

## RICHARD STUTTAFORD AND THE ANTHEM QUESTION OF 1938

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### Introduction

The achievements of Richard Stuttaford (1870–1945) appear to have been primarily commercial, though he made some contributions to the amelioration of urban social conditions as the founder of the pioneering garden city concept in housing in South Africa: in the local history of Pinelands Garden City in the Cape Province Stuttaford emerges as a figure of not inconsiderable importance in the civic life of Cape Town in the Early twentieth century. If his political career is remembered at all, however, people are aware of him only as a less outstanding South African politician. But while reading his speeches in parliament between 1924 and 1942, one becomes increasingly involved with the thoughts of this distinguished and genial man who contributed much to South Africa in a variety of fields: Managing Director of one of South Africa's oldest retail businesses; City Councillor of Cape Town; a leading figure in the Associated Chambers of Commerce of South Africa; Adviser to the Union of South Africa at the Imperial Conference at Ottawa in 1932; Member of Parliament for Newlands and Claremont in the Cape; Cabinet Minister in the Fusion Government of General Hertzog between 1934 and 1939, and subsequently in the Smuts War Cabinet; a viticulturalist and wine farmer at Stellenbosch. He played a much more active role in the history of South Africa than most people are aware of.<sup>1</sup>

### The Anthem Question 1938

There was virtually no likelihood that Hertzog and Smuts would lose the general election of 1938, but cracks had started to appear in the United Party. Of the 150 seats in the House of Assembly, the United Party won 111,<sup>2</sup> and there was a feeling of optimism at the outcome. Smuts told Philip Kerr that "The feeling especially in English speaking centres has been exceptionally fine, and I almost feel as if we are at last through our racial troubles ... I am hopeful that ... we shall see real national fusion, and the new South African nation slowly taking shape".<sup>3</sup>

Smuts regarded this electoral victory as particularly significant for the British Commonwealth, and it was South Africa's role within that body of co-operating nations that had aroused his determination to make fusion work. The overwhelming mandate given by the electorate to the United Party Government in 1938 provided Smuts with a new confidence. He told Kerr: "I should say that on the whole South Africa is probably the best co-operating member of the Commonwealth today except Great Britain herself".<sup>4</sup> It is evident that the election result was welcomed no less in Britain where it was regarded as a "triumph over the forces of racialism, narrow republicanism, anti-semitism and anti-black which ... was largely the stock-in trade of the other side (Purified Nationalists)".<sup>5</sup>

1. *Cape Times*, 20.10.45, obituary.

2. The result of the general election of May 1938 was as follows: United Party = 111, Nationalist Party = 27, Dominion Party = 8, Labour Party = 3, Independent = 1.

3. Lothian Papers, GD 40, 17/367, Smuts to Kerr, 20.5.38 (Scottish Records Office, Edinburgh).

4. *Ibid.*

5. *Ibid.*, Kerr to Smuts, 2.6.38.

Stuttaford's reappointment to the Cabinet as Minister of the Interior and Public Health had by no means been assured in 1938. In fact, political gossip had suggested that he would be dropped to make room for Claude Sturrock, engineer turned businessman and financial authority, who had previously been Minister without portfolio. It was contended that Stuttaford did not enjoy robust health and that his retirement was imminent.<sup>6</sup> This conjecture was not without foundation. In April 1938 Stuttaford had informed Smuts that he was willing to withdraw from the Cabinet in the interests of the United Party Government's programme.<sup>7</sup> By retaining Stuttaford in the new Cabinet, however, Hertzog was avoiding a controversial appointment, and he was satisfying the Cape electorate in the composition of the executive. Stuttaford had not identified himself so vigorously with the small liberal wing of the United Party led by Hofmeyr to upset the balance within the Cabinet and threaten the Hertzog wing, but his acknowledged liberal sympathies would on the other hand placate the Cape liberal voters. Hertzog underestimated Stuttaford's strong convictions, especially his sentimental attachment to the British Empire.

Hofmeyr and other Smuts men, Stuttaford among them, had not always found it easy to accept the standpoint of some Hertzogites on matters concerning the black population groups, and the views of the small liberal wing of the United Party were anathema to some of their colleagues. The relations between Hertzog and Smuts were also strained a good deal of the time. At the beginning of 1938, for instance, Hertzog suggested that as a beginning, "Die Stem van Suid-Afrika" would be played after "God save the King" at the next opening of parliament. The anthem question was a major issue during the election campaign from March to May 1938, and it was largely a sentimental question: to the English-speaking section of the United party, especially those of British origin, "God save the King" was an expression of loyalty to Britain and reaffirmed the British connection with South Africa; to Afrikaners, especially the ex-Republicans of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, "The King" was proof that South Africa was not yet a sovereign independent state, in spite of the Balfour Declaration of 1926, the Statute of Westminster of 1931 and the Status Act of 1934.

Heaton Nicholls observes that Hertzog's decision to allow the playing of "Die Stem" for the first time at the opening of Parliament in February 1938 shows his placation of the growing Afrikaner nationalist movement. He asserts that "Hertzog maintained that in putting "Die Stem" on the programme he was primarily concerned with forestalling the pressure from the Republicans to have "The King" abolished and was also trying out "Die Stem" to see whether it would prove as acceptable to the Transvalers as it was to the Cape".<sup>8</sup> It has been argued that whatever Hertzog's motives were in fostering the recognition of "Die Stem" as a national anthem for South Africa, such a move was bound to create tensions in a party which had among its supporters both English- and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans.<sup>9</sup>

On 11th February 1938, Sir Patrick Duncan opened the sixth session of the Union's seventh Parliament in his capacity as Governor-General. During the ceremony "God save the King" was played three times, as was customary, but for the first time

6. *Forum*, 27.6.38, p. 5.

7. Smuts Papers, (J.W. Jagger Library, University of Cape Town, microfilm), vol. 57, No. 45, Stuttaford to Smuts, 21.4.38.

8. G.H. Nicholls, *South Africa in My Time* (London, 1961) p. 334.

9. R. Levitt, 'The Fusion Government Crises of 1938, with special reference to the Fourie affair' (unpublished B.A. honours thesis, University of Cape Town, 1971), p. 12.

“Die Stem van Suid-Afrika” was played at the conclusion of the Governor-General’s speech. Hertzog explained in Parliament that certain representations had been made to him to include “Die Stem” in the opening of Parliament ceremony, and that he had agreed to this suggestion “after consultation with certain of my colleagues”.<sup>10</sup> It appears that he did not consult the whole cabinet.

The Dominion Party raised the strongest objections. In reply to a question from Col. C.F. Stallard, leader of the Dominion Party, on 15th February 1938, Hertzog went further, and stated that while “God save the King” was not South Africa’s national anthem “Die Stem” might become that. Hertzog said that South Africa had no legally or officially recognised national anthem, and he declared that “The King” was regarded in the Union “as a solemn invocation to the Almighty for His protection to our King”.<sup>11</sup> Hertzog emphasized that “Die Stem”, however, had become accepted by Afrikaners as their national anthem and as the only South African anthem entitled to recognition as the national anthem of the Union.<sup>12</sup> This statement caused a political row among the members of his own party. Even the judicious Patrick Duncan recorded in his notebook that “the result of the Prime Minister’s reply to Col. Stallard was an explosion among the English-speaking members worked up by angry letters from constituents. They in turn put pressure on Ministers and especially General Smuts as the old leader of the South African Party. For a few days the party was on the verge of a break. An explanation by the Prime Minister in the House enabled them to stage a detente but the thing has left a crack in the Fusion building which its opponents will do their best to widen in the election campaign”.<sup>13</sup> Hertzog’s explanation seems to be the result of a deputation led by Heaton Nicholls and Leslie Blackwell to the Prime Minister a few days later, in which Hertzog made it clear that the introduction of “Die Stem” was to be complementary to “The King”.<sup>14</sup> Thereupon the United Party deputation issued a statement to the press that the position of “The King” was secure and that it would not be superseded, but only complemented by “Die Stem van Suid-Afrika”.<sup>15</sup>

During the general election of 1938 the “anthem question” became allied with the “republican issue” at campaign meetings. Smuts, electioneering mainly in the Transvaal and the Eastern Cape, made every effort to reassure the electorate that “The King” would remain the national anthem of South Africa and that “Die Stem” would be complementary to it. He tried to smooth over the cracks: “Why should we not have a second anthem? We have two legs, two races, two national flags. It does nobody any harm, and it satisfies both sections of our people”.<sup>16</sup> For the most part the Smuts Wing of the Fusion Party followed their leader, and on the anthem question addressed their meetings along similar lines.<sup>17</sup>

Stuttaford fought a bitter campaign against the Dominionites in Claremont. It was the first time since 1924 that the Claremont seat had been contested. The anthem

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10. *H.A. Debates*, vol. 31, col. 294.

11. *Ibid.*, col. 293.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Duncan Papers, I C 15 c, Notebook on Political Topics, April 1937 – November 1939, 27.3.38 (J.W. Jagger Library, U.C.T.).

14. L. Blackwell, *Farewell to Parliament* (Pietermaritzburg, 1946), p. 9.

15. *Rand Daily Mail*, 22.2.38.

16. *Star*, 13.4.38.

17. Blackwell, *Farewell to Parliament*, p. 14.

issue was one of the major planks of Stuttaford's election platform, and he echoed Smuts's declaration that "The King" was the national anthem of South Africa and would remain so forever.<sup>18</sup> The Dominion Party resurrected the "status Controversy" in the election campaign in Claremont, declaring that the United Party was "fast going over to a republic" and rejecting the concept of British nationality. Stuttaford vehemently denied such an attack, declaring that in the United Party "There was no intention whatever of South Africans in any way derogating from their position as members of the British Empire ...".<sup>19</sup> Hertzog did not speak with the same voice, though he was accused by D.F. Malan of making "Die Stem" the tail of "God save the King".<sup>20</sup> The result of the election was an overwhelming victory for the United South African National Party. Despite the 111 seats taken, however, Malan's Gesuiwerde Nasionale Party gained thirty per cent of the total votes cast, and nearly half the Afrikaans-speaking population had voted Nationalist.<sup>21</sup> Malan's republican propaganda had achieved considerable success.

On Union Day, 31st May, 1938, a number of military parades were held in the main centres throughout South Africa. The principal parade was held at Robert's Heights, the headquarters of the South African Defence Force, and was attended by General Hertzog and the Minister of Defence, Oswald Pirow. There were two flag poles, one flying the Union Jack and the other the Union Flag. Prior to the start of the parade, an officer was seen to remove the Union Jack. During the parade itself "Die Stem" was played, while "The King" was omitted. At a number of other military parades, including those in Johannesburg and Cape Town, "The King" was not played. A wave of indignation swept through the English-speaking section of the population at these events. These occurrences came to be known as the Union Day Incident, and, coming a mere two weeks after the general election, placed a further severe strain on the fragile unity of the Fusion Government.<sup>22</sup> Many considered that the election promises were being flouted. In the Cape Peninsula feeling ran high and G. Brand van Zyl in a telegram to Pirow reminded the Minister of Defence of the promises made to the English-speaking electorate regarding the anthem issue, and appealed for some placatory measures to restore Cape Peninsula voters' confidence in the government. He warned of a strong movement to persuade the Mayor of Cape Town to call a public protest meeting, and recommended that the government should prevent such a meeting by moving first.<sup>23</sup>

Stuttaford became the centre of the storm when he resigned his position as Minister of the Interior on 1st June 1938. Though Stuttaford declares that it was after "du consideration" that he decided to resign, it seems clear from the brevity of his letter of resignation to the Prime Minister and from the speed with which he withdrew it the following day, that it had been a hasty and ill-considered move, prompted by an intense indignation at the absence of respect on the part of the Prime Minister for a deep matter of sentimental attachment of English-speaking South Africans to the Commonwealth.

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18. *Cape Times*, 4.5.38.

19. *Ibid.*, 9.2.38.

20. *Rand Daily Mail*, 3.5.38.

21. *New Statesman and Nation*, vol. 15, June 1938, p. 1020.

22. R. Levitt, 'Crises of 1938', p. 18.

23. Smuts Papers, vol. 126, No. 22, 1.6.38.

In his letter to Hertzog, Stuttaford announced that "in view of the assurances given by me during the election with regard to the respective use of 'God save the King' and 'Die Stem' I have, after due consideration, decided to place my resignation in your hands".<sup>24</sup> Stuttaford felt keenly that the whole fusion experiment was in jeopardy, and emphasised that the possibility of achieving racial peace in South Africa — the cementing of English- and Afrikaans-speaking South Africans into one white unity bent on finding a common solution to the native problem — was the only reason for his continuing in politics. He felt that he was no longer justified in remaining in the Cabinet.<sup>25</sup> Hofmeyr and Smuts immediately gave Stuttaford their support. Blackwell telegraphed Hertzog that "if the position (is) not rectified I fear my position in (the) Party will become untenable".<sup>26</sup> The twelve Cape Peninsula M.P.'s unanimously demanded that the position of the national anthem be clarified, and that the sentiments of the Peninsula voters should be satisfied by a clear and explicit statement by the Prime Minister.<sup>27</sup>

On Stuttaford's resignation, Hertzog immediately called Harry Lawrence, a Cape lawyer and brilliant debater, to Pretoria to take Stuttaford's place in the Cabinet. This he did without consulting Smuts.<sup>28</sup> He also showed his pugnacity by telling his secretary to put all protests in the wastepaper-basket.<sup>29</sup> There is little doubt that the Union Day Incident divided the Cabinet into two camps — the Smuts wing and the Hertzog supporters. Blackwell claims that 'For two or three days the cabinet met in an atmosphere of crisis and it was uncertain whether or not the United Party could survive'.<sup>30</sup> Patrick Duncan was of the opinion that 'Had this (Union Day Incident) happened just before the election instead of a fortnight after, the result would have been very different. As it is it produced a Cabinet crisis in which a split was only with the greatest difficulty avoided and it has left them in a state of feeling which if it is cleverly exploited by their opponents in parliament may easily break them'.<sup>31</sup> Paton suggests that "Hofmeyr had no real interest in these matters, and could even watch them with amusement, especially when Hertzog in caucus, having returned to his pugnacious self, soundly rebuked those English-speaking members who had protested against the Union Day incidents".<sup>32</sup> Paton clearly states Hofmeyr's position on the Anthem issue when he concludes that Hofmeyr was not one of those who believed that the United Party was on the point of breaking up over the anthem issue.<sup>33</sup> Smuts chose to treat the affair as an accident, but a serious one. "These mistakes (he wrote to E.F.C. Lane) are heartbreaking, and I sit with the broken crockery, even if not with a broken heart. We must endeavour to carry on, but frankly I find it often most trying to work with my old Nat friends. They are more influenced by fear of Dr. Malan than of God".<sup>34</sup> Smuts could nevertheless see the wider implications of the anthem

24. Stuttaford Political Papers (Private family collection, Cape Town), Stuttaford to Hertzog, 1.6.38.

25. *Cape Argus*, 1.6.38.

26. Smuts Papers, vol. 126, no. 23, Blackwell to Hertzog, 1.6.38.

27. *Cape Argus*, late edition, 2.6.38.

28. Paton, *Hofmeyr* (London, 1964), p. 284.

29. *Ibid.*

30. Blackwell, *Farewell to parliament*, p. 21.

31. Duncan Papers, I C 15c, Notebook, 21.6.38.

32. Paton, *Hofmeyr*, p. 284.

33. Bellwood claims, however, that Hofmeyr threatened resignation over the anthem crisis (W.A. Bellwood, *South African Backdrop* (Cape Town, 1969), p. 37).

34. Smuts Papers, vol. 57, no. 148, Smuts to E.F.C. Lane, 11.7.38.

issue, namely Hertzog's bowing to the pressures of Afrikaner Nationalism.

The general public seemed well aware of the jittery state of the Cabinet, and the press was filled with reports on the crisis: "The Union Day incident produced a political crisis, lost the Government a provincial by-election and for a moment seemed to threaten the whole structure of unity and goodwill so laboriously built up during the last five years and so strikingly and trustingly endorsed by the electorate only a fortnight previously".<sup>35</sup> On 1st June, at the Provincial Council by-election in Turffontein, considered a safe United Party seat, the Labour party candidate was elected with a majority of over five hundred.<sup>36</sup> The defeat of the United Party candidate was directly attributed to the indignation of the voters over the Union Day Incident.<sup>37</sup> Paton lays the blame for the division in the cabinet on Hertzog, alleging that "Hertzog seemed indifferent to the crises he provoked whether by action or by intemperate words. He would plunge the Party into a crisis, and Smuts, without appearing to be too important, would have to get it out again".<sup>38</sup> It is little wonder that Smuts turned down the invitations he was receiving at the time to visit Europe, stating: "If I leave this show it may collapse with far-reaching results".<sup>39</sup> The cracks were papered over on 2nd June 1938 when, as a result of Cabinet discussions, a statement on the anthem question was issued from the Prime Minister's Office:

"As far as the legal and constitutional aspects of the matter are concerned, the Cabinet has affirmed the position as stated by the Prime Minister during the last session of Parliament. It follows therefore that there is at present no official National Anthem for the Union. Until such a time as the people of South Africa have agreed as to the recognition of an appropriate anthem, the Government has decided that as a matter of procedure, on all formal occasions under Government auspices, when either 'God save the King' or 'Die Stem van Suid-Afrika' is played, the other will also be played. In practice, such occasions will be limited to those appropriate to the playing of both, having regard to their character as defined by the Prime Minister in his statement above referred to".<sup>40</sup>

Stuttaford had not attended the emergency Cabinet meetings, but Smuts kept him informed of the deliberations. Smuts seems to have been anxious to retain Stuttaford in the Interior portfolio, and as soon as the Prime Minister's statement on the Anthem dispute was issued, Stuttaford signed a letter addressed to Hertzog withdrawing his resignation, which had been drafted by Smuts on his behalf. The letter reads: "General Smuts has told me of the decision come to by the Cabinet in regard to the question of 'God save the King' and 'Die Stem van Suid-Afrika', and of the subsequent discussion in regard to myself. In view of this I wish to say that I would be willing to withdraw the resignation which I tendered to you yesterday".<sup>41</sup> Smuts's mediation in this dispute corroborates Paton's thesis that Smuts was cast in the role of pacifier during the crises of fusion. It is evident that Smuts had pleaded Stuttaford's case to Hertzog and the result was the Prime Minister's reply to Stuttaford: "General Smuts has just handed to me your note in which you say that you would be willing to withdraw your resignation. Let me assure you that I am glad to learn this and to say

35. *Star*, 22.6.38.

36. E.A. Walker, *A History of Southern Africa*, pp. 676–677.

37. Levitt, 'Crisis of 1938', p. 18.

38. Paton, *Hofmeyr*, p. 285.

39. Hancock, *Smuts*, vol. 2, p. 294.

40. Smuts Papers, vol 126, no. 25, 2.6.38.

41. Stuttaford Political Papers, Stuttaford to Hertzog, 2.6.38.

that I shall be glad if you would destroy my note of today in which I accepted your resignation, and that I shall look upon what has happened as not having taken place at all".<sup>42</sup>

These letters provide some valuable insight into the extent of Smuts's influence over Stuttaford, and more important, his ability to mollify the Prime Minister, and in so doing maintain the support of the Smuts wing of the Cabinet. It seems clear too that it was on Smuts's insistence that Stuttaford agreed to withdraw his resignation after assurance had been given that "The King" would receive equal recognition with "Die Stem".

Hertzog found himself with an extra Cabinet minister on his hands, as a result of having invited Lawrence to join the Cabinet. The Cabinet was re-formed to include both Stuttaford and Lawrence, who took Fourie's Place in the Cabinet, in the portfolio of Commerce and Industries.

Stuttaford had been pressed to accept the official statement on the status of "The King", but the English-speaking section of the population and the press were by no means satisfied with this statement. It did not satisfactorily explain the incidents of Union Day, but 'was rather a re-statement of an accepted position'.<sup>43</sup> The Opposition newspapers exploited the breach, and *Die Burger's* editorial of 3rd June 1938 read:

"Fusion Ministers were yesterday engaged in plastering up the crack in their jerry-built edifice — a crack so wide that Mr. Stuttaford stepped through it and threatened to bring down the whole crazy structure ...

Those with ears to hear and eyes to see must realise that there is actually no such thing as Fusion. The ruling party in South Africa is one which has been artificially knocked together".<sup>44</sup>

Once again it was left to Smuts to calm the political agitation. He made a statement on the issue which appeared in the press on 4th June. Smuts declared:

"The position as regards the hoisting of the flag at Cape Town is that the Commanding officer could, at his discretion, have flown both flags and, in fact, was authorised by telegram to do so but the telegram was not received by him in time.

As regards "God save the King" in terms of the King's Regulations it would not have been proper to play it as part of the ceremonial".<sup>45</sup>

On 6th June Lawrence, on returning from seeing the Prime Minister in Pretoria, also issued a statement to the press. He stressed that "The King" had been omitted because it was contrary to military regulations to play it when the King or his representative was not present. The whole affair, he declared, was a "regrettable blunder".<sup>46</sup> Despite this acknowledgement by Lawrence, Hertzog emphatically denied that "anything wrong, either in connection with the not hoisting of the Union Jack or with the not playing of 'God save the King' took place on that occasion".<sup>47</sup> A protest meeting was held at the City Hall in Cape Town, attended by 2 500 people. The

42. Ibid., Hertzog to Stuttaford, 2.6.38.

43. Levitt, 'Crises of 1938', p. 20.

44. *Cape Times*, 4.6.38 quoting *Die Burger*, 3.6.38.

45. *Cape Times*, 4.6.38.

46. Smuts Papers, vol. 126, no. 33, Lawrence to the Press, 6.6.38.

47. Ibid., no. 33, Hertzog to James Thompson, secretary of the Cape Peninsula Council of the United Party, 9.6.38.

meeting passed a number of resolutions expressing its disapproval of the government's handling of the issue.<sup>48</sup>

Stuttaford's action was harshly criticised by the Afrikaner wing of the United Party. A typical reaction was that of Mr. U.D.W. Dienaar, chairman of the Krugersdorp Council of the United Party who complained to Oswald Pirow that —

“baie van ons Afrikaanssprekendes in die Party uiters teleurgesteld is met die houding wat Minister Stuttaford ingeneem het tydens die Krisis in die Kabinet.

As 'n persoon in so 'n hooggeplaaste posisie somer bedank en sekere mense lawaai maak oor voorvalle aan wie die besonderhede nog nie eers bekend was nie, en hy self nie eers 'n bietjie help bydra om sy Kollegas te ondersteun om die saak op te los nie, dan is hy om die minste te sê, baie swak, en sal in alle geval baie van ons se vertrouwe nie meer geniet nie.

Dink hy nie daaroor dat duisende van ons Afrikaanssprekendes ons gevoel van Republiekanisme op die agtergrond, ter wille van ons mede-Engelssprekendes en vir samewerking, geplaas het nie!.....’<sup>49</sup>

On 13th June, the Executive of the United Party met to discuss the implications of the Union Day Incident. Blackwell moved a resolution to the effect that the question of the national anthem should be clarified and resolved on a basis which respected the sentiments of both races. This resolution was endorsed by the Witwatersrand General Council of the United Party.<sup>50</sup> Blackwell claims that before Parliament met on 22nd July, he had talks with Smuts, Hofmeyr and Sturrock, the Minister without portfolio, and that he gathered from these discussions “that relations in the Cabinet between the ex-South African Party and the ex-Nationalists had virtually reached breaking point”<sup>51</sup>

The first session of the 8th Union Parliament opened on 22nd July. The anthem question featured very prominently on the order paper of the day. Notice of a motion by Dr. Malan called for “one single purely South African and officially recognised national anthem”, and a motion by J.S. Marwick, spokesman of the Dominion Party, demanded recognition of “God save the King” as the official national anthem of the Union. On the 25th July the caucus of the United Party met and issued a statement to the effect that it stood by the government's statement of June 2nd. The caucus was unanimous on the principle of equality for the two anthems, but complete agreement could not be reached on the stricture that “there is at present no official anthem for the Union”. When the Prime Minister's resolution was put to the vote Blackwell was the only one to record his dissent. The following day Hertzog asked parliament to endorse the Cabinet's anthem statement. The anthem question was hotly debated in parliament for a number of days, but Blackwell remained obstinate that he could not vote for the Prime Minister's resolution. He objected to the part of the statement which declared that “The King” was not an official anthem of the Union.<sup>52</sup> Eventually it was agreed that Blackwell should abstain from voting on this resolution, but that once parliament had voted on the Prime Minister's amendment, he would abide by the decision of parliament.<sup>53</sup> Blackwell was warned that if he persisted in his attitude he might be

48. *Ibid.*, no. 29, Mayor of Cape Town to Prime Minister, 4.6.38.

49. *Ibid.*, no. 35, U. Dienaar to Pirow, 7.6.38.

50. Blackwell, *Farewell to Parliament*, p. 24.

51. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

52. *H.A. Debates.*, vol. 32, col. 349.

53. Levitt, ‘Crises of 1938’, p. 23.



responsible for the break-up of fusion and that, in view of the critical European situation, he should not jeopardise unity in South Africa.<sup>54</sup> The Hertzog-Blackwell disagreement featured prominently in the press and it was not without a great deal of difficulty that a compromise was reached.<sup>55</sup>

During the lengthy debate Pirow declared himself entirely responsible for the Union Day Incident.<sup>56</sup> The United Party Members of Parliament, while admitting that the Union Day Incident almost caused a break-up of the party, made much of the fact that in future both "Die Stem" and "The King" were assured of equal recognition.<sup>57</sup> All declared their intention to promote national unity, and Smuts appealed to both sections of the electorate to accept the compromise which the government had arrived at on 2nd June.<sup>58</sup> Smuts was pleading for the middle course as he had been since coalition and before. He was convinced that it was only compromise that would keep the United Party together. On 26th August the House of Assembly passed Hertzog's amendment by seventy-one votes to thirty-two. There is little doubt that a split in the United Party had been narrowly averted.

Stuttaford must take considerable blame for precipitating this irreconcilable division within the Cabinet which persisted until the final collapse of fusion over the war issue in September 1939. Duncan's final word on the Union Day Incident is an assessment of Hertzog's standpoint. He recorded in his notebook: "To General Hertzog this idea that 'The King' is our national anthem is merely provocative, and he does not always realise that a United Party if it is to continue to represent both races and to be based on the idea of unity must be ready to make accommodations in matters of sentiment on both sides and prevent them from coming to an open clash".<sup>59</sup>

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54. Blackwell, *Farewell to Parliament*, p. 30j.

55. Levitt, 'Crises of 1938', p. 23.

56. Vide *H.A. Deb.*, vol. 32, cols. 359 – 365.

57. *H.A. Debates*, vol. 32, Nicholls, col. 651.

58. *Ibid.*, Smuts, col. 851.

59. Duncan Papers, I C 15c, Notebook, 14.7.38.