erfenisroete vir Suid-Afrikaners gevestig het. Hierdie artikel verleen aandag aan die verhale van wat met hierdie uitgewekenes gebeur het, hoe en waarom hulle Suid-Afrika verlaat het en die gevare wat hulle moes trotseer. Daardeur word 'n bydrae gelewer tot die herskep van die onmiddellike verlede en historiese erfenis van Suid-Afrika.

102. See also J. GUY, ' Battling with Banality', *Journal of Natal and Zulu History*, 18, 1998, pp. 156-193. In this article Guy critically discusses the relationship between History, Heritage and Tourism in relation to the Anglo-Zulu War and its Aftermath. This also includes the historiography of the Anglo Zulu War. Furthermore, Guy argues that a Zulu perspective of the Anglo-Zulu War and its aftermath is long overdue regardless of the Heritage Industry that invokes a past which makes bearable a sordid and painful present.