

ZULU RELATIONS WITH THE WHITES DURING THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: A BROAD PERSPECTIVE*

S.J. Maphalala
Dlangezwa High School

In order to understand British policy towards the Zulus north of the Thukela (Tugela) River during the nineteenth century, it must be stated at the outset that Anglo-Zulu relations were very closely linked to British expansion in Southern Africa. And unless this is kept in mind, one cannot understand British actions against Cetshwayo and the causes of the Anglo-Zulu War of 1879. Although it is said that Britain was averse to territorial expansion until after the discovery of diamonds, historical facts present a different story. That expansion was prompted by local colonists and governors in the same manner as expansion took place in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and many other places on the globe.

Hardly had the British Settlers arrived at the Cape in 1820, than the first British traders settled in Natal in 1824. Those traders frequently requested that Natal be annexed by Britain. They failed initially, but as the settlement became more permanent, those settlers looked beyond the confines of their small settlement for further expansion of the British Empire. No sooner had the Voortrekkers, whom Britain still regarded as her subjects, proclaimed their republic when British Settlers prompted Britain to annex Natal. A large section of those settlers were sympathetic towards the Voortrekkers on condition they remained under the British flag and within British territories. But it took the "rebellion of Congella" to persuade Britain to act against her rebellious subjects and annex Natal in 1842/43. She did not first gain the consent of the Zulus for such annexation, not even by a treaty in accordance with the policies of those times. The Voortrekkers made a treaty with Dingaan. Britain did not.

At about the same time, British influence was extended north of the Orange River by means of the Treaty System. But when the war of the Axe broke out on the Eastern frontier in 1845/7, it led to the cancellation of the treaties south of the Orange River and the annexation of Kaffraria i.e. the old Province of Queen Adelaide, which is now known as the Ciskei. But before going beyond the Ciskei, one should at least mention the "neutral territory" of Lord Charles Somerset which became the "ceded territory" and which was the first area to herald the extension of British territory after the annexation of the Cape in 1806. Taken in this wider context the Great Trek was merely a small play within a very large play.

The annexation of Natal and the Ciskei was followed by the annexation of the Orange River Sovereignty in 1848. Thus within a very short time British territory expanded considerably. At that stage internal turmoil stopped expansion and Britain reduced her responsibilities by means of the Conventions of 1852 and 1854. For some time no expansion took place until the annexation of Basutoland (Lesotho) in 1868.

After the discovery of diamonds, Britain, again prompted by local men, took a more active part in the expansion policy. In that manner annexation and federation became part and parcel of the struggle for political supremacy. In that way the first federal policy was prompted by the Eastern settlers who had considerable stakes in the

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land of the Free State. Sir George Grey received their support when in addition to the federation of the Cape, Kaffraria and Natal, he wanted to include the Free State much again the wishes of Britain. The demands of the gold diggers of Pilgrims Rest, the traders in the republics, the diamond diggers of Kimberley and the Cape settlers induced Lord Carnarvon to support their requests by means of his federation scheme. Natal favoured that scheme and so Zululand became involved in that new drive for British territorial expansion.

When the federation scheme failed, Britain annexed the Transvaal, but it was prompted by men in Natal, such as Sir Theophilus Shepstone. In that year i.e. 1877, the Ninth Xhosa War broke out, which again highlighted the importance of the Black peoples of Southern Africa. But with the Transvaal of the Boers safely in British hands, it was possible to tackle the Zulus. At that crucial stage the Anglo-Zulu War broke out in 1879, which was followed by the First Anglo-Boer War in 1880. Before giving special attention to the Zulu War, which is the theme of this discussion, it is essential to mention further British expansion. Bechuanaland was annexed in 1885, Zululand in 1887, Rhodesia in 1888, Pondoland in 1894 and the Boer Republics in 1902. Every time Britain, prompted by local men, had excellent excuses for the annexations. After the First World War German territories in Africa were occupied by Britain and that completed the dream of a road from the Cape to Cairo. It is in this wide context of expanding British imperialism that the Anglo-Zulu War must be understood, otherwise we get lost in a maze of weird accusations and counter accusations.

For our special purpose today, the Anglo-Zulu War must be understood in the light of race relations in those times and can be briefly traced from Shaka's contact with Whites from 1824. Although much is made by writers of his barbarism and indescribable cruelty¹, British traders were well received by him.² Shaka's hospitality found concrete expression when he granted Sibubulungu (Port Natal) to the British traders. But bear in mind that in spite of the fear Whites had for Shaka, he never killed a single White man. In view of this, one gets the impression that the so-called barbaric cruelty of Blacks towards Whites was an invention of imperialists who were not after the souls of "heathens", but their land.

Shaka's assassination by Dingane, Mhlangana and Mbopha at Kwa-Dukuza (Stanger) ended the first phase of Zulu relations with Whites. Dingane who succeeded Shaka became king at a very difficult time in that various groups of Whites also arrived in Zululand. Those included the Rev Owen of the London Missionary Society who arrived in 1837 and who established himself near Mgungundlovu. He was to be followed by Piet Retief and a group of Voortrekkers, but Dingane continued to maintain friendly relations with the British traders at Port Natal. Those traders under Ogle, Cane and Isaacs, for the sake of a trade monopoly discredited other groups in the eyes of the king in such a way that Dingane became very suspicious of other Whites. That confusion was perhaps one of the factors which led to the murder of Piet Retief and his followers in February 1838.³ The murder and the subsequent attacks on laagers led to

1. J. Bird: *The Annals of Natal 1495 to 1845*, Vol. 1, (Cape Town, 1965), pp.172-175.

2. J. Stuart and D. Malcolm (eds): *The diary of Henry Francis Fynn* (Pietermaritzburg, 1969), pp.68, 76-79.

3. H. Stander: *Die verhouding tussen die Boere en Zoeloe tot die dood van Mpande in 1872* (Archives Year Book for S.A. History Vol. 2, 1964), p.215; A.J.H. van der Walt, J.A. Wiid en A.L. Geyer: *Geskiedenis van S.A. Deel I*, (Johannesburg 1955), 198.

the Battle of Ncome (Blood River) which brought victory to the Voortrekkers — not extinction of the Zulu people.

However, the Zulus themselves were tired of Dingane's executions. That dissatisfaction is evident from Mpande's defection with thousands of other Zulus to the Voortrekkers.⁴ Mpande was well received by the Voortrekkers and also promised protection. He was allowed to establish his Mahambehlula kraal on the banks of the Thongathi River. That settlement was followed by the formation of an alliance with the Voortrekkers, aimed at defeating Dingane who had run across the Mfolozi River after the Battle of Ncome.⁵ A virtual civil war followed when the two armies clashed at Maqongqo Hill in 1840. So strong was the bitterness in Zulu ranks, that many of Dingane's soldiers defected to Nongalazana.⁶ After that battle, Mpande became king of Zululand and accepted the Voortrekkers as protectors.⁷ This shows that a vast number had no animosity towards Whites as such.

In 1842 Britain annexed Natal and shortly thereafter became interested in St. Lucia Bay. After some negotiations with Mpande, they managed getting it. During those negotiations Mpande still recognised the Voortrekkers as his protectors.⁸ However, Mpande lived in peace with his White neighbours until his death in 1872 when his son, Cetshwayo took over.

In order to secure the recognition of his title by Natal and the South African Republic, Cetshwayo appealed to both governments to crown him as the king of the Zulus.⁹ His appeal was made at a time when Natal wanted to extend her influence in Zululand. Consequently Natal was the first to accept Cetshwayo's request. After obtaining sanction from the High Commissioner, Theophilus Shepstone made a journey to Zululand where he crowned Cetshwayo as the king of the Zulus.¹⁰ In 1871 Zululand was indeed one of the most powerful kingdoms in Southern Africa and Cetshwayo endeavoured to avoid a war with Whites at all cost.¹¹ His conflicts with the Afrikaners were caused by boundary disputes along the Ncome and Phongola Rivers which strained relations.

One should have expected good relations with the British in view of Shepstone's crowning of Cetshwayo, but that was not the case. Shepstone urged Sir Henry Barkly, the High Commissioner, to request the Transvaal to abandon to Natal part of the disputed territory.¹² But after the annexation of the Transvaal, Britain became heir to the disputed territory. After examining the matter, he denied the validity of Cetshwayo's claims to the territory which he had previously staunchly defended.¹³ The fact is, when Shepstone went to annex the Transvaal in 1877, he requested Cetshwayo to mobilise his army along the Transvaal border. That served a double purpose: it was a military threat to the Transvaal and that army might be used against the Transvaal if the Afrikaners became stiff-necked.¹⁴

4. Stander, op. cit., p.248.

5. Ibid., pp.248—255.

6. Ibid., pp.255.

7. Ibid., p.280; B. Roberts: *The Zulu kings*, (London, 1974), p.337.

8. Stander, op. cit., pp.279—280.

9. B.A. le Cordeur: *The Relations between the Cape and Natal 1846—1879* (Archives Year Book for S.A. History Vol. I, 1965), p.219.

10. Ibid.

11. M.D. Wilson and L.M. Thompson (eds): *The Oxford History of S.A. Vol. 2* (Oxford, 1974), p.261.

12. Le Cordeur, op. cit., p.219.

13. Ibid.

14. F.E. Colenso and E. Durnford: *The ruin of Zululand: an account of doings in Zululand since the Invasion of 1879 Vol. 1*, (London, 1884), pp.23—24.

Shepstone's changed attitude can be ascribed to the acquisition of territory and the failure of the federation plans. Henceforth the Zulus, as was the case with the Xhosas during the Ninth Xhosa War of 1877, presented a threat to the peace in those very areas where they and the Transvalers were in conflict. Consequently Sir Bartle Frere was determined to settle the age-old Zulu menace once and for all by demanding that the Zulu military machine be broken up, that Cetshwayo should accept a British resident at his kraal, that few trials be held and that compensation be paid for Sihayo and other incidents.¹⁵ No self-respecting Zulu king could have accepted those conditions. If Cetshwayo had accepted them he could have been overthrown either by some powerful generals or some members of the royal family. Therefore, in spite of the superiority of British weaponry, the Zulus had to fight and ward off the threat to their land and their king. It was "Uyadela wen'usulapho!" (i.e. I wish I were dead).

When Cetshwayo refused in effect to surrender his independence, the Imperial troops under General Thesiger (Lord Chelmsford) entered Zululand in January 1879.¹⁶ That unprovoked invasion marked the end of the so-called friendly relations between the British and the Zulus. It also brought about the end of the Zulu kingdom which Shaka had built with the sacrifice of lives of those brave Zulus. The Zulus were subdivided into several kinglets — more or less a return to tribalism as it was before Shaka united a large section of the Zulus.

The end of the Anglo-Zulu War did not mean resumption of good relations between the British and the Zulus. The reason for this was difficult to understand since Zululand as a kingdom was no more and Cetshwayo had been removed. It was chief Mnyamana Kangqengelele Buthelezi who understood it all. As Cetshwayo's prime minister and commander-in-chief of the Zulu forces at Sandlwana,¹⁷ Mnyamana had learned a lot from the Anglo-Zulu War. He warned Dinuzulu and Ndabuko not to interfere with Zibhebhu ka Maphitha who, according to Mnyamana, was "the puppy of the British government".¹⁸ Mnyamana pointed out in his warning that anyone, leading his puppy with a piece of string, would justly feel attacked if the puppy whom he is leading is attacked.¹⁹ The soliciting of Afrikaner aid against Zibhebhu by Dinuzulu and Ndabuko; the subsequent crowning of Dinuzulu as the king of the Zulus by the Afrikaners; the resettlement of Zibhebhu in 1887/1888 followed by the banishment of Dinuzulu, Ndabuko and Shingana,²⁰ must be understood against this background. After the Anglo-Zulu War Mnyamana wanted to solve problems facing Zululand through negotiation. When Dinuzulu did not take Mnyamana's advice, Mnyamana washed his hands of all involvement with the affairs of Dinuzulu.²¹

It is doubtful whether negotiation could have helped Dinuzulu as Mnyamana had suggested. Dinuzulu was unable to defeat Zibhebhu and this was causing unrest on the Transvaal border and it was one of the reasons why the Afrikaners interfered at

15. Le Cordeur, op. cit., p.220.

16. D. Clammer: *The Zulu War* (Johannesburg, 1973), p.29; Le Cordeur, op. cit., p.220.

17. Inkatha Women's Brigade: Inaugural Congress 26th—29th May 1977 (magazine): "There is a special place in the heart of the nation for Princess Constance Magogo (kaDinuzulu) Buthelezi, mother of our leader Chief Gatsha Buthelezi", p.11.

18. Ibid., p.12.

19. Ibid.

20. S.J. Maphalala: *The chaos caused by Zibhebhu's resettlement in Zululand 1887—1888*, (*Historia* Vol.23, 1, 1978), pp.43—48; G.D. Scholtz: *Die oorsake van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog 1899—1902* Vol. 1, (Universitas, 1947), 131; A.J. van Wyk: *Dinuzulu en die Usutu-opstand van 1888*, (M.A. UOVS, 1971) 80—100; Roberts, op. cit., pp.360—361.

21. Br. Parl. Papers XXXIV of 1888—1890 (Enclosure 1, no.33), pp.178—179; Osborn to A.E. Havelock, 17 May 1888.

Dinuzulu's request, in Zulu affairs. The Afrikaners wanted to see centralized authority in Zululand and thus end to civil strife between the royal house and Zibhebhu. For these complex reasons the Afrikaners, on 21 May 1884, and in the presence of 7000 Zulus, anointed Dinuzulu in Biblical fashion²² as king of the Zulus and two days later entered into an agreement with him against Zibhebhu in exchange for land.²³ Dinuzulu was duly assisted at Tshaneni on 5 June 1884 and Zibhebhu was completely uprooted. Having assisted Dinuzulu in defeating Zibhebhu, the Afrikaners claimed their promised reward — 2 750 000 acres. This was an exorbitant demand but the land was taken from Zibhebhu. It was based on an agreement, subsequently deeply done into by the British government before a settlement was arrived at and the original Afrikaner demand cut down to 1 826 560 acres.²⁴ There is no convincing evidence that the Afrikaners deliberately attempted to cheat Dinuzulu. Instead, there is the agreement of 23 May 1884 to go by. Without that agreement and without the Afrikaner assistance to Dinuzulu, Zibhebhu would have destroyed Dinuzulu and the history of Zululand could have been different.

It was, however, hardly a year after the Battle of Tshaneni and about three years after the coronation of Dinuzulu when the British pounced on Zululand once again. On 19 May 1887, Britain annexed Zululand. The annexation proclamation was read to 2000 Zulu chiefs and their followers. In the same year, Zibhebhu, with about 700 men accompanied by Galloway, left the Bond's Drift on the Thukela (Tugela) to accomplish his unfinished work, viz. the destruction of Dinuzulu.²⁵ Zibhebhu's men were to be reinforced by 300—400 men of Sikizana at Banganomo.²⁶ Sikizana had run to Swaziland when Zibhebhu was defeated at Tshaneni.

Zibhebhu reached Zululand on 5 December 1887 and supported by the British officials and the Zululand police, began a systematic campaign of persecution against Dinuzulu and his followers who were regarded as squatters on the territory on which Zibhebhu had been defeated in 1884.²⁷ The campaign of persecution against Dinuzulu was waged for several months and it made 5000 people of Dinuzulu homeless.²⁸ In spite of that suffering, *The Natal Mercury* stated: "We are told that the return of Usibepu has already had a marked influence on the Zulu mind. ... Cheerful obedience has taken the place of sullen disaffection."²⁹

Dinuzulu was forced into rebellion by the British annexation of his kingdom which, as in the case of Cetshwayo, meant loss of his independence. In a message to Sir A E Havelock, Dinuzulu pronounced these almost prophetic words: "In the days to come, when we of this generation are all dead ... this story of Usibepu's present behaviour will appear to be but a fairy tale ... they will look upon Dinuzulu as having been a very foolish, weak chief."³⁰

After the defeat of Dinuzulu during the rebellion of 1888, he fled to the Vryheid district where he stayed for three months. While the Afrikaners tried to protect him, he

22. S.J. Maphalala op. cit., p.43; Roberts, op. cit., pp.360—361.

23. M.C. van Zyl: *Die koms van die Boere na Zoeloeland in 1884: Genooies of indringers?* (mededelings van UNISA, C37 Pretoria, 1962).

24. A.J. van Wyk, op. cit., pp.14, 25; B. Temkin: *Gatsha Buthelezi, Zulu statesman*, (Cape Town, 1976), p.14.

25. S.J. Maphalala, op. cit., p.44.

26. Ibid.

27. Ibid.

28. S. Marks: *Reluctant rebellion: the 1906—8 disturbances in Natal* (Oxford, 1970), p.93.

29. *The Natal Mercury*, 5.12.1887.

30. G.H.Z.710, No.2151/88: Dinuzulu's message by Mtokwana et al to A.E. Havelock, 14 March 1888.

was persuaded by Harriette Colenso to go to Pietermaritzburg to surrender himself to the governor.³¹ In November of that year, *The Times of Natal* wrote: "The future historian of South Africa will probably find it difficult to decide between the claims of wickedness, weakness, and folly for dictating the political history of Zululand."³² After being tried by a special court sitting at Eshowe in 1889, Dinuzulu and his uncles, Ndabuko and Shingana, were found guilty of high treason and exiled to St Helena for ten, fifteen and twelve years respectively.³³

The British and Zulu relations did not improve when Dinuzulu returned from exile because one of the conditions for his release from banishment was that he should agree to the annexation of Zululand to Natal.³⁴ He arrived in Zululand on 30 December 1897. It was approximately two years before the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War. He lived as a local headman in the Ndwandwe district. At that time Zululand was no longer a united kingdom but consisted of various districts ruled by the chiefs under the supervision of the English magistrates. The Zulu support for the British War (Anglo-Boer War) must be understood against this background.

On 10 September 1899 the Principal Under Secretary wrote a telegram to the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner in Zululand, requesting him to issue instructions to all magistrates in Zululand. Those magistrates were to inform the Zulu chiefs and headmen in their districts that in the event of the outbreak of war between the British and the Afrikaners, the Queen wished the Zulus to remain within their own borders as the war was to be a White man's war.³⁵ A circular with similar instructions was also issued to magistrates in Natal.³⁶ Meetings with the Zulu chiefs and headmen were subsequently convened by magistrates in all their districts explaining the British instructions. Most chiefs and headmen expressed their gratitude to the government as they were in favour of neutrality in the war.³⁷

The Afrikaners on their part also made their position clear to those Zulus who were under their jurisdiction in the Vryheid district. They also had no desire to arm the Zulus and those Zulus who accompanied the commandos did so as wagon drivers, as leaders of teams of oxen and after-riders. They were not to be part of the defence force.³⁸

That was the position when the Anglo-Boer War broke out. The Zulus remained neutral in the War until 1901. In that year Zululand was placed under martial law under Col. H. Bottomley.³⁹ The latter was instructed by General French, commanding south Eastern Transvaal, to arm the Zulus to go across the Transvaal border for the purpose of looting all Afrikaner stock.⁴⁰ That was contrary to British instructions to

31. Van Wyk, op cit., p.181–189; Temkin, op. cit., p.15; M.C. van Zyl, *Dinuzulu se vlug na die Suid-Afrikaanse Republiek in 1888*, (Mededelings van Unisa C30, Pretoria, 1961).

32. *The Times of Natal*, 22.11.1888.

33. R. Edgecombe: *Sir Marshall Clarke and the abortive attempt to 'Basutolandise' Zululand: 1893–7*, (Journal of Natal and Zulu History Vol. 1, 1, 1978, p. 46.

34. The Hon. Chief M.G. Buthelezi, *Where are we one hundred and fifty years after Shaka's demise?* (Speech at Shaka's tombstone, Stanger) 25 September 1978, pp.7–8.

35. Z.A.32: C.M. & C.C. No.40, CR 44/1899.

36. C.S.O.2643: Circulars 1899–1900, CR 25/99.

37. S.N.A.1/4/7: R.M. Dundee Confidential Report, 30 October 1899.

38. J.H. Breytenbach: *Geskiedenis van die Tweede Vryheidsoorlog 1899–1902, Deel I: Die Boere-offensief* (Pretoria, 1973), pp.36–37.

39. S.J. Maphalala: *The murder at Holkrantz (Mthashana) 6 May 1902*, (Historia Vol. 22, 1, 1977), p.41.

40. *Ibid.*, p.42.

the Zulus at the outbreak of the War. However, what was important to the British at that stage was ending the Afrikaner guerilla warfare which went on unabated.⁴¹

Dinuzulu refused to arm his men but Col. Bottomley threatened him with banishment. He therefore had no alternative but to arm his men to go across the Transvaal border.⁴² Consequently, Zulu relations with the British were further strained. On 2 June 1901, after hundreds of Afrikaners had surrendered their arms and thousands of stock had been looted, armed raids across the Transvaal border were stopped. Sir Charles Saunders, the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner, encouraged the magistrates to re-establish the *status quo ante* on the Zulu border.⁴³ It meant that from then onwards magistrates were to instruct the chiefs and their followers not to cross over to the Vryheid district.

At the beginning of 1902, the guerilla warfare was still going on.⁴⁴ Consequently, Dinuzulu was instructed once again to send about 250 armed men under trusted indunas into the Vryheid district in order to help troops under General Bruce Hamilton to collect and drive in cattle.⁴⁵ On 19 March 1902 Dinuzulu, obeying the British orders, sent his men who were subsequently joined by other Zulus on the way until they were about 1000 when they joined General Hamilton's force at Ngenetsheni in the Vryheid district.⁴⁶ Commanding the Zulu forces were Dinuzulu's chief indunas: Madubeko, Ndabuko and Madakavana. The combined forces were later joined by chief Sikhobobo of the Vryheid district with all his Baqulusi armed men. Consequently, a considerable number of Afrikaner stock was looted and that forced the Afrikaners to surrender their arms.⁴⁷

After the lightning blow to the Afrikaners, Dinuzulu's men returned to Zululand but those of Chief Sikhobobo, fearing retaliation by the Afrikaners, remained under Bruce Hamilton's protection in Vryheid Railway Buildings. After the meeting held on General Ferreira's farm on 23 April 1902, the Afrikaners retaliated by burning all Chief Sikhobobo's kraals in the Vryheid district.⁴⁸ On 6 May 1902, Sikhobobo attacked an Afrikaner commando which was camped at Holkrantz (Mthashana) killing 56 of them and taking 3 prisoners. About 52 Zulus were killed and 48 wounded.⁴⁹

The murder at Holkrantz was one of the reasons for signing the Peace of Vereeniging by Afrikaner generals on 31 May, 1902.⁵⁰ The Zulu relations with the British were further strained by lack of compensation for those Zulus who had suffered or died in the War. With regard to compensation for the Zulus living in the Vryheid district who had been promised compensation by Col. G.A. Mills,⁵¹ the governor made it clear that those Zulus were not British subjects when they suffered losses. He said that they could scarcely be classified as such for purposes of compensation, that Col. Mills had no right to make them any promise and that the British government was not

41. Ibid.

42. S.N.A.1/6/25: Miscellaneous papers regarding Bottomley's actions 1901—1902: C.J. van Rooyen's letter, 28 May 1901.

43. Ibid., Telegram no. 1, 2 June 1901; G.S. Preller Collection: A648 (a) & (b).

44. G.S. Preller Collection: A648 (a) & (b).

45. S.N.A.1/6/25: Telegram no.103, 7 March 1902.

46. S.J. Maphalala: *The murder at Holkrantz*, p.43.

47. G.S. Preller Collection: A648 (a) & (b).

48. S.J. Maphalala: *The murder at Holkrantz*, p.45.

49. Ibid., 46.

50. G.S. Preller Collection: A648 (b); E.H. Brookes and C. de B. Webb: *A history of Natal* (Pietermaritzburg, 1967), p.209).

51. G.H.1339: Prime Minister to the Governor, 24 October 1902.

going to be bound by such promises.⁵² Those Zulus who had been armed by Col. Bottomley in Zululand also failed to get compensation. Sir Charles Saunders, the Chief Magistrate and Civil Commissioner in Zululand, stated that the looting by those Zulus brought about the most serious raids by the Afrikaners on Zulu stock and that the Zulus who joined the looting knew perfectly well that they were doing so in direct opposition to the wishes of the British government.⁵³ However, Zululand was under martial law at the time of looting across the Transvaal. The Zulus, through their chiefs and with Charles Saunders's knowledge, were ordered by military authorities to cross into the Vryheid district.⁵⁴ The Governor concluded the matter by giving instructions that compensation by "proved raiders" were not to be entertained. Consequently the Zulus became losers because claims for compensation by "proved raiders" were not considered by the Invasion Losses Enquiry Commission. The statement of "proved raiders" was ambiguous in that the Zulus had never looted without order given them to do so.⁵⁵

The Land Commission of 1904 also strained relations between the Zulus and the British and was one of the chief causes of the Bhambatha Rebellion.⁵⁶ The area demarcated as reserves comprised some 3 887 000 acres. It was also recommended that the reserves were to be excluded from the latter. However, larger locations and Proviso "B" were to be included. The latter was already occupied by the whites and amounted to about 2 613 000 acres. The estimated Zulu population according to the census taken in 1906 (excluding those 17 095 Zulus at work outside Zululand) was about 220 000,⁵⁷ who were thus provided for in the reserves at the ratio of 17 acres per head. The Zulus were however, used to living in wider space. They consequently resented the Land Commissioner and reasoned that when their children had grown up the 17 acres would be a drop in the ocean.⁵⁸ The *Ilanga Lase Natal* also pointed out that the Zulus resented the fact that they were compelled by the delimitation to leave the graves of their ancestors.⁵⁹ Consequently, if there had not been plenty of combustible material, the result of loss of respect, a mere small match like Bhambatha could not have raised so much fire.

However, the Rebellion wrecked all hopes of friendly relations between the Zulus and the English. For his part in the Bhambatha Rebellion, Dinuzulu was sentenced to a fine and four years imprisonment. One of the first acts of General Louis Botha on becoming Prime Minister, was to release Dinuzulu from goal in Natal and to allow him to settle with his wives and some followers on the farm Uitkyk, halfway between Middelburg and Witbank in the Transvaal. There he died after one of the few quiet periods in all his life. The background to his "exile" was the compassion General Botha had felt for Dinuzulu, whom he had known personally since the 1880's and with whose treatment by the Natal Government many Afrikaners disagreed. President M.T.

52. *Ibid.*, Governor to Prime Minister, 25 October 1902.

53. G.H.1304: Saunders to Moor, 9 August 1902.

54. *Ibid.*, Enclosures: Deputy Chairman of the Invasion Losses Enquiry Commission to Governor, 30 August 1902; G.H.1337: Enclosures 1 & 2 in despatch no 252, 7 July 1902.

55. G.H.1304: Enclosure 5, 30 August 1902.

56. *Ilanga Lase Natal*, 24 May 1906; W. van der Merwe: *Die vestiging van die Blankes in Zoeloland 1897—1936* (PhD, UNISA, 1977), pp.116—119.

57. *Ilanga Lase Natal*, 24 May 1906.

58. *Ibid.*

59. *Ibid.*

Steyn, with reference to the Bhambatha Rebellion, made mention of “the hysterical way in which Natal is dealing with the native question”.⁶⁰

Clearly Zulu relations with Whites during the nineteenth century cannot be divorced from the British expansion in Southern Africa. Cecil Rhodes summarised that expansion well when he looked north and desired to extend British influence over the desirable portions of Africa lying to the north of the Cape Colony and the South African Republic. He said: “All this is to be painted red — that is my dream”. He regarded it as Britain’s divine mission to rule the world and spread the benefits of “civilization”. Throughout the nineteenth century, the Zulus behaved in very much the same way towards their neighbours as nations in other parts of the world. They clearly showed understanding of the motives of those who befriended them or who tried to rob them of their land.

60. C.F.J. Muller (ed): *Five hundred years: A history of South Africa*, (Pretoria, 1969), p.329; Prime Minister Vol 103 — Minute Conf. P.M.C., No. 170/07.