

Cattle, Land and Entrepreneurship: Creating the Saulspoot Location after the Anglo-Boer War

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Between 1903 and 1935, the BaKgatla бага Kgafela acquired 26 farms and established 22 villages in what became the Saulspoot Location, Pilanesberg district.¹ If we include the 14 farms acquired after 1935, Saulspoot represents the largest location in the western Transvaal, surpassing even Pokeng.² Apart from its size, Saulspoot Location was the more remarkable because of the circumstances of its creation. As distinct from Pokeng and many other locations, which were established on many farms purchased on Africans' behalf by missionaries in the nineteenth century, Saulspoot was built in the twentieth century without missionary assistance.³ The Location was unique, too, because it came about as the result of agency *outside the Union*, namely by the cattle-rich Kgatla living across the border in the Bechuanaland Protectorate. Saulspoot Kgatla did contribute a fair share to the purchase of many farms, but the Saulspoot Location was testimony foremost to the purchasing power of *Kgosi* Linchwe in Mochudi, Bakgatla Reserve, British Protectorate, and his successor, the regent Isang Pilane.⁴

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1. See Table 1.
2. P.L. Breutz, *The Tribes of the Rustenburg and Pilansberg Districts* (Government Printers, Pretoria, 1953), tables IV and V under-reports the total morgen the Kgatla owned – tribally, in trust and privately – by 40 000 morgen. See below and Table 1. For the farms of the BaFokeng, see Breutz, *The Tribes of the Rustenburg and Pilansberg Districts*, pp 27-28; and for the nineteenth-century process of farm acquisition, J.S. Bergh, "Africans and Land in 19th Century Transvaal: The Case of the Bafokeng," typescript.
3. The lone possible exception was the farm Saulspoot 38 (previously 269), bought in 1869 by DRC missionary Henri Gonin. Until his death in 1910, Gonin kept this farm as his own private property and refused to sell it or place it in trust to the BaKgatla. In 1922, the BaKgatla managed finally to buy it from his family. B. Mbenga and F. Morton, "The Missionary as Land Broker: Henri Gonin, Saulspoot 269 and the Bakgatla of Rustenburg District, 1862-1922", *South African Historical Journal*, 36, May 1997, pp 145-167.
4. For an outline of this process, see R.F. Morton, "Chiefs and Ethnic Unity in Two Colonial Worlds: The Bakgatla Kgafela of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the Transvaal, 1872-1966", in A.I. Asiwaju (ed), *Partitioned Africans*

The farm purchases that established the Saulspoort Location were also the centerpiece of a scheme on the part of Linchwe, Ramono (Linchwe's brother and the first chief in Saulspoort) and Isang to create wealth and help Kgatla on both sides of the border to offset some of the adverse effects of the labour migration system after the Anglo-Boer War. The Kgatla in the Protectorate had old and active ties with the Transvaal, and it was a natural step for them to build up their wealth with a plan that utilized territory and resources on both sides of the border. Buying farms in what became the Saulspoort Location, helped Kgatla leadership to transform its old cattle-based economy and adapt to mining capital in South Africa, as well as to colonial neglect in the Protectorate. Their *modus operandi* was an updated, entrepreneurial, nineteenth-century form of regimental collaboration with the royal family for the purpose of rustling cattle and securing good grazing.⁵ After the Anglo-Boer War, when rustling went entirely out of fashion, Linchwe and his followers became investors in technology, property, water and veterinary development, as well as promoters of large-scale community development projects, grain and cattle-cooperatives, and Western education for girls and boys alike.

Linchwe's attempt to incorporate the Kgatla on both sides of the border for land purchases and other investments, was only partly successful. BaKgatla in the Saulspoort Location contributed to some extent to the purchase of the farms, enjoyed increased security, and accepted *de facto* government from Mochudi. In the Protectorate, most of Linchwe's subjects in the Bakgatla Reserve were reluctant to contribute their time and labour to community and corporate efforts and wait for the results. They opted for labour migration and short-term wage contracts. Meanwhile, Linchwe and Isang continued investing capital in the Union, more so than they could or did in the Protectorate, and transferred large herds of their cattle to Transvaal farms, thereby gaining cheaper access to the Johannesburg market. By the same token, the Saulspoort Kgatla became more productive agriculturally than their Protectorate counterparts, lived closer to social services in their many villages, were less dependent on contract work for Europeans, and lived closer to their employment options.

Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984 (C. Hurst, London, 1985), especially pp 135-137.

5. F. Morton, "When Cattle Rustling Was an Art: Linchwe's Kgatla, 1820-1902", manuscript in progress.

Table 1: Saulspoort Location (private farms in bold italics)

Farm	Old No.	New No.	Morgen	Purchase	Village
1. Saulspoort	269	38	3,925	1869	Moruleng, Marapallo, Maramapong
2. Hoffontein	593	361	3,460	1876	Mokgalwana
3. Witfontein	215	396	2,810	1906	Modimong
4. Modderkuil	565	39	3,750	1898, 1908	Manamakgote
5. Middelkuil	564	8	2,179	1906, 1911	Legogafae, Mabule
6. Welgewaagd	535	133	2,370	1908	Mothabe, Ntsoana le Metsieng
6. Welgewaagd (port.B)	535	133	504	1908	
7. Koedoesfontein	818	42	1,371	1908, 1919	Lengwana
7. Koedoesfontein	818	42	1,371	1908, 1919	
8. Kruidfontein	649	40	3,746	1912(1918)	Lesetha
9. Zandfontein	729	37	2,509	1912	Mogwase
10. Cyferkuil	372	330	3,670	1913	Matsinyane
11. Legkraal	725	45	2,094	1913	Ramatshabalemang
12. Rhenosterkraal	563	132	3,569	1913	Magong
13. Wilgespruit	631	2	3,467	1913	Sebelo
14. Rooderand	399	46	657	1916	Bohule
15 Doornport	251	57	500	1916	
16. Welgeval	133	267	2,507	1918	Madutle
17. Doornport	251	57	1,285	1918	Lerone
18. Spitskop	298	410	1,714	1919	Sefikile
19. Vogelstruiskraal	679	400	2,887	1921	Lebatlane
20. Application	984	398	1,820	1925	Letabe
21. Rhenosterkop	1048	251	2,579	1927	Tlokwane/Mmampana
22. Varkensvlei (port. B)	903	403	779	1929	
23. Nootgedacht	9	406	?	1929	
24. Zwartklip	989	405	?	1929	
25. Kraalhoek	516	399	2,927	1931	Tsidsane
26. Welgeval	749	171	2,408	1933	Kwa Polaseng
27. Blinkklippen(port A)	638	201	403	1936	Ramalebjwa
28. Elandsfontein	815	402	3,848	1937	Mopyane
29. Bierkraal	545	134	6,323	1938	Mothabe
30. Doornlaagte	161	258	3,795	1938	Ramosibitswane
31. Spitskop	168	244	3,172	1942	
32. Rhenosterspruit	609	59	3,687	?	Mabelapudi
33. Schoongezicht	416	282	3,868	?	Mapaputle
34. Vlakplaats	412	283	3,912	?	Mapaputle
35. Syferkuil (port A)	533	9	408	?	Mononono
36. Vogelstruisnek (port D)	602	173	590	?	Maologane
37. Vogelstruisdraai	132	268	2,488	?	
38. Wildebeestkuil (port. B)	733	7	2,775	?	Lesube
39. Witfontein	306	274	3,532	?	Dinokana
40. Schaapkraal	12	170	2,676	?	Madutle
Total Morgen			116,954		

Linchwe and Isang retained their administrative headquarters in the Protectorate for reasons that merged the practical with the political. The Bakgatla Reserve in the British Protectorate contained the standing capital, Mochudi, also the Kgatla's largest town. Linchwe, who was Britain's strongest Protectorate ally during the Anglo-Boer War, was allowed then and later to govern the Bakgatla Reserve without any direct colonial supervision. Linchwe also got Mafeking's backing to be recognized as the paramount chief of the Kgatla in Saulspoor and to be allowed to designate the chief there. Even though they remained residents of the Protectorate, Linchwe and Isang were able to buy farms in the Transvaal in their own names, and keep their cattle there. In addition, as Christians married in common property, Ramono (Linchwe's brother and first chief in Saulspoor) and Isang were able under South African law to bequeath their Transvaal property, including cattle, to their widows and heirs. Thus, transferring capital in the form of cattle or coin into South Africa for long-term investment was easily managed from Mochudi. Only after the cattle weight restrictions of 1924 did Isang's pipeline begin to dry up.

Even after this point, Isang had more opportunities to generate personal wealth in the Union, than he did in the Protectorate. He bought farms for himself in the Transvaal, whereas in the Protectorate, private property was restricted to whites. Africans also lacked title to land in the Reserves, which permitted only communal land ownership in accordance with customary law. Until 1930 (by which time Isang was no longer chief), attempts to use cooperative approaches to wealth accretion in the Reserve went financially and technically unsupported by both Mafeking and Whitehall. The lack of results increased public resistance to Isang's leadership in this regard, and more of his people sought their fortunes in South Africa. At the end of Isang's reign, an estimated 40 per cent of the residents of the Reserve were working for wages outside the area in order to meet the annual tax requirements.⁶

For Isang, the *coup de grace* was the Protectorate's response to the popular clamor for his replacement in office. In 1929 Isang stepped down under pressure and officials installed Linchwe's grandson, Molefi. The young Molefi (20) soon proved to be improvident as a person and uninterested as a *kgosi* in the advancement of his subjects on either side of the border. Protectorate British officials, who had admired Isang's corporate approach to development in the Reserve (and distrusted him as

6. I. Schapera, "Economic Conditions in a Bechuanaland Native Reserve," *South African Journal of Science*, 30, October 1933, p 652.

ambitious for personal wealth), and preferred his administration to Molefi's, wanted to avoid popular resistance and worked to keep Molefi in office.⁷ In 1935 they convened the Linchwe Estate Commission to end disputes between Isang and Molefi over Linchwe's inheritance. The Commission also was a response to the call from the Kgatla in Saulspoort for legal transfer to the "tribe" of farms purchased over the years by their chiefs. The Saulspoorters feared that the farms would otherwise become the private property of Isang. In the year prior to the Commission hearings, Isang had declared to the Kgatla in Saulspoort that he "has laid claim to most of the immovable property and that it should be distributed among Linchwe's heirs of whom he is one that it should not devolve upon the tribe in accordance with Native custom." According to officials, Isang's remarks caused "a great deal of unrest and ill-feeling both in the Protectorate and in the Union."⁸ When the Commission met in Mochudi in 1935, they were obliged to distinguish between farm properties in South Africa acquired in the names of Linchwe, Ramono and Isang as private property and governed by the Union laws of inheritance, and those farms held *de jure* in trust for the Kgatla of Saulspoort Location.

In the course of the hearings, the commissioners determined the extent of Linchwe and Isang's Transvaal property holdings, among other inheritable assets of Linchwe's estate in the Protectorate, especially cattle. The findings of the Commission, which in general upheld Isang's individual property rights in South Africa, while mindful of customary law, raise interesting questions relative to official dealings with African land rights in the Transvaal.⁹

Beginning at the End: The Eclipse of Isang

Has it not been said that of all the causes for dispute among the Bechuana none have been so fruitful as those concerning women and cattle? In this case we have both the woman and the cattle, and it is because Isang insulted Molefi's mother that Molefi and he

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7. The Protectorate recently had been embroiled in putting down popular resistance among the Bakgatla baka Mmanana, BaKwena and BaTawana, among others.
 8. Botswana National Archives, Gaborone (hereafter BNA): DCM 2/7, Interview of D.L. Smit (Minister for Native Affairs, Pretoria) with R.O. Reilly (Assistant Resident Commissioner, British Protectorate) and T.A.C. Emmett (Additional Native Commissioner, Rustenburg), 21 December 1934.
 9. J. Bergh and H.M. Feinberg, "Trusteeship and Black Land Ownership in the Transvaal during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries", *Kleio: A Journal of Historical Studies from Africa*, 36, 2004, pp 170-193.


will never be reconciled; there is no remedy for this except the death of Isang ...¹⁰

Protectorate officers and the anthropologist in the Kgatla capital of Mochudi thought that the brouhaha over Linchwe's estate was rooted in conflict between Isang and Molefi's mother, Seingwaeng.¹¹ She and Kgabyana, Molefi's aunt, told them that after Molefi's father had died, Isang had been determined to kill off his nephew Molefi and wrest the chieftaincy. The first sign was Isang's rejection and demeaning of the widow, Seingwaeng.¹² The two women said that the ageing Linchwe had also feared Isang's ambitions and so denied him the *kgosi's* rain-making powers. They dreaded what Isang might do until Molefi reached his majority. Seingwaeng kept her son away from Isang, while her sister-in-law safeguarded Linchwe's rain secrets and paraphernalia.¹³ Then, after Molefi had finally been installed as *kgosi* in 1929, talk against Isang shifted. Little was heard anymore about Isang's medicines or murder plots. Clearly unafraid of Isang, Molefi went out of his way to insult him.

Molefi, now chief, fed the rumours that Isang had "eaten" his inheritance. The cattle, money and even pots and pans that Molefi claimed as his, had disappeared on Isang's watch, or so it was alleged. Also believed to have ended up unjustly in Isang's possession, were several farms across the border in Saulspoort Location. Matters were made all the worse by the fact that Linchwe had died intestate. Isang denied any wrongdoing, but he refused to account publicly for his father's estate amidst the accusations. For the first four years of Molefi's chieftaincy, the inheritance issue remained acrimonious and unresolved. Meanwhile, the chief's administration fell into critical disrepair. Young

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10. BNA: S. 402/15J, Ellenberger, "Memorandum on Bakgatla Affairs", 12 December 1934.
 11. See BNA: DCM 1/14, 1934 Diary and Reports of Jean Germond; and BNA: S. 305/19, Confidential file. Some of the issues dealt with in this paper have been addressed by this author in "Popular Unrest in the Kgatleng," in F. Morton and J. Ramsay (eds), *Birth of Botswana A History of the Bechuanaland Protectorate from 1910 to 1966* (Longmann, Gaborone, 1987), pp 82-91; and "The Politics of Cultural Conservatism in Colonial Botswana: Queen Seingwaeng's Zionist Campaign in the Bakgatla Reserve, 1937-1947", *Pula Botswana Journal of African Studies*, 12, 1 & 2 – issue 20, 1998, pp 22-43.
 12. The levirate was customary among the Kgatla, with any children resulting being reckoned in the deceased's line.
 13. I. Schapera, *Rainmaking Rites of Tswana Tribes* (Afrika-Studiecentrum, Leiden, 1971), p 2f.

DiKgosi of the Bakgatla бага Kgafela (Kgatlā)



Molefi launched his chiefly tenure with a robust drinking habit and a penchant for hobnobbing with other young men who had seen a bit of the world. He was a free-spender too, and apt to speed away from Mochudi in one of his cars, headed for South Africa. When in town, he routinely quarreled with Isang, whom he blamed for a host of his troubles. However, Molefi remained roundly popular in Mochudi. His neglect of duties came as a relief to many who had endured the last eight harsh, authoritarian years of Isang’s regency. Left alone, townsfolk were now free to do as they wished and had less to fret about during tax season. Molefi was a fair judge of cases when he showed up at court, and his brawling, drunkenness and unabashed milling with commoners made for hilarious stories worth endless retelling. Protectorate officials of course wanted Molefi to take his job seriously. Determined, as they saw it, to uphold chiefly office and promote “native administration” according to customary law, they nevertheless hesitated to intervene without public acquiescence.¹⁴ In mid-1934, the first resident junior official was posted to Mochudi,¹⁵ at which point Kgatlā public opinion began to be measured surreptitiously and at *kgotla* meetings. Officials and social anthropologist, Isaac Schapera, were particularly interested in accounts of witchcraft told to them by Molefi’s womenfolk, and Molefi harped on the inheritance issue when officials were within earshot.

The Protectorate became convinced that what they were dealing with, was a clash of tribal ambitions, old wounds and witchcraft. Public opinion against Isang was so overwhelming, that officials and other Protectorate chiefs brought in to adjudicate the matter, ended up censuring the ex-regent. Isang was fined and banished from the capital. Isang’s absence however did nothing to address Linchwe’s inheritance, or to reduce Molefi’s excesses, and officials thus decided to insert themselves directly into Kgatlā affairs by proclaiming their role as

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14. Recently, the Protectorate had had its hands full with public outcries over its removal of chiefs Sebele II, Tshekedi Khama and Gobuamang.
 15. Assistant Resident Magistrate Sydney V. Lawrenson.

arbiters. In 1935 they appointed a Commission of Enquiry into Linchwe's estate. The commissioners were charged with determining the extent of Linchwe's property and apportion Molefi's inheritance, thereby reducing (if not eliminating) the conflict between Molefi and Isang, and somehow strengthening Molefi's commitment to chieftaincy and the tribal ethos.

In early May 1935 two commissioners (Jules Ellenberger and Howard Rogers¹⁶) held several days of public hearings in Mochudi, where they recorded the testimonies of Kgatla living in the Bakgatla Reserve and of those who had travelled over from Saulspoort Location.¹⁷ Several weeks later, Ellenberger and Rogers submitted their report and recommendations.¹⁸ The commissioners made their ruling "according to Native Law and Custom", following a review of all testimonies and documentary evidence. They determined that Isang had safeguarded Molefi's entire inheritance and was able to provide a detailed and thorough account of all cattle, personal effects, buildings, leases, farms, and cash handed to his care by Linchwe for distribution after his death. Ellenberger and Rogers determined that, in all matters of the estate, the "only person who could give a coherent account ... was Isang himself".¹⁹ Molefi and Isang accepted the commissioners' allocation without dispute.

Applying "Native Law and Custom" did little to end the conflict between Isang and Molefi, or to kindle a sense of tribal duty in the chief. A new phase of uncle-nephew recrimination soon began, and Molefi's public behaviour ascended to the bizarre. He tangled with schoolteachers, commandeered the Dutch Reformed Church (charging admission to watch girlie movies there at night), and turned his regimental buddies loose on the town for two days of rowdyism and mayhem. In 1937, the Protectorate dethroned and exiled him from the Reserve. In their determined pursuit of tribal order, officials installed Mmusi, Molefi's indifferent younger brother, and propped him up with elders.

16. Ellenberger (Resident Commissioner, 1923-1927, retired) represented the Protectorate government, and Rogers (Senior Native Commissioner, Pretoria), the Union government.

17. BNA: S. 343/19-27, Linchwe Estate files.

18. BNA: S. 343/25, "Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Estate of the Late Chief Linchwe Pilane," 28 May 1935.

19. BNA: S. 343/25, "Report of the Commissioners Appointed to Enquire into the Estate of the Late Chief Linchwe Pilane," 28 May 1935.

As much as the Protectorate might have liked, neither Isang, nor Molefi, nor even Mmusi worried about preserving the “tribe” as much as transforming, dissembling, or just ignoring it. By the 1930s, the chieftaincy and the Bakgatla Reserve for that matter were largely irrelevant. Tribal coherence fit the ideal of British rule, but not the Kgatla’s idea of advancement, be it personal or corporate. While regent, Isang had tried a host of wealth-generating initiatives for the Kgatla as a whole, but few of his subjects were interested in it. They grew weary of compulsory cooperatives, community development projects, and civic undertakings, and they increasingly resisted Isang’s attempts to get them to comply with these initiatives. He chalked it up to ignorance and to what he called “laziness”:

This laziness has been encouraged by the suggestion that no man should be employed for nothing and that some payment should be made for whatever he does ... We who have had some education can draw the line between compulsory labour and labour which is for one’s own good. But in so far as commoners are concerned they cannot draw the distinction between enforced labour and labour which is beneficial to one’s self.²⁰

They preferred to be left to their own individual devices.

Isang met with greater success when some men of his own generation followed him in creating groups and syndicates that pooled their investments in land, grazing, breeding, water development and irrigation, mechanized and fertilized vegetable and grain farming, marketing, as well as cattle-smuggling, in order to increase their individual wealth.²¹ The other Kgatla, who had been raised in the twentieth century and made up Molefi’s generation, thought that being with the times meant generating cash from jobs available on white-owned farms or above ground in Johannesburg. Like Molefi, they thought their future depended on bringing wealth in from outside as cash in their pockets, not in creating wealth where they lived. From their point of view, the compulsory community projects of Isang’s regency were a form of unpaid labour that created no paying jobs in their wake. The growing wealth of Isang and his syndicate members was proof that Isang and his like were living off the backs of others through coercion, extortion, or medicine. They were convinced that Isang had “eaten” Molefi’s

20. BNA: African Advisory Council Minutes, nineteenth session (28 February 1938 to 7 March 1938), p 18.

21. Morton and Ramsay (eds), *Birth of Botswana*, pp 23-29; P. Peters, *Dividing the Commons Politics, Policy and Culture in Botswana* (University Press of Virginia, Charlottesville, 1994), pp 51-59.

inheritance as well. Theirs was a sum-zero notion of who had and who did not have. Molefi's refusal to submit to Isang and his uncles, while ignoring the Protectorate's wishes to be a good chief and listening to his own drummer, spoke to their hearts.

However, Molefi and Protectorate officials had similar, static mindsets. Both parties needed the tribal system. In spite of his lack of interest in chieftaincy, Molefi needed the chief's salary and tax commission to sustain his lifestyle, having little education or flare for generating independent income. He tried at times to escape the chieftaincy with money-making schemes that were based on sudden inspirations and thoughts of quick returns. All failed. Similarly, officials needed even disinterested chiefs such as Molefi to run their administrations and afford the cost of the Protectorate through tax collection. Their willingness to abide Molefi for years and to uphold "customary law" in his interest, was intended to sustain a system that suited their purposes.²²

Meanwhile, Isang and his followers were discarding a "tribal", and developing a corporate *modus operandi*. As entrepreneurs, they could increase their wealth and control over their lives, even while remaining subjects of Molefi (or Mmusi) and Protectorate "native administration." Though he knew how to get around the law, such as when smuggling cattle into the Union, Isang was openly deferential to white officials, accommodating his behaviour to, rather than challenging their tribal mentality.²³ He accepted their punishments over his conflict with Molefi without protest, but Isang and his like could not conceal their disgust for Molefi and his profligate minions, who in their view had no vision save self-indulgence and escape from obligation. Isang's group was self-disciplined, abstemious and tight with money. "Free spirits" like Molefi and his younger group, were mere consumers dependent on wages, loans or sinecures.

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22. Resident Commissioner Charles Rey (1930-1937) emphasised development, but without permitting private property, which Isang noted and opposed. Peters, *Dividing the Commons*, p 63.
 23. For an account of how the Kgatla created a tribal identity to gain concessions from the British after 1885 when the Protectorate was declared, see F. Morton, "Land, Cattle and Ethnicity: Creating Linchwe's BaKgatla, 1875-1920," *South African Historical Journal*, 33, November 1995, pp 131-154.

The Kgatla Farms of the Transvaal

Isang's corporate approach was learnt from his father, who with Isang's uncle Ramono, established the joint administration of the Kgatla in the Protectorate and the Union after the Anglo-Boer War.²⁴ The thinly-staffed Protectorate permitted Linchwe almost unrestricted self-government in the Bakgatla Reserve, where he was content to maintain his headquarters. It however was crowded with people and cattle, and the Reserve and the Protectorate were bereft of opportunities for either development or investment. Blocks of private farms along watercourses existed at both ends of the Reserve, but the Protectorate restricted their ownership to whites. Across the border in South Africa where the rest of the Kgatla lived, however, the picture was much more promising. Although subject to legal segregation and the colour bar, "natives" were permitted to purchase or lease certain farms that became available after the Anglo-Boer War. Between 1903 and Ramono's death in 1917, Linchwe and Ramono purchased fifteen farms in the Rustenburg district (the portion later known as Pilanesberg). After Ramono's death, when Linchwe gradually retired from public life due to failing health and Isang assumed authority, more property was added. Before he stepped down as regent in 1929, Isang had purchased another nine farms and set in motion the purchase of two more, respectively acquired in 1931 and 1933. Altogether, the three men acquired twenty-six farms, and they leased an as-yet-undetermined number of farms along the Oodi (Crocodile) and Madikwe (Marico) Rivers for their cattle-posts.

It is worth recalling that, when the Anglo-Boer War ended in 1902, Kgatla in South Africa were living on white farms, apart from the four farms they owned and that were held in trust by the Native Commissioner. Thirty years later, at the end of Isang's reign, all but a few Kgatla lived in one of the twenty-two villages located on their own properties. The combined territory used or occupied by the Kgatla, comprised 61 000 morgen, or 200 square miles. This was a staggering achievement!

While they helped the South African Kgatla to establish themselves, Linchwe, his brother and his son bought farms for themselves and their families too. Of the twenty-four Location farms, eleven farms

24. For an outline of this process, see R.F. Morton, "Chiefs and Ethnic Unity in Two Colonial Worlds: The Bakgatla Kgafela of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and the Transvaal, 1872-1966", in A.I. Asiwaju (ed), *Partitioned Africans Ethnic Relations Across Africa's International Boundaries, 1884-1984* (C. Hurst, London, 1985), especially pp 135-137.

or portions thereof were the personal property of Linchwe, Ramono, Ofentse and Isang.²⁵ Three were Linchwe's (Witfontein 396, Middelkuil 8 and Cyferkuil 330), two Ramono's (portions of Koedoesfontein 42 and Doornpoort 57), one Ofentse's (Welgewaagd 133 – portion B), and five Isang's (Vogelstruiskraal 400, Application 398, Nooitgedacht 406, Zwartklip 405 and Varkensvlei 403– portion B). Altogether, these five chiefs owned 16 520 morgen or 54,6 square miles of land.²⁶ Also Linchwe, Ramono and Isang contributed substantial sums towards the purchase of farms owned by the Kgatla in their own right (and in trust with the Minister for Native Affairs), judging from the scattered record.

The chiefs' and Kgatla-owned farms formed what was, after the Land Act of 1913, known as Saulspoort Location. They enabled the Kgatla to establish large villages, build dams and irrigation works, develop agriculture and sustain large cattle-holdings. The Location farms were semi-arid and too short of surface water, particularly in drought years, to be able to support their populations entirely, but villages were close to roads connected by bus to Rustenburg and the Witwatersrand, where work above ground was readily available. Saulspoort Location became more prosperous than the Reserve in the Protectorate, more capable of supporting its population, and less dependent on white employment. As of 1949, the Location and the Reserve each supported around 20 000 people, although the Location, by then nearly reaching its maximum extent, was one-tenth the size of the Reserve.²⁷ A 1949 survey of the Rustenburg and Pilanesberg districts also revealed that

... labour migration seems to take place on a smaller scale [among the Saulspoort Kgatla] than among other tribes. While work in towns is preferred, a few men work on the Thabazimbi mine and on the Witwatersrand, and very few on farms in the Brits district. A number of people produce enough to have a surplus of maize

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25. Privately-owned land by Africans was legal after 1904.
 26. In 1935 the South African Government overruled the Linchwe Estate Commission's recognition of the farm Application 398 as Isang's personal property. Though Isang had purchased it with his own money, the South African government declared it legally only tribal land, because it had been Crown land when Isang purchased it and therefore entitled only for tribal ownership, in trust with the Minister of Native Affairs. Isang was not reimbursed.
 27. Breutz, *The Tribes of the Rustenburg and Pilanesberg Districts*, p 247; Bechuanaland Protectorate, *Bechuanaland Protectorate Government Census, 1946* (No publisher, place or date), p 4 – table II(c) and p 7 – table II(f).

and sorghum for sale, while others obtain the cash they need by selling cattle.²⁸

About 40 per cent of Kgatla men in the Reserve worked in South Africa, and about 50 per cent of the “working population [of the Location] appear to live in towns for periods.”²⁹ Though the percentage of wage-earners in the Reserve and Location were about equal, once the nature of work contracts, the distance between home and work, and the cost and strain on families are compared, it becomes clear that Location residents were much less beleaguered than their Reserve counterparts. In terms of cattle-holdings, Location residents owned much fewer cattle than those in the Reserve – 10 000 head versus 75 000 to be precise, but with the 1924 weight restrictions, cattle in the Reserve were effectively cut off from South African markets.³⁰ Most strikingly, however, the Location easily outperformed the Reserve in agricultural commodities, as the following comparison illustrates:

	<u>Reserve</u>	<u>Location</u>
Maize (bags)	230	1 513
Sorghum (bags)	1 097	6 236
Beans (bags)	371	68
Millet (bags)	795	---
Orange trees	---	79
Fruit trees	---	285

The advantage from gaining access to property in the Transvaal was even greater with regard to cattle. Soon after the Anglo-Boer War, the BaKgatla moved large herds into the Transvaal. By 1905 they had established at least 25 cattle-posts on white-owned farms, leased along the Oodi and Madikwe Rivers. Others were found. By 1910, the

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28. Breutz, *The Tribes of the Rustenburg and Pilanesberg Districts*, p 284.
29. Breutz, *The Tribes of the Rustenburg and Pilanesberg Districts*, p 247; I. Schapera, “Economic Conditions in a Bechuanaland Protectorate Reserve”, *South African Journal of Science*, 30, October 1933, p 652. Schapera made no estimate of women migrant labourers, but oral evidence collected in 1982 makes it clear that many young girls in the Bakgatla Reserve walked across the border to obtain jobs on farms and in towns. See the interviews of Leah Moagi and Motlapele Molefi in R.F. Morton (ed), “Interview Notes on Bakgatla History”, Department of History, University College, Botswana, February 1982.
30. S.J. Ettinger, “South Africa’s Weight Restrictions on Cattle Exports from Bechuanaland, 1924-1941”, *Botswana Notes and Records*, 4, 1972, pp 21-29; Breutz, *The Tribes of the Rustenburg and Pilanesberg Districts*, p 280; *Bechuanaland Government Census, 1946*, p 66.

Transvaal Native Affairs Department stated that “the herds of cattle owned by the Bakgatla are immense”.³¹ The Union government attempted to lure white farmers into the dry area north of the Kgetleng (Elands) River by sinking boreholes, but many owners appear simply to have leased them to the Kgatla.³² The irony was sweeter still for the Kgatla, whose herds were replete with the progeny of beasts they had rustled from unprotected Transvaal farms during the Anglo-Boer War.³³

As with acquiring land, so the lead was taken by Linchwe with enlarging cattle-holdings. Many of the initial posts along the Oodi and Madikwe were his.³⁴ Ramono, whose role in Saulspoort Location was representing Linchwe in Kgatla affairs and maintaining agreeable relations with Pretoria, was not permitted to be a cattleman. His estate revealed slightly more than a hundred head. As Linchwe explained, “Ramono’s cattle were not his own property, but belonged to various people”.³⁵ After Linchwe handed all his chiefly responsibilities to Isang, attempts were made to purchase farms strictly for grazing. In 1921 alone, Isang applied to buy twelve farms for this purpose.³⁶

Coincidentally, but perhaps not, seven of the fourteen farms acquired between 1908 and 1919 in the Rustenburg district, proved of interest to prospectors. In 1922, soon after Isang assumed authority from his father, the Saulspoort Bakgatla passed a resolution granting prospecting rights on these seven farms to Potgietersrust Platinum, and in

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31. State Library, Pretoria: Transvaal Native Affairs Department, Annual Report, June 1910.
 32. Union of South Africa, *Report of the Natives Land Commission II* (Government Printers, Cape Town, 1916), pp 305, 327-328; Union of South Africa, *Report of the Natives Land Committee, Western Transvaal* (Government Printers, Cape Town, 1918), pp 8, 20, 22, 48, 57.
 33. R.F. Morton, “Linchwe I and the Kgatla Campaign in the South African War, 1899-1902”, *Journal of African History*, 26, 1985, pp 169-191.
 34. Transvaal Archives (hereafter TA), National Archives Repository, Pretoria: Linchwe – R. Williams, 30 January 1904, and LTG 124, 110/38 “Native Cattle Posts on the Crocodile River”, 26 August 1905, p 41.
 35. South African Archives (hereafter SAA), National Archives Repository, Pretoria: NTS 61/55, volume 333, part I, H. Williams – Acting Government Secretary, 20 October 1917 and Inventory of the Late Chief Ramono Kgamanyane Pilane, 29 October 1917.
 36. Tussenkomst 448; Turfbult 989; Gomkiri 982; De Kameelkuil 813; Elandskuil 814; Mosqietdoorens 981; Zwartklip 988; Pieterse (?) 106; Vaaldraai (?) 202; Haakdornbult (?) 302; Bethanie 190; Donald 93. SAA: NTS B98/308, volume 3454, E.R. Osborne – Secretary for Lands, 24 February 1921, and Magistrate of Rustenburg – Secretary for Native Affairs, 23 February 1921. Because they did not adjoin the Location, Isang’s request was denied.

the next several years Isang purchased two more as his personal farms (Zwartklip 405 and Nooitgedacht 406) where platinum was later discovered.³⁷ Garnering prospecting rights had been well understood since the 1880s, when Linchwe had negotiated several contracts applicable to the Bakgatla Reserve with Benjamin Weil. At that time, however, the purpose had been to keep large mining companies *out* of the Reserve, not to bring them in.³⁸ The consequences were likely to be transfer of authority over the territory where minerals were discovered from the Protectorate to the respective mining company.³⁹ In contrast, the purchase of title deeds to farms in South Africa placed Linchwe and Isang in a position to arrange for prospecting rights or leasing farm portions to mining companies for substantial fees, without risking loss of the whole. For the five farms involved in the prospecting contract of 1927, Isang received £625 per year on behalf of the Saulspoort Bakgatla.

Isang, Private Property and Incorporation

Linchwe and the Bakgatla generally understood Roman-Dutch law as it applied to inheritance of “natives” married “in community of property” according to Christian rite. Linchwe converted to Christianity in 1892 and divorced his wives except for Isang’s mother, who also converted. Isang’s mother and father did not re-marry in church though. To do so would have risked a major split among Linchwe’s commoners, who shied away from the Dutch Reformed Church and feared that Linchwe’s conversion, if coupled with Christian marriage, would divert his attention and resources away from their welfare. They preferred that his wealth and inheritance should remain subject to customary law, so as to keep it accessible to them and their future leader. As a result, Linchwe never resolved the conflict between his measured steps to accommodate himself and close followers to the new economic order on one hand, and on the other, the resistance to Christianity and the colonial order as felt by large numbers of his subjects. The consequence, therefore, was that he died

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37. SAA: NTS 293, 162, volume 1170, Cranko and Schaffer – Secretary of Native Affairs, 12 September 1929; Resolution by Ofentse Pilane and others, 25 May 1922; NTS 6853, 55/319, part I, Agreement between Bakhatla tribe and Potgietersrust Platinum signed by Isang, 27 July 1927. Also A. Manson and B. Mbenga, “‘The Richest Tribe in Africa’: Platinum-Mining and the Bafokeng in South Africa’s North West Province, 1965-1999”, *Journal of Southern African Studies*, 29, 1, March 2003, p 27.
 38. F. Morton, “Threat from the South: Cape Colonialism and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, 1885-1895”. Unpublished paper presented at the Rhodes Centenary Conference, St. Anthony’s College, Oxford, November 2002.
 39. Rhodes’ British South Africa Company and the Tati Mining Company had been given such authority in the Protectorate.

intestate, leaving the issue of distributing his wealth and inheritance to the elders who survived him.

Ramono, Linchwe's brother, though with much less wealth and authority to worry about than his older brother, elected to marry according to the Christian rite and leave a will detailing the inheritance for his wife and children. His was a model later adopted by Isang, and revealingly, when Ramono died as chief in Saulspoort in 1917, Linchwe sent Isang to serve as executor of Ramono's estate.⁴⁰ Ramono had two families, the children by his first Christian wife, Mantlho, who predeceased him, and his wife Martha, whom he married in 1904 in Rustenburg, and their three children. All surviving dependents were provided for in his will, which was administered under Sections 70 and 71 of Proclamation 28 of 1902.⁴¹ Ramono's private shares in two farms (Koedoesfontein 42 and Doornpoort 57) were passed on to his wife and descendants, including a portion of Doornpoort 57 which went to his daughter by his first marriage, Matlhodi, who was Isang's wife.

Though Isang's farms in South Africa remained his (except for Application⁴²), his property in the Reserve was largely that of cattle, and few of those. His major assets (including cattle) had been relocated to the Union, where, by 1938, he had declared himself to be a permanent resident.⁴³ It is likely that these moves show that Isang expected the Protectorate to be incorporated into South Africa, a long-standing issue of concern among all Batswana in the Protectorate, and one that came to the surface after Macdonald became Prime Minister in 1937. In Isang's view, preparing for transfer made more sense than opposing it. Such appears to have been the case when Isang addressed the African Advisory Council in early 1938:

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40. SAA: NTS 61/55, volume 333, part I, Griffiths – Secretary for Native Affairs, 11 February 1917.
 41. SAA: NTS 61/55, volume 333, part I, Griffiths – Secretary for Native Affairs, 29 August 1917.
 42. Application 398 was regarded by the 1935 Commission as Isang's property, because he had paid for it, though he had registered it in the name of the Kgatla for convenience at the time (1925), but the Union ruled that the farm had been Crown land before sale, and therefore could only be registered with the Minister of Native Affairs in trust for the tribe, in this case, the Kgatla followers of Isang living on the farm, and not by an individual. BNA: S. 343/27, D.L. Smit (Secretary for Native Affairs) – Administrative Secretary to the High Commissioner, Pretoria, 12 July 1935. Isang was not reimbursed.
 43. BNA: African Advisory Council Minutes, nineteenth session (28 February 1938 to 7 March 1938), p 49.

Our minds are not quite at rest with the term "Reserve". If you look at the Proclamation, No. 1 of 1896, you will observe there that Montsioa's [BaRolong] lands were called "territories". Similarly the Bamalete country is described as "territory". All these areas were originally termed "territories" and what is running through our minds all along is that the Act of Union has not been changed. It remains as it was, and as Your Honour said in your opening speech the question of the Protectorate is a burning question in the newspapers as well as overseas. Therefore the description "Reserve" produces some apprehension in our minds as we know what it means in the Union, and the word annoys us. We want the Union to understand that our lands are called "tribal territories" and not "Reserves".⁴⁴

Of importance here is that a reserve (such as Bakgatla Reserve) that became a tribal territory could consist of and grow to include properties purchased and titled.⁴⁵ Incorporation under such circumstances would have availed the Protectorate Kgatla of the opportunity to purchase farms along the standing border with the Union, where for decades they had located their cattle, as well as gain access to the Union cattle-markets for their substantial herds in the Reserve.

For several years, Isang had been the only one among Protectorate leaders to favour incorporation. In 1934, Mochudi-based Reverend J. Reyneke, with whom Isang was on friendly terms, had advised Isang and several others that "it was possible for the Union to strangle [the Protectorate] into submission if they wanted to be unfriendly and that ... beforehand ... the natives should see to it that they had title to their Reserves."⁴⁶ Several months later, in Mafeking, Isang and prominent Rolong S.M. Molema convened a meeting for the Protectorate chiefs and their counsellors who were visiting the Resident Commissioner, to press the issue of incorporation.⁴⁷ Protectorate officials were not informed about it, but soon found out from Molefi, who attended.

Isang's pro-incorporation views angered other Protectorate chiefs (who had been opposed to incorporation for years) and Protectorate officials, who in the 1930s became outspoken opponents of transferring the Protectorate to the Union. As Gaborone's Resident Magistrate,

44. BNA: African Advisory Council Minutes, nineteenth session (28 February 1938 to 7 March 1938), p 100.

45. The Lete and Rolong territories included farms of which the titles had been purchased from white farmers.

46. BNA: S. 336/17, Reyneke – C.F. Rey, Resident Commissioner, 14 May 1934.

47. S.M. Molema, "Bechuanaland Chiefs, Incorporation and B.P. Administration", draft article. BNA: S. 337/7, *Cape Argus*, 16 April 1935.

Vivian Ellenberger remarked, “we have danced to the tune set by the Union Government far too long.”⁴⁸ Ellenberger, son of 1935 Linchwe estate commissioner Jules Ellenberger, belonged to a Protectorate civil service made up of many English South Africans who championed the Protectorate during the Hertzog years. From their perspective, Isang “is a man to be watched.”⁴⁹ British officials in South Africa together with the High Commissioner kept Protectorate officials aware of Isang’s contact with Afrikaner officials, particularly Piet Grobler, Minister of Native Affairs. On one hand they feared Isang as “a man of influence both in the Protectorate and in the Union. He has influential European friends here and in the Transvaal, and one cannot stress too strongly the danger of his raising a ‘hornets’ nest.”⁵⁰ High Commissioner Herbert Stanley was persuaded that Isang “would seek legal advice ... and might endeavour to stir up an agitation against the Protectorate Administration in the Union Press.”⁵¹ On the other hand, they were convinced that Isang was a puppet in the hands of Hertzog’s administration. The Union Secretary for Native Affairs, D.L. Smit, let Protectorate Resident Commissioner, Charles F. Rey, know through High Commissioner H.J. Stanley that:

Grobler was very anxious that Isang should be put in as chief [in the event of Molefi’s removal]. The Groblers had for long been on friendly terms with Isang and his family ... it throws an interesting sidelight on Isang’s activities a little time ago when he gave the impression that the Bechuana (or some of them) had changed their former views on the subject of transfer to the Union. For ways that are dark and for tricks that are vain some of our Transvaal friends are as peculiar as Bret Harte’s Heathen Chinese.⁵²

“If Grobler wishes to use Isang,” wrote Stanley, “and if Isang is willing to be used as an agent of pro-transfer propaganda among the natives, that would be for me an added reason for keeping him out of the succession [sic] to the chieftainship.”⁵³

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48. BNA: S. 336/17, Ellenberger – C.F. Rey, Resident Commissioner, 5 May 1934.
 49. BNA: S. 402/5, R.O’M. Reilly – Rey, 4 September 1934.
 50. BNA: DCM 1/14, J.D.A. Germond – V. Ellenberger, Resident Magistrate of Gaborone, 10 September 1943.
 51. BNA: S. 402/10, H.J. Stanley, High Commissioner – J.H. Thomas, Dominions Office, 28 November 1934.
 52. BNA: S. 402/10, H.J. Stanley, High Commissioner – Sir E. Harding, Dominions Office, 29 August 1934.
 53. BNA: S. 402/6, Stanley – Harding, 9 October 1934.

Conclusion

The official animus against Isang perhaps was symptomatic of a paternalist temperament favouring tribal preservation over individual advancement. In their recent study of African land held in trust by the Transvaal Department of Native Affairs, Bergh and Feinberg have argued that the trust system and the officials responsible for it, “time and again ... defended the interests of Africans.”

The Department offered a variety of services to Africans, such as the evaluation of agreements like deeds of sale; the terms of mortgage agreements and mineral leases; assistance against unscrupulous whites; and help in finding good legal representation. Department officials looked out for the interests of Africans by scrutinizing contracts and evaluating interest rates, lease payments, and purchase prices.⁵⁴

Bergh and Feinberg offer as evidence the farms acquired in trust by the BaFokeng and detail the collaboration between their leaders and representatives of Native Affairs in defence of Fokeng rights particularly when negotiating mining concessions, but concluding more broadly that “African traditional leaders [in the Transvaal], such as August Mokgatle, accepted the trusteeship system for a number of reasons.”⁵⁵ While there is no reason to challenge this overall conclusion, Isang’s experience provides grounds to probe the official motivation and dynamics of the trustee process. What Isang (and his father) represent, at least insofar as private property is concerned, is the attempt to circumvent the trustee system and take control of property in its own right. Trusteeship, after all, was not a means for Africans to acquire property in the legal sense, but an entitlement to communal settlement in perpetuity. Under the trustee system, the farms affected were not for sale and thus served purposes other than investment. The 1905 Tsewu case notwithstanding, few Africans found it possible to acquire land in their own right, with the freedom to dispose of the property if need be.

Isang’s career, if we may reduce it to a line or two for our convenience, was devoted energetically and assiduously to maximizing both his and the Kgatla’s resources for the purpose of generating wealth for himself and those who would accept his lead. His imagination and understanding of the complex circumstances bearing on this objective were unparalleled. They were also understood by the British officials in

54. Bergh and Feinberg, “Trusteeship and Black Land Ownership”, p 191.

55. Bergh and Feinberg, “Trusteeship and Black Land Ownership”, p 189.

the Protectorate and Union who, more often than not, stood in his way. Begrudgingly, he was regarded, as “one of the wealthiest natives in the Union.”⁵⁶ It would however seem that the British plan of stewardship was built on a communal principle and afforded no scope to Africans wanting to develop individually or corporately as entrepreneurs. Whether in the Protectorate or the Union, the colour bar, after all, drew the obvious lines separating Africans from commerce, trade, shopkeeping, and a host of other paths to wealth accretion. The exception was private land ownership, available to Isang only in the Union, which he made repeated efforts to acquire.

It would be a mistake to characterise Isang as a budding capitalist, an emulator of a Western model. We must remind ourselves that Isang was foremost an historian and chronicler of his African heritage, more knowledgeable than any other on Kgatla customary law, language and oral history, as well as an arch opponent of segregation, which as a young man he had openly spoken against in a white public forum in the Union.⁵⁷ Isang was a master of detail, be it the individual identities of the thousands of cattle he owned or husbanded for his nephew, or the thousands of people he governed, knowing each by their names, their wards, and their extended family relationships. He had a prodigious mind. His large capacities also included violence, intrigue and vindictiveness. British officials distrusted him, particularly when he was in touch with his many Afrikaner acquaintances, including Rustenburg lawyers and high-ranking officials in Pretoria. Such relationships stemmed from a decades-old pattern of interaction between the Kgatla and Rustenburg Afrikaners, from Paul Kruger to Piet Grobler, and from the Kgatla’s deep familiarity with the Transvaal’s social and political landscape. It would be a mistake too, to assume that Isang regarded such ties as built on subservience. Perhaps at times etiquette involved deference, but if Isang saw himself as a client of the Transvaal Boers, it becomes difficult indeed to explain why in 1912, when 28, Isang threatened to shoot an Afrikaner policeman who tried to arrest him for

56. SAA: NTS B190/162, volume 1161, I.P. O’Driscoll, Assistant Native Commissioner, Pilansberg – Additional Native Commissioner, Rustenburg, 5 April 1940.

57. “...it is only those nations still in barbarism,” Isang stated in 1917 before the Natives Land Committee in Rustenburg, “which can live under segregation policy.” For the full speech, see *Report of the Natives Land Committee, Western Transvaal* (State Printers, Cape Town, 1918), p 47.

poaching inside the Union near the Protectorate-Union border, and was acquitted of all charges.⁵⁸

Postscript

After Isang had died on 22 January 1941, his widow Matlhodi D. Pilane purchased the Transvaal farm Spitskop 168 (new number 244)⁵⁹ for her twins' inheritance. Like Isang, Matlhodi believed that land remained Africans' only true option for securing one's future, and she shared his disdain for the urban lifestyle that in her mind had pulled down Molefi's generation. She believed the value of the farm she wanted to bequeath, with its excellent grazing, borehole and fencing, to be far greater than the £1 434 she put down for its purchase. Matlhodi argued that if the money were to be drawn by her children

... when they become of age they would probably buy themselves motor cars and in consequence would visit Johannesburg frequently and might be faced with the danger of forming friendships which would not be beneficial for their character and welfare. They might waste their money, for industrial and commercial investments are closed to natives in the Union. They could only invest their money profitably and usefully in the purchase of cattle, but it would not be any good for them to acquire cattle in large numbers, for they would not have the necessary grazing for them.

A native's wealth consists in possessing ground and cattle and outside these channels there are no fields of investment for them.⁶⁰

Matlhodi purchased two half shares from what appears to have been two childless sisters—from the widow Mathilda Sara Shaplanse, the other from Esperance Elisa Willemburg, wife of Robert Willemburg, and married out of community of property.⁶¹ Thus, the sisters sold their inheritance to a woman with the inheritance of her children in mind.

58. Public Record Office, Kew Gardens: CO 417/511, G.M.J. van Dam, District Commissioner, Rustenburg – Secretary, Transvaal Police, Pretoria, 23 April 1912; BNA: S. 44/1, Telegrams: Resident Commissioner – “Blastove”, Resident Magistrate, Gaborones, 29 April 1912 and 10 June 1912.

59. Not to be confused with Spitskop 298 (410), purchased by the Kgatla in 1919.
60. TA: MHG 2243/41, Mathodi D. Pilane – Master of the Supreme Court, 1 May 1942.

61. TA: MHG 2243/41, Mathodi D. Pilane – Master of the Supreme Court, 1 May 1942, deed of sale attached.

Abstract

During the first four decades of the twentieth century, extensive farm purchases in the Rustenburg district of the Union of South Africa formed part of a complex, cross-border effort led from Mochudi in the Bechuanaland Protectorate by *kgosi* Linchwe Pilane and his son, the regent Isang, for the purpose of creating wealth free of the regional contract labour system. Their *modus operandi* was adapted from a successful nineteenth-century system for rustling cattle and securing good grazing. After the Anglo-Boer War, Linchwe and Isang's followers became investors in technology, property, water and veterinary development, as well as promoters of large-scale community development projects, cooperatives, and Western education.

The Saulspoort Location, remarkable for its size, arose from Isang's vision of linking property ownership to community advancement as a form of capital investment. The Transvaal offered more opportunities for wealth accretion than the Protectorate and the Saulspoort Location became more productive agriculturally than the Bakgatla Reserve in the Protectorate and more effective in ameliorating the colour bar.

Ultimately Isang's influence was undercut by administrators and young Kgatla in the Protectorate. Whereas Isang's methods were significant adaptations to the new regional political economy, Isang's successor in Mochudi, Molefi, and the officials who backed him, clung to the tribal system based on chieftaincy and labour migration. Molefi, without aspirations for his subjects, needed the chief's salary and tax commission to sustain his lifestyle. Similarly, officials needed even indifferent chiefs such as Molefi to run their administrations and afford the cost of the Protectorate through tax collection, at the expense of development.

Opsomming

Beeste, Grond en Entrepreneurskap: Die Totstandkoming van Saulspoort-lokasie na die Anglo-Boereoorlog

In die eerste vier dekades van die twintigste eeu, het uitgebreide aankope van plase in die Rustenburg-distrik van die Unie van Suid-Afrika deel uitgemaak van 'n ingewikkelde, oorgrens poging wat vanuit Mochudi in die Bechuanalandse Protektoraat deur *kgosi* Linchwe Pilane en sy seun, die bewindhebber Isang, aangewend is om welvaart te skep wat

onafhanklik van die streek se kontrakarbeidsstelsel sou wees. Hulle *modus operandi* was 'n aanpassing van die suksesvolle negentiende-eeuse stelsels van veediefstal en die vind van goeie weiding. Na afloop van die Anglo-Boereoorlog, het Linchwe en Isang se onderdane beleggers in tegnologie, eiendom, water en veteriniere ontwikkeling geword, asook voorstanders van grootskaalse gemeenskapsontwikkelingsprojekte, koöperasies en Westerse opvoeding.

Die merkwaardige groot Saulspoort-locasie het uit Isang se visie ontstaan. Dit het naamlik behels dat grondeienaarskap as 'n tipe kapitaalbelegging aan gemeenskapsvooruitgang gekoppel is. Die Transvaal het meer geleenthede vir die verkryging van welvaart as die Protektoraat gebied. Mettertyd het Saulspoort-locasie op landbougebied meer produktief as die Bakgatla Reserwaat in die Protektoraat geword, asook meer effektief in die versagting van die kleurskeidslyn.

Uiteindelik is Isang se invloed deur die amptenare en die jong Kgatla in die Protektoraat ondergrawe. Waar Isang se metodes betekenisvolle aanpassings tot die nuwe politieke ekonomie van die streek was, het Isang se opvolger in Mochudi, naamlik Molefi, en die amptenary wat hom (Molefi) ondersteun het, aan die stamstelsel wat op kapteinskap en arbeidsmigrasie gegrond was, bly vaskleef. Molefi was sonder ambisie vir sy onderdane en het bloot die kapteinskap se salaris en belastingkommissie benodig om sy lewensstyl te handhaaf. Insgelyks het die amptenary selfs onverskillige kapteins soos Molefi nodig gehad ten einde hulle administrasie te kon beheer en die koste van die Protektoraat deur belastinginvordering, ten koste van ontwikkeling, te kon bekostig.

Key words

Bakgatla Reserve; community of property; incorporation; Isang Pilane; Linchwe Estate Commission (1935); Linchwe Pilane; Molefi Pilane; Pilansberg district; Saulspoort Location; trusteeship.

Sleutelwoorde

Bakgatla-reserwaat; gemeenskap van goedere; inkorporasie; Isang Pilane; kuratorskap; Linchwe Estate Commission (1935); Linchwe Pilane; Molefi Pilane; Pilansberg distrik; Saulspoort-locasie.